

DISCUSSIONS: EVANGELICAL AND THEOLOGICAL

Robert L. Dabney

Volume 1

PREFACE.

THE publication of these selected discussions from the writings of Dr. Dabney was projected upon the following plan: The whole number of volumes will be four. Three of these, classified as "Discussions Theological and Evangelical," "Discussions Ecclesiastical," and "Discussions on Philosophy Relating to Christianity," will be issued under the imprimatur of the church, and for which the church will stand responsible in the sense in which it is responsible for other publications issued under its auspices. The church does not make itself responsible in any such writings for every particular error which may be expected in the works of fallible men; its responsibility is limited to those statements which are in accord with the recognized creed of the church. So far as any statement of doctrine or theory of philosophy or inference in either sphere of theology or metaphysics is not in such accord, it is to be credited to the writer alone. The fourth volume of the series, "Discussions Secular," will be issued uniform with the other three, but for this the church, of course, assumes no responsibility whatever. This fourth volume will contain papers of great historical and civil interest, and also a certain percentage of discussions which might have been introduced into the Ecclesiastical and Philosophic volumes. It will contain matter of universal interest to every class of readers.

These papers are selected out of a mass of productions which would furnish perhaps more than one volume similar to those embraced in the present series. The aim has been to choose the best, so far as the discrimination could be made, and those bearing on issues now living in the discussions of the day. Those papers which handle the great permanent subjects of the Christian system will never lose their interest. The method in which these are dealt with in these discussions may safely be left to the judgment of all competent to appreciate them.

The editor would pointedly call attention to the invaluable assistance rendered to the issue of these volumes by the Rev. George Summey, of Chester, S. C. But for him it is not unlikely the enterprise would have failed altogether. The subscription lists hung suspended for many months below the figures which would enable the publication, Mr. Summey secured enough additional subscribers to warrant going forward with the enterprise. In addition to this, he has not only given his practised skill to the correction of the proofs, but the Index of the papers published is solely due to his generous labor. To him many thanks are due from all the friends of the undertaking and from all who shall receive the benefit of these sound and vigorous discussions of valuable truth. To the skilled labor of Mr. Robert Whittet, of the publishing firm, and his painstaking efforts to secure accuracy and tasteful execution in the mechanical make up of these volumes, many thanks are also due. All who have taken a share in the work of giving these volumes to the world are entitled to the satisfaction of feeling that they have aided in giving a wider and more enduring existence to defences and expositions of pure and invaluable truths—truths which take hold upon the great abiding interests of mankind—sound and strong expositions of Christian doctrine, and safe principles of ecclesiastical polity and philosophical theories grounded in common sense and in accord with the great evangelical system. These traits will appear to every judicious reader no less clearly than will the extraordinary ability with which they are presented.

Praying for the abiding blessing of Him from whom all great and precious gifts descend upon his servants for the salvation of the world and the edification of his church, we commit these works to his hands, to accomplish all he may see fit to accomplish by them, both for the present and for many days to come.

C. R. V.

NEW PROVIDENCE MANEE, *Sept.* 26, 1890.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

IN introducing these volumes to the reading world, it is proper that something should be said in reference to the character and the points of view of the man to whose abilities and untiring energy they owe their origin. Student, teacher, farmer, mechanic, author, soldier, financier, theologian, philosopher, and preacher of the gospel, his varied gifts have spread themselves over such a variety of employments and displayed such efficiency in everything he touched, that it will be impossible to form a just judgment of the works now collected together, or of the genius and character of the author, without some brief notice of his life and the principles which have regulated his energies.

Robert Lewis Dabney was born in the county of Louisa, in Virginia, on the 5th day of March, 1820. He was the son of Charles Dabney, a native of Louisa county, though of an old Hanover lineage, and Elizabeth Price, daughter of Captain Thomas Randolph Price, and Barbara Winston, his wife. The family of Charles Dabney consisted of himself, his wife, and their eight children, four boys and four girls. Robert was the sixth in this scale. His early education was conducted in country day-schools, created by the joint efforts of his father and some of his neighbors. These schools, in plain log cabins, were common at that day, and were often very efficient instruments of education. All three of the early teachers of Robert Dabney—Caleb Burnley, Thomas Meredith, and Charles Burnley—were faithful and capable men. Under them in succession he was trained in the rudiments of English, in geometry, and pursued quite an extended course in Latin and Greek. This training brought him to the close of the year 1835. From the beginning to the middle of 1836 he pursued his studies under the direction of Rev. James Wharey, the pastor of the church. During these six months he rode a colt seven miles once a week to recite. In the month of June of that year he entered Hampden-Sidney College as a sophomore, half advanced, passed through the junior course, and left in September, 1837, without graduating. He then returned home to his mother, now a widow, and for two years taught a country school in the neighborhood, similar to the schools in which he had been taught as a boy. In December, 1839, he entered

the University of Virginia, and in 1842 retired with the degree of A. M. In July, 1842, he again returned to his paternal home, and spent more than two years in managing the affairs of his mother and teaching a select private school, with the view of educating her younger children. He entered Union Seminary in October, 1844, took the full three years' course in two years, and was licensed to preach in May, 1846. His health at this time was nearly ruined. He spent one year as a missionary in his native county, and at the beginning of July, 1847, became pastor of Tinkling Spring Church, in the county of Augusta, where he remained six years and two months. At that period he was elected to the chair of Ecclesiastical History in Union Seminary, which he held until 1869. In that year, after serving as Adjunct-Professor of Theology in addition to discharging the duties of his own chair, he was made full Professor of Theology. He discharged the duties of this position until 1883, when, warned by his physician of the necessity of a change of climate, he accepted an invitation to take charge of the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Texas, the duties of which he still discharges with characteristic energy, in spite of a blindness now become total, and of general health giving way. The only interruption to the long term of his services in the Seminary was occasioned by the war, and for sixteen years of his stay in the school of theology he served as co-pastor of the College Church along with his colleague and brother-in-law, Dr. B. M. Smith. This regular parochial work he was at length constrained by bronchitis to resign. Discharging this accumulation of duties, interspersed with various literary labors and the management of the little farm attached to his professional residence, some conception may be formed of the immense labor which for many years taxed all the resources of his energetic mind.

The war between the States began in April, 1861. When the Seminary session closed in May, Dr. Dabney proposed to the session of the College Church that Dr. Smith should solely occupy the pulpit during the summer, and he himself should be allowed to follow the young men who, in considerable numbers, had left the congregation to go into the army, and serve as chaplain. But the directors of the Seminary had expressly ordered the faculty to keep the Seminary open. This compelled Dr. Dabney to take only a temporary position as chaplain, and return to the Seminary in October, 1861. This was always a matter of regret to him, as it broke up the chaplain's work, which he felt he ought to have done during the whole war. Early in 1862 the conscription law emptied the Seminary, as he had foreseen. The wife of Gen. Stonewall Jackson, then living in Dr. Dabney's family, being related to Dr. Dabney's wife, reported to Gen. Jackson that he was virtually out of all obligations to the school. Jackson promptly

offered him the post of chief of staff to his corps, with the privilege of doing missionary work in the army every Sunday. Dabney had no military education, and the offer seemed to him at first to be unreasonable. But the patriots and divines of his acquaintance urged him to accept, and with many misgivings he did so. After fully justifying the singular but shrewd judgment of his chief, in the latter part of the campaign of 1862 his health broke down, in accordance with his own misgivings, and, resigning his post, he returned home. As soon as the fatal termination of the war allowed the Seminary to resume its work he resumed the duties of his chair.

Such is a brief outline of the history of the author of these volumes. They are the result of his systematic labor in the intervals of a time devoted mainly to the business of his professorship and pastoral charge. They are not the only results of it; other volumes, consisting in part of his own original work and in part of an editorial arrangement of the works of other men, which involved about as much labor, in one instance at least, as if the work was his own, give equal testimony to the energy of his will. The valuable Commentary of Dr. Francis S. Sampson on the Hebrews is an instance of one of these labors; his own *Life of Gen. Stonewall Jackson* is an instance of another.

These remarkable results of a busy life were due to the systematic habits of a judicious student, combined with the extraordinary talents and energy of the man. His habits were simple, and brought under a systematic control. His time was regulated, and everything to be done was assigned to its own period. He secured for himself a full allowance of healthful sleep. His hour for retiring would have seemed to many students absurdly early. At ten o'clock he was in bed, and always allowed himself eight hours for repose. He thought it no economy of time or energy to cheat nature of the full amount of rest which was necessary to keep up his strength to its full vigor. He had time allotted to all his employments, and had it in sufficiency for his outdoor business, for the close inspection of his affairs, and for the entertainment of his friends. When the period for study came, he worked with the speed and power of an engine, and accomplished results which would have done credit to a student who never left his study. This systematic arrangement of his time, and the energy with which he turned it to account, allowed play for faculties not usually conceived as part of the furniture of a man of letters. Trained in the management of his mother's affairs, he was skilled in the arts of the planter, and made an excellent farmer of the little tract of land which he owned, adjoining the official residence allotted to him as professor. He was a capital mechanic, skilled in the use of tools, making no little of the furniture of his house and the tools of his farm. Without any instruc-

tion in the arts of the architect and the map-drawer, he drew plans for churches and private dwellings with all the elaborate detail of a professional artist, and the wall of his class-room was adorned with a map of his own drawing. He was a close economist on a principle of Christian obligation, early adopted and carried out with characteristic steadiness; a financier whose judgment had the testimony of a steady success in the increase of his property; and he was at the same time a generous patron of every Christian interest, the ready helper of kindred and friend in time of need. His powers of observation were close and keen, and his interest in topographical matters, and his habit of close questioning the chance acquaintances he made about the soil, climate, productions, and modes of management of the sections where they lived, made him the most minutely and widely informed man of his time touching all parts of his own State and of many of the surrounding States. His studies were not confined to the lines of his own profession. He was a student of nature, a student of law, a student of philosophy, and a student of politics on the highest range of statesmanlike investigation. He was a political economist of a high order, and studied the bearings of progress in the development of society, in the growth of towns, in the increased facilities of transportation, in the multiplication of employments, in all the physical changes of the age, as few professional statesmen studied them. He was wide awake to the effects of such things on the political and social, as well as on the moral and religious, interests of society. He had the prophetic forecast of the true thinker, as well as the practical judgment of the man of business. When the war for Southern independence broke out, he threw himself into it on the side of his own people with characteristic energy, and the peculiar traits of his practical and strong understanding came out on a theatre altogether foreign to the habits of a man of his profession. He joined the army as chief of staff to Gen. Stonewall Jackson. It is a strong tribute to the sagacious and energetic qualities of the man that that cautious and keen soldier should have selected a teacher in a theological school as the chief of his own military family. The two men were congenial spirits, and on the strong common sense and keen habit of observation of his clerical officer Jackson placed more reliance than he did on others far more thoroughly drilled in military technics.

The characteristics of his mental and moral nature appear in strongly marked forms in these volumes now given to the world. He will here be seen, as he was, a force at once independent and intensely conservative, thrown into the great battle-field of the period in which he lived. One of the leading traits of his mind—its inflexible conservatism—brought him into resolute opposition to many of the results of the pro-

gressive spirit of the times. This trait was the fountain of much that was valuable in his labors, and of much that brought on him the censure of more adventurous and less cautious minds. He may have yielded too much occasionally to this conservative tendency, for it is human to err, and all virtues in fallible human nature may pass into evil by excess. But it can be said, without fear of contradiction, that in the vast bulk of Dr. Dabney's labors his conservative tendencies were the ministers of truth and righteousness. There is always need for a restraining as well as a progressive force in the onward movement of society, and the one is as wise and useful as the other. In an age like the present, where the progressive tendencies have been stimulated to the highest degree, and have passed into excesses as obviously dangerous as some of its results have proved beneficial, the rise of a restraining influence, confronting the excesses and exposing the evil impulses from which they have flowed, is unquestionably a thing which wisdom will approve. In no age of the world's history has there been more need for a wise and resolute conservatism than in the present era. This century will stand preëminent in history for the great movements which, for good and evil, have exerted, and will continue to exert, an unparalleled influence on the destinies of the human race. Distinguished for great activity of thought, for the extension of popular intelligence, for the infinite development of the communication of information, for inventiveness, for scientific discoveries, for advanced scholarship, for a wide-spread and audacious skepticism, for vast development of transportation, commerce and manufactures, this remarkable age has accomplished results, both for good and evil, which will qualify the current of affairs for centuries to come. The progress of speculation has assailed the Christian faith and the foundations of moral obligation, with the undisguised intent of overthrowing both as forces in society. During the active period of our author's life, the most sustained and determined conflict with infidelity the gospel has ever waged has prevailed. The struggles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were child's play compared with it. The battle has raged along the whole line of literary, scientific, philosophic, and even religious investigation. The assault has been met with corresponding ardor and ability wherever it has been made. The Christian response, too, has come in wonderful forms, not only in the field of argument, but in the field of action. Never before have the propagandist powers of the church been so greatly displayed, at least since the age of the apostles. If the age is the age of skepticism, it is also the age of missions. If it is the age of unbelief, it is also the age of faith. Never has the power of the gospel preached in its simplicity been more conspicuously displayed than in the work of Moody the evangelist, and Spurgeon the

pastor. Never has the power of prayer been more scornfully assailed than by the rationalism of Tyndall and Huxley, and never more gloriously vindicated than in the work of George Müller. Never has the influence of a refusal to abide by the moral precepts of the Tables of Stone, and the moral teachings of the New Testament, been followed by results so vast and openly ruinous. The exaggerated construction of the theories of civil freedom, and the repudiation of the voice of the Holy Ghost touching the relation of master and slave, have issued in the blood of hundreds of thousands of the human race, in the desolation of eleven States of the American Union, in the overthrow of the fundamental principle of the Constitution of the United States government—government based upon consent—in the loss of millions of treasure, in the misery of millions of a once free and happy people, and in raising issues which overhang the future with the impenetrable and menacing darkness of a midnight tempest. The same causes have unsettled the securities of society, the stability of governments, the safety of property, and the immunities of a refined civilization over all Europe. The vast, vague menace of socialism and communism rises in every enlightened nation like a ghost in Ossian. The same causes have introduced the reign of vast social corruption, the disturbance of the comforts of domestic life, the decay of commercial integrity, the disgrace of political faithlessness, and the tyrannies of democratic communities as ruthless and bloody as the despotism of an Oriental despot, on a scale larger than the despotism of an individual ever reached. It has produced not only the liberation of millions of half-civilized slaves, but the tremendous peril of their enfranchisement. It has shaken the securities of every nation of Christendom.

Among that noble host of Christian champions who have met the assaults of infidels, the author of these volumes has made a noble record. Differing radically in some things from many of his fellow-soldiers in the sacred warfare, he has proved equal to the foremost of them, if not in the learning peculiar to their separate departments, certainly in independence and energy of thought, superior to them all in the staunch conservatism of his principles, and above all in the uniform subjection of his bold intellect to the word of God. Conservative to the core, he has stood in the old paths, and confronted the audacious novelties of modern speculation with consummate tenacity. His work on the *Sensualistic Philosophy*, steeped in the essence of common sense, is the most overwhelming demonstration the age has produced of the unsoundness of the positive and relative speculations of the age. His mind, in its great leading characteristic, has shown itself eminently realistic and practical. Philosophical speculations, no matter how acute or profound, were to him nothing worth if they

brought out conclusions at war with common sense. He was a truer disciple of the great Scottish school than Sir William Hamilton himself. An enthusiastic believer in the possibility and the value of a real philosophy, he repudiated every theory which discounted its conformity with the primitive intuitions of the human understanding. Reverencing the Bible as the word of Almighty God, he had no patience with processes or conclusions which insulted its supreme claim to absolute authority. He abhorred especially the saintly villainy which, dressed in gown and bands, and standing demure as the wolf in sheep's clothing in the pulpits of the Christian church, assailed the teachings of the sacred Scriptures in doctrine or morals. The intellectual as well as the moral qualities of the man bound him to this species of open and unsparing war on all the heresies which sprang up in the course of the so-called advanced thought of the age. These qualities explain, not only the positions which he took, but the method of his defence and assault; not only the matter of his thought, but the mode of its expression. The matter was always grounded on the intuitions of common sense or the lessons of experience, on the examples of history or on the teachings of the Bible. The mode of its expression was determined by his intense convictions, his indignation against every moral obliquity, his full recognition of the authority of truth, and his fearless spirit. His power of analysis was wide and keen; his judgment sound; his capacity of observation close and vigilant; his temper hot, eager and resolute; his sensibilities just and tender; his powers of sarcasm and invective extraordinary; his mastery of language rich and fertile, fully equal to all the demands of his thoughts; his fancy pregnant with poetic beauty; his capacity of moral indignation, tender feeling, sympathy with suffering, and deep convictions of truth, unusually great; his sense of justice keen; his hatred of all tergiversation, fraud and faithlessness to covenants passionately vehement; and his courage, both moral and physical, of the truest temper. All these qualities are impressed upon his work. Such a mental and moral structure, ruled by such absolute reliance on the authority of common sense and the word of God, might have been expected to wage war with error as Cœur de Lion waged among the ranks of the Saracens.

This keen expression of moral indignation sometimes jarred on the nerves of timid persons, and the writer was accused of indulging in unlawful passion. But this is a false judgment. There is such a thing as just anger. Our Lord himself grew angry at the desecration of the temple and the bottomless hypocrisies of the Pharisees. It is wrong to deal with dangerous error and want of candor in its propagation, as if it were empty of all moral significance. That Dr. Dabney made no

mistakes in this direction is obviously improbable. That his generous and ardent temper never passed over into some excess, none of his most loyal friends—a host among his own people—are disposed to deny. But his keenest assaults never bore the least taint of malice towards persons. His faults were the excess of noble impulse in every case, and no one was ever more ready to confess them, no one ever more gentle in receiving the admonition of those who were entitled to admonish him. All the defects, however, which may be found in the large products of his long and energetic labors are literally nothing in comparison with their value. All the peculiarities of his mental and moral nature are impressed upon them, and give a charm to the appreciative reader. His approach to a subject was always direct and straightforward. He evaded no difficulty; he bent to no complication; he yielded to no evasion. He seized at once on the heart of the matter, and moved straight on the lines of discrimination which led to the true evolution of its substance. His style was after the model of Swift, in the main character plain, didactic, seeking the most direct and clear expression, flexible to every shade of his thought, energetic, free of flow, and, unlike that of the cynic of St. Patrick, not disdaining to rise occasionally into rich poetic beauty. His taste in letters, as in all his general habits of mind, was at once simple and poetic, clinging to the old simplicities of life in which he was bred, and yet keen in the appreciation of all beauty in nature and in art. Patient and painstaking in all he undertook, the energy of his nature drove him to incessant and varied labors. His strong conservatism led him to the full conviction that the haughty, progressive spirit of the age often left behind the valuable achievements of the past, and as often abandoned old truth as it discovered new. To him truth was truth, no matter how old, and he revered the grand intellects of an earlier day and their approved work more than the untested pretenders of the modern world. He believed in the crucible of time.

Hating injustice with intense feeling, he scorned the self seeking which truckles to triumphant and unjust power for mere advantage. Believing utterly in the word of God, he never flinched from denouncing the errors which flowed, with all their desolating effects, from a refusal to abide by the teachings of the Scriptures. He spoke out boldly in defence of revealed moral truth repudiated by angry millions, and fearlessly uttered his sympathies with half a continent overwhelmed by a triumphant fanaticism. Reverencing truth—the truth of the past not less than the truth of the present—nothing could persuade him that past evils could change their nature into good, or had any claim to be delineated in any other colors than their own; a spade was a spade, and it was a lie to say it was not. His bold and uncom-

promising convictions never brooked the timid prudence of concealment in deference to the passions of hostile multitudes. Hence he often came in collision with that apprehensive expediency which could see no recourse but in silent submission, leaving truth to pass out of view, and lawful self-protection to cower under the dread of fanaticism armed with power and insolent with victory. Hence he often encountered the censure of those whose rights, honor and interests he defended with the most intense sympathy.

The brave and unfortunate people of his own section never had a truer or more faithful friend than the author of these volumes. His active fancy and tender sensibilities never lost sight of the miseries of his countrymen in his own comparatively complete exemption from poverty and want. If any one is disposed to deprecate the fearless assertion of the truth which vindicates the scriptural authority of the social institutions which provoked the hostility of a fanaticism essentially infidel, we would ask such a one if the moral teachings of the word of God are to be suppressed or buried out of sight just because they convict that fanaticism of its guilt? Are the old and glorious annals of the Southern States to be allowed no vindication before the bar of history? Are they to relinquish that defence thrown over them by the word of God himself? Are the countrymen of Washington and Henry to allow the slander to go down unresisted to posterity that they were criminals of the deepest dye because they stood in a relation which is warranted by the finger of God on the granite record of the moral law? Shall they submit to have a record of untainted fidelity to all their obligations under the constitution covered with oblivion, while the record of their antagonists is blazoned in the heavens, although it is blotted with breach after breach of their constitutional obligations? Rest assured, this cannot be; and if so, let the voice of this true servant of God and his country be heard; let his vindication of the moral and political principles of his people be admitted to an impartial judgment. Nothing is to be gained by the attempt to send the truth into perpetual exile. It must prevail at last.

While these volumes will contain a defence of the substantial rights of the Southern people, they will also contain the most abundant evidence that the most ultra friends of Southern independence after the struggle commenced were passionately imbued with the hope that the issue might not be raised, and that the conflict might be averted. More than one paper in these collections will show with what intense Christian solicitude Dr. Dabney, always a type of the most decided Southern feeling, endeavored to avert the calamity. That testimony will appear in that section of the publication which comes out under the auspices of the Committee of Publication. It will also appear in the fourth volume, for which the church assumes no responsibility.

Another gratifying element in these volumes, strongly marked, is the type of religious feeling and principle in the character of the author. His whole religious frame of thought and feeling was moulded by that form of Christian truth called Calvinistic. He accepted the Bible as the absolute word of God, after the old model of faith in the church. He received it as not only inspired in its matter, but inspired in its expression, not only as knowledge given of the Holy Ghost, but as given in words taught of that divine agent. He accepted all its humiliating lessons of human guilt and depravity as a true diagnosis and exposure of the moral condition of the human soul. He accepted the sovereign grace and power of God as the only source of hope to man, considered as an individual or considered as a race. He accepted the atoning sacrifice of Christ as the only purchase of redemption—his positive righteousness as the only ground of title to eternal life. He accepted the offices of the Holy Spirit as the only deliverance from the unholiness of the human heart, and the deadly habit growing out of personal sin. These truths he received from the word of God, and saw them reproduced in his own consciousness more and more as his own intuitions were more and more purged into clear vision under the power of grace in his own soul. His view of the sanctity and authority of the law of God, and the righteousness of its prescriptions, was peculiarly strong. His personal religious character was moulded by these strong truths, and partook of their strength. His intuitions were vigorous and steady, his principle of obedience was staunch, his affections undemonstrative, but intense. His apprehension of sin was in proportion to his apprehension of the excellence of divine law; and with all the manifestations of his energy and courage, his personal humility, his sense of his own faults, were both deep and tender. His piety, modified by the habit of reflection in his professional employments, was profoundly reflective; he studied constantly the phenomena of his own soul under the various phases of his religious experience. Relying on the truth as the sole instrument of sanctification, he learned much of the false phases of religious feeling bred by error, as well as of the true effects on the moral nature of the truth as it is in Jesus. Relying on the truth, he approved all the legitimate activities of the Christian work growing out of it, and had but small regard for so-called Christian activities growing out of human devices appended to the divine system of ordinances and instrumental means. The thoughtful paper in these volumes on admitting persons to the communion of the church is a fair example of this wise reverence for the truth.

His religious character was eminently one of principle, and when clear in his own consciousness of acting under a motive drawn from the teachings of the word of God, he submitted quietly to miscon-

structions which, in the censures of good men, touched him to the quick. An example of this is found in the discussion on Christian Economy, which formulated the principle in his heart that regulated the management of his property all his life. He was censured as unduly rigid in his economical measures; but he was only obedient to the law of the Master under whom he was a steward; and when the time came for the outgo of these carefully husbanded resources, they flowed as freely under the same wise regulation. This reign of steadfast principle gave a force and struggle to Dabney's religious life which can never be imitated without eminent advantage to the cause of religion. His ardent, deep-toned, reflective piety gives many an invaluable lesson in these pages. At once steadfast and adventurous for the truth, bowing his ear to the teachings of the Holy Spirit, while his eyes fixed on the written word as the guiding lines to correct any misapprehension of what was coming to his own intuitions, the author has given many a lesson of such value to his brethren in the ministry, and to the church at large, that it is to be hoped they will not willingly let them die.

The deep and staunch texture of Dr. Dabney's piety is receiving a noble test in his last years. Stone-blind, and frequently suffering intense pain as his health gives way, he is still doing the full work of the chair of Philosophy in the University of Texas, and of the chair of Theology in the nascent Theological School in Austin, and doing all with such happy cheerfulness as vindicates the grace of God and the trust of his servant in a way to touch the very heart of all who see the noble proof of both.

In his person Dr. Dabney was about six feet high, originally slender, in his middle manhood stalwart and powerful. His complexion was dark, his hair a dark, silky brown, his brow broad, under the large sockets of which a pair of keen black eyes gazed out, his gait without grace, but strong and steady, his lips thin, his nose large and well-formed, the whole face comely and striking to the most casual looker. For many years a flowing brown beard fell from lip, chin and cheek. As a speaker he was direct, plain, clear in thought, and always moved by strong convictions, and frequently eloquent in a high degree. As a preacher his sermons were crammed full of thought, and frequently moving from the deep and sometimes unmastered sensibility they contained. He had but few peers in the pulpit of his day. His speeches in the courts of the church were always weighty in their logic, and on occasions when he deemed the truth or the church to be in danger from the policy or intrigue of mistaken men, the torrent of argument and passion flowed, fused like the iron and the white heat from the crucible of a furnace. His great work, however, was done with his pen, and a material part of it is now presented to the public in these

collections. The number of his publications was very large; the present series is far from exhausting the catalogue. In the latter part of his life a talent for poetical composition and a disposition to indulge it, of which no suspicion existed before, has made its appearance. Several of these pieces have been printed in the last few years, exhibiting the characteristic marks of strong conception and deep feeling under poetical forms, which have illustrated his mastery of English phrase in a direction entirely new. But the most valuable of his numerous and diligently elaborated works are to be found in his defences of evangelical truth, and his expositions of the philosophy underlying the gospel system. In these the church is left heir to expositions which will never cease to be of value in its long, stern conflict with the powers of darkness.

The part borne by the nominal editor of these volumes is intentionally reduced to a mere supervision. Dr. Dabney speaks for himself. His life-long friend, whose name appears in a nominal relation to the work, will not qualify the utterances of a mind so independent and so fully entitled to speak out its own convictions. He will only say to a certain class of readers, who are not accustomed to a rigid construction of positive argument, that they are following the thought of a thinker so trained to exact discrimination that he does not always explain the exact purpose of his distinctions, and sometimes leaves his reader to discover it for himself. An example will be found in the discussion on the "Various Readings of the New Testament Versions." He has been charged with upholding as certain truth the authority of the disputed passage in 1 John v. 7, against the general consent of scholars that it is spurious. He expressly disclaims doing more than keeping this an open question; but the disclaimer is overlooked in the mass of reasoning which is gathered around the assertion of its probable genuineness. But that powerful argument is explicitly designed to keep the question open, and not to affirm the positive canonicity of the disputed paragraph. He does develop the force of the claim to genuineness, so as to justify his purpose to keep the question open until it is more satisfactorily settled. It is easier to sneer at the "antiquated scholarship" of the plea than to set it aside. Yet nothing but a want of attention could fail to see that the author does not claim for it a decisive overthrow of the strong external evidence as now arrayed against it; he only proves that, in spite of the external evidence, the internal evidence is so strong as to enforce the propriety of its being kept an open question until final research has settled it by an external evidence sufficiently powerful to overcome the powerful internal evidence in its favor. Dr. Dabney always has a definite object in view in his discussions, and he seldom misses his mark.

Hoping that a spirit of impartial candor in those whose views are combatted in these able papers may give fair play to their power for good, they are now committed to the world to run their course, and commended to the acceptance of that Divine Master whose glory they seek in a world full of error.

C. R. VAUGHAN.

NEW PROVIDENCE MANSE, *May* 14, 1890.

PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN ECONOMY.

THE history of the Christian world shows that there has been a wide-spread sensibility in the consciences of Christians to the sin of indulgence in superfluities. This sensibility has sometimes shown itself in a morbid, and sometimes in a blind, undistinguishing way. Among the mendicant and some monastic orders of the Romish communion, poverty and simplicity of life formed a part of the vows and rules, however little part they may have had in their practice. Among the churches of the Reformation we find the Mennonites forbidding, not only all luxuries of dress, equipage and furniture, but even the fine arts and liberal education. The denomination of Quakers, as is well known, practiced a similar sobriety. A part of the original discipline of the Methodists was to enforce a strict renunciation of all the pomps and vanities of the world. These facts indicate that the conscience of the Christian world has had an extensive feeling of the obligation to moderation and self-denial in the use of wealth, though they may prove that this feeling has not been very well defined nor intelligent.

Several things in the present state of the church induce the belief that there is a strong demand for the discussion and enforcement of the true principles of Christian economy at this day. These circumstances are the great increase of material wealth, and consequently of luxuries, in civilized nations, in consequence of the amazing applications of physics to the arts of production; the obvious and constant progress of genteel society in the style of living; the strong similarity of rich Christians to rich unbelievers in regard to the style of living; and the peculiar demands of God's cause for pecuniary resources in this, the golden opportunity for evangelical effort.

If the attempt be made to settle the principles of Christian self-denial in expenditures, by drawing a line between the part to be appropriated to ourselves and the part to be appropriated

to God, we see not where or how that line can be safely drawn. How much revenue has God a right to draw from our possessions? How much is due to us? What general ratio shall be taken for making the division? We can see but one scriptural or rational answer which the Christian can make to these questions: *Our property is purely a trust fund, and the whole of it is to be used for the benefit of the owner.* There is to be no division at all. There is to be no line drawn between God's portion and our portion. All is God's, and all is to be employed for him. Here is the only true and safe starting-point for deducing our practical rules of Christian expenditure.

The idea of a stewardship is a correct illustration of the nature of the tenure by which we hold our possessions. This is plain from the fact that the Scriptures employ it to illustrate our responsibility for all the means of serving God, and our property among the rest. A steward is one who manages property which does not belong to him. This is just the case with us. The property in our hands is literally God's property. He created it. He preserves it. He calls it his own while it is in our hands. "Every beast of the forest is mine, and the cattle upon a thousand hills." The most important property of a pastoral people is cattle, and God expressly claims the domesticated cattle, as well as the wild animals which were not appropriated as individual possessions. Now, it is the plainest truth in the world, that the steward is to manage the estate committed to him, not for his private advantage or profit, but for that of the owner. The owner, as a just and benevolent man, will of course allow his steward a competent subsistence out of the estate; but the profits of the property are his, not his servant's; and the general aim with which the whole is managed is to promote his advantage.

But the Scripture likens our relation to God to one far closer and stricter than the steward's. We are ourselves God's property. We belong to him, body and soul, just as truly as the riches which he has lent us. "And *ye* are not your own, for ye are bought with a price. Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, *which are God's.*" "Also he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant." "Ye also have a Master in heaven." It is a settled rule of law, that a slave can own no property. Whatever he has, and whatever he may acquire, be-

long to the master to whom he belongs, except so far as the master may lend him the use of it. So we, God's slaves, can own nothing. Hence we argue that if all which is, in human language, most essentially our own, our limbs, our faculties, and the fruits of their exertions—if we ourselves, in the very essence that constitutes our being, belong to God, and ought therefore to be employed for his exclusive use, much more does our property, which is only entrusted to us. Our property may be viewed as one class of material and instruments, lent to us, with which to work. Now, of course, if the limbs and faculties, with all the products of their exertions, belong to God, the results of these borrowed tools and materials belong to him by a double right.

The same conclusion follows from all those passages of Scripture in which it is taught that we are to render to God all the service of which our faculties and circumstances admit. We are to employ all the lawful means within our reach, and to exert every nerve, to serve and glorify him. "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things." "And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." And Christian love is a feeling eminently practical; "for this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments." According to these rules, the only limit to the service we are to render to God is the limit of our strength, means and opportunities. In whatever way it is possible for us to do anything, without sin, whereby the glory of God may be promoted, that thing it is our duty to do. We are to serve God *with all our strength*. Our property is a part of our strength, and therefore we are to serve him with all our property. It is to be noticed, also, that though no Christian acts up to this perfect rule, yet no true Christian desires or aims at any less. No true penitent is satisfied with any imperfection, for imperfection is sin. If, then, there is any part of our property of which it is *impossible* to make any lawful use for the glory of God, that part, and that part alone, we may spend upon ourselves. And where shall that part be found, when there is so much want, ignorance and sin to be relieved, and while there are so many thousand thirsty channels in which benevolence might flow?

It is important also to bear in mind this: it is not enough to be able to say that the use which we make of our property is an innocent one, and has some tendency to promote the glory of God. It is our duty to make the best use of every part of our possessions that is possible in our circumstances. If there was any way within our reach in which our money might have produced more good and more honor to God when we spent it in something innocent, but less beneficial to his service, we have come short of our duty. *We have sinned.* For the only rule allowed us is to serve him "*with all our strength.*" We have no right to waste any part of our efficiency.

The principle that we are to use the whole property entrusted to us for the highest advantage of the owner is surely established by superabundant proof. The steps by which the above reasonings have led us are so simple and short that there can be no hesitation in admitting them, unless hesitation be produced by what is very obvious at the first glance, that the principle now established will condemn the habitual conduct of Christians to a woful extent. How few are there who put their hands into their pockets with a constant and conscientious recollection of their stewardship! How few earn for God! How few look around them amidst the demands of God's suffering cause, or suffering poor, for the strongest claim and the best means of glorifying him with their superfluous wealth! Do we not rather look within, among the idle desires of vanity or self-indulgence, to see which we shall gratify first, thinking we have been very conscientious if we stop to enquire whether it is innocent?

We pass now to some specimens of the manner in which this principle applies. And first: it is proper that we should employ so much of God's property as is necessary in our own sustenance. The servant must be duly fed and clothed, in order that he may be able to work for his master. This expenditure is most strictly an expenditure in God's service, since it results in work done for him. And this justifies us, not only in expending on ourselves what is needful to sustain the body, as wholesome food, raiment, and shelter, but also whatever is truly needed to give the highest efficiency to both body and mind for God's service, and whatever truly promotes the noblest development of our moral qualities. This will include, for instance, that comfort and cleanliness in food and dress, and those recreations and en-

joyments which are necessary to give the greatest firmness to the muscles and most healthy energy to the animal spirits, food for the mind, such as judicious education, good books and useful accomplishments, proper medicines and remedies in sickness, and a wholesome and natural cultivation of those tastes which tend to refine and elevate the moral nature. We believe that neither God's providence nor law has designed that man shall serve him as a dull, over-worked hack, but that the rendering of the highest and best and greatest service is perfectly consistent with man's highest enjoyment of the natural and rational blessings of life. The simple and temperate use of all those enjoyments strengthens man for his work, by promoting the contentment and cheerfulness of his feelings. In one word, it is right to expend on ourselves all that will qualify us to serve God with the greatest efficiency. This is strictly expending God's property in his own service.

If we are asked whether this admission can be extended to an allowance of artificial luxuries and the costly refinements of fashionable life, an answer will be found in this question: Can any way be shown in which they make us more efficient servants of God? Do they promote health? No, they are debilitating. Do they cultivate the mind? No, they dwarf it. Do they promote cheerfulness? They are much more fruitful of care and petty jealousies. Are they necessary to give that respectability among men which extends the influence for good? No. Do they promote that humility, that spiritual mind, which are more essential to usefulness than health or animal spirits? Alas! no. Let an honest conscience answer these questions, and an answer is found for the other.

Second: it is right to employ a part of our Master's possessions in sustaining and rearing the families which he has committed to us. Next to the preservation of our own lives, this is the most obligatory of all uses which we are required to make of the property entrusted to us. God's providence points to us as the proper agents for the sustenance of our own families and the training of our children for usefulness, by placing them nearer to us than to any one else. In sustaining his servants and rearing new servants for his use, we are strictly applying his property to his advantage. And the same remarks made concerning the extent of the provision for our own sustenance and

equipment for service apply to our households. We should expend on them so much as will bring their bodies, minds and hearts to the highest efficiency for God's service that our circumstances will permit. But surely we have no right to mispend our Master's property in providing for our families luxuries, amusements, fineries, or wealth, which add nothing to their energies, bodily, mental or moral, but, on the contrary, produce vanity, effeminacy, envy and self-indulgence, and unfit them to "endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ." That this is the tendency of the refinements and luxuries of fashionable life, especially with the young, whose characters are in a forming state, is too clear to be disputed. Let this single fact testify, that not only in the church, but in the worldly professions, few of the men who make their mark and serve their generation are reared in the lap of wealth. The *useful men*, the workingmen of every community, are usually the sons of poverty or of plain mediocrity. To use God's wealth in bestowing such indulgences is a double dishonesty. It embezzles the trust, and it robs him of the services of our children by disqualifying them for active usefulness. A kindred abuse of the trust is committed by those who stint their children of a thorough education for usefulness because so large a portion of their means is appropriated to selfish indulgences, or more frequently to the schemes of avarice.

Third: a part of the possessions entrusted to us may be rightfully employed in making a reasonable provision for ourselves and those dependent on us against the contingencies of the future. As the parent is charged now with the sustenance of his children, it is proper that he should lay by in store something to keep them from want when he is taken from them by death. How much of God's property may be rightfully retained for this purpose must be decided in each case by its own circumstances. But this much may be said in general, that we are certainly not justified in laying up wealth for our children by any consideration of our obligation to God; for, as experience declares, there is nothing which is so apt to make a young person worthless, both to his Maker and his fellow-men, as a large inheritance. How, then, can we be right in abstracting a large part of that trust which we are bound to use wholly for God's glory, and employing it to destroy the usefulness of one of his creatures? The rule proper to men of large wealth seems to be this: that they

shall set apart for those dependent persons whom they shall leave behind them a comfortable maintenance, and appropriate the rest to the glory of God. Or, if they leave more than this in the hands of their heirs, it should be with the express understanding that those heirs shall take it only as the successors in their stewardship. Where there is a reasonable probability that the heir will not be faithful to this trust, the parent has no right to bequeath him the surplus property above a competency, whether the unfaithfulness of the heir arise from wastefulness or avarice. What would be thought of a steward who, when compelled to take a long journey and to employ a substitute in his trust, should entrust his master's property to a hand known to be faithless? So the steward of God, going that journey from which he will never return, has no right to commit his Master's possessions to faithless hands because those hands happen to be his son's. He should himself appropriate his surplus wealth to its owner's use before he goes hence. There is nothing which more betrays the defective views of Christian men concerning their property than the manner in which they bequeath it. How few are there who remember, in making a will, that the possessions of which they are about to dispose *do not belong to them*, and that the utmost they can presume to do, as Christians, is to appoint successors to themselves in their stewardship? If they wittingly appoint an unfaithful one from their weak partiality, they are themselves unfaithful stewards. How shall they be able to stand up in judgment and "give an account of their stewardship," when its last act has been to place the trust in a defaulter's hands? When the conscience of the church is properly awakened and enlightened on this point, there will be more instances like those rare and honorable ones of which we occasionally hear, when Christians who are entrusted with much wealth will bequeath more of it to pious and charitable uses than to their children.

Those who have any property remaining after these three lawful deductions are made are required obviously, by our principles, to use it in doing good. The particular modes in which wealth may be made to promote the glory of its owner, God, are exceedingly various; and the choice in each case must be left to the conscience of the individual steward. But there will be no danger of serious mistake if the sincere purpose in every case is

to use all our possessions for the highest glory of God. And let the truth be again impressed, that, as we are commanded to love and serve God with *all our strength*, it is not enough to be able to say that the object we have selected for the expenditure of any surplus wealth is innocent and has some tendency to honor God. Our duty is not done till we have conscientiously selected that object by which our expenditure will do the highest honor to God and good to his creatures that are within our reach.

It now requires little argument to show that the whole list of superfluities, fashionable indulgences, and extravagances, is cut off. No Christian, no man, can expend his Master's wealth upon them without committing sin. For we might even admit that a multitude of these extravagances were innocent, that they had some tendency to refine the taste; in a word, we might admit all that the softest luxury could plead in their behalf; and yet, while it is true that there are other ways open, in the providence of God, in which wealth may do a higher good, it is a sin and a waste to spend any of it in superfluities. Who does not know that there are thousands of ways for doing that higher good with wealth in this world of want and ignorance? And the greater the contrast between the beneficence and utility of these works of mercy and the supposed advantages of these selfish superfluities, the clearer is the sin of indulging them. Some may ask, What is superfluity, and what is extravagance? We do not at all dispute that to draw the line between the allowable comforts of life and sinful extravagance, by a general rule fitting every particular case, may be impossible. But it is not at all necessary to draw such a line. All that is necessary is to establish in the consciences of men sound principles on this subject, and in their hearts the supreme love of God. The particulars will then easily take care of themselves.

But it will not be difficult to illustrate the subject by a number of instances, which are clearly on the wrong side of the supposed line, and in which multitudes of wealthy Christians will find themselves clearly condemned. When a Christian man, who has professed to dedicate himself and his all, body, soul and estate, to the highest glory of God and love of his fellow-creatures, passes by the hundreds of starving poor and degraded sinners around him, the thousands of ignorant at home, and the millions of perishing heathen, whom his money might instrumentally rescue

from hell-fire, and sells for a song his safe, strong, comfortable family carriage, and expends hundreds in procuring another, because his rich neighbor is about to outstrip him in this article of equipage; or when he sacrifices his plate and china to buy new at a great cost, because the style of the old was a little past; or when he pulls down his commodious dwelling to expend thousands in building another, because the first was unfashionable; is not this sinful waste? When hundreds and thousands of God's money are abstracted from the wants of a perishing world, for which the Son of God died, to purchase the barbaric finery of jewelry, as offensive to good taste as to Christian economy, jewelry which keeps out no cold blast in winter, and no scorching heat in summer, which fastens no needful garment and promotes no bodily comfort, is not this extravagance? When large sums of money are expended on exotics not half so pretty as a clover blossom nor so fragrant as a common apple-tree flower, whose only merit is that no other lady in town has obtained one, what is this but extravagance? We are deeply convinced that if our principle of self-dedication were honestly carried through the usages and indulgences of fashionable society, a multitude of common superfluities would be cut off. Indeed, we doubt not that the depth to which it would cut, and the extent to which it would convict the fashionable Christian world of delinquency, would be the grand argument against it.

In a word, the awakening of the Christian conscience of the church to the truth, and to its duty, would reduce all Christians to a life of comfortable simplicity, embellished, among those who possessed taste, by natural and inexpensive elegance, and all else would be retrenched. The whole of that immense wealth now sacrificed to luxury would be laid on the altar of religious benevolence, or devoted to works of public utility. The real politeness and true refinements of life would be only promoted by the change. Every useful branch of education, all training by which mind and body are endued with a higher efficiency for God's service, would be secured, cost what it might. Every truly ennobling taste would receive a simple and natural cultivation. But the material luxuries and adornments of life would be sternly retrenched, and Christian society would be marked in dress, in equipage, in buildings, sacred and domestic, in food, and in every other sensuous gratification, by a Spartan simplicity, united with

a pure and chaste decency. Wealth would be held as too sacred a trust to expend any part of it in anything which was not truly necessary to the highest glory of God in the rational and spiritual welfare of his creatures, our fellow-men.

As has been before indicated, every one will perceive that such an application of the principles of Christian economy would bring about a great revolution in the manners of our Christian people. Even well-meaning Christians who are possessed of wealth everywhere allow themselves a vastly wider license and act on far different principles. We shall therefore beg leave to pursue the discussion of this part of the subject farther, and suggest other reasons for carrying our Christian sobriety to the extent indicated.

And first, we strongly urge that some principle far stricter than that on which Christians usually act is imperatively demanded, to remove the reproach of worldly conformity. The external likeness of the church to the world is the bane of our efficiency in saving souls. We profess a difference between ourselves and the unrenewed, as radical as that between light and darkness, almost as wide as that between heaven and hell. But in all the visible and practical concerns which interest the unrenewed heart, we nearly resemble them. Our words say that we believe riches to be vanity and emptiness. Our acts seem to say that we love and seek them as intensely as those do who make them their all and their god. We say in words that "we have here no continuing city," but in act are as eager to adorn our dwellings here as though they were our only home. We profess that we have richer and nobler enjoyments than the pomp of this life, and then swell and rustle with as much pomp as any other human insect of a day. What is the result? The world believes our conduct and not our words, like a shrewd world as it is. Practical skepticism seals their consciences against the teachings of the pulpit. Our worldly conformity gives the lie to all our assertions of nobler principles, of the birth of a new and higher nature, and of the treachery of earthly good. However inefficient the world's conscience may be to control its own sins, it is abundantly acute to perceive the demands of consistency; and men feel that those who have the hopes and principles, those who acknowledge the tremendous obligations to a dying world of brethren, which Christians profess, ought to use their wealth in

a manner utterly unlike the world. When they see us use it on the same selfish and grovelling principles with themselves, the inevitable impression, unacknowledged it may be, in the consciousness of those who were trained to respect religion, but yet potent and blighting in all, is that religion is a "sham." But now let Christians seek and use wealth wholly for God. Let them show by their conscientious simplicity of indulgence and conscientious alms-doings that they have conquered that covetousness which worldly men feel to be *their* strongest passion, and could calmly place their feet upon those indulgences and vanities which worldly men feel to be *their* highest pleasures; and the world will own, with conviction and reverence, that Christianity is a living, a lovely and fearful thing. The world will at least believe that Christians believe that there is a heaven, a hell, and a strict day of account. The world will be convinced at least that Christians believe their perishing fellow-men have souls to be saved, worth a little more than fashionable *éclat*, jewelry and equipage. Men will at least believe that we are earnest in our warnings.

In this connection it may be remarked, that the extent to which the worldly conformity of the church follows on the heels of the advancing luxuries of the world, plainly indicates that something is wrong with us. Every age has added to the wealth of civilized societies, and every generation, nay, every year, the style of expenditures advances. More costly dwellings are built. What were commodious and respectable mansions a few years ago, are now dragged away as so much rubbish; and if Providence permits our much-abused wealth still to increase, the places we now build will be pulled down to make room for the more luxurious palaces of our children. New and unheard-of indulgences are invented. What our fathers regarded as luxuries almost extravagant, we have accustomed ourselves to look upon as ordinary comforts, almost despised for their cheapness. More capricious wants are indulged; more costly articles of adornment are invented. And, as if to repudiate in the most direct and expressive mode every remnant of the obligations of sobriety, *costliness* has become the very element of fashion. Because the ornament is monstrously expensive, in proportion to its true utility, therefore it is sought. Now, let extravagance of expenditure take as enormous strides as it will, the indulgence of Christians follows

close on its heels. No species of adornment, however outrageously wasteful; no imaginary indulgence, however capricious, has become fashionable, but rich Christians have soon proceeded to employ it almost as commonly as the world. Some of the most enormously luxurious dwellings are those occupied by Christian families. The most extravagant finery is often seen on Christian backs. Now, where is this to stop? Do the principles on which Christians now expend God's possessions fix no limit *any where*? If they do not, they must be erroneous. Let us see some line drawn beyond which artificial and imaginary wants are not to encroach on the claims of our stewardship. No such line exists. On the present principles of the church, luxurious expenditure has before it the prospect of indefinite progress. And let it be observed, that those who ride on the flood-tide of extravagance are not merely those inconsistent persons whose piety is under grievous suspicions on all hands, but often they are those who stand fair and are much esteemed in the church. Now, if it shall be objected to the principles here advocated that there will be no limit to their fair and legitimate application till they reduce us to a cynical rudeness of life, the just retort is, that to the opposite principles on which the Christian world usually acts there is no limit. They will admit one extravagance after another, on the plea of usage and the customs of society, and the innocence of the particular indulgence in itself, to the utmost extent to which an apostate world may please to run in its waste of God's abused bounties. Hence it is evident that there must be error in those principles. And let any one attempt to go back and review them, comparing them with the principles of the Bible in order to eliminate that error, and he will find that there is no rational or scriptural stopping place short of the strict rule we have advocated.

Another reason for the application of this strict rule is found in the prevalence of covetousness in the church. Much has been said, and justly said, concerning this sin, and the opposite virtue of Christian liberality, recently. The religious world has rung with denunciations of prize tracts, some of which have proclaimed covetousness to be the master sin of the church. This may be true or untrue. It is sufficient for our purpose to say, what everybody will admit, that it is a sin prevalent and ruinous to a fearful extent. Now, we believe that the great spur to covetous-

ness, in the general, is this custom of fashionable expenditure prevalent in the Christian world. That the fiercest covetousness must usually be the result of prodigality has been clearly seen, at least since Sallust's well known character of Cataline was written, "*Alieni appetens, Sui profusus, ardens in cupiditibus.*" And we suppose that, usually, the craving for gain is the child of a craving to spend. Few examples of the actual miser present themselves, where coin is hoarded and gloated over and loved for its own sake. Money is usually valued inordinately, because men's hearts inordinately desire the supposed style, *éclat*, and distinction of fashionable expenditure which wealth will enable them to attain. But now, could the pulpit and the religious press only succeed in establishing correct sentiments of Christian economy in the public opinion of the religious world; could all useless expenditure in a Christian be set in the same inconsistent and odious light in which cards and dancing are usually regarded by Presbyterians, the sinews of covetousness in the church would be cut. The usual motive to covetousness would no longer exist with any who regarded their good name; because that expenditure could not be indulged for which large wealth is coveted. Were those who made large gains compelled to regard them as gains made for God, the instances of rapacity would be as rare as the instances in which servants and apprentices are found too industrious in earning money for their masters.

The nature of the motives by which luxurious expenditures are prompted, one would think, ought to be sufficient to reveal the inconsistency of all such indulgences in Christians. Very innocent and plausible motives may be feigned, and in some cases may be truly felt; as when men say that they are only filling the obligation of their stations and complying with the demands of genteel society in living expensively. There may be some who persuade themselves that this is their feeling. But it is very plain that the usual motives of expensive living are self-indulgence and sensuality, ostentatious pride, cowardly weakness and dread of the charge of singularity, petty rivalry, and personal vanity. Are these motives which Christians ought to foster? Surely they are utterly at war with the humility and spirituality which our Saviour commands. It is our constant duty to choke them and watch against them; and were expensive living perfectly innocent and free from other objection, the fact that it

ministers to feelings so vile would require us to shun it. The mere fact that it was often the minister of these unholy and contemptible sentiments in other minds should lead us to shun it, though as yet unconscious of their taint. We are told to pray, "Lead us not into temptation." If we would not be hypocrites, our conduct must be conformed to our prayers.

A reference to the views which prevailed in former ages concerning the evil effects of luxury will suggest another consideration. The time was when wise heathens and wise Christians alike looked upon luxury as a vice in itself—a thing which emasculated the hardihood and energy of the character, stimulated all the vices, as tropical heat and moisture force up the vegetation of a wealthy soil, and unfitted man for usefulness. Wise legislators excluded luxury as the bane of commonwealths and as a crime unworthy of manhood. Historians constantly pointed at the luxury which accumulated wealth had provoked as the cause of Persian imbecility, of Grecian decline, and of the downfall of imperial Rome. Senates made repeated attempts to restrain it by sumptuary laws; attempts which were vain indeed, and ill-judged, but which evinced the reality of the evil. The plain, good sense of the olden times pointed out the stubborn fact, which men had not then learned to dodge by a deceitful philosophy, that luxurious expenditures, in wasting the labor of working hands and the products of labor, must be ruinous to public wealth. What has now become of these old-fashioned facts and truths? How is it that a Christian ethics, in a Christian age, professing to be unspeakably purer than all pagan systems, is silent concerning a vice which old pagan Sparta and Rome reprobated? How is it that Christian people indulge, without a whisper of disapprobation or a frown of public opinion, in luxuries more elaborate than those which even a polished Cicero denounced as disgusting and contaminating in the young men of licentious Rome? How is it that it has become proper, and manly, and wise, for the soldiers of the cross, who ought to be girded for the terrific war with "principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in high places," to soften their effeminate limbs with indulgences which would have been shameful and ruinous in the secular soldier or athlete? It passes our wit to tell! To us, who remember how Paul commanded "to crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts," how he set the example

of "keeping under his body and bringing it into subjection," and how he has charged us "to endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ," how every Christian has dedicated himself, professedly, soul and body, to a tremendous conflict, for a stake which is composed of his own soul, worth more than a world, and a world of immortal souls like his; to us it does seem that every indulgence which diminishes the hardihood and self-denial of the man, or unnerves him for the strife, is a crime and a treason, leaving out of view the waste it causes of the material means for carrying on the great cause. Do the fashionable indulgences now common among rich Christians have this effect? Let the fact before referred to give the answer, that the *working men* of the age are usually the sons of simple mediocrity.

And not only are these indulgences objectionable as weakening to the Christian character, but they waste the attention and time of those who love them. He who goes to warfare should not encumber himself with much baggage. The true soldier has no time to provide gorgeous caparisons for his horse and drapery for his own limbs. All that he can take care of is to have his weapons in fighting order. All else is an incumbrance. When Darius and Alexander met at Arbela, the Macedonian phalanx was horrid with brass and iron. The only things which glittered along the sturly ranks were the deadly points of the pikes and the sword-blades. But the half-armed men and horses of the Persian came sweating under gorgeous draperies of worsted and purple and gold, which swept the earth. Which conquered? Of Frederick the Great, Macaulay says:

"Some young Englishmen of rank proposed to visit Germany as volunteers, for the purpose of learning the art of war under the greatest of commanders. This last proof of British attachment and admiration Frederick politely but firmly declined. His camp was no place for amateur students of military science. The Prussian discipline was rigorous even to cruelty. The officers, while in the field, were expected to practice an abstemiousness and self-denial such as were hardly surpassed by the most rigid monastic orders. However noble their birth, however high their rank in the service, they were not permitted to eat from anything better than pewter. It was a high crime even in a count and field-marshal to have a single silver spoon among his baggage. Gay young Englishmen of twenty thousand a year, accustomed to liberty and luxury, would not easily submit to these Spartan restraints; and the king could not venture to keep them in order as he kept his own subjects in order.

Thus act the children of this world, who are wise in their generation. And thus should act the children of light. They should

be too busy in the service of their king to have a thought for gewgaws, and too anxious for efficiency to burden themselves with superfluities.

But, after all, the most plain and direct reason for strict simplicity of expenditure is found in the fact that God has condescended to make wealth an instrument for promoting his cause, and in the urgent demands of that cause. When we consider the good that money may do, if prayerfully devoted to God's service, and the good that needs to be done, how can any one who professes to aim to love God with all his strength, and his neighbor as himself, waste any portion of it in any thing approaching superfluity? Let those to whom God has entrusted wealth, think how many destitute families there may be within their reach, who suffer acute anxieties and many destitutions from poverty, to whom a little aid would bring unspeakable relief and thankfulness. Let them think how many agencies of good near them, how many Sabbath-schools, how many poor ministers, are crippled by want of pecuniary means. Let them listen to the continual prayer of all our missionary departments for more means. Let them remember the almost countless plans and schemes of beneficence, devised by pious zeal, in which money may promote the glory of God and the good of man. Let them cast their eyes around a perishing world, where hundreds of millions are hurrying, in one generation, to eternal, irreparable destruction for lack of the gospel, and remember that money can be employed as an agency to assist in their rescue, and that their alms-giving can now be borne speedily to any remote and destitute spot on the wide field of death. And then let them ask themselves, with the cry of a perishing world in their ears, and that dread account in their eye where we must answer for having done our utmost for the rescue of our race, whether they have anything to spare for superfluities. Is it enough, when this tremendous destitution stands before us, that we shall be able to say that we have made contributions to all the usual objects of Christian alms-giving, and contributions liberal, according to the public opinion of a perverted and selfish world, while stores of wealth still remain to be wasted on objects which are required by no rational want? No, it is not enough. We have not done our duty till we have looked above and beyond the grovelling standard of self-indulgence, and have exerted the

full efficiency of all that God has entrusted to us, be it units or millions.

Could the church but be brought up to its duty, possessing as it does in all Protestant lands so large a share of the world's wealth, how would Zion prosper? While no true comfort of life would be deducted, and no rational and wholesome enjoyment lost among the rich, while the true dignity and refinement of society would be only promoted; how would the Lord's vineyard flourish? Our missionary boards, staggering under the burdens of perishing millions at home and abroad, would no longer groan for aid, but would thank God and take courage. Instead of crying for means to feed their poor, half-sustained and faithful workmen, with overflowing treasuries they would call for willing hands to approach and employ the bounty of the pious. How many hearts among the poor would sing for joy? How many useful hands and heads would be raised from obscurity and poverty, and made fruitful of good to their fellow men? The church would again advance on her grand mission of evangelism, with a power and speed fulfilling the prophetic vision of the Apocalypse, "an angel flying in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach to every nation, and kindred, and people, and tongue."

Protestants look upon the Bible as their complete and sufficient rule of duty. Hence our readers may feel that, after representing Christian economy as so strictly binding, and superfluous expenditures for things not in themselves necessarily sinful, as so clearly a sin, we should be able to show that the Bible is not silent on this subject. It is to be observed, however, that the Bible never promised to give a specific precept for every detail of duty. It is a complete rule of life, in laying down principles and precepts which, by clear and easy application, will direct us in all the details of duty. We refer our readers, accordingly, to the scriptural truths from which we set out, and demand if our application of those truths was not fair, easy and obvious. If it was, this is enough. But we are not compelled to fall back on such a reference by any dearth of specific precepts in the Bible. In Luke, xiv. 12, our Saviour expressly asserts the principle, that the rich should refrain from ostentations and unnecessary hospitalities to their equals, in order to be able to relieve the truly destitute. We see not how one who believes in plenary

inspiration, and who reverences the word of Scripture too much to tamper with its fair meaning, can make this passage anything else than an explicit prohibition of unnecessary expenditure in hospitalities. And this, too, is one of the most generous, graceful and popular modes of expenditure; the form of extravagance which men would regard as most "leaning to virtue's side." 1 Timothy and 1 Peter forbid Christian females to indulge in "gold, pearls, brodered or plaited hair, and *costly* array." A most sensible expositor has well remarked, that the prohibition would of course have been extended to the stronger sex had not the apostles taken it for granted that manliness alone would be a sufficient safeguard against such follies in them. Now, we by no means exalt the letter over the spirit so far as to interpret the apostles as meaning that curled hair would be innocent while braided hair was sinful, or to interpret them as placing obedience to the precept in the shunning of those particular follies there mentioned. But a fair interpretation cannot avoid this conclusion, that the two apostles concur in explicitly forbidding personal adornment with means expensive, either of time or money, as a thing inconsistent with Christian character. We are all aware that an accommodating exegesis has frequently come to the aid of fashionable Christianity in attempting to whittle away the point of the precepts. And among others, a recent writer has politely come to the rescue, in remarking upon the passage from Peter, by representing the gist of the apostle's meaning as this: that Christian wives may wear these follies; he, of course, does not condescend either to allow or forbid things so innocent, and unessential and trifling; but if they wear them, *they must not regard them as their ornaments*. We think it reply enough to ask, *for what* should the good ladies wear them, then? We feel sure that the female mind at least will concur with us in saying, that to forbid the wearing of any costly array *as ornament* will be a very efficient, practical prohibition of wearing it at all. Once compel people to regard it as no adornment, and they will not trouble themselves to put it on. Let the reader also consult 1 John ii. 16.

The remainder of these remarks will be devoted to considering the most common objections which are made against the principles we have advocated, and in justification of expensive habits. In this negative form some ideas may perhaps be introduced

which are of great importance as positive supports of our views.

We are well aware that the prompt objection against what we have said will be this: that if the principles we have advocated were carried out to their fair extent they would cut off everything but the baldest necessities of life and reduce society to a Gothic rudeness. Every man who would be truly consistent must be a Diogenes. The same rule which would forbid the expensive refinements of the most wealthy, if justly applied, would also cut off the cheaper refinements of middle life, and would reduce man to just so much clothing as would cover his nakedness, and that of the coarsest quality which would suffice. The very buttons on the backs of our coats must be cut off and thrown into a missionary box, because they can button nothing. And thus, as our principles prove too much, they prove nothing.

Now, what is all this but an argument to our ignorance and our prejudices? It does not disprove the Scripture rule, but only announces *fear* of it, lest it should cut deeper than the self-indulgence and weakness of the objectors possibly can or will endure. Grant that the rule, when strictly applied, should cut off all the refinements now common in Christian society, it might only prove that society has gone exceedingly far astray from its duty, (a very possible supposition, at least with those who believe in the universal depravity of human nature,) and not that the rule was false. Suppose that those who support this rule in theory, and among others the author of these remarks, should be found unwilling to follow it to the extent of cutting the buttons off the backs of their coats. It might only prove that their conduct was inconsistent with their principles, and not that their principles were wrong.

But a further and entirely satisfactory explanation of the objection will be found by recurring to what was said in defining the allowable and proper subsistence of one of God's servants. In order that he may be fitted to work most efficiently for his Master, that substance should include, not only supplies for his immediate bodily necessities, but all that promotes the most noble and perfect development of the bodily, mental and moral man. Neat and decent apparel, lodging, food, *are necessities of life*, not indeed of animal existence, but of that dignified, rational and moral existence by which God's servant is able to glorify him and

bless his fellow-men. The natural and useful accomplishments of life *are necessities of life*. They are necessary to that highest style of man by which most good is done and most honor rendered to the power of Christianity. And we do assert that the distinction between that sordid manner of life which sacrifices one's usefulness by inevitably incurring constant ridicule, contempt and dislike, and a chaste and strict simplicity, is a distinction perfectly easy to all except those who do not wish to see it. There is an extreme of simplicity in dress and living to which any man of truly respectable qualities may go without incurring inconvenient notoriety as an oddity, and without incurring necessary contempt. This is evident from the Spartan example of many noble men, of whom we may mention John Howard and Chief-Justice Marshall. And we do assert again, that this extreme of simplicity lies far, far beyond the customary style which the average of rich Christians now allow themselves. *There lies the proper line*. Any man whose heart is right can find it.

The objection we have described might be sufficiently removed even by considerations of pecuniary economy. We do not dress in blankets and live in shanties because true economy forbids it. The coarse fabric will become so worn as to admit the assaults of weather and disease so much sooner than the moderately fine and substantial cloth, that it is true economy to wear the latter. It might be possible to live in a shanty of boards; but this shanty would require to be so perpetually patched and renewed that, in the end, it would prove more expensive than a substantial brick house. And again, good taste costs no money when allowed its true, natural and chaste developments. Economy itself having dictated that we shall select for a covering a moderately good cloth, we discover that it is actually less wasteful to cut this cloth into decent and comely shape than to make a clownish botch of it. The parent of six children observes that health and decency and chastity require that his dwelling shall contain a given number of chambers. And when this is determined, he will find that a true architectural taste is perfectly at one with economy. To adopt a chaste and graceful outline for his building, in which every essential element of the construction shall be an ornament, and no ornament shall be superfluous, to protect his materials with good paint, to employ skilful mechanics who will keep out the weather by making good joints, all this is as

necessary to procuring the requisite cubic feet of house room, at the cheapest ultimate cost, as it is to true architectural taste. And anything more expensive than this is as truly a sin against pure taste as it is a sin against Christian economy.

We have thus passed to the discussion of what we had marked down as the second objection: that so stern a simplicity would cut off the indulgence and education of all the refining tastes. This objection proceeds upon the postulate, that wherever our Creator has implanted native and instinctive propensities in us, their very existence shows that there must be some innocent and proper indulgence for them somewhere. Thus: it was he who implanted hunger; there must be, therefore, some indulgence of the appetite which does not partake of the sin of gluttony. It was God who implanted the capacity for feeling indignation; there must be, therefore, such a thing as "being angry and sinning not." If every possible exercise of the propensity had been sinful, a holy Creator would not have implanted it. But surely this does not imply that every indulgence to which the perverted propensity may attach itself is therefore innocent. Is there, then, nothing by which those instinctive and refining tastes for the graceful and beautiful in form, color, and sound may be gratified, except the "costly array" of luxury? If we condemn as sinful waste the employment of a company of foreign musicians, at a cost ten-fold greater than that which would procure the labors and talents of the noblest warriors and statesmen to the nation, or at a price sufficient to feed all the starving poor of a commonwealth, shall we be charged with banishing every indulgence of musical taste when we leave to men the music of nature, of singing birds, and babbling brooks, and sighing winds, the sweet symphony which comes up with the morning breeze from the lowing kine, mixed with the ploughman's mellow song as he lounges fieldward, and the cooing of the dove in the dewy tree-top? Shall we be accused of banishing music when we leave men the inexpensive but sweet domestic concert, the song of praise to God, and the soft harmonies of children's voices? And if we forbid men to waste God's precious treasures in barbaric fineries of dress, or building, or equipage, shall we be accused of robbing them of all that is beautiful in form and tinge, when we leave them the countless beauties of sky, and earth, and sea? No. We admit that a proper cultivation of these

tastes has a true tendency, though, where unaccompanied with better agencies, a most weak and insufficient tendency, to elevate man's soul. But their proper and beneficial cultivation is by the enjoyment of the beauties and harmonies of nature. The artificial and expensive pursuit of the fine arts, as it is seen in luxurious society, tends only to substitute in place of true sensibility a nauseous affectation of taste, concealing a callousness as truly brutal as that of the Vandal. The truest and most wholesome indulgences of taste are those which nature presents to us at least cost. Luxurious indulgences deprave this capacity of our souls as truly as they waste God's property.

Again, in support of expensive living we often hear a great deal said about "the style proper to one's standing in society." And such a style is represented as necessary to distinguish the different ranks in society. The truth lies in just the opposite direction. This is just one of the chiefest social evils resulting from luxury, that it assists in confounding the proper distinctions of society. When expensiveness of living becomes the index of rank and gentility, then whoever can procure wealth, by fair means or foul, claims that rank. Thus, by this very boasted means of keeping up the proper distinctions of society, vulgar and ignorant persons are admitted into the society of the pure and well-informed, and that vilest and most despicable of all aristocracies, an aristocracy of wealth, is introduced. The consequence is, that the coarseness and low principles of the rich boors are diffused through all the circle into which their luxuriousness has introduced them. And an unrighteous standard of admission is erected, which excludes humble worth, and talent, and taste, because united with poverty. But if extravagance were disreputable and were banished from professedly virtuous society, if the rich practiced a simplicity of living equally attainable by all of moderate means, the distinctions of society would necessarily be drawn by some other criterion than wealth. They cannot possibly be drawn by any other so base and injurious.

But let us admit that the principle claimed is correct. Let us suppose that there ought to be gradations of expenditure according to the possessions and social position. The Christian who professes the obligation to use all his property for the glory of God surely ought not to assume any higher grade of expendi-

ture than is really necessary to maintain his social position. Surely he should not expend for this object, granting its propriety, more of God's wealth than is necessary, when so much is needed for the cause of God and our perishing fellow-men. Now let us take, for the sake of example, some one grade of wealth and social standing. Let it be the hundred thousand dollar men. Among this class several will be found who, either from prudence, or covert avarice, or from a sort of very sensible laziness, which is unwilling to be fatigued with pomp, spend far less than the average of their peers. They are not sordid, but they live far within their means and beneath the expenditure of similar men around them. Every large society presents such instances. Now, are these men ostracized by their class? Is their social position compromised? Is there any lack of respect when they enter the society of their equals? Not at all. The fact then proves that a higher grade of expenditure than theirs is not necessary for any social advantage. Why, then, cannot all Christians of a similar grade of wealth stop at their limit of expenditure? Even upon the mistaken grounds upon which we argue, all that goes beyond this is clearly sin. It is waste and perversion of a trust that should have been sacred to noble and blessed ends. All know how far rich Christians, even those whose religious character stands fair, go beyond that line of supposed social necessity as it is drawn by the actual facts of society. Even by this imperfect rule a great dereliction from Christian economy is proved upon the church of this day.

There is another justification for luxury which assumes a profounder air, and proceeds upon pretended grounds of political economy. It is claimed that "luxurious expenditures on the part of those who have wealth are, in fact, beneficent to the community, by encouraging and employing and paying the industry of all who produce those luxuries. "Such expenditure," it is said, "is the legitimate means for distributing again the accumulations of wealth, so that they may circulate for the common good. The rich man, therefore, who, without immoral dissipations, expends a splendid income in splendid living, is fulfilling a public duty." We unhesitatingly assert that he is a public curse. His splendid living may, in one sense, "distribute" coin or bank notes, but it is a whirlpool that absorbs and destroys public wealth, and his luxuries, instead of encouraging

and rewarding industry, only pervert it and misdirect it. We will explain.

It is the most vulgar delusion to suppose that coin or bank notes are public wealth. Every college boy knows that they are only the conventional representatives of wealth. The wealth of the community consists in the productions of the skill and labor of its citizens, exerted on material nature. If a ploughman expends a year's work in raising five hundred bushels of corn, that corn is a part of the public wealth. If an artisan expends a year's work in making a trinket worth five hundred bushels of corn, that trinket is public wealth. If the five hundred bushels of corn are exchanged with a foreign merchant for a basket or two of costly wine, that wine is a part of the public wealth. But if that trinket or wine is bought by some rich citizen for money, the community is no richer than before. The purchaser now has the item of wealth, and the seller has in its stead some coins which are not wealth, but which, being the established representative of wealth, will serve him to produce him some other item of wealth when he pleases. Now let us suppose that this rich purchaser thrusts a hole through his daughter's ear with an awl and sticks this trinket in it, where it is finally lost, or becomes worthless through change of fashion; or that he drinks up this wine at a splendid entertainment, then there is a positive and irreparable loss of public wealth. This item is forever consumed, and has left no equivalent behind it. A year's work of an industrious citizen is consumed. And the skill, industry and time of its laboring citizens are the true wealth of a community, because they alone produce wealth. The money which this rich man paid for the year's work, which has been destroyed, is not a substitute for its value to the community, because the community before possessed both the money and the commodity; now it has only the money. Every luxurious indulgence is therefore destructive of public wealth. As all political economists know, it is *unproductive consumption*. The idea on which the old sumptuary laws were partly founded, that every luxurious expenditure tends to impoverish the country, is a stubborn fact.

Let us look also at "the encouragement of industry" which such expenditures produce. We have said, what none can dispute, that the true wealth of a nation consists in the time, skill and labor of its working citizens. The public welfare, so far as

it is corporeal, consists in an adequate supply of all the objects required by man's actual and natural wants for all the people. A certain total of those objects, such as food, clothing, etc., will be necessary annually to provide for all its citizens. *Now, the only source from which the nation can draw this supply is the annual industry of its own citizens* (unless, indeed, it is engaged in predatory warfare). Some of the articles of that supply may be imported from abroad; but if so, these imports are produced, not with money, but with some product of the nation's own industry. International commerce must always be, in the main, a barter. A certain number of the working hands of the nation must therefore be evidently employed annually in the production of the supply for the natural and necessary wants of the whole people. If too few hands are employed, the supply becomes inadequate, and those who are least able to buy at increased prices suffer want. Now it is very plain, that if many of the working hands of the nation are turned aside from the production of these supplies for real wants, to producing the objects of imaginary and artificial wants, by the seduction of better wages from the rich, the result is an inadequate supply of solid values, and suffering and misery at the other extreme of society. The perversion of industry may result in an increase to the individual laborer in the shape of larger money wages, but the inevitable result to the nation at large is a deficiency of the necessities of life and consequent misery to the laboring class in general. Money fills no hungry stomach and clothes no shivering back of itself. It is only the representative of other things which do. We will illustrate. Let us suppose that the increase of luxury causes the transference of a thousand laboring hands from the production of corn or other actual values which the nation bartered for foreign corn to the production of plate and jewelry. Their wages as farm laborers were fifty cents per day, and their wages as artisans are now one dollar per day. The change has seemed to result in advantage to these thousand laborers, because their wages are better. But the total result is that there is thus much less corn in the nation to feed it, and the price of corn rises, and as many people suffer for bread as were formerly supplied by the industry of these thousand men. And the use of the plate and jewelry produced is wholly an unproductive consumption, a total and irreparable abstraction from the national

wealth, while a large part of this corn, if these laborers had been suffered to continue producing corn, would have been eaten by working men, who would have used their strength in earning wealth in some form. Thus it would have been productive consumption.

The expenditure of money on artificial wants is therefore not an encouragement, but a misdirection of industry. It results, not in the increase, but in the final destruction of portions of the public wealth. Instead of diffusing accumulated wealth for the benefit of the laboring classes, it depresses those classes in general, begets starvation, and enhances the prices of the necessities of life. The artisans who profit at the time by these expenditures of course deny these conclusions, but just as sure as there is truth in political science, or the teachings of history, they are correct in the main.

These remarks explain at once the fact, so often remarked, that in every country the extremes of destitution among the poor are equal to the extremes of accumulation among the rich. The usual results of accumulated wealth must be indulgence in luxury, and luxury begets a misapplied industry and consequent want.

A plain corollary from these truths is this, that all laws of primogeniture, and all legislation which fosters large accumulations in single hands, are hostile to public wealth and the general good of the people. That nation is always most truly rich and prosperous to whom the words of Horace apply :

"Privatus illis census erat brevis, commune magnum."

We have here an explanation also for the anomalous evils of English society. In unfolding this explanation we shall illustrate the truth we have attempted to explain. The English are an industrious nation. Their agriculture and manufactures are eminently skilful. Nowhere on earth is science made to do so large a share of the productive work of human hands; and yet, with all this teeming production, England cannot comfortably feed and clothe her people any year. We do not now allude to the effect which her taxation and naval and military expenses may produce, but only to social causes. England is distinguished above all other nations by overgrown private fortunes. The incomes of these fortunes seek channels of expenditure, and the result is that a vast portion of the productive labor of the nation is perverted to the production of supplies for artificial wants.

Her aristocracy have acted upon the mistaken policy of "encouraging industry" by splendid expenditures until the industry of the nation is crushed. Men who ought to be producers of food and clothing, or of solid values to be bartered with other nations for food and clothing, have been seduced, by the offer of better money wages, to expend their labor on ten thousand things which satisfy no actual necessity of any man: on the manufacture of jewelry, and of dress and equipage, on the building of useless palaces, on the enclosing of useless, or partially useful parks, with unnecessary iron railings, on the laborious construction and keeping of pleasure grounds, on the watching of hares and partridges, on the tending of useless horses, dogs and deer, on the driving of unnecessary vehicles, on the rendering of unnecessary menial services, and a hundred other things. Thus, myriads of hands, which ought to be producing the solid supplies for the nation's actual wants, are industrious about nothing. And although personally these attendants may receive better wages, the general result is a waste of national industry and national want.

Let none then attempt to defend expensive living on these grounds. This plea contains one of the most valid reasons against it. The Christian should feel every superfluous indulgence a sin, because its general tendency is to blight the public welfare.

We shall be asked, possibly, "What, then, do you propose? Shall the incomes of the rich be hoarded, from year to year, while they confine themselves to the frugal expenditures of this Christian economy?" We answer, by no means. Let them flow forth freely, and to the last drop; but let it be in the channels of a true and a wise beneficence. Let a reasonable share of our wealth be devoted to the improvement of the agricultural and other resources of the country, with a benevolent regard to the temporal comfort of our fellow-citizens. But above all, let it be expended with boundless liberality in the great labors of evangelism: in printing saving truth, in sustaining teachers and preachers, in diffusing knowledge at home and abroad. Thus will our superfluous wealth employ and reward the industry of multitudes of meritorious men who perform this labor of love, and, unlike the expenditure of luxury, it will not be an *unproductive* industry to which our money will entice them. There

is no labor that is more fruitful of public wealth than evangelical labors, whether in the domestic or foreign field. Every ignorant, degraded man who is enlightened and sanctified becomes at once a producer of material wealth, for he is rendered an industrious citizen. And every heathen community that is evangelized becomes a recipient and a producer of the wealth of peaceful commerce. Thus superfluous riches may be scattered, not to create a devouring vortex of the national wealth, but to become, in turn, the seed of wealth, and to bless our fellow-men and the world with temporal welfare. And above all, an income of praise and a harvest of souls may be collected for the great Giver and Owner: "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen."

BRECKINRIDGE'S THEOLOGY.

IF there is to be literary criticism, it is of the first importance to the church that it should be impartial; and with this justice no personal motive or favor should interfere. This criticism assumes to be a guide to the public opinion of Christians. If it is seduced by any motive to speak partially, it tends to corrupt public opinion, commend error, and debauch the taste of the people. Either praise or blame bestowed indiscriminately and unfairly will soon teach them to distrust such a guide, and thus the influence of this important engine for good will be lost. It might be well for the conductors of the critical press to inquire whether their rashness has not nearly produced this effect already. These thoughts, coupled with the conviction produced by a careful perusal of the book, that the notices of Dr. Breckinridge's Theology (Vol. I.), which have appeared hitherto, are mostly inaccurate and indiscriminate, determine us to exercise the right of discussing it in a more thorough and impartial manner.

There is another consideration which seems to strongly urge, if not compel, such a discussion. This book claims to be a *representative one*. On the first page of the "Preliminary Words" a representation is made which amounts to this, when stripped of its elegant and animated language: That some one great representative mind in each age has usually embodied for posterity the most fundamental and important thinking of that age; that this representative man and these representative thoughts have usually been taken from the midst of the great, master, mental movement of that age; that these are the elements which make the great literary remains of former centuries so valuable; that the disruption of 1837-'8 was the great event of our American Presbyterian world in this century; that Dr. Breckinridge was perhaps the master mind of that movement; that therefore he is

perhaps the man to write the immortal, representative book of this church in this century; and that this is perhaps the book. Now we do not so much cite this to characterize its egotism, although a passing protest should be uttered against this and other evidences of that blemish which are not unfrequent in the book. All unseemly personal passions should be sternly banished from the elevated domain of literature, and especially of religious literature. In that realm should reign a pure serenity approaching in sacredness the repose of religion, so that the denizens may meet there none but the elevated emotions and purifying influences of the region itself. In this the temple of the muse should be like the sanctuaries of religion. It is therefore always a sin against good taste and propriety for an author to introduce any personality of feeling, either that of personal self-laudation or personal malignity. Only the emotions of the great subject should be felt. But it is rather our purpose to point out that such claims as are insinuated in these "Preliminary Words" leave Presbyterians no option. They must publicly accept or reject the representative book which claims to be their exponent. If all our public expressions are those of approval, we shall, as a denomination, be held responsible for the work as a whole, and justly. For this we, for our part, are by no means ready. If there are errors or defects of marked importance, it is far better that we should speak honestly of them ourselves than be triumphantly convicted of them by rival denominations. We profess also some sensibility to the charge from without of an interested and ungraceful zeal in lauding our own prominent authors. Such praise of ourselves (as it is accounted in a sense) prompts to the suspicion of insincerity, and provokes resistance. A great denomination would better consult its true dignity by remembering somewhat the caution of Solomon, "Let another praise thee, and not thine own lips."

After waiting long in the hope that these weighty motives would move some abler hand, we shall therefore examine this work with entire candor. The claims to originality, which are not obscurely set up, the apparent depreciation of the labors of predecessors, and the manner in which the author has ever exercised the rights of criticism and reply towards others, surely justify impartial and candid investigation. To employ any other would be wrong under any circumstances. We shall not be de-

tered from independent expression of opinion by the fact (which may very possibly be asserted against us as a fixed and irreversible verdict of the public), that so many periodicals and persons have spoken of this work in terms of unmixed and extravagant praise. If any one will count the number of books and pamphlets "noticed" in one of our weeklies, and consider the distractions of an editor's life, he will be fully prepared to credit the assertion that in these critiques books are usually praised without being read. We venture the surmise, that it would be quite an amusing occupation to bring these gentlemen to the witness-stand and make them tell, "honor bright," how many of them had read three whole chapters of this book when they penned their praises. It is time, at length, that the scales of literary judgment should be handed over from those who have not read the book to those who have; the atmosphere is perhaps now sufficiently cleared from the dust raised by the first pawings and shoutings to admit some justice of vision. Nor shall we be restrained from independent judgment by the fear of any such fling as was made in one quarter against a judicious and well-informed notice of "Breckinridge's Theology," in the *North Carolina Presbyterian*, where an editor first states that he is not prepared to judge between Dr. Breckinridge and his North Carolina reviewer, and then, with equal injustice and inconsistency, pronounces judgment by insinuating the charge of spite and perversion of testimony. That one who, like us, has ever been an almost enthusiastic admirer of Dr. Breckinridge's talent and eloquence, and, ten times more than most of these laudatory journalists, an advocate of his ecclesiastical principles and services, should regard such innuendoes in the exercise of that right of criticism which every author challenges in the very act of asking the public attention to his book, is a thought only calculated to produce a smile. Americans, and Presbyterians least of all, are not wont to be thus governed. As the public notices of the work have hitherto been marked by almost unmixed praise, we naturally begin by stating some of those defects in the book which compel us to dissent from that praise. We shall not be understood, we hope, as having found no points in which we can cheerfully concur in it.

1. The first of those grounds of dissent which obtrudes itself on the reader consists of the frequent grammatical and rhetorical

blemishes. These are the more surprising, because the author has, both elsewhere and in this book, so often written, not only with nerve and eloquence, but with precision. But here many sentences are positively incomplete in structure. The last sentence in the first paragraph of Dr. Breckinridge's "Preliminary Words," contains three participles which have no nouns, expressed or implied. Inadvertences of this kind, and others similar, are repeated in numerous cases, which it is not needful to weary the reader by quoting. This book would often fail to stand the good, old-fashioned test of correct grammar, that the sentences shall all admit of being correctly parsed throughout. There are participles having no nouns, and a number of sentences in which there is no verb for the subject. Should the book meet that classical destiny which some of its admirers predict for it, and should it be employed as other English classics have been for a text-book in parsing, we sincerely pity the urchins who are required on peril of the birch to construe its unparsable passages. Another frequent defect is the holding of the sense suspended through long, compound sentences,—a structure condemned by the canons of rhetoric, and one which mars perspicuity, and greatly increases the labor of comprehension for the reader. Still another blemish seems to have arisen from the unguarded indulgence of that propensity to which animated popular speakers are liable, of lavishing intense epithets to strengthen the expression. Thus, in this book, a multitude of things are declared to be "infinite," "stupendous," or "immense." It is not only said (on p. 158), but deliberately argued, that Christ performed an "immense" number of miracles in person. If this were true, then miracles would have ceased to be miracles, and common instances of natural law would have had a better claim to be considered such. On p. 271, § 7, it is said that the *knowledge that we may gain* of God's being is "immense." On p. 369, it is said that the facts of God's personality, unity, spirituality and trinity, are "stupendous." The fact that human nature was created in the divine image is also called, along with sundry others, a "stupendous" fact. To a plain man, who regards that which is stupendous (from *stupere*) as something which paralyzes with fear, it is hard to see how this truth, however important or joyful, can be justly described as "stupendous." On the page last mentioned, which was selected at random, we find the pet adjective,

"infinite," four times, besides "transcendently," "stupendous" twice, and "boundless." The language of a scientific work should be characterized by accuracy rather than the exaggerations of the popular speaker. Such phrases in such a work often violate truth as well as taste. These things, together with the vague and changing senses in which metaphysical terms are employed (*e. g.*, that much-abused word "absolute"), cause the surmise that the author's mind has not been carefully trained to philosophic studies.

It may be urged in defence that these blemishes of style are but spots on the face of the sun, so that it is a trivial criticism to notice them amidst merits so much higher. We reply, that we have noticed them not as great defects, but still as defects. True, a dull man may be accurate in style who is incapable of Dr. Breckinridge's thought or eloquence. But we conceive that the correct way for judging such a blemish is that which a sensible pedagogue of our acquaintance applied to a vain urchin indifferent to his wretched spelling and proud of his Latinity. "If spelling well is so commonplace that its possession confers little honor, then certainly its lack is *all the greater discredit* to one who boasts higher accomplishments."

2. To proceed to matters more serious. The classification of this book is as inconvenient and faulty as it is novel. In a science the objects of method are such as these: to secure completeness of view, to set all the truths deduced in their most luminous and logical relations among themselves, to secure the introduction of each point just where its discussion is most needed and will most facilitate subsequent steps, and thus to promote at once brevity, facility and accuracy. A moment's reflection must convince the well-informed theologian, in advance of any examination of this book, that the author has adopted a division of his whole subject which he must break at almost every step in order to get on. For at every step the objective (Vol. I.) and the subjective (Vol. II.) must mingle themselves in inextricable union in any possible discussion. How does the author himself begin his objective volume of the treatise? By subjective statements as to man's moral condition. He says, in the beginning of his argument of his first book, "To know our own nature and condition is the first step towards making this knowledge of God available." Is not this knowledge of ourselves subjective? The

chapter which treats of the being and nature of God begins with another set of subjective truths: man's consciousness of his own existence and of a world external to himself; his consciousness of the distinction of matter and spirit, and his rational intuitions. The writer, if we understand him, proposes as the topic of his fourth book, the knowledge of God which we acquire, as distinguished from the things known therein. We will not pause to remark farther upon the frequent departures from this topic throughout the book as constituting a violation of his own method. But it is obvious that, just so far as he adheres to this topic, he is treating a subjective aspect of the matter. And the twenty-third chapter, the first of this book, is little less than a statement of the subjective states and intuitions, mental and moral, which must be at the base of all religious knowledge; a statement indeed manly and comprehensive, and exhibiting the highest excellences of the writer's manner. Again: one of the means by which God makes himself known to us is said to be the new creation, which is made the subject of a whole chapter in this book. Must not the soul's apprehension of its own regeneration be all subjective? And so throughout this "objective" volume we find nearly as much of the subjective as of the objective. And we may safely predict that the second volume, which promises to treat "the subjective," will be found, when it appears, fully as much objective. The division is unpractical and impracticable.

But the effects of the author's compliance with it have been worse than those of his breaches of it. The abortive attempt to preserve the method has compelled the postponement of matters which should have been discussed, if at all, near the beginning. Thus, the whole evidence for the inspiration of the Bible is deferred to the third volume; and meantime, almost every step assumes the Bible to be true. Not only is this proceeding unsatisfactory to one not yet convinced of such capital points, but there is always a fatal scientific objection to the delay of those demonstrations which are fundamental to all the subsequent. When such capital points are assumed for the present as proved, and a superstructure of many varied propositions is built on that assumption, the reasoner will almost inevitably employ some of these propositions proved by the help of the assumption, when at length he comes to prove the point assumed; and thus his

whole process will be a vicious circle. It would seem also that Dr. Breckinridge's attempt to postpone all polemical work to its proposed place in the third volume has caused him to omit, or exceedingly to maim, a number of other discussions. But can any proposition be proved, without directly or indirectly assailing the opposite? And if this distribution into objective, subjective, and relative was to prevail in other questions, why not stick to it in all? The chapter on the being of a God is polemical, for it is against the atheist. That chapter which gives a fragment of the old, familiar argument for Christ's divinity is polemical also, for it assails the Socinian. The only result of the attempted method is, that a very incomplete view is given of a demonstration which any intelligent Presbyterian minister would present with respectable completeness.

Another effect of the endeavor to carry out this division has been to dis sever the presentation of divine truths from their practical operations on the soul, in a most mischievous manner. For instance, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost is the basis of that of sanctification; but the former is objective, while the graces of the latter are subjective states of the soul. And so the discussion of them all must be separated by a volume from those truths on which they immediately depend. Christ, the object of faith, and faith, the subjective act which embraces him, must be divorced by the space of a whole volume. But why multiply illustrations? The book is full of them.

Cicero somewhere defines religion as a "religatio," a binding back of the soul to God, by its relations to him. Our Catechism says: "The Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." All revealed theology is, then, eminently a science of relations; for the objective and subjective truths which it teaches concerning God and man all have their value in the relations which exist between them. It is *our* God, a God related to us, of whom our theology teaches. A God not related to us at all is practically no God. Has not the Epicurean theology been always judged equal to atheism? The words objective and subjective do express a difference in the aspect of truths making up Christian theology; but the same truth is objective, subjective, or relative, according to the point of view. It is therefore to us a simple matter of astonishment that any one should have dreamed of making them

the basis of a division in the practical treatment of a science. As well might one talk of separating the doctrines of *plus* and *minus* in algebraic equations into two distinct volumes. The subjective, objective and relative must perpetually intermingle in every apprehension of truth: how can they be separated into different volumes in the discussion? In the one and same cognition, it is the subject which apprehends, and the objective truth which is apprehended; and a relation is then felt between subject and object. They cannot be separated without suppressing the cognition. But when the author comes to define the third or "relative" part of his treatise, we learn, to our surprise, that he does not employ the term in its established, philosophic meaning, but that he means by it Polemic Theology! "Well," it may be answered, "a writer is entitled to employ an old word in a new sense, provided he defines it." We rejoin, that however justifiable this may be in usual cases, the propriety of altering causelessly the established nomenclature of science may well be questioned. But if it is proposed to treat under the term, Relative Theology, truths in contrast with their opposite errors, as a separate division, then the objections above indicated remain in full force against the method. Truth cannot be taught at all without opposing the related error; so that, in this sense, all inculcation of truth is "relative," or polemic. This was not what the old divines meant by Polemic Theology.

In a word, the writer had no sooner adopted his novel classification, than he found it impracticable; if he would budge at all, he must do so by violating it at almost every step. It would have been well if he had not been misled by the determination to be original, and had been content with some method which the wisdom and experience of ages have approved. There are some roads so straight and beaten that they cannot be departed from save at the expense of going wrong.

3. When we proceed to the book itself, we find sundry points for which we would be unwilling that we, or the Presbyterian denomination, should be held responsible by our silence. But when we speak of defects, or actual errors in discussion, we would by no means be understood to imply that the book is heretical in the grave sense of that word. Dr. Breckinridge's soundness in the faith generally is so well known, and has been proved in so many ways, that any attempt on our part to assail

or defend it would only excite a smile; and we would here emphatically say, once for all, that the great ruling points of theology, which must ever decide the essential difference between Pelagian and Calvinist, such as the total depravity of man, the need of a proper divine intervention to repair it, the true divinity of the Mediator, are stated with a manly boldness, and a comprehensive view of their importance, which have given us the highest pleasure.

But in a master work, we are entitled to expect not only orthodoxy, but accuracy. To claim the former for Dr. Breckinridge is claiming no more than every Presbyterian minister is expected to possess of course. There may be errors of discussion not affecting the orthodoxy, which yet are worthy of note, because they may have evil effects. And first, we object to Dr. Breckinridge's mode of demonstrating the being of God. It will be noticed that, on page 56, the author states that this mode is one of his own construction. To assist its inspection we will state briefly and fairly in our own words the writer's steps. They are substantially these:

If there had ever been a time when nothing at all existed, there never would have been anything at any subsequent time. But something does exist, at least the inquiring, thinking I; therefore something or other has existed from eternity. Here the author pauses to draw the familiar old inference, that atheism is indemonstrable, because a finite creature never can prove that among these somethings, some of which must have been eternal, there may not be a God. Next. Our necessary intuition divides all known substances, numerous and multiform as they are, into two classes, matter and spirit. Therefore one of three propositions must be true: either some spirit existed from eternity and produced other spirits and all matter, or some matter existed eternally and produced other matter and all spirits, or something of matter and spirit united existed eternally, and produced all things. Which of the three is true? The first, says Dr. Breckinridge; because we are conscious that we, compounded of matter and spirit, did not create ourselves or anything else. It is equally clear to us that we were not created by any lower form of being than ourselves, such as an animal, or a being animal and spiritual compounded, but, on the contrary, by some being greatly superior to us. Was this superior substance which

created us pure spirit, or mixed like us? Not mixed, because man, the highest being known to be compounded of spirit and matter, cannot create; and matter cannot create mind; therefore it must have been spirit which was *efficient* in the first creation. If then matter was also eternal, it was wholly inert in creation, either by itself or united to spirit. Has matter existed along with spirit from eternity, but thus inert? No, says Dr. Breckinridge, because the very nature of a *first cause* implies that it is single; because whatever mystery is found in the supposition of an eternal first cause is doubled by supposing two; and because it is unphilosophical to introduce the supposition of a second original cause when it is needless. Hence matter which is neither a first nor an efficient nor a creative cause, cannot possibly be an eternal cause; it must be an effect. And therefore the first eternal something, the creative cause of other things, must have been pure spirit. Last, this spirit must be equal to all that we find him doing, and infinite in power, life, glory and perfections, for the extent and skill of his created works imply this.

We urgently request the reader to compare this statement with Dr. Breckinridge's chapter, and see for himself whether it is a correct abstract of his argument. Now, we find its first position solid, for it is the basis assumed by the ablest moral reasoners, such as Howe and Samuel Clark. But in Dr. Breckinridge's second step this objection arises: since the distinction between mind and matter is assumed as the necessary postulate, the whole subsequent proof is worthless to the pure idealist and to the materialist; or else, to have any force with these classes, the author must assume, in advance, all the difficulties of these two great inquiries and dispose of them. Is this politic? The question is not whether *we* can admit the postulate that matter and mind are, self-evidently, distinct substances, for we do admit it. But multitudes of thinking men are pure idealists, and some are sincerely materialists. The question is, whether it is forensically wise to give it up, as Dr. Breckinridge seems to do, that to them the existence of a God cannot be proved? Is it wise to make this grand moral truth any more dependent than is absolutely necessary on metaphysical propositions which, whether they ought to be questioned or not, many men do question?

But again, the whole subsequent process is here vitiated as a rigid proof (which Dr. Breckinridge claims it to be), by a tacit

assumption. It proceeds thus: All the multiform substances *known to us* fall into two classes, matter and spirit. Does this authorize us to claim that there *cannot have been*, from all eternity, nor in all the universe, any other substance? Surely not. Surely the atheist might here retort on Dr. Breckinridge in the method of his own corollary, and say, "Before man can demonstrate that there cannot be, in all the vast universe, and in all infinite time, anything substantially unlike the two substances known to him, he must himself be infinite in knowledge." Yet it is most evident that Dr. Breckinridge's whole subsequent process rests on this assumption, for otherwise there might be other hypotheses than the three alternative ones which he says exhaust the possibilities of the case. We cannot perfectly demonstrate the being of God by starting with such an assumption. But waiving this fatal *faux pas*, we urge further, the proof that it must have been pure spirit which existed eternally and created all other things is wholly inconclusive on two essential points. It is worthless to exclude the Peripatetic theory, that organization and reproduction have been from eternity, and the Platonic hypothesis of eternal inert, chaotic matter. Of the former theory, indeed, the author takes no distinct notice. Now, let the reader consider if the making of this supposition, "that the regular operation of natural causes in a finite series, somewhat as we now see them, has been from eternity," would not wholly break down the author's reasoning? And is that supposition wholly answered by him? There is no hinting of any of those profound arguments which Howe, Clark, and Robert Hall judged so necessary to rebut this supposition, and which seem to us, whether conclusive or not, to embrace all that the human mind has hitherto devised on this subject. But again: the considerations seem to us very inconclusive by which Dr. Breckinridge attempts to prove that only a pure spirit can create. Surely the fact that we are not aware of a power to create anything is very far from a *demonstration* that no higher being composed in whole or in part of some other substance than spirit can possibly have power to create. If this inappropriate line of argument is pursued, it can be used with more analogical force against Dr. Breckinridge's conclusion than for it; for, whatever is the inscrutable nature of the creative act, it is an act of causation—it implies power in the efficient. But so far as the analogy of man's natural knowledge goes, his ma-

terial body is the necessary instrument or medium, not the source, of all his exercises of power. And whenever the tie is severed between any human spirit and its body, all experimental evidences to us of any exercises of power by that spirit cease for ever. Especially is this true of that power which seems to approach nearest to the creative, generative power. So that, if we make our appeal to human experience in the manner Dr. Breckinridge makes it, all the analogy would go to prove that the union of matter to spirit does facilitate its efficiency, and so may possibly promote or even be essential unto its power to create. The spirituality of the first cause must be proved in some other way than this. Such a way might have been easily found in the familiar treatises.

As to the Platonic theory of creation, that both the intelligent Creator and the inert material must be from eternity, Dr. Breckinridge seems at this part of his argument to attempt the proof of no more than this: "If matter has been eternal, it has been inefficient as a cause of other existences. And the very conception of a first cause is that it be single, while the supposition of a second original cause doubles the mystery, and is philosophically unreasonable, because needless." Now all this is utterly inconclusive as against a Platonist; for the Platonist did not conceive of eternal, chaotic matter as a *cause* in the sense of Dr. Breckinridge's proposition; that is, as a *source of power*, but as the passive recipient of causation, the inert, powerless, negative material, on which the first cause and all second causes operate. Let the Platonic conception of causation, as a phenomenon necessarily implying an object as much as an agent preëxistent, be supposed—and Dr. Breckinridge has not excluded its possibility by anything in his argument,—and the presence of matter inefficient, along with efficient spirit, from eternity, becomes most philosophical and necessary. Let the Platonic postulate be (I do not say granted, but) only held not self-contradictory, viz., that the bringing of any real substance into existence out of nothing is inconceivable and impossible—*ex nihilo nihil fit*. Then the creative act, performed in time, as much acquires a preëxistent material, as a preëxistent Creator, so that the mystery of a substance from eternity is not doubled, but greatly, yea, essentially relieved by the supposition of eternal, inert matter. And be it noticed, that Dr. Breckinridge's argument contains not one

word or one idea to disprove the possibility or even reasonableness of that postulate. How reasonable it did seem to man's unassisted intuitions appears from this, that every thinking pagan mind, Pythagorean, Platonist, Stoic, Peripatetic, held it, or something of the same kind still stronger, as an axiom. Surely, when this postulate seems so reasonable to the natural mind, and so utterly explodes all Dr. Breckinridge's reasoning, if granted, his argument is most inconclusive until that point is settled. Profound modern divines have proposed rational arguments to prove that inert matter cannot be from eternity, such as these: that if from eternity it must be necessary, self-existent and independent, and so immutable and not amenable to the moulding power of another substance no more self-existent than itself; or that, if necessary, it must be infinite and immense, whereas that which has dimension must have limits; or that the obvious adaptation of matter to the purposes of the designing first cause gives us a similar ground to conclude that he is the author of its organization. Whether these reasonings are entirely conclusive, it is not necessary for us to determine. Perhaps it is beyond the power of man's unaided reason to decide this point, and God's creation of all things out of nothing must ever remain purely a doctrine of revelation, as it was first discovered to man by revelation. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." (Heb. xi. 3.)

In conclusion, we cannot but regard that which is new in this argument for the being of God as inconclusive. It would have been better if the author had not only begun and ended with Howe in his "Living Temple," but had followed him throughout. His alterations from Howe have not been improvements.

4. The chapter on the "Immortality of Man" also contains much that is inconclusive, and several errors less innocent than mere *non-sequiturs*.

The writer begins by roundly rebuking all previous moralists, because they have limited the rational arguments on this subject to the immortality of the *soul*. They have done this, we are told, in imitation of the poor, blind pagans, who had no means of knowing the resurrection of the body. And in doing so they have narrowed their ground in a senseless way, and surrendered much of both the strength and interest of their subject. Now, we beg

leave to hint that it is not the most modest thing in the world to speak thus, when such men as Bishop Butler have maturely concluded that this was the best method in which to consider the merely rational arguments for a future existence. And we venture to add that this reproach of them is captious and causeless, and that it will appear that the "better way" remains still to be discovered, even after the publication of this chapter on the "Immortality of Man." If we appeal to the Scriptures we find the life and immortality of both soul and body there brought to light, and we accept them as truths with joyful and implicit confidence on God's mere word. But are there any reasons for our inquiring what *mere natural reason* says of man's future existence? Would it gain us, for instance, the pleasure and comfort of seeing two converging lines of evidence, reason and Scripture, tending to the same truth? Would it help to commend God's truth to every man's conscience? Is it desirable to evince the essential part of this great truth to those unhappy men who reject the authority of God's word? Does Dr. Breckinridge dispute the propriety of making such an inquiry at all? No, he attempts it himself in this very chapter. But if the inquiry be made it must for the present be limited to this: what does *mere reason* say? For if we are going to claim any authority for our conclusions over the conscience of him who denies the truth of Scripture, or if we wish to claim the advantage of the convergence between the rational evidence and the scriptural evidence, we must for the present consider the rational evidence by itself, else our results will be utterly sophistical; or if we do not care to accomplish either of these objects, we should leave out the rational argument wholly; we may all concur in compiling a discussion which shall consist of nothing but Scripture proof texts. And now, if we are to consider fairly the rational arguments for a future state, they *must be* limited for the time to the immortality of *the soul*, because all the natural analogies or other premises from which we reason apply only to the soul, and owe their whole force to a careful discrimination between the properties of the soul and the body. Concerning the future resurrection and existence of the body reason has no light. The indestructibility of the atoms of matter, if proved, proves nothing for the immortality of those organisms called bodies; or if it proves anything, might prove it equally of the bodies of brutes, and even of veget-

ables. But we can prove the *possibility* of the soul's existence separate from the body. We can show the contrast between its properties as a monad, not organized nor discernible, and those of organized bodies. And thus the argument for the *immortality of souls* is made possible. We venture to assert, then, that Bishop Butler has done a very sensible thing in arguing concerning the soul alone "just for the nonce," because this is the only way in which it can be argued at all. Again: all sound moralists teach just what our Saviour did when he said (Luke ix. 24, 25), in substance, that a man might save his *life* and yet lose *himself*; that is, they teach that the soul, discriminated from the body, is the *ego*, the sentient, conscious being, the true moral agent, the true subject of blame, and of the misery which is the penalty of it. The body is its tabernacle and instrument, so that if the immortality of the soul is proved, the essential point is proved, the basis of moral responsibility is well laid; in a word, all the more essential moral ends of the argument are gained. The censorious objections to the common method are therefore unfounded, and have evidently sprung from the disposition so often manifested in this book, to find a novel track, right or wrong, rather than from any mature consideration.

But this suggests a more serious error. On page 61 the author very properly repeats, and in animated, eloquent language, the familiar old truth, that our whole interest in a future existence depends on the continuance of our proper and conscious identity. But he then most preposterously asserts, that the united immortal existence of body as well as soul is essential to a proper, conscious personal identity. And to foreclose the apology of a *lapsus lingue*, the assertion is repeated afterwards in another emphatic form. Is it not the soul, then, which is the proper seat of feeling and consciousness? Is not the true identity that of the sentient, acting, thinking spirit, rather than of the changing organism which is its tabernacle? Perhaps we have here a result of Dr. Breckinridge's preference for Locke, his preferred text-book in mental science when at Jefferson College, whose mischievous analysis of personal identity into a result of mere consciousness has been so long exploded. Truly, this is a psychology which (to borrow a much-abused word from Dr. Breckinridge, applicable however here with strict accuracy,) will lead to "immense" results. One of these results will obviously be, that the disem-

bodied saints, between their death and resurrection, can have no proper identity, and therefore no proper moral concern in the conduct of their life, or in its retributions. During that long season, identity is suspended, and, consequently, the enjoyment of rewards and experience of penalties. God need not pour out any glory on Abel, Noah, Abraham, Moses, to reward their faith, during these thousands of years; for they have no proper identity as yet, and will not feel the relevancy of the recompense. So God has not yet laid one stroke of righteous punishment on Cain, Dathan, or Judas; for they would not feel they were smitten for what they themselves did. Is it possible that Dr. Breckinridge means to accept these consequences, which are repugnant both to Scripture and the Confession of Faith? We suppose, of course, he does not. Will he explain by saying that he only meant to utter a forcible and rhetorical expression of this idea: that he conceives man will possess an identity somewhat more entire, one both mental and personal, one which will heighten our conception of propriety and relevancy in God's retributive acts towards him, when his soul is reunited to his body? It is a pity he did not add something, as he has not done, to limit the inexperienced reader to this idea.

The author then proceeds, on p. 63, to put forth another astounding statement with equal distinctness. It is asserted that the resurrection and immortality of the bodies of the wicked is a result of the union of human nature to Christ in the covenant of grace, just as the fall of all men and their death, bodily and spiritual, were the result of their union to Adam in the covenant of works. It is expressly asserted, that it is impossible to say the wicked would have risen if Christ had not assumed human nature. And this negative statement is then strengthened into the positive by asserting the sense above stated for 1 Cor. xv. 22: "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Now, if these statements of Dr. Breckinridge are correct, it follows that, if God had provided no Saviour when man fell, there would have been no bodily resurrection at all. Is such a conclusion true or scriptural? Do the Scriptures represent that there is any vital or gracious union of the reprobates to Christ, by virtue of which they enjoy a corporeal resurrection? Is it not the result solely of the almighty and sovereign power of God put forth to prepare them for righteous retribution? But we

were informed by Dr. Breckinridge, in a previous paragraph, that without the resurrection of the body the proper identity is impossible, which is necessary to make retribution in a future state at all relevant. Hence, had God determined that when man fell into bodily and spiritual death by sin he would furnish no redemption for a part, none would have had a bodily resurrection, and consequently none would have had a proper identity, so that future punishment would have had no appropriateness in any case. Of course none would have been imposed. The author, of course, does not intend to favor the Universalists; but in his own exposition of 1 Cor. xv. 22, he is precisely on their ground. The sound, old-fashioned divines have usually interpreted the twenty-second verse in the light of the twenty-first, and have taught that the two terms expressing universality ("all in Adam," "all in Christ") meant, in each case, all those federally connected with the respective heads, so that the "all in Adam" are all those connected with him by the covenant of works; and the "all in Christ" are all those connected with him by spiritual union in the covenant of grace. The Universalists persist in making the terms absolutely universal in both cases; and therein Dr. Breckinridge is of their mind. It will avail little for him to distinguish, and say in addition, that the connection of the wicked with Christ's person taught in this place is different from that of the righteous, and extends only to a corporeal resurrection for retributive purposes; for the Universalists would say (with truth) that Paul makes no distinction between the different persons who make up the "all in Christ" as to the vitality and benefits of their union to him. And they would prove from the context that Paul evidently intends a connection of the "*all*" with Christ as efficient for good as the union of the "*all*" with Adam was for their ruin. Was not the death which all died in Adam spiritual as well as bodily? And should not the life which all regain in Christ be therefore understood to mean spiritual as well as bodily life, regeneration of souls as well as resurrection of body? Once more, the "*all*" who are made alive in Christ are clearly identical with "them that are Christ's" in the twenty-third verse; but the phrase, "they that are Christ's," usually means the redeemed. So that Dr. Breckinridge, by adopting this rash notion, delivers himself and us over, bound hand and foot (no doubt unintentionally), to the Universalists.

A part of the reasonings of the remainder of this chapter seems to us very inconclusive. Thus the immortality asserted for man is defined as an immortality in exactly that mode of existence in which he was created, sinned, fell and died; that is, an immortality of soul and body united in their present union. So far well; but an attempt is then made (pp. 64, 65) to prove it by man's consciousness of his spirituality and of his materiality. It is argued, he knows he is a spirit, he knows that he has a body, he knows that the two are essentially different, and yet he feels that both combined make up his personality. Hence he is represented as concluding validly, that the continued existence of his personality must include that of both soul and body united. If this means that man's conscious identity includes necessarily a bodily identity, then it is false. If it does not, it contains no valid proof of the inference. We repeat the obvious truth, which Dr. Breckinridge admits even in this section, seemingly unconscious of its contradiction to his own inference, that if a bodily identity is necessary to a conscious identity, it is impossible that any soul now in heaven or hell can feel its identity before the last day, which is untrue.

It is then argued that the soul, being immaterial, cannot be destroyed except by the annihilating power of its Maker. And so, matter being indestructible, and the resurrection of the body being assured to us by the Scriptures, the subsequent destruction of the latter is equally impossible, except by annihilation. But as God has not given us any reason in revelation to expect such annihilation in either case, the presumption lies wholly in favor of the immortal existence of both soul and body united. Now, on this attempted argument we remark, first, that it is wholly superfluous. Nobody who had admitted a future resurrection of the body on Bible testimony will then contest the continued existence of it afterwards. For everybody understands that if the Bible says man's body will rise again, it means of course that it will be raised to die no more, except those absurd heretics who assert the final annihilation of both soul and body in hell. Where, then, was the use of arguing the immortality of the body when raised, from the fact of its resurrection coupled with the soul's immortality, when nobody who admits the last two facts can possibly have any interest in denying the first? But second, the argument is unsound, for it is not true that a resurrec-

tion body cannot be again destroyed except by annihilation. Is that body material? Is it not then organized? Is not a diamond as truly an aggregation of particles of carbon as a lump of charcoal, though so much more splendid, and can it not be dissipated by oxygen and heat as truly as the charcoal? Is it perfectly possible, on natural grounds, that the glorified body might be destroyed by a separation of its atoms like any other organism? The fact that the ultimate atoms are imperishable no more proves that it cannot die than it proves a dog immortal. The resurrection body, like man's earthly body, will be sustained in existence by the upholding providence of God, and if that providence permitted it might again die by dissolution. The doctrine of the resurrection and endless life of the body is purely one of revelation. Let us joyfully accept it on that ground, and all is said that can be said in proof of it.

It is worthy of remark, that Dr. Breckinridge, on pages 66-69, uses some of the feeblest of those rational arguments which had been employed by the common current of moral writers before him, and which he began by decrying. He leaves out the strongest and best, which are drawn from man's moral nature and conscience. And those which he employs bear, with that degree of probable evidence which they possess, on the immortality of *the soul*. There is a consideration which commends to us the doctrine of a resurrection of the body when once it is brought to light in the Scriptures. This is the obvious propriety of the soul's being rewarded or punished in and by the same body in which it had lived and obeyed or rebelled. Dr. Breckinridge does not distinctly mention this.

5. On page 96, language at least incautious is employed concerning the mediatorial person of Christ. This person is correctly defined as of two natures united, but not confounded; but it is then said that we must not divide the two natures, even in contemplation, as to anything that related to the mediatorial work. If this means that we must not conceive the personal union as broken in the doing of any of those acts which either nature performed, it is correct. But if the language means, what every reader would naturally understand by it, that we must not distinguish, even in thought, between the natures which were immediately concerned in this or that act of Christ, it is impracticable and unscriptural. Surely it was only the human nature

which "grew in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man!" Surely it was only the human nature which was baptized without measure with the Spirit as a preparation for his work! Surely it was only the human part that "knew not the day nor the hour" which God designed for the consummation of all things! Surely it was the human alone which suffered, feared, wept, and died for us! Can *God* feel these things? True, the value and dignity of these acts of the human nature are accounted infinite, because the nature which wrought them was united to a divine person. But this is another thing than the one seemingly intended. We mention this instance of incautious statement, not because of its own importance so much as because it is a specimen of what frequently occurs in the volume.

6. On pages 123 to 127, where the author is treating of the mediatorial estates of Christ, he professes himself somewhat dissatisfied with the customary distinction of our Saviour's "humiliation and exaltation." He therefore proposes another, which is signified to be of his own devising, founded on the doxology with which the Lord's prayer is closed in Matthew vi. 13: "For thine is the *kingdom*, and the *power*, and the *glory* for ever." The phrase "kingdom," according to Dr. Breckinridge, embraces the season of Christ's personal ministry on earth. The "power" describes the season from his ascension (or probably from Pentecost) till his second coming, a season which is supposed to be peculiarly distinguished by the effusion of spiritual power. And the "glory" signifies all the time from Christ's second coming to eternity.

The author claims that this new distribution of Christ's estates is much more accurate and complete than the former, and more fruitful of instructive inferences, as well as more illustrative of the applications of Messianic prophecy. He considers it also rather a lucky thing that the authors of the old distribution (into the estates of humiliation and exaltation) did not go so far wrong, but that the readjustment of theological language and ideas to his classification, which will have to take place, may be made without any violent change of nomenclature.

Now there are two things to be remarked about this new distribution, which will make the reader consider it rather a queer thing. One is, that the words on which it is founded are very possibly not a part of the word of God at all, but an interpola-

tion of some early copyist. Without fully discussing their genuineness, it is sufficient to say that they are not found in the Lord's prayer in Luke; and such are the marks of spuriousness in this place in Matthew, that, of four esteemed modern critics, Griesbach, Scholz and Lachmann expunge them incontinently, as no part of the word of God, and Knapp marks them doubtful. Now we profess no warm sympathy with the expunging verdicts of the critical editors of the sacred text; we lean always towards the old *textus receptus* where we can. But what will be thought of this attempt to build a theological classification solely on the basis of one disputed text, which many devout Christians believe to be no Scripture, and which all the best informed regard as somewhat doubtful? Shall we attempt to explain it by supposing Dr. Breckinridge ignorant of these doubts? We shall not make any supposition.

Our second remark is, that if this text is Scripture, as every personal feeling would incline us to wish to regard it, it certainly does not mean what Dr. Breckinridge finds in it. Its scope obviously is, to express the ground or reason upon which the petitioner urges the previous requests. It is as though he said: "We ask these things, our Father, because, being forever possessed of the kingdom, power and glory, thou art able to answer." That the three words do not describe three stages, successive to each other in Christ's mediatorial life, is made as clear as the sun by the text itself; for the Being addressed is said to possess all three "forever"; and, therefore, all three together. The Being addressed in this prayer is not the Son our Mediator, as Dr. Breckinridge considers, but the Father as representative of the whole deity, as is proved by our Saviour's own words in John xvi. 24, "Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name," etc. And thus Presbyterians have ever held, arguing as they did that the Lord's prayer could not be a liturgy binding on us, because it contained no reference to a Mediator. Dr. Breckinridge very naively remarks that there cannot be a case found where the words *dunamis* and *doxa* are used to describe the kingdom of Christ while he was personally ministering to it. Very true, because there cannot be found a case where they are used to describe it at all. But we can find more than thirty instances where the word *basileia*, restricted by Dr. Breckinridge to the kingdom during Christ's personal ministry, is applied to it in the

New Testament after the resurrection and ascension. Again, Dr. Breckinridge supposes that the word *dunamis*, expresses the season of the power of the Holy Ghost, extending from Pentecost to Christ's second coming, and manifested in the prevalence of his converting influences. But if there is anything established about this word in the New Testament exposition, it is that, when applied to spiritual efficiency, *dunamis* signifies rather miraculous than converting effects. But these miraculous effects, says Dr. Breckinridge himself, were most frequent during Christ's personal ministry (the *basileia*, according to him), and we know that in our day (still a part of the *dunamis*, according to him), they are wholly wanting. This specimen of *exegesis* we shall not venture to characterize. No sensible commentator, who has supposed the words to be genuine, ever made any difference or difficulty about the meaning, so far as we are informed. Look, for instance, into the two most judicious, Calvin and Scott; the obvious sense is, that the child of God addresses his prayer to him, because he forever possesses kingly authority over the worlds of nature and grace, almighty power, and divine perfections and honors. These make him the proper object of worship.

But the classification itself is nearly as bad as the exposition on which it rests. According to the old division, the estate of humiliation was divided from that of the exaltation by the resurrection. And here there was a marked, a decisive transition, by which our Lord passed from his subjection in the humble form of humanity, to his glory as divine king in the universe, and head over all things to the church. From that time forth his exaltation is properly divine, and therefore substantially the same. A partial progress takes place in its manifestations, as his kingdom of grace is gradually extended over the earth, and then transferred to his own presence; but from the resurrection onward the attitude and state of the mediatorial Person is divinely regal. There is henceforth no essential change. But according to the division proposed by Dr. Breckinridge the periods of his career are not marked off in any such decisive way. The third is but a continuation of the second.

7. The next point upon which we shall touch is Dr. Breckinridge's enumeration and classification of the attributes of God. He begins by saying that, as God is an infinite being, not only is every perfection in him infinite, but the number of them is also

infinite, and those mentioned in the Scriptures are almost countless. The reader will be prepared, therefore, to expect a cumbersome list. We do not know how we can make intelligible what we have to say on this complicated exhibition of the attributes better than by presenting it to the reader in a kind of tabular view. We request him to examine it attentively, assuring him that it represents Dr. Breckinridge's distribution with tolerable correctness, and erring, if at all, only by some slight omission. There are five main divisions, subdivided as follows :

I. Primary attributes ; *i. e.*, qualifying God's very being—

Embracing----	{	1. Simplicity.
		2. Infinitude.
		3. Independence.
		4. Self-existence.
		5. Necessary existence.
		6. Eternity.
		7. Incorporeity.
		8. Immateriality.
		9. Immeasurability.
		10. Incomprehensibility.
		11. Life in himself.
		<i>And the like.</i>

II. Essential attributes ; *i. e.*, qualifying God as an *infinite Spirit*—

Embracing----	{	1. Intellect, under which are self-intuition, omniscience and infallibility.
		2. Will, including freedom and actusity.
		3. Power, or omnipotence.

III. Natural attributes ; *i. e.*, relating to the distinction of true and false—

Embracing----	{	1. Wisdom.
		2. Knowledge.

IV. Moral attributes ; *i. e.*, relating to the distinction of good and evil—

Embracing----	{	1. Holiness, or rectitude.
		2. Goodness—four forms :
		{ Grace,
		{ Love,
		{ Mercy,
		{ Long-suffering.
		3. Justice.
		4. Truth.

V. Consummate attributes; *i. e.*, resulting from the union and completeness of all—

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Embracing . . . | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Life and infinite activity. 2. Majesty, or infinite dominion. 3. Omnipresence. 4. All-sufficiency. 5. Uniqueness, or oneness. 6. Blessedness. |
|-----------------|---|---|

Now, if there is any kind of writing in which accuracy, care and discrimination are necessary, and the lack of them unpardonable, it is in drawing up a scientific classification, and most of all on a subject so vast, mysterious and sacred as the nature of our God. Incorrectness in classification will insure the same fault in all the discussion proceeding upon it. If the former is bungling and illogical, confusion, repetition and error must reign in the latter. But we have no wish to state the responsibilities of an author in this matter more strongly than Dr. Breckinridge has done himself on p. 314: "In concluding a subject so immense and so difficult, I may be allowed to refer distinctly to the classification of the attributes of God proposed and discussed in the seventeenth chapter. If what has been advanced in the five chapters which succeed that one can be considered a just and true outline of the most difficult part of all knowledge, then the analysis upon which that classification rests must be allowed to be so far comprehensive and exhaustive of the vast subject as to furnish the diligent student of the Scriptures with important suggestions in his endeavors to reduce to a clear and simple method its sublime revelations touching the nature of the true God." . . . "There can be no doubt that upon such a subject as this a just method is next in importance to a strict adherence to revealed truth, if indeed either is possible without the other."

Now, we find Dr. Breckinridge, in the seventeenth chapter, merely mentions, in order to set aside, all the classifications of the attributes by former divines, without even discussing their merits. We then feel ourselves entitled to expect something better from him. Let us see. First, as to his five main divisions, we assert that there is no proper ground whatever for separating the *essential* and *primary attributes*, viewed in Dr. Breckinridge's own senses. The primary, he says, are those which qualify God simply conceived as being. The essential are those which are necessarily implied in his essence as an infinite, personal spirit.

But we hold that God's being cannot be conceived nor proved except as the being of spirit. We cannot prove that God is, except as we prove that his essence is spirit. When we predicate existence, we must have in the mind a previous conception of the essence of which we predicate it. See now if Dr. Breckinridge's own list does not contain a virtual admission of this. Thus, among his primary attributes (those qualifying God simply *as being*) we find *immateriality*! On page 263 he says his primary attributes may be regarded "as conditions, if I may so express myself, without which God, considered simply as God, cannot be said to have a being or any other perfection." God's being, then, according to his own admissions, can only be conceived of as that of spirit; so that, according to his own definitions, all his "essential attributes" are as truly primary as his "primary." Again, among the so-called "primary attributes" there are several which cannot be proved except by assuming God's spirituality beforehand. How, for instance, can God be simple in his essence or immense unless he is spiritual? Let the reader also note here, that these two cases not only prove the above point, but present two glaring instances of false arrangement. For if there is any propriety at all in Dr. Breckinridge's divisions of "primary" and "essential attributes," then simplicity and immensity undoubtedly belong to the latter class, as he defines them. It is only as God is a spirit that he is either simple or immense.

But to return. Dr. Breckinridge's eighteenth and nineteenth chapters dwell much on a metaphysical distinction between *essence* and *existence* (of which we shall have more to say in due time). The essence of a thing, he teaches, consists in its apprehension as possible by the divine intellect; its existence arises from the divine will willing it into being. Now surely, since God's supreme intellect is the pattern of all lower ones, if this is the order of cognition in the divine mind, it ought to be in ours. But in this order the essence must be apprehended first, and in order to apprehending the existence. Hence, if there were any reason for the division of "primary" and "essential" attributes the essential should come first. But in truth, there is none. *God's being is the being of his essence.*

In a scientific classification mere phraseology is important; every word should be intelligently selected. Why does Dr.

Breckinridge choose the word "natural" to name his third class of attributes, "wisdom and knowledge"? In any sense in which the word can be understood of divine attributes, are not those which he marks as "essential" as much natural as are wisdom and knowledge? The word is not discriminative. And in the fourth class, which Dr. Breckinridge describes as "moral," he tells that he means by them attributes which have relation to "good and evil." Now these words have two senses. Does he mean right and wrong? Or does he mean the beneficial and the mischievous, the pleasant and the painful? Ambiguities should have no place in a classification.

When we come to examine the list of particular attributes ranked under these five chief heads, we are compelled to say that we find the strangest confusion. Two cases have already been indicated. The second attribute on the list is "infinite." If Dr. Breckinridge means by this the infinitude of God's substance, then it is identical with his immensity, and one or the other should have been erased. If he means the infinitude of his qualities, then, according to Dr. Breckinridge's definitions, it should have been put among the "consummate" attributes. Next we have "independence" placed before necessary existence and self-existence, but it is a deduction from them, and should have been placed after them. A little after we have incorporeity and immateriality distinguished. Can any one tell what is the difference? Dr. Breckinridge, as we have seen, admits but two sorts of substance—matter and spirit. That which is not bodily must be spiritual. Why say the same thing twice over? So far as we can imagine, the only conceivable ground on which a distinction could be drawn would be something like that of the old Pythagoreans, who described spiritual beings as invested with a sort of $\sigma\chi\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$, which was not spirit, nor yet mere matter. There might be some sense in a Pythagorean's adding, after he had called a thing immaterial, that it was also incorporeal (although he would never have called his $\sigma\chi\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ proper $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$). But Dr. Breckinridge cannot avail himself of this, because, in his proof of the being of God, he assumes that there can be but two substances—matter and spirit.

Proceeding to the second main division, we find first under it "intellect," manifesting itself in omniscience and infallibility. Now, would not any thinking man suppose that the attributes of

wisdom and knowledge would be introduced here? Surely the distinction of the true and false comes under the jurisdiction of the divine intellect? Does God know, is God wise, by some other attribute than his intellect? Wisdom and knowledge then should have been by all means ranked here. But no, they are divorced from their connection by the interposition of other distinct heads, and made into a grand division separate and independent. Again: why should God's knowledge be distinguished from his omniscience? Is not his omniscience just his infinite knowledge? and is not the knowledge which Dr. Breckinridge attributes to God under the head of his natural attributes infinite? He says, God's natural attributes are those which are concerned about the "the true and the false," and then places omniscience and infallibility outside of the head of natural attributes. We are to understand, then, that God's omniscience and infallibility are not concerned about the true and the false.

The last class of attributes is the consummate. We suppose there is no intelligent Christian who did not expect, when he read Dr. Breckinridge's definition of these, to see God's holiness placed at their head as a thing of course. If there is any attribute at all which has claims to this place, holiness is the one. Did Dr. Breckinridge exclude it because it was a moral attribute, and must therefore go into the fourth class? Others ranked as consummate are essential or natural, and should therefore, for equal reason, have been detained in the second or third class. But this class of consummate attributes is as singular in what it contains as in what it omits. First we find mentioned life and infinite activity. That God has life in himself was asserted as an attribute of the first class, and his *actuality* was ranked in the second. Now we would be willing to offer a small premium for the discovery of the distinction between activity and the newly coined word actuality. Third among the consummate attributes we find omnipresence. But God's immensity was placed in the first class. Should they not have been placed one immediately after the other? If there is any intelligible distinction, it is in viewing God's immensity as relative to infinite space vacant, and his omnipresence as relative to all being other than his own, coexisting with him in infinite space. So that in any view God's omnipresence is but a phase of his immensity, and should have come next to it. Certainly, if there is any difference, it is less a

"consummate attribute" than his immensity. Again: what is meant by God's "all-sufficiency?" If it means that he is equal to all the actual and possible emergencies of his universe, it is nothing but his omniscience and omnipotence, and no separate attribute at all. If it means his complete sufficiency to his own well-being, is not this the same as his infinite blessedness? Once more, we opine that *unique*-ness is not exactly defined by *one*-ness.

Such are some of the obvious confusions and absurdities of this tedious and yet defective classification. We will weary the reader no longer with it. We feel that the intelligent student will arise from his examination with little less than a feeling of outrage that an author should thus coolly pass in review the classifications of great predecessors only to reject them summarily with no other notice than to infer from their diversity the complexity of the subject, and then obtrude as preferable such a jumble of inconsequential and repetitious statements. He will feel with us that we have here a curious evidence, either of incompetency or of supercilious carelessness. It is time men had learned that the forms of a science matured by so many master minds are not to be so lightly recast.

8. We have now arrived at the eighteenth and nineteenth chapters, those which the "North Carolina Pastor" has shown to be borrowed from Stapfer's Polemic Theology, to the no small excitement of our Presbyterian public. We profess that we feel little zeal in the estimating of this charge compared with other errors of the book. We speak thus, not because the wholesale borrowing has not been demonstrated, nor because we think it justifiable. Those who will examine Stapfer, Vol. I., Chap. iii., as we have done, will perceive unmistakably that the bulk of two whole chapters is a translation of that author, sometimes literal, more often slightly paraphrastic, but always tolerably faithful; with a few paragraphs and sentences interspersed here and there, seemingly of the author's own composition. The same passages of scripture in many places are quoted in the same order, and to prove the same points. In some cases even the matter of collateral remarks in the notes of Stapfer is quoted in the same connection. But we have never been keenly given to the watching and detecting of plagiarisms, nor prone to suspect their commission. Almost nothing can now be original in theological discus-

sion, and we feel far more concerned with the correctness of the principles advanced, whether invented or borrowed, than with their source. Yet, as the public has been called to witness the trial of this accusation, our literary verdict would seem incomplete without the expression of an opinion on it. Let us express it deliberately and moderately.

To estimate this matter fairly for both sides, the general peculiarities of this author and his book must be kept in mind. He has usually borne the character of a thinker, adventurous, independent and original. The treatise seems to be very novel in its method, and breathes to an unusual degree independence of other men. The author seems boldly to strike out and attempt a reconstruction of the science from its primary materials. He tells us in the beginning of his second paragraph in his "Preliminary Words:" "I have not aimed to produce a compend of Theology; I aim to teach Theology itself." The public have seen it remarked in laudatory newspaper notices that the work does not contain a single reference to any other book but the Bible, and this as a triumphant evidence of its originality. It may be that in this boasting Dr Breckinridge's admirers have misrepresented him, so that he is rather unfortunate than blameworthy for their perversion of the circumstance. But all these things very naturally account for the fact, that when a thorough scholar met with the footmarks of his old Latin friends, Stapfer and others, where he and all the public had been unwittingly led to expect such decided originality, he should consider the thing unaccountable and unpardonable.

But on the other hand, let us grant all fair allowances in Dr. Breckinridge's favor, such as these: That there can be little which is new, and at the same time valuable, on such a subject as Christian Theology in our late day; that the church obviously should not be forbidden to enjoy the reproduction of the great thoughts of her fathers, merely because they would not then be original; and that he who makes these borrowed thoughts his own by passing them through the *alembic* of his own mind, melting them into unity with his own thinking, and clothing them in his own language, is not to be charged as a plagiarist, because no scholar can do much more in a science so matured. Let us also particularly direct the reader's attention to some sentences of general acknowledgment contained in the

"Preliminary Words," p. 10, of which the following is the most explicit: "The details which have been wrought out by learned, godly and able men in all ages, of many creeds, and in many tongues, have been freely wrought into the staple of this work when they suited the place and purpose, and turned precisely to my thought." For, anxious as we are not to overestimate what is wrong in this matter, we really fear lest the general spirit of high egotism and claim of originality which characterize the book at large may have led the reader to overlook the extent of these acknowledgments, as has evidently been the case with many of the public. And let us be distinctly understood as allowing that these general acknowledgments of help from previous writers do much modify the case. We can well conceive that Dr. Breckinridge may feel that they fairly justify it, and that in his own conscience he may stand clear to himself of the charge of disingenuousness. But still there remains a painful error, and the fact that it is committed by one high in fame and office only makes it the more imperative that the voice of just disapproval should be uttered firmly and loudly, lest such an example should sanctify in the eyes of younger and smaller men these forms of literary license so painfully prevalent already.

First, then, it must be said, that acknowledgments such as those Dr. Breckinridge makes in his preliminary words have their well-established meaning in the republic of letters; and that meaning *is not the one* which his friends have to impute to him in order to his acquittal. Dr. Breckinridge was bound, if he intended these phrases of acknowledgment to mean more than the public understands by them to apprise them distinctly. When an author says, in such phrase, that he has used the labors of predecessors, the public understand from him that he has studied them to inform his own mind, and thus prepare himself for writing, that he has embodied the facts and ideas derived from them in the structure which his own reflection rears; not that he has incontinently transferred nearly whole chapters in the very phrase and form of another mind. Let the reader here recall the judicious and wise terms in which the venerable Dr. Alexander defined this privilege, illustrating it by the case of Symington's treatise on the atonement. And now, that this is what the public expects, when an author uses such language of general acknowledgment, is perfectly clear from the impression

which the first revelation of these extracts made. That impression was one of profound surprise. Editors friendly to Dr. Breckinridge said so in no measured terms. And we know perfectly well that those ardent friends of Dr. Breckinridge who are now engaged in defending him on the plea of these acknowledgments are not satisfied in their hearts; they feel that their estimate of the book is not precisely what it was before.

But, second, the comparison of Dr. Breckinridge's chapters eighteenth and nineteenth with Stapfer reveals, by conclusive circumstantial evidence, that he has not in this case used Stapfer in any such legitimate mode as literary usage allows. He has not employed him to inform his own mind, and then thoroughly digested the material and assimilated it by his own reflection. On the contrary, it is a plain case of bodily transference; of the scissors-and-paste mode of bookmaking; of almost mechanical translating. For how else can we account for it that the blunders in translating should have been made by Dr. Breckinridge which the "North Carolina Pastor" has revealed; such, for instance, as the confusion of *casus* with *causa*. These blunders utterly confuse Stapfer's sense and scope. If as clear a mind as Dr. Breckinridge's had been truly redigesting that author's thinking by its own reflections, the blunders would have been impossible. It is therefore perfectly plain, that when those blunders were committed Dr. Breckinridge's mind was performing only the servile process of mechanical transference. But a moment's reflection should have convinced Dr. Breckinridge that this sort of thing was not what any man would reasonably expect from his preliminary acknowledgments. How easy would it have been to add four inverted commas, or an asterisk pointing to one word at the bottom of the page. He should have remembered that a multitude of his readers are not so familiar as he professes to be with the writers "of all ages, of many creeds, and in many tongues," so that, notwithstanding his general reference to them at the beginning, his silence has left them liable, yea subject, to the mistake that this thinking of the eighteenth and nineteenth chapters was done by him. The fact that there is a literary usage of the force of common law in the kingdom of letters requiring a more specific acknowledgment must tend to confirm this mistake. Is there not here, therefore, a *suppressio veri*?

Third, it is most unfortunate for Dr. Breckinridge that this very part of his treatise is sprinkled with expressions which must naturally be mistaken by his reader for tacit assumptions or implications of originality as to that part. Thus, on page 261, (near the top): "The chief classifications of the attributes of God which have been heretofore suggested, as far as I have discovered, are these which follow." After giving the list, and assigning reasons for using none of them, he says (page 262): "*I have, therefore, ventured to attempt such a classification.*" He gives it briefly in the seventeenth chapter, and then occupies chapters eighteenth to twenty-second inclusive in expanding it, among which are the two chapters substantially taken from Stapfer. At the close, on page 314, he says: "*In concluding a subject so immense and difficult, I may be allowed to refer distinctly to the classification of the attributes of God proposed and discussed in the seventeenth chapter.* If what has been advanced in the five chapters succeeding that one can be considered a just and true outline of the most intricate part of all knowledge, then the analysis upon which that classification rests must be allowed to be so far comprehensive and exhaustive," etc. Dr. Breckinridge here distinctly claims the classification of chapter seventeenth as his own. At the close of his expanded discussion thereof, he refers distinctly to it, and puts in a claim that, if the expansion which follows is successful, then the credit of it *belongs to his classification*. Let us distinctly acknowledge that this does not amount to a direct claim of the whole expansion as his own exclusive work, as well as the seventeenth chapter; but is it not far better calculated to suggest such a belief than to hint the opposite fact, that whole chapters of it are the work of another man? Would not a thoroughly candid man have felt compelled, when coming so very near a seeming claim of originality in the whole, to except carefully what was not his own? Again, at the top of page 269, he says: "*What I am now to prove and illustrate, therefore, is the perfections of God,*" etc. The proof, for page after page, is almost exclusively Stapfer! On page 273 he says: "That infinite understanding *which I have shown* in a former chapter was an attribute," etc. The former chapter is Stapfer's in substance. On page 281 he speaks of the "precise definition" (of miracles) "*which I have just given.*" That definition is Stapfer's *verbatim*, allowing for the difference of Latin and Eng-

lish! (The italics are not Dr. Breckinridge's, but our own.) Is this ingenuous? Is it not worse than a *suppressio veri*? Dr. Breckinridge may say (or his friends may say for him) that he did not intend all this *ego-ism* to be construed as implying a claim to originality in these places, and did not suppose it would be so construed after his general acknowledgment of help from others, and that it is only a malignant ingenuity which forces such a sense on his words. We can only say he is very unfortunate, for the common reader will be very apt to think that sense the most natural one. But we have no disposition to charge that it was necessarily his sense. Only, his language is very unlucky.

Fourth, Dr. Breckinridge's previous attitude has been such as almost to insure and compel an unfavorable judgment from the public on this point. His tone has usually been boastful, and depreciatory of the labors of other divines. Is he, of all other men, to be allowed to use the thoughts of others as his own? In the annual catalogue of Danville Seminary for 1855-'6, for instance, page 11, are the following words, which it is well known came from Dr. Breckinridge's pen. He is commending the method of study without text-book, and exclusively by oral lecture, pursued at Danville :

"To the professors themselves it need not be denied that teaching in this way is incomparably more difficult than in the ordinary way, nor need it be concealed that professors who are not willing to make themselves competent had better avoid attempting anything of the sort. It is not very difficult to hear recitations out of a text-book, and, if need be, add a few desultory observations by way of commentary two or three times a week. The labor is not particularly severe to superintend, in a general way, the studies of a class groping along where we have groped before them. But to make one's self master of a great subject; to be the text-book yourself in a certain sense; to teach thoroughly and systematically from day to day that which must cohere always and perpetually illustrate itself; to quicken, to guide, to develop the faculties of men in their attempts to acquire a profession which you have loved ardently and practiced intensely yourself; this is altogether a different kind of work; different in the enormously increased labor it enacts (exacts?); different in the sum of the immense results."

Now we do not cite this paragraph chiefly in order to remark on the cool arrogance exhibited in it, that one of the youngest professors of the church, and in the youngest divinity school, one who had never enjoyed the benefits of our other schools enough nor acquainted himself with them sufficiently to know whether they taught well or ill, should thus depreciate and taunt re-

spectable associates in his own employment. Nor need we tarry long to contrast with this the dignified, Christian forbearance of those who have for so many years presided in the other schools which has refrained up to this day from all public notice of these unworthy flings. Our main purpose is to call the reader's attention to the fact that this book of theology originated, as is well known, in the course of lectures whose method is explained in the above paragraph. So that it is perfectly reasonable the public should expect, as it did expect, in the book those thorough qualities claimed in the catalogue for the lectures. Now, let the reader re-peruse the long and inflated sentence at the close of the above paragraph, and ask whether it would lead him to expect such a use of the labors of other minds as is found in the eighteenth and nineteenth chapters of the Theology. He can draw the contrast for himself. It requires few words to show how easy and just Dr. Breckinridge has made the administration of a scathing retort, should any of his long-suffering associates in the work of instruction desire to inflict it. They have but to borrow his strain, modified a little more than he has modified his borrowings, after this fashion: "It is not very difficult to manufacture profound lectures by simple translating, with author and dictionary on knee and pen in hand, out of profound old theologians, now generally unread, adding, if need be, a few desultory observations by way of commentary. The labor is not particularly severe to bring before a class a series of lectures which shall cause them to think the lecturer some great one, when there is a shelf full of good old authors, 'of all ages, of many creeds, and in many tongues,' to draw upon, while the class are NOT groping along where the professor has groped before them, because they are told that they need not have any other text-book except the professor himself." Dr. Breckinridge said in his "Preliminary Words" that the fruits of his attainments would manifest themselves to the learned reader. Now, his divinity students were not learned hearers. When he delivered these eighteenth and nineteenth chapters as lectures eighteenth and nineteenth to his class, did he regard the same sort of general acknowledgment of his obligations to other authors which he has made to us as sufficient for them also?

And this suggests the gravest aspect of this matter. A man high in station, an admired preceptor is bound to consider the

force of his example; and instead of absurdly arguing that a man of station must not have a fault exposed, lest the high interests with which the church has entrusted him should suffer when his reputation suffers, justice says that his faults must be rebuked all the more faithfully, because his station will make them so extensively mischievous. The moral sense of the community does, and will ever, justly reprobate the minister who shines in the pulpit in borrowed plumes. When such a man is detected, his reputation is justly impaired. The outraged feelings of his hearers persist in regarding him as *a pretender*. The delinquency is that of Falstaff bearing the dead body of Hotspur from the battlefield, aware that the spectators would infer therefrom that the exploit of slaying the hero was his. The confidence of the people in that minister's integrity is at an end. Now let us put a case: A young pastor of seeming gifts begins his pulpit labors with an opening sermon in which he distinctly informs his people that he expects, as a well-instructed scribe, to use freely the matter wrought out for him by able men of other days. But after a season it is discovered that he has preached sermons nearly the whole of which were borrowed from old preachers in their own words from time to time, without one farther word of acknowledgment. Is that what the people expected from his opening sermon? Is not that man justly "sent to Coventry" by his charge? Now it is not necessary to assert the exact parallelism of the two cases. But we assert with confidence, that if the master is justified in doing the one, the pupils will not be slow to take the liberty of doing the other.

In conclusion, such surreptitious use of borrowed materials degrades the intellectual faculties no less than the moral. The great benefit of study is not in the mere knowing, but in the digestion of acquired thoughts. It is thus only that knowledge is made our own, the mind improved, and its fecundity preserved. But this habit of borrowing fosters indolence and dwarfs the mind, at the same time that it undermines integrity and self-respect. It is peculiarly to be regretted that anything which even approaches an example of such practices should be done by one whom the General Assembly has placed at the head of a school for young ministers, and whose genius and vivacity have given him so much prestige over the minds of young men.

9. But we have no disposition to press the charge of plagiarism

in the above case; while we must judge Dr. Breckinridge's course therein mistaken and unfortunate, we repeat that we are willing to grant that he felt justified to his own conscience. There is evidence, however, in the discussions adopted from Stapfer far more decisive as to his correctness and scholarship. The reader will find in the nineteenth chapter, pages 274-276, the following speculations taken from Stapfer, Vol. I., § 321 to 354, which we will briefly state in substance. God's intellect is infinite; he therefore must know, with the *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ* everything which is possible. The possibility of anything consists in God's seeing that the existence of it would not imply a natural contradiction. God's true and perfect intellect therefore cannot but see as possibilities all things (whether created or uncreated or never to be created) which are naturally possible. Hence the *ideas* of all possible entities are in the divine intellect, and are there by a necessity, as the result of God's perfection. Now the *essence* (*essentia*) of these possible things *consists in their possibility*; i. e., God's eternal seeing that they are naturally possible is what constitutes their essence. Hence the essences of all possible entities are from eternity in God's intellect. They are there of course immutably and necessarily and essentially, because otherwise his intellect and knowledge would be mutable and finite. Therefore (and this is the desired deduction) the essences of all possible entities arise by a metaphysical necessity from the intellect of God, and not from his will or choice. It is the existence (the *esse*) of these entities which proceeds from the divine will. The possibility, in other words the essence of things, is necessary (in the metaphysical sense), because essential to God as a being of infinite intellect. But to say that a thing is necessarily possible is not the same as to say that it will necessarily exist.

Having stated these things in Stapfer's words translated, Dr. Breckinridge concludes his paragraph by saying (as though drawing a long breath after the labors of the discussion), "These distinctions, though they may appear intricate, are not only true, but important as bearing upon questions connected with the origin of evil and with the Manichean heresy, which was so long the pest of the church of God." Will not the reader be amused to compare with this the following words from the note which Stapfer appends to this place? "*Ratio autem cur Philosophi in*

hoc adstruendo prolixiores sint, praecepue haec est, ut Manicheismum hoc morlo optime debellare queant, et omnes difficultates solvere, quae circa Originem mali moveri solent." How, then, do these speculations solve the difficulty of accounting for the origin of moral evil and to overthrow the Manichean theory about it? If the reader would see, let him turn over the leaves of this same Stapfer to Chapter III., § 438, etc., and he will conclude with us that this is as unlucky a case of borrowing as has ever occurred; in other words, that this argument is one of the few in that usually excellent and orthodox writer which no educated minister in America, except Dr. Breckinridge, will be willing to *father*. It is a pity that Dr. Breckinridge did not notice how Stapfer all along credits these speculations (with a candor more worthy of being borrowed than his discussion) to the celebrated Dr. Christian Wolf and his follower Bulfinger. Now, those who are familiar with the history of theology know that Wolf, the exponent of Leibnitz, matured a method for moral and metaphysical reasoning of a formalistic and modernized scholastic type which was excessively fashionable in Europe about the time Stapfer wrote. (Wolf flourished from about 1715 to 1750.) This method was vehemently assailed, as well as advocated, by many divines, and with such success that the orthodox king of Prussia for a time deposed Wolf from his professorship in the University of Halle, and banished him from his kingdom for the dangerous and atheistic tendency of some of his reasonings. And among the speculations for which he was thus deposed and banished were these very notions about the source of essences and the solution of the origin of evil. Now, the Wolfian philosophy has been as utterly exploded and is as utterly relinquished at our day by all educated men as the science of alchemy or judicial astrology. Its reign was short, and its principles are now universally held to have been exceedingly awkward and sophistical. These places of Stapfer are just the ones which well-informed theologians skip over as blemishes in an otherwise excellent author, while they excuse them as being accordant with the reigning methods of the day. But they are just those which Dr. Breckinridge has selected to borrow.

But let us see their application to Manicheism. From the above view of essences as consisting in God's intellection of possibilities, Stapfer reasons substantially thus: Hence it follows

that God's *will* in calling them out of *posse* into *esse*, or giving them existence, *changes nothing* in them. When the essence is found, the nature, or *sort* of entity, is determined. So that whatever of imperfection, metaphysical, physical or moral, attaches to the universe or the things in it, is due, not to God's will, but to the ideas in God's intellect. But *they* are necessary, essential in God, and it is no fault nor choice in God that they are what they are; for, to repeat, the essence is but God's intellection of the possibility, and must be according to what it is, unless we would have God's intellect see things as they are not, *i. e.* see them falsely. Now it is the will, the volitions of an intelligent free agent, to which we attach all praise or blame. But God's will, in creating or disposing, changed nothing in the essences; it only superadded to them existence. So that God must not be blamed for any evil in his universe. Thus that awful mystery is solved, why a God who is almighty, and could do exactly what he pleased, should have made a world in which there will always be sin, if indeed he is truly holy and hates sin. Thus the Manichean solution of that mystery, by supposing two eternal first causes, one holy and kind, the other cruel and evil, is shown to be superfluous.

Now, is *this the Theodiceu* which Dr. Breckinridge considers so valuable? We wonder if he is willing seriously to father it, yea, with a great wonder. Will not the reader be tempted to suspect that when he so naively repeated his reasons for troubling us with these "intricate yet important distinctions," he knew not what he was talking about? The well informed reader will see at once that nothing but a phase of *realism* ever made this argument appear anything else than absurd to those who constructed it, and that nobody can consistently advance it except a Wolfian or a realist. Is Dr. Breckinridge either? Does Dr. Breckinridge hold that universal ideas are entities, having essences before they exist any where except in God's thought, and separate from the existence of those things of which they are ideas? Remove this old scholastic theory, and the whole argument is a shadow. No educated man of this century that ever we have heard of goes farther than the conceptualists; all agree that the idea of a thing separate from the thing is no entity, and has no essence of its own. The idea is nothing but the conceiving act of the mind itself viewing it. In this

practical question of the origin of evil, the difference between the idea *in posse* and the thing *in esse* is all the difference between *nothing* and *something*. There is no essence where there is no existence, other than the essence of the mind that conceives the possible something; for the essence can be nothing but the essence of the thing existing. Hence, the distinction which is insinuated when it is urged *that the divine will changes nothing* in the essence of the thing willed into existence, is utterly illusory and worthless to every conceptualist, much more to every nominalist. It is the divine will which makes the whole change from the thing's not being at all to its being; and this is everything.

Even the unlearned reader may clearly see the vanity of this wretched, antiquated piece of scholasticism as a solution of the origin of evil. For, in the first place, if it proves anything, it proves that God is absolutely controlled by a metaphysical necessity as to the kind of universe he shall create, so that he is not truly independent and almighty. There has been from eternity a metaphysical necessity that the essence of everything should be what it is, so that God himself is subject to a new kind of *fate*, as dishonorable to him as that of the Stoic. In the second place, it smacks of Pantheism, for if the essences of all things are in God eternally, essentially, necessarily and immutably, and if those essences are, before creation, no other than God's own intellect (see Stapfer, § 356, note), they must be equally in God since they came into existence. For that which is in God eternally, essentially and necessarily, in consequence of his very perfection, can in no way and at no time be taken out of him. So that the essence of Dr. Breckinridge, of us, of our readers, of Satan, are all still in God! Third, on the Wolfian premises even the solution would be sophistical; for, according to him, the essence, *i. e.*, the possibility of all entities which possibly could be, are in God's intellect. Everything is possible, the supposing of which is not opposed by a natural contradiction. God's infinite intellect, therefore, contained not only the essence of the universe which he actually brought into existence, but of an infinite number of different universes; and that some one of these possible universes might have been better than the actual one, or even sinless, is not impossible, for it implies no natural contradiction to conceive it. Hence, among the numberless possibilities in the

divine intellect, there must have been the possibility, or, in other words, essence, of a better universe than this. Why, then, did not his will bring that one into actuality instead of the one we have? And last, the same explanation should hold as well to explain any evil connected with man's acts. We also might "do evil that good may come," and the same metaphysical process might be applied, step by step, to prove just as validly to our poor neighbor groaning under the injury that it did not originate in our will, but in the *necessary essence of a possibility*. Here, for instance, is one who, to secure some end lawful in itself, has voluntarily wounded his brother's body. Says he: "The pain and danger of a wound are attributes of its essence—of a *wound in posse*. They are necessary attributes, and I had no choice about making them so; for if my mind conceives truly, as it must if it acts normally at all, it must conceive a possible wound as both painful and dangerous. Of course I did not choose to wound for the sake directly of its pain and danger to you, but for the sake of the ulterior good with which the wounding was tied by a *nexus* of metaphysical necessity. So that my free will should not be blamed for the pain and danger of your wound. Those bad qualities were of its necessary essence; my moral act only brought that essence into actuality." A sorry salve this for a smarting sore. And a sorry salve are these worn-out philosophizings for that profound trouble which has tortured every reflecting soul, the origin of evil. It were better to come at first to that solution to which every mind this side of heaven must come at last: "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." "It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?"

10. The attentive reader will perceive in Dr. Breckinridge's book an obvious hinting of the modern millenarian doctrine. This perhaps is one of the subjects he intends in these words from his preface (page xi.): "Upon some points which have always agitated the Christian mind, I have spoken with a certain reserve, dictated alike by the appreciation I had of the true nature of those questions, and of my official position as teacher of theology, appointed by a church whose standards were framed by men holding almost opposite views on those points, and wisely avoiding defining them as of faith." If our surmise is correct, we can by no means say with him that the Confession of

Faith has avoided defining this doctrine as (not) of faith. (See Confession, Ch. XXXII., § II.; Larger Catechism, Ques. 87, 88.) The varied phases and degrees in which modern millenarians hold their creed, the brevity and vagueness of the hints of it in this book, and lack of space, forbid extended discussion. Some of those hints may be seen by the reader, pages 85, 86, 133 bottom, 185. To those who consider the theory as we do, as involving no trivial errors, even these hints of approbation constitute a subject of some regret; for one of the surest ways to secure the adoption of a doubtful doctrine is this frequent reproduction of it without express assertion or argument, but in seemingly logical connection with other admitted truths. To those who believe in millenarianism these hints of it will, of course, seem an additional merit. Our purpose is fulfilled by merely putting the reader on his guard on this topic. And in doing this we cheerfully accord to Dr. Breckinridge the credit of refraining from the obtrusion of his peculiar views as carefully as can be expected of one who is so zealously committed to them as he is said to be.

11. Perhaps other subjects of criticism might be profitably handled, but the reader has been detained long enough. We plainly avow that we expend more space in pointing out defects than excellences, not because the book has not many things which we would praise with sincerity, but because too much praise has already been given in the newspapers. We well know that the excessive, unqualified, and in some cases fulsome laudations which have been uttered do not express the sober judgment of well-informed Presbyterians. Some of them could hardly be true of any book, unless its author were more than human. That the Presbyterian press should have spoken as it has of a book marked by such blemishes as we have pointed out has been mortifying to many of the wisest. It indicates either that this press has run miserably low in its stock of sound, discriminating, theological learning, or that it is infected with a servility towards station and brilliant reputation utterly inconsistent with the parity of the ministry and the manly independence of our people.

Those things which have seemed to us the chief merits of this work we shall enumerate more briefly indeed than we have recited defects, but with no less emphasis and sincerity. And the first of these merits, it seems to us, is the uniform tone of high

and sustained reverence in which the great things of God are discussed. An exalted conception of his majesty and sanctity breathe from many passages, which are in pleasing contrast with the flippant dryness and coldness we sometimes see in the discussions of the pulpit as well as of books. The second point of high merit is the manliness and wisdom with which the great truths which determine decisively between orthodoxy and heterodoxy are stated. The trumpet is one which gives no uncertain sound; and these great truths are frequently so put as to evince that not only a true interpretation of Scripture, but a true view of man's nature and religious wants, are best satisfied by their most unflinching adoption. A third class of excellences will present itself to the reader in frequent passages of true animation and eloquence. The style is, indeed, not entitled to the praise of simplicity or perspicuity, but it is always animated, and often elevated. The power and skill of the successful declaimer are often seen in the dramatic and ascending grouping of conceptions, and sometimes the effect rises even to grandeur. As a specimen of this excellence we would indicate especially the passage in which the humiliation and exaltation of Christ are portrayed. (Pages 127 to 133.)

If something like a general estimate of the work must be given, we would say that it is such a book as those who know Dr. Breckinridge would expect of him. And in saying this, we cheerfully allow to him many high and some splendid endowments. Nor shall we deny the valuable services which his courage, general orthodoxy and zeal have rendered the church. That he has genius, none who have heard his forensic efforts will dispute, nor that his understanding is active, strong, adventurous. But this work shows him rather the man of *genius* than of *science*. It is well known that his theological education was abridged and irregular, and that his middle life was spent amidst exciting and diversified labors, not favorable to the systematic digestion of knowledge, however intensely they may have stimulated special and fragmentary studies. This training, and the temper of his mind, self-reliant, depreciatory of antagonists, and eager for independence of method and thought, were no safe preparation for walking steadily the narrow and dizzy paths of moral speculation. Patience of mind, to perfect, review and mature, was lacking. Indeed, the brightest displays of Dr. Breckinridge's ability, as well

as the most eloquent instances of style, have always been delivered in the excitement of forensic collision. He requires such excitement to steady and brace his powers, to clarify and nerve his otherwise obscure language. His muse is *Bellona*, his inspiration the *guadium certaminis*; his successful logic is that of the concrete. Dr. Breckinridge's friends have committed a grave error in persuading him that he is a dialectician. When he sits down in contemplative calmness to write on abstract subjects, his mind wavers for want of a stronger resistance, and strikes vaguely. To write a book on systematic divinity, and especially to write it so hurriedly, was the very thing he should not have done. The department in which his labors would have been most truly useful to the church, and creditable to himself, is that of church polity; for here his habits of concrete and forensic thought, the legal training of his early life, and his experience of ecclesiastical politics, would have qualified him for success.

When we come to the structure of the discussion, we find in addition to the traits indicated in our remarks on Dr. Breckinridge's classification, this characteristic: he seems to desire continually to deal only in views of truth the most elevated and expanded. There is a constant attempt to assume points of view so high as to look down upon those conclusions to which the rest of us mortals have to toil up. The consequence is, that the expansion of view not seldom destroys distinctness of outline; we are raised so high that our heads are in the clouds, and we see nothing. Thoughts are enunciated which seem as though they might be very comprehensive and fine, which are certainly extensive enough to contain everything, but so undefined that we feel no assurance they will hold anything. There is a "dim magnificence" which cannot be better characterized than in the language of Aristophanes, which Mr. Macaulay applies, for a similar purpose, to Mr. Gladstone.

ὦ γῆ τοῦ φθίσματος, ὡς λεπὸν, καὶ σεμνὸν, καὶ τερατώδες.

But it is *vox et preterea nihil*. There is also in many parts an indistinctness of scope and purpose, which leaves the reader in doubt whether he has apprehended the intended drift of the author, or the whole of it. He often seems to intend that we shall see pregnant and far-reaching conclusions from the mere juxtaposition of statements, and as we read we are a *little*

inclined to feel as though we ought to see them, and find them as valuable as indicated; and yet, read over as often and attentively as we may, we do not, and cannot see them. It is evident that the thoughts have been thrown together vaguely, and only half-evolved from the mist of their conception; they need to be wrought out into distinctness of outline and connection. This book is one which will never, by any possibility, be used for the practical purposes of theological instruction.

On the whole, if this work had come from a man not previously known it would have been justly regarded as one striking, and, in some respects, remarkable. It will add nothing to Dr. Breckinridge's fame. It shows, indeed, the characteristics of his genius, but in a manner less favorable to his reputation than his previous productions, because he has unfortunately selected in this case unsuitable ground for their display.

THE MORAL EFFECTS OF A FREE JUSTIFICATION.¹

WE learn from the Epistle to the Romans, that Paul had no sooner declared his conclusion, "that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," than the cavil was thrown back, "Shall we, then, continue in sin that grace may abound?" From that day to this the enemies and maligners of the gospel theology on the one hand, and its perverters on the other, have echoed the same deduction. On the one hand, the tendency to *antinomianism* has adopted and justified it as a correct inference, sometimes openly, and more often covertly. In the Lutheran Church, Agricola of Eisleben, a contemporary of Luther, and among the English Puritans of the seventeenth century, Dr. Crisp, were charged with this monstrous error; the first with justice, the second, probably, unjustly. "Since Christ has vicariously paid the whole legal debt due from sinners to God," the antinomian argues, "and the title to acceptance and life thus accruing is bestowed on every believer through his faith alone, the precept has no further claim, either of penalty or obedience, upon us who believe. God cannot justly demand payment of the same obligation twice over. If Christ's work was vicarious, we who embrace it are free in every sense. Disobedience to the moral law cannot bring us into condemnation. Or, in other words, transgression ceases to be guilty when committed by the justified believer. There may be a certain seemliness in the grateful hearkening of the believer to the wishes of his divine benefactor. There may be motives drawn from secular order and temporal advantage in favor of a moral life; but the justified believer is under no obligation. If his faith is clear, no sin vitiates his title to heaven." But it is seldom such speculations have been openly uttered in the history of Christian

¹ This discussion appeared in *The Southern Review* for April, 1873, being a review of, 1. *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, and *History of England*: By James Anthony Froude. 2. *Works of William Ellery Channing*, D. D. 3. *Symbolism of Catholics and Protestants*: By J. A. Möhler, D. D. 4. *Journal and Works of the Rev. John Wesley*, D. D. Philadelphia. Vols. III., IV.

doctrine. Luther and some other Protestants, in the heat of their zeal against Pharisaism, have perhaps uttered rhetorical assertions of the believer's emancipation from the penalty of the moral law too bold to be safe when torn from their designed connection. It was not seldom the complaint of the best Protestant divines, in the Lutheran, the Reformed, and even the Moravian communions, that sluggish and lustful minds perverted their precious gospel of free justification to excuse their idle or profligate living. But what truth peculiar to revelation has not been wrested? We freely admit, that should a man whose soul is enslaved to his lusts, and wholly unenlightened by the purifying principles of the gospel, be so unlucky as to adopt a false hope of heaven (on *any* scheme of doctrine), the result will be the emboldening of his evil desires. But this evil effect will be as sure upon a sacramentarian or a Pharisaic theory in the case supposed as upon ours; and such is the testimony of experience. There have always been a thousand licentious professors of the self-righteous schemes to one of the evangelical. In the latter class we have to enumerate those frequent and shocking instances where an unholy life is startlingly illustrated by the contrast of the gracious creed which is so loudly and so falsely professed. But in the former class are found the millions who live in shameless sin under the altars of the Greek, Roman, and other ritualistic churches.

But the conclusion, that a free justification must encourage licentious living, is advanced by opposite parties. The Romish, the Socinian, and many worldly writers, argue thus: "The consequence is unavoidable, and therefore the principle cannot be true. For God is a holy God, and Christ's was a holy mission. Therefore the Scriptures cannot have intended to teach so odious a doctrine. If men are told that no merit of a virtuous life can contribute one whit to their acceptance with God, and that, provided they are believers, no sin can jeopardize it, they must be indifferent to obedience. Yea; the inference is at least plausible: The more wickedness in God's children the more his grace is glorified! It cannot be, then, that the doctrine of justification by faith without works is of God."

We must expect that so long as there are minds unenlightened by grace, there will be such cavilings. Dr. Thomas Chalmers informs us that in the days of his skeptical worldliness (which

extended beyond his ordination), he regarded the doctrine with abhorrence on this ground. But after he had learned to preach Christ crucified in Paul's method, he bore wholly another testimony (*Life*, by Hanna, Vol. I., pp. 434-'5.) "During the whole of that period, in which I made no attempt against the enmity of the mind to God; while I was inattentive to the way in which this enmity is dissolved—even by the free offer, on the one hand, and the believing acceptance of the gospel salvation—even at this time I certainly did press the reformation of honor and truth and integrity among my people, but I never once heard of any such reformations having been effected among them. . . . It was not till I took the scriptural way of laying the method of reconciliation before them that I ever heard of any of those subordinate reformations."

It is well known to theologians that Romanists uniformly charge a licentious result upon the Protestant doctrine of justification. We need do no more than cite the most bitter and adroit of their modern polemics. Möhler, in his *Symbolism* (Ch. 3, § 25), labors through dreary pages of fraud to evince this. He charges that the antinomianism of Agricola of Eisleben, or of Nicholas Amsdorf, was the legitimate corollary of Luther's teachings. He represents Luther as teaching "an inward and essential opposition between religion and morality." He says that had Luther been sufficiently well informed of the history of opinion, he must have avowed as his own that conclusion of Marcion, so denounced by the Fathers: That the preceptive God of the Old Testament was a different being from the gracious God of the New.

Passing to a very different school of legalists, we quote from the great New England Unitarian, Dr. Channing, a representation of the manner in which the Socinians adopt the same cavil. In his sermon, "Unitarian Christianity more Favorable to Piety," (*Works*, Vol. III., p. 190), he says: "Trinitarians also exhibit the work, as well as the character, of Christ, in lights less favorable to piety. It does not make the promotion of piety its chief end. It teaches that the highest purpose of his mission was to reconcile God to man, not man to God. It teaches that the most formidable obstacle to human happiness lies in the claims and threatenings of divine justice. Hence it leads men to prize Christ more for answering these claims and averting these threatenings, than for awakening in the soul human sentiments of love toward

the Father in heaven. Accordingly, multitudes appear to prize pardon more than piety, and think it a greater boon to escape, through Christ's sufferings, the fire of hell, than to receive, through his influence, the spirit of heaven, the spirit of devotion. Is such a system propitious to a generous, ever-growing piety?"

Froude, in both the works cited at the beginning of this article, discloses very plainly his Socinian and latitudinarian affinities. He is fond of pointing to the Protestant doctrine of justification as the corrupter of the English people, and of identifying its foremost advocates in church and state with corrupt scoundrels. He takes care not to mention that staunch Hugh Latimer and John Knox, whose spotless integrity he cannot but applaud, were the firmest advocates and best exemplars, at once, of that doctrine. In the *History* (Vol. V., p. 259,) he writes: "Such was the state of things which lay before the successors of Somerset (Protector to the child-king, Edward.) They were called upon to fight against corruption, which had infected the whole community, and, among the rest, had infected themselves. It was easier and pleasanter to earn the titles of 'Ministers of God,' by patronizing teachers who insisted on the worthlessness of good works, and could distinguish correctly between imputed and infused righteousness."

Under the heading of "Moral Results of the Reformation" (p. 405), he writes: "The people had exchanged a superstition which, in its grossest abuses, prescribed some shadow of respect for obedience, for a *superstition which merged obedience in speculative belief*: and under that baneful influence, not only the higher virtues of self-sacrifice, but the commonest duties of probity and morality were disappearing."

In his *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, under the title of "The Condition and Prospects of Protestantism," he tells us that he attended in the West of England (evidently among either the Welsh or the Wesleyan Methodists), a devotional meeting of evangelical Protestants. Here is a part of his malignant travesty of the truths there inculcated: "We were told that the business of each individual man and woman in the world was to save his or her soul; that we are all sinners together; all equally guilty, helpless, lost, accursed children, unable to stir a finger, or do a thing to help ourselves. Happily, we were not required to stir a finger; rather, we were forbidden to attempt it. An antidote had

been provided for our sins, and a substitute for our obedience. Everything had been done for us. We had but to lay hold of the perfect righteousness which had been fulfilled in our behalf. We had but to put on the vesture provided for our wearing, and our safety was assured. The reproaches of conscience were silenced. We are perfectly happy in this world, and certain to be blessed in the next. If, on the other hand, we neglected the offered grace ; if, through carelessness, or intellectual perverseness, or any other cause, we did not apprehend it in the proper manner, if we tried to please God ourselves by ‘ works of righteousness,’ the sacrifice would then cease to avail for us. It mattered nothing whether, in the common acceptation of the word, we were good or bad, we were lost all the same, condemned by perfect justice to everlasting torture.”

“ It is, of course, impossible for human creatures to act toward one another on these principles. The man of business, on week-days, deals with those whom he employs on week-day rules. He gives them work to do, and he expects them to do it. He knows the meaning of good desert, as well as of ill desert. He promises and he threatens. He praises and he blames. He will not hear of vicarious labor. He rewards the honest and industrious. He punishes the lazy and the vicious. He finds society so constructed that he cannot exist unless men treat one another as responsible for their actions, and as able to do right as well as wrong,” etc., etc. That is to say, Mr. Froude thinks it very absurd that we do not think God *ransoms and saves* a world of lost, guilty sinners on the same principles on which “ the man of business ” *governs* some of his fellow-creatures and natural equals ! Perhaps he might be undeceived if he would listen to such words as the following, from a book of which he manifestly knows little : “ Thou thoughtest,” says God, “ that I was altogether such an one as thyself ; but I will reprove thee.” (Ps. l. 21.)

We propose, however, as the most effectual way to expose the errors and misconceptions of all these objectors, to present a connected view of the teachings of a number of Protestant Confessions upon the doctrine of our justification. If there is any representation of its doctrines for which a church may properly be held responsible, and to which it may appeal, to show what it does and does not teach, it is the creed or confession deliberately adopted for itself. We wish to evince, first, the glorious

harmony (amidst all less important diversities) of all the Protestant communities upon this "*Articulus Ecclesiæ stantis aut cadentis*"; and, second, the unanimity with which they disclaim and denounce the antinomian corollary sought to be fixed upon them.

Let us begin with the most noted of these documents, the Augsburg Confession, written by Malancthon, sanctioned by Luther, and presented by the German Protestants to Charles V., in 1540.

"When the gospel accuseth us of sin, our convicted hearts ought to conclude that the remission of sins and justification are bestowed on us, *gratis*, for Christ's sake, by faith. . . . It is given *gratis*, that is, it doth not depend on the condition of our worth, nor is it given for the sake of any works precedent, or the worthiness of [works] following," etc. (Sec. 4.) They then add section 6: "They teach that when we are reconciled by faith, the righteousness of our good works *must necessarily follow*, which God hath commanded us, as also Christ hath enjoined: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.'"

The Helvetic Confession, composed by Bullinger, Myconius, and Grynæus, A. D. 1536, says, after defining justification as God's "remitting our sins, absolving us from their guilt and penalty, receiving us into grace, and pronouncing us just" (§ 15): "But since we receive this justification, not through any works, but through faith on the mercy of God and on Christ, so we teach and believe with the apostle, that sinful man is justified by faith alone on Christ, not by the law or any works." But, in § 16, they add: "The same apostle called faith 'efficacious,' and 'working by love,' Gal. v. . . . This same faith retaineth us in our duty, which we owe to God and our neighbor, and confirmeth patience in adversity, and formeth and maketh a true confession, and, to say all in one word, propagateth good fruits of every kind, and good works." "For we teach that works really good are born of a living faith, through the Holy Ghost, and are done by believers according to the will of God and the rule of his word," etc.

"Although, therefore, we teach with the apostle, that man is justified *gratis*, through faith in Christ, and not through any good works, still we do not therein vilipend or disapprove of good works. For we know that man was neither created, nor is he born again,

through faith, in order to idle ; but rather in order that he may do ceaselessly the things which are good and useful," etc.

The Confession of the French Protestant Church, 1561, says (§ 17): "We believe that we are reconciled to God by that sole sacrifice which Christ offered on the cross, so that we are accounted before him as righteous ; since we cannot be pleasing to him, nor possess the fruit of our adoption, save as he pardoneth our sins. Accordingly, we testify that Jesus Christ is our whole and perfect cleansing, in whose death we obtain a full satisfaction for guilt," etc. (§ 18): "Accordingly, we clearly repudiate all other grounds by which men deem they may be justified before God, and, all estimate of our virtues and merits discarded, we rest in the sole obedience of Jesus Christ," etc.

Compare, now, the following from § 22: "We believe that we, who are by nature servants of sin, when this same faith intervenes, are regenerated into a new life. But by this faith we receive the grace of living holily, while we embrace that gospel promise, that the Lord will give us the Holy Spirit. Faith is, then, so far from extinguishing the zeal for living well and holily, that it rather wakens and inflames that zeal in us ; whence good works do necessarily proceed."

The well-known Confession of the Westminster divines, adopted by the Presbyterians of Great Britain and America, may sufficiently represent the views of all the Protestants known as Calvinistic ; and a brief citation from it may fairly stand for the Belgic, the Heidelberg, the Augsburg, and other symbols of that school. In the eleventh chapter the Westminster Confession says :

"§ 1. Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth ; not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous ; not for anything wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ's sake alone," etc.

"§ 2. Faith, thus receiving and resting on Christ and his righteousness, is the alone instrument of justification ; yet is not alone in the person justified, but is ever accompanied with all other saving graces, and is no dead faith, but worketh by love."

As a representative of the Anabaptist communions, we insert an extract from the Mennonite standards. They show that, widely as these sects differed from other Protestants, they were all at one touching justification and good works :

“Catechism: Ques. 3.—Do you then hope to be justified and saved by your good works in keeping the commandments of Christ?”

“Ans.—No; by our good works we cannot gain heaven, or merit eternal blessedness; but it is by grace that we are saved, through faith, and that not of ourselves; it is the gift of God.” (Eph. ii. 8.)

“Ques. 4.—Whereunto, then, do good works and the keeping of the commandments of Christ serve?”

“Ans.—By good works we show forth and manifest our faith in Jesus Christ; for obedience to the commandments of God, wrought by love, is the light and life of faith, and without which faith is dead. (Jas. ii. 20.)”

The Articles of Religion adopted by the Episcopal Churches of Great Britain and America (the churches which love the parental relation to the great Wesleyan communion, if often step-parents), state the matter thus:

“ART. XI.—Of the Justification of Man. We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only, is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the homily of justification.

“ART. XII.—Of Good Works. Albeit that good works, which are the fruits of faith, and follow after justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God’s judgment; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith, insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.”

The Articles as held by our Methodist Episcopal Church are identical, save that in the former of them, the reference to the homily, and in the latter, the word “necessarily,” are omitted, and the idiom is a little modernized.

The most venerable of all these Confessions we have, for a particular reason, reserved for the last of our witnesses. It is the Confession of the Bohemian and Moravian ministers and nobles, the leaders of that Reformed Church before the Reformation, whose character was illustrated by the labors and martyrdom of John Huss. This body, at the dawn of the Reformation, joyfully

recognized the new Protestants as their brethren in the faith. The renewed discussions of the movement, begun by Luther and Zwinglius, caused the church of "the Picards," as they were styled, to present their formal Confession to their prince, the Austrian king of the Romans, A. D. 1535. At the end of Article VI. they say:

"They further teach, that men are justified before God by faith, or trust on Jesus Christ, alone, without any strivings, merits, and works of their own. As Paul teacheth: 'But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.' Again: 'But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets.' And this righteousness is 'by the faith of Jesus Christ.' Elsewhere: 'Through him, whosoever believeth is justified.' And this sixth Article is among us held the most fundamental of all, as being the sum of all Christianity and piety. Accordingly, our people teach and discuss it with all diligence and zeal, and strive to inculcate it on all."

ART. VII.—"To this they add: 'Let those who are justified by the sole grace of God, and faith on Christ, do the good works which God commands, and let each one walk worthily in them according to his vocation, in whatsoever grade of life, state and age he may be. For thus the Lord, with Matthew: 'Teach them,' saith he, 'to observe all things which I command you.' But, since many things are extant in Scripture touching this, we forbear to treat it farther.' . . . 'But they teach that good works must thus be done, that faith may be by them approved. For good works are the sure witnessings, seals, and *indices* of the living faith within, and fruits thereof, by which the tree is distinguished (Matthew vii.) as good or evil,'" etc.

The point of present interest to us in this witness is, that the great founder of the Wesleyan communion was so largely indebted, under God, to the descendants of this Moravian communion for his final and joyful establishment in the peace of the gospel. A shattered remnant of these Christians, fleeing out of fiery persecutions in the eighteenth century, found refuge under Count Zinzendorf, at Herrnhut, in Prussian Lusatia, and spreading thence, planted themselves in several spots of Europe and America. It was during Wesley's voyage to Georgia that he first saw these humble Christians, and was struck with their possession of an

assured spiritual peace which he then lacked, notwithstanding his ardent strivings. After his return he entered into more intimate relations with their ministers in England; and, finally, seeking the rest his soul craved, he visited their parent seat at Herrnhut. There he met Christian David, a Moravian minister, whose simple and sincere wisdom he learned to esteem above that of the others, and of Count Zinzendorf himself, from whose mouth he received this testimony:

"The word of reconciliation which the apostles preached, as the foundation of all they taught, was: That we are reconciled to God, not by our own works, nor by our own righteousness, but wholly and solely by the blood of Christ."

"The right foundation is not your contrition, not your righteousness, *nothing of your own*, nothing that is wrought *in you* by the Holy Ghost, but it is something *without* you, viz., the righteousness and blood of Christ." . . . "And when they have received this gift from God, then their hearts will melt for sorrow that they have offended him," etc.

Wesley tells us, in his journal (May 24th, 1738), the issue of his doubts and fears. "I was now thoroughly convinced, and by the grace of God I resolved to seek it [faith] unto the end. 1. By absolutely renouncing all dependence, in whole or in part, on my own works or righteousness, on which I had really grounded my hope of salvation, though I knew it not, from my youth up. 2. By adding to the constant use of all other means of grace continual prayer for this very thing—justifying, saving faith, a full reliance on the blood of Christ shed for *me*, a trust in him as *my* Christ, as *my* sole justification, sanctification, and redemption." Thenceforward he was able, with a triumphant hand, to sweep his hallowed lyre, as he took up that strain which was silenced no more, and which to-day he is singing in glory:

"Jesus, thy blood and righteousness,
My beauty are, my glorious dress;
Midst flaming worlds, in these arrayed,
With joy shall I lift up my head."

We shall close our appeal to this "great cloud of witnesses" with two emphatic sentences from those "Sermons" of Wesley which are recognized by Methodists as carrying almost the force of a doctrinal covenant among them. In Sermon V., on Justification, he says:

“5th, Faith, therefore, is the necessary condition of justification; yea, and the *only* necessary condition thereof. This is the second point carefully to be observed, that the very moment God giveth faith (for *it is the gift of God*) to the ‘ungodly,’ that ‘worketh not,’ that faith is counted to him for righteousness.”

These witnesses evince at least two things: the universal agreement of the evangelical churches in excluding the merits of man’s works from his justification, and their equally hearty belief that this justification by the sole righteousness of Christ is only conducive to holy living. It is the latter proposition which we propose farther to consider. Our purposes are to clear away the slanders and misconceptions of the opposers of the great Protestant doctrine, and to admonish ourselves and our brethren against the secret tendency, should it lurk in any of us, toward perverting the grace of the Redeemer to the excusing of our sluggishness. The theme which we argue is, in truth, just the one asserted by Paul: “Do we, then, make void the law through faith? God forbid; yea, we establish the law.” The “war is to be carried into Africa.” So far is it from being true that a free justification disparages the claims of holiness, it enhances them far above any force which they could derive from a plan of justification by works, even were such a plan permitted to sinners.

Let us, in advancing to this issue, sweep away a preliminary obstacle. The few nominal Christians who have been audacious enough to assert a theoretical antinomianism, sustain it, as we saw, by this false logic: “Since Christ has paid our debt vicariously, if the law of God put in any claim of positive obligation on believers, either preceptive or penal, this would be the intrinsic injustice of requiring payment twice for one claim.” This proceeds on the double error of regarding God’s claim of right upon man as one of commutative justice only, instead of rectoral justice, and of degrading Christ’s satisfaction for sinners to a mere pecuniary equivalent. Let us explain: God is not our equal, trading with us, but our creator, sovereign, proprietor, and chief end. Christ’s vicarious righteousness is not a mere commercial equivalent, but a gloriously suitable, yet free, moral equivalent, devised and wrought by divine grace at its own option. When a man is in debt to his fellow, under the rules of commutative justice, if his security offer to the creditor the precise amount of money due, in legal coin of the realm, it is “a

legal tender." The creditor is obliged to accept it as payment, and has no option to say, "I prefer the money of the principal debtor himself." If he says this, he loses his whole claim thenceforward, and the debtor goes free. But it is a miserable degradation of Christ's satisfaction to conceive it thus. God, the creditor, is sovereign owner of the debtor. The debt is moral, and not commercial. There is no law superior to God, restraining his holy and righteous discretion as to the shape in which his justice shall demand and receive its satisfaction. Hence, when divine mercy proposed a vicarious satisfaction, the free, optional acceptance of the Sovereign was as essential to its validity as the divine worthiness of the Substitute. Now, the greater includes the less, and the whole its parts. If the divine creditor has discretionary right to devise and accept a substitution, of course he has the included right, when he accepts it, to reserve any terms or conditions with the released debtor which he chooses. What terms he has seen fit, in his mercy, holiness and wisdom, to reserve and stipulate with us sinners, is therefore simply a question of fact. What saith he in his gospel of this? The substance of the answer is this: That he graciously accepts "Christ as the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth," reserving to himself these two points—both entirely consistent with a blessed reconciliation—that the beneficiary shall still observe the law as his rule of holy living (though no longer as his covenant of works), and that the Father shall have the option of chastening the reconciled child during his militant state, for his good, in love and not in wrath. "These things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in God might be careful to maintain good works." "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth." Now, such being the transactions, and God having expressly stipulated these reservations in the very offer of his mercy, it is a simple impertinence to say that he can no longer require obedience of us without claiming the same debt twice.

We can fully admit the truth of one part of the Romanist and Socinian objection: no doctrine can be true which abrogates the force of God's commandments over his reasonable creatures. If the doctrine of a gracious justification did this, it could not be true. But such is not its effect. Our God claims holiness as his consummate attribute. "Evil shall not dwell with him."

Our obligation to imitate and obey him is more original even than any published precept, for it is founded on our natural relation to him, as moral creatures of a righteous and beneficent Sovereign. Christ came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil; it was impossible that he should come on the former errand. Hence, whatever change of dispensation man's sin and fall and God's mercy may have prompted, it is simply impossible that there can be anywhere or for any object a dispensation of disobedience.

To rebut the charge that the teaching of a gracious justification encourages license, we might appeal first to experience. It was the testimony of Dr. Chalmers, who at first believed the charge, that he found those who boasted in the merit of their obedience to commend them to God less zealous to obey, while those who claimed no merit of reward for their works were most punctilious in their works. This seeming paradox, when honest observation first forced it on his attention, appeared unaccountable. Grace afterward taught him the beautiful solution. The fact which we claim in our favor can justly be put in a very pungent form against our accusers: that the most current charge the world has had to bring against the advocates of the evangelical doctrine is that of over-strictness. Who were the Protestants stigmatized in the seventeenth century as "Puritans" (purists in their conduct)? The especial advocates, among the Anglican clergy and people, of this doctrine of a gracious justification. We have seen the doctrine of Wesley; what was the name of reproach hurled at his adherents? They were "Methodists;" they were so strict in their obedience as to live by a *methodus*, forsooth! But a century of the fruits of Christian charity, zeal and virtue, borne among Methodists by this hope of free justification, has transmuted the term of obloquy into a title of honor. Such is the inconsistency of the indictment. When the gospel doctrine is presented in theory, the world exclaims, "O! it breeds license of conduct; away with it." But when it is fairly presented in the actual conduct of its representative advocates, the virtue which it prompts is "too strict." This world, just now so jealous of relaxation of life, cannot endure the restraints of such a life.

But to proceed. It is argued that men cannot be longer induced to exert themselves in righteous living when you have

assured them that their righteousness can earn nothing, and that the lack of it forfeits nothing. Such reasoning evidently proceeds upon the assumption that self-interest is the only, or at least the chief, motive to a Christian life. We might, then, dismiss the whole debate by saying that such is not our estimate of the life of faith; we can descend to no such grovelling scheme of morals. The believer has better motives to spur him to a ceaseless career of duty than a mercenary calculation of advantage to his self-love. Hence, even if all motives of self-interest were extinguished, other and nobler ones would remain. But the evangelical doctrine does not propose to extinguish, neither does it neglect, the desire of good to one's self. So far as a rational regard for our own welfare here and hereafter is a legitimate affection, it leaves it in full operation. This desire is enlightened, purified, subordinated to God's will and glory. But we assert that all the force which it can have, or ought to have, as motive to stimulate effort, is left unbroken by the promise of justification without the merit of our own works. This we evince in three ways:

First, The gospel teaches us that while believers are not rewarded on account of their works, they are rewarded according to their works. This is a plain distinction which the Romanists (as Möhler, in his *Symbolism*,) labor most deceitfully to confound. They represent us as teaching that works done by the aid of Christ's grace are not morally good in God's sight; that they must be classed as in themselves sins at least venial, if not mortal sins; that in God's sight the sins of the unrenewed are as rewardable as the obedience of the regenerate. Now, what we teach is, that an act done in sincerity and affection for God, agreeable to his precepts and by the aids of his grace, is the object of moral approbation with God; he is pleased by it. It does stand in moral contrast, in his view, with the sin which violates his precept. But we hold that this act, if its good motives be mixed with any remains of indwelling sin, must still be estimated by the heart-searching God as what it is, short of the perfection required by the divine law. We hold that even a perfect act of to-day could not atone for the delinquency of yesterday, because, even though we had "done all those things which are commanded us, we must say we are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do." We believe, with Paul,

“that by the deeds of the law shall no flesh [already sinful and condemned by that law] be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin.” This is but saying, that a criminal who had confessed, or been convicted of murder, could not appeal to the statute against murder for acquittal, because the sole legal function of that statute as to that man was to affix his doom. Hence, while we ascribe to all gracious works a right moral quality, approvable by God so far as they are morally right, we refuse to ascribe to them the “condign merit” of the Romish divine; we do not believe that they create a claim of debt against God to bestow a reward. This were in every point of view preposterous; both because we had before forfeited all such claim, and incurred the opposite title, the title to punishment; because the credit of the works, in the highest sense, returns to God, whose grace enabled us to do them; and because he is our sovereign proprietor, to whom we and all our services originally belonged. (See Luke xvii. 9.) The slave did not deem that he had brought his owner in debt by rendering a service which the owner rightfully claimed as property. Hence we have no “condign merit” on which to claim even a restoration to favor.

But when our divine Substitute has effected that restoration to favor gratuitously, then our holy Father can be pleased with all truly good works, as thank-offerings of our gratitude to his undeserved grace. He declares that with such sacrifices “he is well pleased.” He has taught us, moreover, that in order to manifest his benevolence and holiness to the world, he will apportion the riches of the inheritance which Christ purchased for us, and bestowed “without money and without price,” to the amount of our sacrifices for him. And this is not a transaction of commutative or even of distributive justice, but a bestowal of fatherly love. Christ bought this privilege, also, for us. “While death is the *wages* of sin, eternal life is the *gift* of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” That the gift is proportioned by this rule is plain from the parable of the talents. The servant who gained for his lord an increase of ten pounds from one, is made ruler over ten cities; while the servant who gained five pounds, while commended in like manner, is made ruler over five cities. The apostle (in 2 Cor. ix.), while inculcating alms-giving purely as a thank-offering to God, yet adds: ‘He which soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly, and he which soweth bountifully

shall reap also bountifully." Hence it follows that a sluggish or unholy life, even if it did not suggest any doubt of the whole inheritance, would at least rob it of a large part of its riches. The sordid pleasure of the self-indulgent is short-lived; the subtraction of joy and glory from the future prize will be everlasting. Here is a motive appealing to enlightened self-interest, to which a living faith cannot be insensible. Does any one say, "No; any seat, the lowest within the gate of heaven, will fully sate my ambition." The answer is, that such an ambition can attest only a dead faith—a faith which is worthless to place the soul within the gate; for the soul that loves God and heaven must crave all of heaven that it can attain.

But, second, sluggishness in duty cannot be indulged without bringing our title to the inheritance into doubt. All know our Saviour's maxim, "By their fruits ye shall know them." He has given us this rule, not only for judging the validity of our neighbors' titles, but of our own titles, to his favor. Indeed, while the Scriptures everywhere make our works naught, as meritorious grounds of justification, they make much of them as evidences or *indices* of our justification. They plainly assume that all other evidences would become invalid if they remained without this vital sign—the fruits of holy living. These simple remarks give us at once the key to understand and reconcile two large groups of texts which some suppose contradictory. The one class runs thus: "If I wash myself with snow water, and make my hands never so clean; yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch, and mine own clothes shall abhor me." "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee; wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." (Job ix. 30, 31; xlii. 5, 6.) "I will make mention of thy righteousness, even of thine only." (Ps. lxxi. 16.) "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." (Ps. cxliii. 2.) "We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do." (Luke xvii. 10.) "But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident; for, The just shall live by faith." (Gal. iii. 11.) "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us," etc. (Titus iii. 5.) The other class reads thus: "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands and a pure heart; who hath

not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully." (Ps. xxiv. 3, 4.) "Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you." (John xv. 14.) "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him." (Acts x. 34, 35.) "Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only." (Jas. ii. 24.) "Little children, let no man deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous." (1 John iii. 7.)

Such are the texts of the second class. Several of them are claimed by the Council of Trent and the Romish Catechism in support of their dogma of justification by their works of inwrought righteousness. To the inconsiderate there may seem to be a contrariety; but the easy and obvious solution is in the truth that, while our works are naught as a ground of merit for our justification, they are all-important as evidences that we are justified. The man who hath clean hands and a pure heart is the one who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord. Obedience characterizes one as a friend of Christ. The fear of God and works of righteousness distinguish the man who is accepted of him. The faith which evinces its living power by no works has no power to justify. The justified person is the one that doeth just works. All this is true. But this is far short of saying that the merit of the clean hands and pure heart is what entitled the first-mentioned to his place in the hill of the Lord, that a sinner's obedience deserved the bestowal of Christ's friendship, that the fear of God and righteous works purchased Cornelius's acceptance with him. In a word, the personal value of the believer's good works to him in the transaction of his justification is not in their purchasing, but their indicative, power. In the eyes of an enlightened self-interest the latter may be as truly precious as the former. Let us suppose that there were a penniless young man, who had received from some generous friend the free gift of a beautiful landed estate in fee simple. The benefactor purchased it for him, we will say, for ten thousand pounds sterling. Upon installing the beneficiary (who is a pauper in his own resources) in the possession of it, he hands him a "title deed," or written "instrument of conveyance," which he recommends him to preserve jealously. Now, why should the beneficiary lock it up in his strong box as though it were a set of diamonds? Is it worth

anything? In one sense, no. As merchantable "stationery" it is simply a sheet of spoiled parchment or "legal cap," worthy of nobody's desire but the rag-picker's! It could purchase nothing, not a loaf, much less a whole estate. But, in another sense, yes. As evidence of title, if no other proof is available, it is worth all of ten thousand pounds. For, without it, the possessor of the land would be liable to be ousted at any time by the heirs of the vendor. He will do well, therefore, to guard it as carefully as though it were ten thousand pounds in coin. So the humble believer, who claims no merit from his obedience, yet has a reason for valuing it. Self-love is not, indeed, his ruling spring of action; "the love of Christ constraineth him." But so far as a regard for his own welfare is consistent with grateful love and devotion, he feels the preciousness of his sincere obedience as the only adequate evidence that his faith is justifying. Let us make a practical comparison of the *stimulus* of self-interest in his case with the case of the legalist. The latter, when betrayed by temptation into unchristian conduct, says to himself, with selfish alarm, "Ah! I must amend my ways, or the purchase money of my inheritance will be lacking." The former, in similar backsliding, says, "My gracious redeemer offers me the inheritance without money and without price, but, ah! I must amend my ways, or the evidence that I am his beneficiary is lacking." Wherein is this *stimulus* less pungent than the other?

This view implies, of course, that the believer, in examining his assurance of personal grace and salvation, always regards the fruits of holy living in himself as one essential ground thereof. They "spring out of a true and lively faith, insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree is discerned by its fruits." (Art. X.) "Show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." (James.) "Know ye not your own selves how that Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates?" (Paul.) The relation of this confidence of hope to faith has been much and needlessly confused amidst the dust of this controversy. Some Protestants, in their over-zeal for defending the believer's right to confidence, have virtually impugned these words of the apostle, asserting that if a Christian permits anything in himself, in any form, to enter as a part of the ground of his confidence, he has forsaken a free justification, and is building again upon his own works. They

would have our confidence grounded on nothing but our own immediate consciousness of faith embracing the Saviour. The Romanist who denies his trembling follower this blessed confidence altogether, yet echoes the argument, charging that the view of the Protestant churches, thus understood, really returns back to a reliance on works for our hope. On the other hand, Rome, not very consistently, urges that if the believer is allowed to ground a confidence of hope upon any consciousness of sincere faith, or witnessing of the Spirit; that if he is encouraged to argue any degree of hope whatsoever from anything else than an inwrought sanctification attested by good works, he is betrayed into sheer antinomianism. [And here Rome persistently proceeds: since those good works are so imperfect in all Christians, except the martyrs, as to require penance and purgatory to atone for their defects, so the hope inferred from them must be always imperfect also, and dashed by doubts.] Now, it appears to us, that all this dust is cleared away by addressing the believer thus: True, to conclude that you have hitherto been justified in Christ, while entirely lacking the fruits of holiness which result from union to him, is antinomianism. But to make this past absence of fruits a reason for projecting this mistrust into the future, this would be legalism and unbelief. You, weak Christian, would say to an unbeliever, paralyzed by his mistrust from taking Christ's yoke, that his lack of love, peace, and strength for duty, might be very good proof that he had hitherto been an unrenewed sinner; but it is sheer unbelief to make this miserable past experience a ground for doubting and rejecting Christ's full and free salvation offered to faith. You, our doubting brother, would require that sinner to *believe in order to* experience the peace and strength. You would not, indeed, encourage him to believe that he was already reconciled while disobedient, but you would tell him that he might be assuredly reconciled and obedient in believing. So the gospel replies to the doubting Christian, "Be not afraid, only believe," and his joys and grace shall follow as the *fruits*, and not as the *roots*, of his trust. In other words, an experience of the power of grace, working through faith all holy living, is not the *a priori* source or cause of an interest in Christ [that would be legalism]; but it is the *a posteriori* sign, because the sure result of our interest in Christ. To refuse that sign would be antinomianism. Thus we find the two great

truths, "Christ our only righteousness," and, "by their fruits ye shall know them," perfectly consistent.

The third point remains to show that a free justification does not diminish the believer's legitimate self-interest in his good works. The gospel assigns a certain relation between faith and that righteousness of Christ which it embraces, on the one hand, and holy character and living on the other. The relation is that of *means to end*. It is true, indeed, that we are not reconciled to God by merits of our own works, for we have none that are worthy. But we are reconciled to him by the merits of another's work, in order to become capable of good works. God "justifieth the ungodly," in order that, being justified, he may become godly by the inworking of the purchased grace. It is not necessary to multiply many references to the Scriptures to sustain this cardinal truth. "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins." Such is the key-note of the gospel. "Even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." "Who gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." Redemption from the curse, and gratuitous restoration to favor, are the means; restoration to holiness the end. Now, when we deny the place of means to our own righteousness, and assign it to the place of end, surely we have not depreciated its importance. The end is higher than the means. It may be true that the practical utility of the essential instrument is virtually that of the end. If there were a treasure in a vault, and there were no other possible means to reach it besides a certain lost key, then the discovery of that key would, in one sense, be worth the treasure. But, yet, the value of the key is derived solely from the value of the treasure. After the vault was rifled of all, the key would be useless. So that it remains, the end is practically higher than the means. The man who understands that Christ has justified him, not by, but in order to, good works, cannot possibly slight their importance. This is so plain that it is hard to see why the self-constituted advocate of good works is not satisfied. It leaves the interest which he professes to patronize in the place of

crowning importance. Is not that enough? The true solution of his dissatisfaction is, that this arrangement is unsatisfactory because by it "boasting is excluded." This, and this alone, is the offense. Good works are provided for, and that in the most efficacious possible way; but it is a way which permits "no flesh to glory in his sight." Hence alone the discontent.

This may be set in another light equally strong. No presentation of the plan of salvation can be more popular or concrete than this, that it is a plan to raise the heirs of hell to heaven. But what is heaven? The Bible never represents mere impunity as the inheritance of the believer; it is only an incident of that inheritance. The essential trait of heaven is holiness. A God of holiness is the source of its bliss, and moral likeness to him the way in which he makes us partakers of that bliss. Purity of heart is essentially the harmony of a rational nature, and is in itself peace. Sin is spiritual disease and death; to be sinful is to be wretched. These are the truths which lie at the very basis of both law and gospel. Hence, if God had no perfections of justice and holiness concerned in the work of redemption, and his sole aim were to gratify the attribute of benevolence by bestowing enjoyment upon sinners, this aim would still require their sanctification. For if sin is misery, sinners can only be made happy indeed by being made holy. The process of redemption, then, is one whose design throughout is holiness. But a justification encouraging sin would be a preposterous path to lead to such an end. The man who designs to reach the south does not travel toward the frozen north! That pretender to Christianity must be demented, truly, who would pursue a life of sin as the means of entering, through Christ, the way, into a state of perfect holiness.

Indeed, such a debate as Nicholas Amsdorf is said to have held, concerning the relative importance of faith and works in the Christian life, is preposterous. Both are of essential importance; the one as necessary means, the other as end. It is as though one should debate which is the more essential to a vine, roots or grapes? And when the generous vine displayed its luxuriant foliage to the sun, with the luscious clusters blushing through the leaves as they bent toward the earth, let us suppose that we heard some one argue thus: "Those beautiful clusters do not sustain the vine. It is the unsightly roots, grovelling

unseen amidst the mould underneath, which perform that function. From these roots comes the vital sap which causes all this luxuriant beauty and fruitfulness. Therefore, grapes are of no account in the vine." Such is the antinomian inference. We should answer: "Thou fool! True, the grapes do not sustain the vine, but the root sustains it for the sake of the grapes. True, the fruit is the result and not the cause of the growth. But it is for the sake of this fruit alone that the vine is grown. Without its generous fruit, 'what is the vine tree more than any tree, or than a branch which is among the trees of the forest? Shall wood be taken thereof to do any work, or will men take a pin of it to hang any vessel thereon? Behold, it is cast into the fire for fuel.' As a fruit tree, which is valueless for its timber, unfit even for the cheapest uses of the mechanic, and prized only for its fruit, if it be fruitless, is but rubbish, fit only for fuel, so the pretended believer who does not bear the fruits of holiness is 'rejected, and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned.'"

But these are merely the preludes of our argument. We now leave the defensive position for the aggressive. We claim that we do not "make void the law through faith;" and we also claim that by this doctrine "we establish the law." The gospel scheme of a gratuitous justification is the best, yea, the only scheme, for evoking works that are really good. To introduce this positive part of our argument, we request the reader to study the simple, yet comprehensive, view by which the apostle (in the sixth chapter of Romans) refutes the abhorred inference that "we shall continue in sin that grace may abound." What ideas of the gospel can be simpler than these? Redemption repairs the fall. Christ, the second Adam, undoes for believers all that the fall did. But the fall left man both guilty and condemned, and inwardly depraved. As it left us, we were the "servants of sin" (vs. 17) as well as under condemnation. All of this made up or constituted that curse, that ruin, from which Christ came to lift us, at the prompting of redeeming love. He undertook for us, died for us. "He was made a curse for us," and in this way "hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." Now, can it be that it is but a partial redemption; that in the remedy the curse is divided, which in the ruin was one and indivisible, and a part is lifted from us, and a part left upon us? Surely not. If we

are redeemed, we are redeemed from the whole curse, from the inward corruption as well as the outward wrath. And this is the more certain because the corruption, the spiritual death of soul into which the fall plunged us, is so inseparably connected, by action and reaction, with the condemning sentence. Sinners dread and hate God because his justice condemns them, and his justice condemns them because they are so wicked as to dread and hate him, the infinitely holy. Then, for the stronger reason, it cannot be that our Saviour has healed a part of this indivisible curse in his saved people, and left a part unhealed. Again, how does Christ interpose for man? He offers *himself* as "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Hence, the believer "is not under the law, but under grace." He does not live under the covenant of works as a plant of salvation, but under the covenant of grace; for Christ has fulfilled that broken covenant for us, under which we had fallen and could only perish. But see how, from this blessed fact, the apostle draws precisely the opposite inference from that of the legalist and antinomian (vs. 14). "For sin *shall not have dominion* over you, *for* (or *because*) ye are not under the law, but under grace." And this is the consistent, the unavoidable inference. Under the covenant of works we fell, with Adam, into a state of condemnation *and corruption*. Because our gracious Redeemer has taken us out from under that covenant, therefore we must come out from under both the penalty and the dominion of sin, which make up the ruined state. If we have come out from the one, then from the other also.

But how? By our own strength? No. Christ, in redeeming us, bought for us grace also—grace to quicken and convert our souls, to deliver us from the bondage of sin, and make us servants of righteousness. And as the curse was one, inseparably one, so the gift is one glorious gift. United to Christ by faith, believers share his spiritual life as surely as they share the merit of his justifying righteousness. Just as surely as the body of the Redeemer was emancipated from the grave, so surely are their souls, by that death of the Lord, emancipated from the corruption and bondage of sin, if they cleave to him by faith. It is as impossible that the glorified Saviour can suffer and die again, after he proclaimed "It is finished," as that the believer, who is in Christ by faith, can still live in Satan's bondage. And

this is precisely what our baptism means. That water, emblem of the sprinkling blood of Calvary, is a "water of separation;" it separates us from our old, sinful life to a new, penitent and holy life; it marks a transition from the old to the new as clear and distinct as the tomb of Joseph made between the mortal, suffering life of Jesus and his glorified existence after his resurrection. He becomes to us not only Priest, but King, not only Victim, but Captain of our salvation; and no believer who has true faith ever dreams of or desires the separation of the offices. A simple faith embraces a whole Christ. Thus this ministration of free grace is also the most efficacious ministry of holiness.

In farther illustrating this inspired argument, we shall pursue two lines of thought, each of which is conclusive. First, then, while the gospel requires us to *discriminate* justification from sanctification, "that boasting may be excluded," it forbids us to *separate* them. Is it by the instrumentality of faith we receive Christ as our justification, without the merit of any of our works? Well. But this same faith, if vital enough to embrace Christ, is also vital enough to "work by love," "to purify our hearts." This, then, is the virtue of the free gospel, as a ministry of sanctification, that the very faith which embraces the gift becomes an inevitable and a divinely powerful principle of obedience. No system of legalism, devised for a sinful nature, can do that. Dead faith is an intellectual notion, a mere opinion of the head, which, if it is attended by any conative action of the heart, is only accompanied by the feeble and fickle desires of self-love and remorse. But this faith does not justify (as it does not sanctify). Living faith is a hearty, decisive determination of the intelligence and the will together, of the whole, free soul. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness." This is the faith which attains a gratuitous justification. Now, *what is its object?* To this there is a general answer and a special answer. The first: Its object is the whole word of God so far as known; the second: The gospel promises. But the two answers find their consistency in this further truth, that faith embraces both objects on the authority of God, the same God speaking in them. The God who promises and invites is the same God who instructs, commands, and threatens. Why is faith willing to risk its everlasting all upon his promises? Because she relies on his truth in them. But the same truth is in the precepts! Then the

same faith will recognize its power and authority there also. Does faith respect God's authority?—respect it enough to venture its immortality upon that authority? Then surely it must respect it in both places. Hence the same faith “acteth differently upon that which each particular passage of the word containeth, yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises, of God.”

Now, we ask, when God gives this faith to a man, is there any danger of its embracing the last object, the promises, and being oblivious of the others? Can it be vitally alive to the invitation, and dead to the precepts and threats? That vitality would be monstrous. As well might the surgeon tell us that he had so restored life to a paralyzed limb that it could now thrill with pleasure at a soothing touch of the gentle hand of affection, and yet that it was insensible when pierced with his steel to the bone; that it was fully sensitive to the genial warmth, but still callous to the devouring fire. Faith has been called the vital breath of a Christian soul. The analogy is good. Then it will breathe toward both precepts and promises if it is a living soul. It is as preposterous to deny this as it would be to tell us of a living infant breathing in only one lung, and yet normal and healthy. If its organs are neither monstrous nor diseased, it must breathe in both lungs in order to breathe in either, else in a few moments it will be a dead child. But *it will breathe* in both; to this every instinct of its vitality impels it; and it will endeavor to do so with an energy which can be repressed by no violence except one which destroys life.

Thus faith must perform its vital action in both the spheres of obedience and of trust, or it cannot live. This becomes more manifest when we observe how intimately the precepts and promises are intermingled in the gospel. The requirement of duty and the promise of free grace are entwined together like two melodies mingling in one harmony; the ear of faith cannot separate either from the heavenly strain, nor would it mar the concord if it could. Not only do both parts of the teaching alternate, as we pass from page to page of God's word; they are offered to our faith in the very same breath. Would David (in the thirty-second Psalm) sing the blessedness of him “whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered, to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity”? He cannot conclude without adding, “and in whose

spirit there is no guile." Does the apostle reassure us with the delightful declaration that "there is now, therefore, no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus?" He cannot even close his sentence without pausing to define those who are entitled to that blessed assurance, as those "who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit." The faith, then, which is the instrument of a gratuitous justification can never neglect the precepts of its Saviour, for it is as much its nature to quicken the soul to the heeding of them as to the embracing of the promises.

The second line of argument by which we prove that the doctrine of a free justification is the best instrument for inciting to holy living, is suggested by the adaptation of the gospel, as a system of truth, to this end. It is the beautiful peculiarity of the system that God has so constructed it as to be the most efficient possible for the inculcation of holiness, as it is the most gracious possible for the encouragement of hope in a sinner's bosom. Is it not just the assertion of the apostle, when he says (Titus ii. 11, 12), "For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world?" etc. Now, a wise Jehovah does not construct his works by chance. He, doubtless, designed this gospel for both these ends. We safely infer, hence, that it was no part of his purpose that the gospel of his grace should be a ministry of licentiousness; but he designed to redeem us unto holiness. Let any trait be examined which distinguishes the gospel from the revelation of God made in the works of nature to the natural reason; it will be found that that trait is a moving appeal to the soul for holy living. We might dwell upon the greater attractiveness which the gospel throws around the divine character, alluring us toward it in reconciling complacency. We might dwell upon the power of the example of Jesus, when he "suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow in his steps." We might display the all-important influences of hope, sweetly encouraged by promised grace, replacing stubborn fear, desperation and self-accusation. It would indeed be profitable to unfold in contrast the chilling and depressing effects of a legalistic scheme operating upon the infirm, tottering efforts of fallen man. We could easily show how truly "Hagar with her children

is in bondage until this day." The serious effort of duty cannot but bring the sins of our hearts into comparison with the exalted standard of a spiritual law. And as this disclosure is made to the self-righteous, but convicted, man, that the "law is spiritual, but he is carnal, sold under sin," the task of winning a justification by rendering, in his own strength, an adequate obedience to this holy law, at once recognized and dreaded, presses upon the galled neck, until the fainting wretch is crushed to desperation. Many is the sinner whose remorseful struggles for reformation have been ended by this very cause, who has thrown off the futile and slavish endeavor, and who now goes on with a stolid hopelessness in those paths of sin which he is too weak to forsake, and which yet lead, as he knows, to perdition. Now, how inestimable is the boon of well-grounded hope to such a soul? Teach it that there is a way out of this slough of despair, that there is a gratuitous reconciliation, which enlists him under a gracious Captain who will "make strength perfect in his weakness," that the believing soul is "complete in him in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so that the warfare may be hopefully renewed and the victory won, and the news is as life from the dead.

But our design is to explain these points; that this plan of gratuitous justification is the most efficient ministry of holiness, because it sets in the strongest possible light the demands of the divine holiness, the inflexibility of the law, the absolute necessity of conformity thereto, and the evil of sin; and because it supplies the generous incentive of devotion as our motive to duty. We may illustrate these positions most fairly, and also most forcibly, by showing the parallel applications of the gospel scheme and that of the opposers.

The legalist proposes, for instance, to pay a certain homage to the righteousness of God by signaling his reconciliation with a reform of his life, and the assumption of a certain round of duties, either of outward morality or ritualism. He expects the merit of these performances to satisfy the divine rectitude and to earn a favorable reward. Such is his theory. But unless he is besotted with sin, does he not see that his reformation is partial and unstable; that his duties are prompted by mixed motives, a part of his desire therein being morally indifferent, and a part positively selfish and deceitful; that his ritualism is often formal

and apathetic, and that the whole service is tainted by a mercenary aim? This righteousness cannot even satisfy himself in his honest moments, yet he relies upon it to satisfy God's holiness! Then, indeed, is he easily pleased! Then, indeed, is his holiness no very exacting thing! Why should man give himself much concern about the favor of so facile a ruler as this? The prize so easily won is as easily despised. But the gospel tells a very different story. It shows us a divine holiness so lofty and inflexible that it is incapable of conniving at defect; it will call nothing perfect which is not perfect, and yet can accept no less than perfection. So pure is this holiness that the slightest stain of sin renders our raiment unfit to appear before his judgment-seat. Nothing can be displayed there with acceptance except the spotless robe of Christ's righteousness. Not even the infinite pity which commends itself to us by sending his own Son to die for us when we were enemies, can sway that rectitude to reward anything less than perfection. Such is the God with whom we aspire to dwell in heaven; the God whose holy eyes must judge the imperfect deeds which we present to him as the evidences of our title to the righteousness of faith! No words are needed to show which of these creeds will most incite to watchfulness and holy fear.

But to hate and fear sin is to seek holiness. Let us contrast the lessons taught by the two creeds touching the evil of sin and the inflexibility of the law. The legal schemes recognize the existence of sin and guilt, and they propose their satisfaction for them. Saith the Socinian, they are remitted, out of the general kindliness of God, at the price of our repentance and reformation. Saith the ritual moralist, they are atoned for by the "sacrifice of the altar," and by our penances, and alms, and contrition, and holy works. But what are these atonements? These reformations, are they not shallow and partial? These few penitential tears are drawn more by selfish fear than by generous grief and love. These penances are but the mercenary traffickings of remorse. These masses are but the vain mumblings of superstition; and the alms and works are wrought in vain glory and selfishness. Can sin and guilt be covered by so cheap an atonement as these? Then, indeed, are they no great things! God is easily appeased his justice easily satisfied, and what need is there that any sinner should stand in awe of a law which is only

proclaimed in order to be set aside when the moment of its application arrives? Why regard sin as so dread a thing if it can be so slightly washed away? But now what saith the gospel scheme? That this law, which so sternly prohibits every sin, is inexorable and eternal in every line, so that heaven and earth shall pass away sooner than one jot or tittle shall fail; that God descended into human flesh, and died on the cross, not to destroy it, but to fulfil; that when once the deadly stain of guilt falls upon a soul, so deep and dire is that taint in God's eyes no penitential tears can avail to wash it out, though the head were waters, and the eyes a fountain of tears; no alms nor penances can hide it; no human priest juggle it away with his spiritual magic; nothing can purge it save the blood of the Divine Son, or else the endless burning of penal fires. True, that blood flows freely, unbought, for every polluted soul, and wherever faith touches the priceless stream the deadly spot is cleansed; but yet the infinite riches of God's throne must be given to purge it. Thus, while the legalist learns in his pride to depreciate his sin and despise the divine justice, the rescued believer stands with holy awe and adoring gratitude, ever learning a deeper, more solemn lesson of the dreadfulness of sin, as he looks from the blackness of the pit of retribution to the amazing price which was needed for his ransom, and the amazing love that paid it.

Socinian books, and many others which lean toward their errors, teem with assertions of the mischievous effects of the Bible doctrine of essential justice in God. They say that it paints the heavenly Father in a repulsive aspect; that it makes the penitent sinner recoil from him with dread; that it seeks to substitute fear for affection. They flout the idea that sin carries an intrinsic and necessary obligation to penalty. They tell us the pretended justice which demands it is but barbarian revenge cloaked under the veil of principle, and the creed which symbolized this necessity of just retribution by the perpetual stream of sacrificial blood is but "the theology of the shambles." Instead of that account which the holy Scriptures give of the ground of Christ's suffering, that they were because "the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all," these gentlemen propose various subordinate results as the solution of the events of Gethsemane and Calvary. Saith one, "It was designed solely as an example for us." Another: "It was merely a touching attestation of the

divine pity." Another: "It was the Father's expedient to draw prodigal children to himself by a beautiful manifestation of outgushing love." Now, all this is true in its place; but they thrust the incidental design into the place of the essential, thus destroying the consistency and the moral effect of the whole plan. These statements express subordinate truths, but they are true, because, and only because, *Christ's sacrifice satisfied the divine perfections outraged by our sins*. God and conscience both declare that justice is eternal; that it cannot properly give place to any expediency, however amiable; that *the man* who "does evil that good may come" is worthy of a just damnation. Therefore, if this awful instance of divine holiness and human innocency impersonated in Jesus, suffering the direst inflictions which providence has ever poured out on guilty men, is to be left unexplained by essential justice, then it is effectually emptied of all its encouraging lessons of divine pity and penitent hope. It rather stands out as a terrible anomaly, confounding justice with gratuitous cruelty, principle with expediency, innocence with the foulest guilt, and converting the foundations of the divine rectitude into a chaos, the contemplation of which freezes love into horror, and hope into despair. There is no longer a source left in Gethsemane or Calvary for a single influence which may allure the penitent soul to better things. We retort the charge, then, and assert (what experience bears out) that this humanitarian theology is as corrupting to man as it is dishonoring to God. When one of these professed advocates of "advanced thought" is heard babbling this shallow creed, if he be not simply babbling in the idleness of his conceit, he had best not be trusted with any rights of other people, for he is but confessing his own obtuseness to moral obligation. The obligation of ill-desert to penalty is as original as the obligation of well-desert to reward. He who boasts his influence to the one will not be slow to betray the other. One who is ready so flippantly to strip his God of his judicial rights, is not likely to stickle at plundering his fellow-man of his rights. In this theory of sin, punishment, and atonement, he has adopted the creed of *expediency*. Will he not act on a similar one in his own affairs? Worst of all, he has fashioned to himself a *God of expediency*. Nothing can be so corrupting to the soul as to have an imperfect or sinful model exalted upon its throne as the object of its adoration, the stan-

dard of its imitation. "They that make idols are like unto them ; so is every one that trusteth in them." As the arrow is ever prone to sink below its aim, so men will ever allow themselves to be worse than the divinities they reverence. Nor can any preceptive stringency repair this corrupting effect. In his precepts God enjoins upon us a rigid standard. He that justifieth the wicked is as abominable to God as he that condemneth the righteous. If *we* presume to do evil that good may come, we are justly damned. If expediency prompts us to deny truth or right, *we* are forbidden to yield, on the peril of our souls. In this case, he that loveth his own life shall lose it. Thousands of God's dear children have been required to be martyrs rather than deny the right. Now, God has also told us that our morality is to consist in the imitation of him. A father prohibits his sons, under the severest penalties, ever to postpone principle to expediency. But the sons see their father do the very thing as often as plausible occasion arises. Such a family government may make them skulking hypocrites; it can never make them honest men.

Our crowning plea is, that the gospel plan of gratuitous justification is most promotive of good fruits, because it furnishes us with a supreme motive for obedience, which is at once the most permanent and energetic, and the most worthy. "We love him, because he first loved us." Very little reflection is needed to see that when once human nature became godless, all plans of future blessedness, by what divines call a "covenant of works," that is, engaging to dispense future reward for present service on the ground of merit, became ineffectual. Such was the dispensation of promise made to Adam: "Do and live." For him it was then appropriate. His nature was then pure, and in harmony with the rectitude of his Maker and Lawgiver. The keeping of God's commands, all of which his heart both approved and loved, was intrinsically pleasant to him; it was sweet to him to obey for the sake of the honor thus done to the Father whom he adored. When the additional appeal was made to his legitimate desire for his own welfare and for that of his expected offspring, by the promise and threat, this supplied a subordinate motive for the same obedience, consistent with the higher motives. Thus man's free agency was placed under the most potent and beneficent influences conceivable by us before the gospel was revealed to

work out for himself a holy and happy destiny. But, since the race has become "alienated from God by wicked works," all this is changed, and that plan has become inappropriate. Some one may reply: "But does not the Bible still say to sinners, 'If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments?'" We answer: Yes; Christ said this to the young ruler, but it was said in reply to his self-righteous question, "What *good thing shall I do*, that I may have eternal life?" (Matt. xix. 16.) He demanded to know the plan for saving himself by works; Christ could give him no other answer than the one given by the covenant of works. But the real design of the Saviour was, after all, to lead him to the experimental knowledge that this plan was now impracticable for sinners. And there can be no better exposition of the reason why, than that which is contained in this instance, viz., that from a sinner like him a covenant of works could only procure an obedience which was partial and mercenary. Men, since the fall, are alienated from God, opposed to godliness, supremely self-willed, and toward God supremely selfish. Now, a hireling may, for wages, serve a master whom he dislikes. That is to say, the loose verbal usage of men speaks of his labor as the service of his employer. But, in strictness of speech, the unwilling hireling is serving himself instead of his employer. He labors, not for the employer, but for his wages; that is, for himself. The whole transaction is purely mercenary. And such is the best result which a legal scheme can produce from our fallen nature. But is such a pretended righteousness worthy of approbation before that God who "requireth truth in the inward parts?" To an earthly parent it would be an insult. How much more must it not be a dishonor to the Father of our spirits?

The gospel proposes, therefore, no such sorry scheme as this. In devising a *religion for sinners*, God, acting with a wisdom worthy of his nature, has omitted the whole notion of purchase and merit as irrelevant to both the legal and moral state of creatures condemned and corrupted. He has provided a gratuitous salvation, in which satisfaction to the rights of the law is wondrously combined with the most persuasive love to the culprits, in which "mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." Providing in the unspeakable love and pity of redemption the sweetest conceivable instrument for alluring the hostile heart to himself, and turning its mistrust into grateful love, it bestows "remission of sins," and "inheritance

among all them which are sanctified," simply "by faith which is in Christ," as a free gift, the gift of the Father's infinite mercy, Christ's dying love, and the Holy Spirit's condescension, in advance of all workings and earnings of the sinner's own. And, in the bestowing of it, Christ says to the grateful, melting beneficiary, "If thou lovest me, keep my commandments." Let it be supposed that any service is elicited by this tender appeal, then how superior, in its disinterestedness, to that mercenary trafficking for future advantage which the self-righteous heart had offered to God. But to compare them would be a disparagement to this evangelical obedience. Evidently, if there is practical power in this gospel plan, its fruits, and its fruits alone, are suitable (while creating no claim of debt against our Proprietor and Redeemer) to receive the smile of his approbation. They are the work of his own grace, the results of Christ's blood and the Spirit's cleansing, the first flush of the returning image of God's holiness.

But moralists sometimes reply, that while this theory may be very beautiful, it is impracticable. They say they know human nature, and they know how Utopian is the hope of governing mankind by disinterested devotion. "Self-interest," they exclaim, "is the main lever of human action, and if the divines wish to produce practical effects, they must place the plea of self-interest in the forefront of their appeal." This we flatly deny. Believing, as we do, that human nature is godless and alienated from all heavenly goodness, we yet assert that it contains amidst its ruins enough to refute this miserable philosophy. There are men so degraded as to be supremely selfish, even toward their fellows. But when we look at the better instances of social virtue found among the ungodly, we find that self-interest is not the most abiding nor the most energetic principle of action. Disinterested social affections endure more, and do more, than fear or avarice. That reader must be unblest, indeed, with those affections who has not experienced this truth in his own history. Let him ask himself, whence it is that he receives the service which is most grateful to his own soul, as well as most prompt and punctual? Not from the mercenary hirelings who covet his gold, or who fear his frown, but from friends or children, who find their happiness in pleasing him. In the hours of his anguish and danger, who ministered to him with most unflinching and self-sacrificing zeal? It was a sister, a wife, or a daughter, who, exposed to no wrath or penalty from him, and

utterly forgetful of the thought of all other reward than his rescue and his happiness, lavished their strength and care at his bedside with a perseverance which all his gold could not have purchased from a hireling nurse. But we find our best argument in witnessing the sacrifices of that affection which is the purest and most generous of all the remnants of Eden left in human hearts. In every virtuous household we see a ruler, who is served with an obedience more tireless and uncomplaining than fear ever exacted from the subjects of a despot. No slave of an eastern sultan, with the bow-string or the scimitar suspended over his neck, ever toiled for his monarch as the servant of this ruler for him. At his slightest call, ease and fatigue are alike disregarded; his voice silences every other wish, and life itself is not held too dear a sacrifice for him. That king is the infant in his cradle, and the servant is the virtuous mother! He is powerless, dependent, impotent to bestow reward or penalty; but that very helplessness is his sceptre, and by it he rules as autocrat, dominating every other motive in the mother's heart. Love is the mightiest lever of human action, not fear nor selfishness. "For love is strong as death; jealousy is cruel as the grave; the coals thereof are coals of fire, which hath a most vehement flame. Many waters cannot quench love, neither can the floods drown it; if a man would give all the substance of his house for love, it would utterly be contemned."

Now, then, if grace does beget evangelical love in the believer's heart, we have in it a principle of new obedience as much more permanent and powerful as it is purer than the mercenary selfishness of the legalist. But this is just what the gospel promises and effects. When the penitent beholds the divine compassion flowing in the redeeming blood of his Saviour, and comprehends the freeness and vastness of the love of redemption, he learns that most potent of all motives, "The love of Christ constraineth us." We may righteously join in the indignant reply:

"Talk they of morals? O thou bleeding Lamb,
The great morality is love to thee!"

It thus appears that the charges of immoral results against the Bible doctrine of gratuitous justification are the antipodes of truth. That doctrine is the best, yea, the only adequate enforcement of true holiness. It is the glory of the gospel, that faith, and faith alone, "is the victory which overcometh the world."

THE LIGHT OF A HOLY EXAMPLE.

"Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven."—MATT. v. 16.

F. G., Esq., was a "lawyer of the old school." Born about the year 1785, the son of a large landholder in one of the Atlantic States, he was reared in the midst of that society, at once graceful, chivalrous, cultivated and irreligious, which followed the Revolutionary War and the influence of the French alliance. He was, like the lawyers of his day, deeply read in the old English law, and well acquainted with the English classics, scrupulous in his integrity, deliberate, shrewd, perspicacious in intellect, disdaining all personal and professional meanness with infinite scorn, scrupulous and gravely ornate in dress, and ever dignified and courteous in manner. The "flush times" of 1816, following the depression of the second war with Great Britain, found him in one of the Atlantic cities, in the full tide of his early success. He was tempted, like so many others, to venture everything in the purchase of real estate; and in a few years, chiefly by the treachery of some whom he had trusted, he was bankrupt. This misfortune left him a soured, if not a misanthropic, spirit. To gain the means for the more speedy payment of debts he departed alone to the extreme southwest; and for twenty years his friends saw him no more, and heard little of him, save that he was making large professional gains, had paid off his debts to the last penny, and was living the life of a *bon vivant* and man of society among the French of the gay Southern capital.

At the end of that time he returned to the home of his fathers, a man verging on old age. His caustic wit, his ancestral and intellectual pride, his fondness for elegant literature, his misanthropy, were in no wise diminished, and his irreligious and epicurean habits much increased. Although the surviving kindred whom he found were decided Christians, he never accompanied them to the house of God, spent his Sabbaths in amusements, and observed the most jealous reserve concerning his religious views. It was understood that he had long learned to disdain

both Protestantism and popery as rival delusions, and was a low-type Socinian, or rational deist. As the monotony of a celibate life crept on, his habits of free living grew upon him, until they threatened serious consequences. The account given by a simple servant, who was his valet, was as graphic as it was truthful. "My master," said he, "was very anxious to get some good old spirits, and yet he condemned all he got as adulterated. One time he says to me, 'Take my demijohn, and go to old Mr. J.; he is an honest, old-fashioned merchant; tell him to send me some genuine French brandy.' I brought it; but he was as dissatisfied as ever. Then he said, 'Do you go to Mr. H.; he deals with the honest German farmers of the West; tell him to send me some honest, farm-made, old rye whiskey.' But when this came he pronounced it 'vile stuff.' However, I noticed that, though it was 'vile stuff,' wherever it came from, the demijohn always went down very steadily. Well, so it went on, until one day he was very sick, and seemed to have a sort of fit, and not to know any thing. I was so frightened I went off for Dr. A., and he came; and he bled him in a great china basin from the washstand. However, he got entirely well; and he nibbled at the 'vile stuff' very skittishly after that."

Soon after this, Mr. G. astonished his friends by deliberately destroying his stock of drinkables with his own hands, and adopting the most rigid total abstinence customs. But he declared that he did this from no temperance principles. He considered good wines and liquors a legitimate and very pleasant indulgence, which, he said, he should certainly allow to himself if they could be procured. But he considered himself a *connoisseur*; he now found that all wines and liquors in America were adulterated. In good old times they exhilarated, now they stupified; then gentlemen could indulge, even freely, in these convivialities, and live to a ripe old age; now he noticed that free livers died in a few years. He had determined, therefore, never to taste even malt liquors again, simply because he did not wish to be poisoned like a rat.

Not long after this his solitude and approaching infirmities caused him to remove to the house of a widowed sister, where he spent the closing years of his life. Among the children of this Christian family was a son, a young minister of the gospel, but residing away from his native place in his far distant charge,

and a younger sister just budding into lovely womanhood. She was beloved by all for her sweet and consistent piety, and her gentle, disinterested charity. This change of residence brought the wearied man of the world into contact with books and associates somewhat different from the former. The son was accustomed to visit his widowed mother annually during the vacations of his pastoral care; and on one of these visits he noticed some such hint of an intellectual interest in Christianity in the uncle as led him to introduce the subject, though with trepidation. He found that the old man had been reading a number of Christian books, but only for mental amusement. He talked of their topics with the tone with which a naturalist might talk of some curious researches in entomology. "Nephew," said Mr. G., "I have been reading lately Dr. Hanna's *Life of Chalmers*. Did you know that great divine confessed he was a Presbyterian minister many years before he was a converted man? Isn't that considered very singular among you? And Dr. Hanna—who, you know, is his son-in-law—relates, that one thing which opened Dr. Chalmers's eyes was his observing that many evangelical persons, all of whom he had considered fanatical, were more zealous to live holy and diligent lives of obedience, while claiming no merit therefrom for their justification, than he and his friends were who relied on that sort of merit. I suppose it must have been true; but it strikes one as very queer, isn't it? Ha! ha! ha!"

In this strain he chatted on in the most communicative and amiable tone. He would make no avowal of any personal concern of the heart in these great truths, but admitted that his intellect was interested, and avowed himself willing to reëxamine the system of redemption, more because it would occupy his abundant leisure in a pleasing manner than for any other reason. The young minister directed him to some suitable books, and especially to the careful study of the Scriptures themselves. His visit terminated without other developments.

The next summer he again went, according to his wont, to cheer his widowed mother. Soon after his arrival, she availed herself of a moment of privacy, to say: "My son, strange things have happened here since you went last. Your Uncle F. has confessed Christ. He sent for the session of the church, excusing himself for his difficulties of locomotion, and desired them to examine

into his fitness for the communion of the church. They held a sessional meeting in his room; and the Rev. Mr. W., who moderated the proceedings, says that never was such a meeting of session seen. The elders were so astounded by the strangeness of the change, and still so overawed by his reputation for sense and cynicism, that they were the questioned rather than the questioners. And then his religious experience was so original and queer. They say he seemed only afraid that they should give him credit for more grace than he thinks he has. He regards himself as a mere babe in grace; but says his mind is clearly made up to live and die in faith, and therefore he thinks he ought to confess Christ at once. He was as methodical and lawyer-like about it as though he had been writing somebody else's will. However, he was received, and is now a regular member of the Q. church."

This narrative the young minister heard with open-eyed wonder. "Do they really think," asked he, "that there is a saving change in him?" "Indeed we do," replied she, "there has been a progressive change for some time. You know, though he was always the gentleman, we were always a little afraid of him; but now he is always gentle; his misanthropy and sarcasm are all gone, and he appears to be as willing to die as to retire to his nightly rest."

The young minister sought the first convenient opportunity to congratulate him upon the wondrous change. It must be confessed there was also a little tendency to congratulate himself as one of the instruments of it; and hence, he was curious to know how far the instructions he had given or the books he had recommended had been useful. But the developments did not seem at all to gratify that vanity.

"Had Uncle F. read such and such books, which he named last year?"

"Yes."

"Had he been impressed by them?"

"No; not particularly."

After a little while the old gentleman seemed to apprehend the drift of these inquiries, and said rather drily, "If you are asking for the means of this change, I cannot say that any of your books wrought it."

"What then," he was asked, is the instrumentality which has

wrought this great revolution? We all know that since last year your infirmities have not permitted you to go to church."

"Well," he replied, "I suppose that, so far as it was any one thing, it was Katy." (The niece.)

"Why," exclaimed the brother, "has she presumed to take on her the task of religious monitor? Does she preach to you?"

"Oh! no; she is too modest for that. But you know, nephew, she is the best person in the world" (and this he uttered with the peculiar air of nonchalance and sententiousness with which he asserted his deliberate opinions), "and what I have seen for myself of her principles and conduct since I have lived here has changed all my convictions."

Being encouraged to explain himself, he proceeded as follows: "You know that I was all my life a sort of Socinian or rational deist, and regarded the whole system of experimental religion as a fanatical delusion. I saw so much falsehood, pretense, and hypocrisy, that I believed in no pretensions of superior holiness. Of course I did not deny a God or a hereafter; but I thought Christ one of the few sincere and pure men whom the world has possessed; and I flouted the idea that there was any Holy Ghost or regeneration. I supposed that, so far as anybody could penetrate the darkness beyond the grave with his hopes, those who were philanthropic, truthful, courteous, and just, had the best chance; and I felt that our chance, who cultivated these social virtues and made none of these pretenses to superior grace, was far better than that of the Christians. My theory about conversion was this: In many, it was a rascally pretense (as my dealings with mankind showed). In the rest, it was an amiable delusion. I saw great numbers find out for themselves this fact. And they were truthful enough to avow it, and frankly go back to the world. I saw a number of others who had evidently found out also that their supposed conversion was a delusion; but they had not the candor to say so, and they therefore continued to wear the mask—some from mere cowardice and false shame, others from calculated rascality. The third class was of those who continued sincere, and, evidently, honest devotees. My theory about them was, that they also were deluded, only they had not found it out yet. Many acquaintances whom I highly esteem were among this class, and, as you know, some of my dearest relatives. I thought I saw the reason why they remained

undeceived, in the enthusiasm and romance of their natural temperament, and as they, unlike the second class, were perfectly honest in their amiable fanaticism, I could love them none the less for this social virtue, nor had I any desire to undeceive them. They seemed to enjoy the delusion, and I was glad that they should do so.

"Such was my theory, and I was thrown close to Katy, and I have studied her thoroughly. I *know* that my estimate of her principles is correct; I have seen her tried too often. I saw in her not only amiability, which I have often loved in others, but an unaffected and supreme disinterestedness and love. I saw in her one person where selfishness was not. I had seen many affect unselfishness, but this I saw was real, for I know the signs of hypocrisy only too well. She wasn't like anybody else. Now, nephew, I know human nature, unfortunately for myself; I know all about it, and I know that it is a poor, selfish thing. I know of what it is capable, in its lovelier phases, and what it is not. And it was perfectly clear that Katy had something which I with all my pride of integrity and philanthropy never had, which nobody has by nature. And it was an admirable thing, too! Now, you see, I was obliged to ask myself where it came from, and as I was sure it could not come from nature, it must come from above nature. Here, then, was a divine principle actually at work. What else could I conclude? Well, then, the doctrine of regeneration *must be true*, absurd as I had thought it was before. There was no other solution. I saw that there is such a thing as the implantation of a superhuman, divine principle in a human being. And I had to believe that it came by this gospel. You see, Katy always says that if there is anything good in her, it comes from God, through Christianity; that she gets it by believing the gospel and praying through Christ, and I am obliged to believe her. Besides, there wasn't any other way to account for it except that, which was not absurd. But *there was the thing*, and it had to be accounted for.

"Now, you see, when I saw there really was a way in which God gave a person a new nature, as a man of sense I could not but know that it was good for me too. So I desired it for myself. How can a person see perfect disinterestedness, love, purity, and truth, and not want it? At least I wanted it; I knew I had needed it all my life, amidst all my pride. Well, of course, the

only thing to do was to seek it, and I did so. And that is just the history of the matter."

"And you believe, Uncle, that you have received it?"

"Why, yes; that is my hope. Understand me, I don't think I know much about it; I know very little. I have only this one point: I know there is a redemption in Christ, for I see it wrought in one person; I know I need it; it is promised to prayer; I rely upon that."

After an interval he added, with the same tone of inimitable nonchalance: "Nephew, I am not the least afraid to die; I should like very well to die this evening. I have pains and infirmities that nobody knows of, and, as I am getting of less and less account, I should like to be gone. But it is all right; I am ready when my time comes."

His time did come after some months of increasing sufferings, which he bore with Christian resignation and gentleness, and his darling Katy was one of those who received his parting breath. A few years after she followed him, in the prime of her loveliness. We doubt not that they are now together before the throne; the old man of learning, and logic, and earthly wisdom, as spiritual child, and the gentle young maiden as spiritual parent.

This remarkable experience of a very singular man is not presented as a symmetrical type. But it is exceedingly instructive as showing how the witness of a true and holy life is made the divine warrant of the gospel. This is the continuous miracle, the spiritual resurrection which proves that "Christ is risen indeed." Mr. F. G. had doubtless been conversant with other genuine instances of holy living before, and he had not been convinced by them. But the living power of this last holy example, where previous ones had failed, may be partly explained by the exquisite tact, grace, and genius which embellished this instance of the divine life, disarming his spirit of adverse criticism, and gaining for it a dispassionate judgment; and chiefly by the fact that God's time to set to work by his Spirit had now arrived. The most valuable lesson of this history is this: We see here how "the logic of a holy life" wrought, when once it was listened to, with a mind singularly perspicacious, deliberate, and cautious, trained in all the learning of the law to the appreciation of valid evidence, and the distinguishing of false from true. When circumstances at length enabled this man to verify one

instance of undoubted spiritual mindedness, it was enough. He recognized it as the signature of a divine work, and by a process of inference as rigid as legal proof, ascending "*posteriori*" from effect to cause, he ascertained the personal agency of the Holy Ghost, the divinity of Christ, the doctrine of regeneration, the duties of faith and prayer.

The light of a holy example is the gospel's main argument.

THE BIBLE ITS OWN WITNESS.¹

“And many more believed, because of his own word; and said unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world.”—JOHN iv. 41, 42.

TO him who reflects, the claim with which the gospel presents itself must appear exceedingly remarkable. Wherever it comes it demands immediate belief, as the first duty, and on pain of damnation, while it does not pause an instant to consider the knowledge of him whom it addresses concerning the literary evidences of its authenticity or his opportunity for informing himself. To the unlettered laborer, as to the laborious antiquary, she says alike, “Believe, and thou shalt be saved,” and “He that believeth not shall be damned.” On the other hand, the gospel demands an intelligent and rational faith; it contemns and sternly rejects the pretended assent of ignorance, prejudice, and subserviency, requiring us to be “able to give a reason for the hope that is in us.” What is the explanation of this high and exacting attitude? What is that common ground of rational evidence, accessible to every reader and hearer, upon which this claim can justly rest?

The solution of the mocking infidel is prompt and simple. The faith of the unlearned Christian, he decides, *is* naught but ignorant prejudice, blind imitation, or prescription. What right, he asks, has such a man to an opinion here? What does he know of the extended and intricate discussions concerning the composition of the canon of Scripture, the history of these documents called inspired; the historical evidence of their genuineness; the correct state of their text? He does not even know one sentence of the dead languages in which they are composed. His pretended faith is, then, but the accident of his birth and rearing, and is as worthless as that of the Moslem, who believes in Allah

¹ A sermon preached in the chapel of Union Theological Seminary.

and Mohammed only because he happened to be born in Arabia, or of the pagan, who worships imaginary gods only because his stupid mind has been drugged from infancy with the fables of polytheism.

The papist also assails the Protestant's rule of faith (which is the Bible alone, received on rational evidence,) with almost the same cavils. And this is but one instance of several in which Rome is found leagued with the infidel enemies of Christ. "The Protestant rule of faith," says the popish controversialist, "is absurd and impossible. Protestantism professes to scout an implicit faith as unworthy of a rational being. But how shall the convicted soul of the trembling sinner, who is most probably unfurnished with letters, and prevented by the exactions of secular labor from investigation (for such are the most of mankind), who is perhaps, in addition, urged by approaching death and harrassed with sickness, perform that extensive work of inquiry necessary to an intelligent exercise of private judgment? Can he master these learned discussions? Can he become such an adept in the languages of Scripture as to verify, by his own comparison, the correctness of the translation which his minister has placed in his hand? Has he time to thread the thorny mazes of the expositors, and ascertain the orthodox interpretation of its language? But unless he has done all this, he has no right to assert a belief in the exercise of his private judgment. His faith, after all his boasts of intelligence and pretended scorn of the implicit belief of the docile son of the church, is but blind prescription, for this learned process is plainly impracticable for the bulk of mankind. The only difference is, that while the unlearned Romanist trusts implicitly to the authority of a holy, infallible church, the unlearned Protestant is led blindfolded by his heretical parson." Such is, in substance, the charge of the papist.

But we reply unanswerably, that from the very nature of the human mind, belief cannot possibly arise without evidence, any more than bodily vision can take place without light. This humble and teachable son of Rome must, then, have adequate knowledge that she is the true church, holy and infallible; that Christ has made her sovereign declaration the rule of faith to his soul, and promised salvation to him who adopts it; that some one system amidst the different ones promulgated in the course

of ages, by different popes and councils, is the true creed of the church; that this is consistent with the teachings of the apostles, from whom the popes claim succession. Is there not here a field of inquiry at least as extensive and thorny as that which he has imagined for the Protestant? But unless it is investigated, the papist has no right to hold his rule of faith; for belief without evidence is a mockery. And what means have common men to ascertain the testimony of the church, save the instructions of their several priests? What means have they to verify the teachings of their spiritual guides, by comparing them for themselves with the voluminous and contradictory *folios* of the Roman doctors? Manifestly, then, this boasted popish rule of faith comes practically to this, that to the individual layman his individual priest is his rule of faith, *his gospel!* And this priest is uninspired; he works no miracle or sign to guarantee his lofty claim; he is perhaps not recognized in other respects as even a man of personal integrity or sanctity. Thus terribly may their cavil be retorted.

These instances show us, my brethren, the direction in which lies the answer to the question with which we set out. Since Christ demands of us an intelligent faith, and that irrespective of our possession or lack of literary culture, it appears plain that he regards his gospel as containing its own self-evidencing light. The literary evidences of its divine origin, drawn by the learned from antiquity, have their value; but wherever the Bible is read with honesty, it presents, within itself, sufficient proof to evince that its claims are reasonable. Only on this supposition can its lofty and imperative attitude be justified.

The text presents us an apt instance of this species of internal evidence. Our Redeemer had come, an utter stranger, to the well of Sychar, and had preached his gospel to the Samaritans whom he met there. They were unworthy members of a hostile sect, knew nothing of Jesus of Nazareth, had made no effort, as they had no means, to verify his antecedents, or test his credentials as the Messiah whom they, in common with the Jews, expected. But yet reason showed them evidence enough of his claim in the matter of his discourse itself. They did not now need the preliminary inquiry. Common sense told them that a being who could depict the past life without any human means of learning it, and read the sinful heart, and teach such truths of grace

and holiness and power, must be clothed with the divine sanction. With well-grounded conviction, the woman exclaimed, "Come, see a man which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ?" "And many more believed, because of his own word; and said unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world." The truth which I desire to teach you from these words, my brethren, is this, that the contents of a message may be such as to demonstrate its authenticity, without external inquiry touching the messenger. The messages delivered by the ambassador may themselves constitute his sufficient credentials. So *the gospel brings its own self-evidencing light*.

That I may meet all such cavils as those of the infidel and papist in the most thorough and candid way, I shall suppose the plain, unlettered inquirer, with no book save his English Bible, and with no means or leisure for investigation, other than such as are demanded of every man by the supreme importance of the subject, honestly pondering the demand which he sees God there making upon his immediate and intelligent faith. I shall not indeed paint the Christian faith as the easy acquisition of folly and prejudice, or of an indolent and perfunctory glance at divine truths; for truths so grand and sacred as those of the gospel will appear, when demonstrated to the reason, to deserve and require the most laborious and impartial efforts of our faculties. But I shall suppose a case, involving no other learning or wisdom than that of the simple English reader weighing the contents of his English Bible with such diligence and impartiality as the worth of an immortal soul deserves. He has been told that the English which he reads is not the tongue in which the inspired men wrote; he is aware that the words before him profess to be a translation of the actual words of inspiration, carefully made by capable and honest, but fallible men; but he is unable to verify its fidelity for himself. The chief external proof of that point, within the reach of his mind, is but this, that he observes this English Bible possesses the confidence of all the honest, the pure, the wise, and the learned within his acquaintance. Now let us suppose this unlettered inquirer setting himself, from this posture, to study this book, and to decide whether it contains within itself sufficiently obvious marks of divine origin.

We shall find that the only difficulty of our task is the universal diffusion of this light of evidence over the whole field of sacred Scripture. Our appreciation of its elements is the less easy because of the very fact that, as Bible readers, our minds have been immersed in and surrounded by it from youth. My effort to analyze it before you and define its parts is beset with a difficulty like that of the physicist who should endeavor to separate a beam of sunlight into its prismatic colors in an open field bathed with the radiance of noonday. Were he and his spectators shut up in a darkened hall to which only one pencil of sunlight was permitted to enter, the exhibition of his theorem would be easy. But amidst the glare of mid-day, the very profusion of the light would serve to obscure his result. So in my proof, my difficulty in causing you to see the analysis of the evidence arises only from the breadth and universal diffusion of the light.

I. *The manifest excellence and truth of THE CONTENTS and PROPOSED END of revelation commend it to our minds.*

The most immediate and universal result of human reflection is the conviction of a God, supreme first cause, uncreated Creator of all other things. The admission of this foundation truth may be regarded as the first and loudest requirement of our reason. Well, the Bible is in perfect harmony with this requirement, in that it does not begin by setting about the demonstration of the being of God, but *assumes* it as a first truth, needing no inspired assertion. But, then, while this book nobly confirms all that a correct reason could surmise of "his eternal power and godhead," it proceeds to reveal to us a circle of perfect and infinite attributes, not only of omnipresence, power and omniscience, by which he appears competent to his whole grand work and supremacy, but of truth, righteousness, goodness and holiness, by which he is necessarily and intuitively seen to be worthy of adoring approval and delightful moral acquiescence. Here is a perfect object, concerning which right reason cannot but say that it is precisely thus God ought to exist; a full approbation of his excellence and glory can only be withheld at the cost of outraging our own undertakings and violating our own consciences. Does this book paint him with "clouds and darkness round about him?" Yet, "justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne." Nor does our reason utter any clearer dictate than this, that since the finite cannot comprehend the in-

finite, he would not be truly God in whom there was to us no mystery.

Next, the most profound and intimate conclusion to which our reason impels us, from our belief in the being of God, is his providence, which we recognize as a silent, but supreme superintendence, impressing an order which is both wise and righteous upon all creatures and all their actions. But now we find that this truth is the very key-note of the system of this book. It proposes itself to us as nothing more than a history of this providence, which it perpetually asserts and explains. When we look into its teachings we see there familiarly asserted the very truths as to God's ways and will which furnish us with the explanation of that course of nature, with its profoundest laws, which we observe around us. Providence and this book set forth precisely the same system of things. Yea, more; the least learned of the penmen of these Scriptures habitually announce, as their familiar maxims, those principles of the divine rule which are the conclusions of our widest experience, the inevitable tie between character and destiny, the dependence of posterity on the virtues of their fathers, the superintendence of a secret but almighty will over the volitions of free agents. How strong the proof here that the book is from the same God whose control we obviously see and feel in our daily lives!

When we proceed from the description it gives of God's nature and ways to his law, we find every precept worthy of his rectitude. Whereas *we know* that all men are sinners, we read in this book a code of duties absolutely without taint of sin, which condemns by its spirituality every man under heaven, and yet commands, by its miraculous purity, the approval of every one whom it condemns. We find a multitude of points in this code which corrupt man could never have invented; and yet, when taught us here, they all appear evidently worthy of God, and just and wholesome for man. Especially when we read the Decalogue, do we find what no human virtue or genius could have constructed, and least of all the wisdom of an age and a race formed under the debasing influences of Egyptian polytheism,—a digest of all human duties towards God and man, into ten propositions, so wondrously simple and comprehensive that nothing is omitted, and nothing confused. The understanding of a moral creature is inevitably impelled to conclude, that if the precepts

of the Bible did not come from God, they are certainly worthy of that origin, and can be reasonably accounted for by no other. For else, this code of perfect holiness must be accounted the offspring of the very sin it condemns.

The marvellous consistency of these books among themselves is enough to show that they all came from one source, and that divine. They profess to have been written by different men, at intervals during more than a thousand years; and the internal evidence is abundant to show that this is in the main true. These authors were of different languages, characters and culture, legislators, warriors, scholars, kings, priests, herdsmen, peasants, mechanics, fishermen. Yet there is such perfect agreement, and that upon subjects the most profound and mysterious, that the fiercest criticisms of eager enemies have to this day been unable to convict them of any substantial discrepancy. Must they not have been taught all by one infallible mind?

But especially when we listen to the Bible delineation of our own moral state, do we find in our own sorrowful and guilty consciousness an echo which confesses the perfect justice and fidelity of the description. This wonderful book does what no other, not the most ancient, history or tradition attempts; it gives the explanation of that insoluble mystery: how a ruined and polluted creature could be found amidst the handiwork of a creator whom we must believe to be at once omnipotent, benevolent and holy. It solves the problem by telling us that "God did create man upright; and *he* sought out many inventions;" that after man proceeded from his Maker's hand, holy and happy, he fell and was ruined by the sin of his first father. But this is not the chief fact. I point to those clear and decisive statements which sacred Scripture makes of the most profound and melancholy revelations of our inner consciousness; of the emptiness and vanity which our experience so bitterly realizes in all those terrene objects to the pursuit of which we are all, nevertheless, obstinately impelled by a perverted heart; of the ineradicable spring of sinful desire within; of a will freely, and yet certainly, directed against the *dicta* of our own better conscience, by which will we are ever prompted to choose that evil which we are ever compelled to reprobate; of "a certain fearful looking for of judgment" which causes us to recoil from that immortality which should be our glory and joy. And of a sorrowful longing, without hope,

for moral renovation, which yet man is ever too weak and sinful to effectuate. Now I ask, by what wisdom is it that this book hath revealed an insight so much deeper, more honest, and more searching, than any human philosophy, into this abyss of our miserable consciousness? When man's guilty soul avouches its truth in every groan of his remorse and his anguish, does it not appear obviously the utterance of him whose eyes behold, whose eyelids try the hearts of the children of men? What artificer of imposture hath ever been wont to deal thus with the victims whom he would befool?

But among all the contents of this book, it is its *professed chief end* which commends itself to the reason with most commanding force. For the most cursory reading of this book shows us that its burden everywhere, its one great, perpetual announcement, its good news (*evangel*), is the proposal of a work which, if practicable, cannot but challenge the approval of every right mind, with a self-evidencing light as clear as our consciousness of our own existence; a work the depreciation of whose excellence would betray at once a disregard of self monstrous and suicidal, and a satanic malignity towards our fellows; a work whose mere proposal should be so full of blessing and glory, that the refutation or surrender of the hope should be resisted by man's soul with the agony of despair. This proposed work is that which no other reformer or philanthropist has ever presumed to suggest; one which the ceaseless yearning of our misery even had not emboldened us to ask. This proposal is no less than the offer of redemption to man for the glory of God, a complete deliverance from guilt by justification, and from corruption by sanctification. How unique, how satisfying to man's necessities, how worthy of heaven, is this glorious end! It is not like the vain, wicked and impious dreams of philosophy, or of polytheism, or of Mohammedanism, the proposal to find the elements of restoration where, from the nature of the case, it is impossible they can exist, in the nature itself that is ruined; or to set aside the obvious doom of man's ill-desert, leaving God's justice and holiness outraged; or to endow a corrupt soul with an immortal blessedness which is incompatible with its sinfulness. No; this gospel offer goes to the foundation of the needed work. It proposes to engage the omnipotence, love and wisdom of God himself, both to satisfy divine justice, and to restore man's ruin

in sin; so that the deliverance shall meet fully every demand of offended heaven, and every necessity of fallen humanity, and endow us with a new blessedness as righteous as it is precious, and as everlasting as it is righteous. Must not every right soul exclaim, Oh! if this news may but be true; never can there descend from the skies a word so dear to man, so worthy of God! At its announcement must not every most pious and reverent aspiration for his honor concur with every holy and legitimate longing of the hungry soul for its own good, and every impulse of benevolence for others, in the ardent wish that the reason *may find* full authority and evidence the glad news *is true*? And why should the most jealous caution resist that joyful conclusion? Methinks there is abundant confirmation in the message itself; a message too grand and strange to be the fiction of man's folly; too pure, and noble, and righteous, and benevolent, to be the invention of a malignant imposter!

II. If one were sick and full of anguish with a mortal disease, and an entire stranger were to come to him and profess the purpose of kindly healing, every man must say that the proposal is every way right and good. To test the character of this stranger, it would only remain to see whether his secret intention and his ability corresponded with his profession. So let us now consider that Redeemer whom this book proposes to us as the physician of our soul's malady. Time forbids my staying to argue the constitution of his person, as God in man, and thus able for his undertaking; or to unfold the perfect adaptation of the offices he assumes to bear, as our prophet, priest, and king, to our necessities; or to dwell upon his miracles and predictions as divine sanctions of his claims. Moreover, I promised that I would not go outside of those materials of proof which the plain reader can find in his English Bible. All that I claim on the above points is, that the reader's common sense must approve *the fitness of the character and function which Jesus Christ seems to assume for the redeeming work which he professes to undertake*. If there can be a real salvation for sinners, it must be by atonement and new birth. And these must be wrought by one who has more than human power, to renew us, and more than human independence and worth, to pay his life for a world of sinners. Now, such do we find Christ's claims in this book. He is here said to be both Son of man and Son of God, in one

person; to have authority to lay down his life and take it again; to have given this life for the sins of the world; and to exercise a divine power in baptizing the hearts of sinners with the Holy Ghost. The question is, are these wondrous claims true? I offer you, in proof, the lovely and perfect *character* of Jesus as painted by the evangelists. We read these four histories, and we find there described a being who, from his cradle to his cross, was never guilty of a fault, or even a foible. He is represented to us as having displayed every virtue of the perfect man, along with the majesty and might of deity. His love and beneficence were only equalled by his truth and rectitude. His only occupation on earth was doing good; his only ambition was to bear away, or at least to lighten, the sorrows of others. To the claims of selfishness, avarice, ambition, he displayed a lofty insensibility, such as no human character has ever approached, yea, such as the imagination of man had never dreamed of imputing to its most glowing creations. With boundless power at his command, he was never once seen to employ it to gratify, or aggrandize, or avenge himself; it was used only to bless others, while he remained so poor that he "had not where to lay his head." When he opened his mouth, it was to speak as never man spake; his discourses breathed only purity, wisdom, and love. Heaven and earth alike pronounce this character holy, harmless, and undefiled; the utmost malice could bring no taint upon it by the foulest arts of subornation; the pagan procurator who condemned him testified that no fault could be found in him; the very traitor who betrayed him was constrained to declare him innocent, as he went, lashed by the furies of remorse, to his own place. His sanctity was tested by the fiery furnace of slander, persecution and murder; yet there was no alloy; equally meek and magnanimous, with a spirit as inflexible in its moral courage as divine in its forgiveness, he only shone with the purer radiance in the furnace. But why do I attempt to describe that which is indescribable? The moral beauty of this character so reveals itself to the intuitions of the humblest mind, as well as to the most cultivated, that your own conceptions of it perpetually transcends in glory all the images of rhetoric. I thank God that it is so; and that a complete portraiture is as needless as it is impossible. For herein is the value of this character, that it requires no training, nor logic, nor

effort for its apprehension; it commends itself as immediately to the heart of the child or peasant as of the wise or learned.

Now, is this picture authentic? Did this man, Jesus, truly speak these words, and live this life, and die this death in Judea? Then, *what he said* I must believe to be true; true by the evidence of this spotless integrity, love and faithfulness; true by all the irresistible beauty of his character. To tell me that such virtues as his could be the inventor of a lie, and that a lie so base, so unfeeling, so impious as this would have been, outrages both my reason and my heart; as though one should tell me that night, with her blackness of darkness, was the parent of the light, and death the author of life. What would you have said to me if I, in my youth, after witnessing from my infancy the steady, consistent integrity of my honored father, and after owing the happiness of so many years to his faithfulness and love, had refused credit to his word on the pretext that I had no knowledge of the thing he spoke? You would have decided, with disgust, that I showed the head of a fool, in that I could not be blind to the evidence of such consistency, and the heart of a scoundrel, in that I refused the instinctive homage of my confidence to such excellence. Even so; if you now saw such a being as Jesus is described, performing his ministry of love and sanctity under your observation, you would be compelled to yield credit to his word. *When I contemplate the personal character of Jesus Christ, I feel that I can trust everything to his veracity.*

But the objection may be imagined that this life and character are not under the inspection of this plain reader of the English Bible as a present reality; all that he knows is that this book in his hands, which professes to be a correct translation of certain histories, said to be eighteen centuries old, describes such a life and character. I reply, this is enough. For *there* is a wondrous description; the question whence it came must be answered. Only two answers are possible; either it is a fiction, or it is not. Will any one dare to say the former? Then he must hold that a company of liars have composed the noblest and most beautiful model of truth ever seen among men; that the loveliest image of virtue which has ever entranced the admiration of the wise and good is the invention of the most loathsome vice. For how foul and cruel and profane must have been the temper which could deliberately set itself to forge such a cheat, in mockery at

once of God's majesty and mercy and of man's woes and dangers? That an exploit of genius which the noblest intellect and heart of scholar has never equalled, and which the most profound critics declare to be an inimitable achievement should have been accomplished by men who were ignorant at once and base; and that these hateful imposters expended all this miraculous art in constructing an imaginary picture of which the only apparent result is to condemn their own falsehood in inventing it,—this is, indeed, not only a greater miracle than the miracles of the gospel, but an impossibility. He who can believe this is more credulous than the most insolent skeptic has represented the humble Christian.

Here, then, is the result of these converging lines of evidence; that while all else in the Bible is manifestly worthy of God, so far as it is comprehended, this great proposal of the Bible, that man shall be restored to obedience, holiness and happiness, is so self-evidently right and good that to reject it is at once a crime and a folly. And that the Redeemer, sent to do the glorious work, presents a character so consistent with his proposed mission that reason and virtue both imperatively demand for him our full confidence.

III. We now make a third appeal to the common sense of our supposed inquirer, the materials of which are presented by every sane and honest man's intelligence. We ask him to verify the authenticity or falsehood of this gospel news by its effects on society around him. Cast your eye, my friend, upon the people within your own knowledge. You see a society, embracing a part of these people, called the *Christian Church*, which professes to have made this book the rule of its spiritual life. Now, the demonstration is in this fact, that *the people in this society verify the very results indicated in the book*. Among some of them you observe an inconsistency between holy professions and unholy conduct, expressly foretold by the book, and presenting you with an impressive instance of the malignity and *virus* of that disease of sin which the book imputes to natural men. But among others of them, you observe, what your Bible has also expressly predicted, instances of the sincere adoption and efficacious influence of the gospel; and uniformly you see that the character of these is lovely and deserving, just in proportion to the degree of fulness with which they embrace and feel the truths

of their Bibles. The effect of the book on their character, precisely as they permit it to have its legitimate effect, is to produce a result of such self-evident excellence that to condemn it, or to refuse it your hearty approval, is a manifest outrage against your own reason and conscience. Moreover, you notice that not only are those the best people who most sincerely embrace and follow this book, but that nearly all that is truly good in society flows directly or indirectly from the influence of this book and these people. You think that you discover here and there a gentleman who is honorable and benevolent, or a lady who is pure and amiable, who is not the votary of the Bible? Yes, but when you investigate the origin of these persons, you probably find that they derived these lovely qualities toward their fellow-men from Christian parents who drew all their graces from this holy book. Now, I appeal to your common sense: "Doth an evil tree bear good fruit? Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" If the Bible is false and infidelity true, how is it that error here bears the precious fruits of truth? If you still deny that this gospel is from God, then it would appear that, so preposterous are the conditions of man's existence here, it is necessary for him to believe a lie in order to make the nearest approach to his true welfare and the true ends of his existence.

But this is only a part of the argument. When you study a little the effects of the Bible upon those who are most obviously its sincere receivers, you perceive that it has been the instrument of making a change in them for which nature cannot account. You saw that the book promised to its recipients a quickening of the soul dead in sin by God's own power—a new birth by the Holy Ghost. Astonishing, amazing promise! But here are some instances in which it is verified. Here and there, among these nominal or questionable Christians, are some who present the undoubted evidence of a long and consistent life that they are truly actuated by a heavenly principle. Now you, my friend, know enough of human nature, without any Bible, to perceive that this principle is not naturally in man, and that there is no power in his nature to generate it. You see all men, you see yourself, uniformly, originally, certainly devoted to the world and self-will, in preference to God. It is manifestly the natural law of our radical dispositions of heart. You may sometimes or often have had *religious* thoughts and purposes; but you are

perfectly aware that they were not *golly or heavenly*; they were all but the efforts which self-love, in the form of *awakened fear*, exacted of your unwilling souls. You know that you have always yielded to or at least harbored the unconquerable desire to return to sin as soon as the spur of remorse was a little withdrawn. But these genuine Christians not only refrain from sin, but hate it; they not only submit to duty, but delight in it. They manifest a permanent revolution of soul from self and sin to godliness. Your own understandings also show you very plainly that such a change as this bespeaks more than earthly power; that the stream of volitions cannot rise of themselves higher than their own fountain in the evil heart; that the attractions of heavenly-mindedness cannot, by their mere native power as inducements, reverse that disposition which is naturally dead to them. These men were obviously "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i. 13.)

Here, then, is proof of the divine origin of the gospel as practical and impressive as a visible miracle. The book promises such a change to those who embrace it; the change is above the powers of nature; but lo! in these cases where the truth is heartily received it actually occurs. What verification could be more complete?

And now, will any one attempt to break the force of this evidence by pointing me to the multitude of spurious or doubtful Christians? Is it thus insinuated that the reality of this divine change in any case is uncertain? I reply: What of the many counterfeits? Is not their existence precisely what Jesus Christ predicted? The question is, whether there has not been at least one within the range of your own observation whose Christian integrity was undoubted? For a single case reveals the finger of God. And I will not believe that you have been so unblessed as never to have possessed at least one such heavenly-minded friend. I point you back to the chambers of your own memory; I call up the dear and venerated forms of your dead who dwell enshrined in your heart's recollections; I point you to that revered relative, most probably a sainted woman, your aunt, your gentle sister, your mother, whose Christian love was at once the sweetest blessing and the holiest lesson of your life. Recall, I pray you, the light of that pure example, whose benignant beams filled your home with peace and quiet joy. Remember that

steadfast, generous heart, whose unselfish affection was the solace of all your sorrows; the unwearied life of magnanimous self-forgetfulness; the generous patience which bore all your ingratitude and waywardness, and took no revenge, save by blessing; the unquenched fire of devotion burning on with steady flame in privacy, in prosperity, in sorrow; and that calm, radiant face with which she was wont to come down at twilight from the chamber of her secret communings with God. Especially do I remind you of the end, which set the seal upon the consistent testimony of the whole life; when you saw the gentle sufferer lie upon her dying bed, and receive the last blessing of a love whose unselfish fire death could not quench; when you beheld her awaiting, peaceful, weak, it may be, and prostrate and contrite, yet unappalled, the approach of that last enemy, whose most distant threat, as you well know, fills your guilty heart with shuddering, and witnessed her triumph over his sting by the strength of her Redeemer—ah! *you know* that there was in that breast a principle which you have not and which the world cannot bestow. It was the new nature received through this gospel. I testify unto you that God gave you this holy example, and blessed you with this Christian love, in order to convince you, by the demonstration of a present, living wonder of his grace, that his gospel is no cunningly devised fable. Perhaps you have said to yourself that had you been an eye-witness of the reputed miracles of Jesus, had you stood with those Jews of Bethany beside the opening grave, and seen Lazarus come forth at the call of the divine voice, bound with grave-clothes, you too would have believed. But you ask, How do I know that these narratives are authentic? How can I verify these professed histories across the chasm of eighteen centuries? I reply: Here God gave you, by the ministry of this same gospel, a moral miracle as unquestionable, and if you consider it aright, as impressive as these—the quickening of a dead soul.

Thus the Bible contains, in its own message and effects, evidence which should be sufficient for the common mind, if honest. This evidence has been represented to you here as appealing, not only to the reason, but to the conscience. Will any hearer object for this cause to its strict, demonstrative force? Shall it be urged against me, that I have presented a sentimental, rather than a logical, view of these evidences? I claim that this is no deroga-

tion from its just force ; it is rather the glory and strength of the argument. For the moral judgments of the soul which I have addressed are the highest, the most intuitive, and the most imperative functions of the reason. The student of numbers has a rational judgment of the truth of this statement, that in division, the larger the divisor, the smaller the quotient. So has he a conscientious judgment that Judas was criminal for betraying his Master ; and it is attended with a lively sentiment of reprobation. But is the mind any less certain that the latter proposition is true than that the arithmetical one was true? Not a whit. When conscience announces her verdict for the right and the just, it is as supremely rational as the clearest perceptions of the true.

Moral and spiritual judgments are no less logical than the scientific. But there is an all-important difference, my hearers, between them ; a difference in favor of my cause. The moral truth, when recognized, brings to your soul instantaneous and imperative obligation. Your conviction immediately binds you to the corresponding right action, by a claim which cannot be resisted or postponed without criminality. We have been examining the proposition that in every division, the greater the divisor, the smaller the quotient. Suppose you deny that this abstract statement is universally true? I shall say that you must have a queer sort of mind! Suppose you agree with me that the proposition is universally true? What then? Why, nothing! unless you choose to enter upon some such arithmetical processes. But now I come to you with a different, a moral proposition: I tell you that in yonder poor-house there is a venerable man, sick, naked, friendless and destitute, and I show you evidence which identifies this pitiable sufferer with the generous benefactor of your youth, long lost to your knowledge. Your mind must needs admit the logical force of that evidence. And now, what? There immediately emerge to you the obligations of gratitude, of beneficent ACTION, requiting your suffering friend; and to refuse, or even delay that action, brands you as criminal. So, in this gospel argument, the appeal to the rational intuition is partly moral, and not merely scientific ; and therefore *faith is a duty, and unbelief a sin*. Thus the cavil is exploded which objected against the gospel system, for erecting the soul's state of belief into a grace or a crime. It is because the belief on Christ involves right judgments of conscience and choice of heart, as

well as correct notions of the intellect. This solemn trait of the gospel is, therefore, strictly consistent. Hearer, will you now do your duty by "becoming obedient to the faith?"

I now take you to witness that, in establishing the truth of this gospel, I have used no other materials than that familiar knowledge and common-sense which the humblest reader may bring to his English Bible, if he is honest. Here, then, is the mode in which it becomes a practical rule of faith to common men. And here is the answer to the sneer, that the faith of such Christians is but senseless prescription or prejudice. To the right heart, the gospel is its own sufficient witness.

From this point of view you will see it to be a reasonable proposition, that the best book to be read by him who is inquiring into the evidence of the Bible is the Bible itself. This is no paradox. There is a stranger who wishes to be received as a trustworthy person. He offers you certain testimonials from abroad which, he claims, will prove satisfactory when verified. But you, as a practical man, thrust them aside, and prefer to converse with the stranger himself. If you can do so frequently and intimately enough, to gain a thorough personal acquaintance of your own, you prefer to judge him for yourself. Thus do with the Bible. Search the Scriptures honestly and diligently, and you will find out whether they are from God, or whether they speak of themselves.

ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.¹

WE here group together two books which advocate the Restorationist theory of Origen. The first has as its *nucleus* the five sermons in Westminster Abbey, in the end of the year 1877, in which the author was understood to preach Universalism. But as presented in an American dress by the Messrs. Dutton, they are preceded by a long controversial preface, intermingled with many notes, and followed by five *Excursus* attempting to sustain its doctrine.

The doctrine of the endless future punishment of the impenitent is one so awful and solemn that it is with painful reluctance the Christian sees it made a subject of controversy. The *odium theologicum* must be malignantly developed indeed, to make one forget that in proving the truth he may be only sealing his individual doom, and is assuredly doing it, unless he attain some degree of the Christ-like spirit of love. It is presumed that there is not a right-minded man in any church who would not hail with delight the assurance that every creature of God will be finally holy and happy, provided only it could be given with certainty, and in a way consistent with the honor of God. If there are men who are glad to have the fact the other way for the gratification of their own malice or indignation, we have never met them, and we gladly relinquish them to Canon Farrar's eloquent invective. But we submit that he may be doing great injustice by confounding with this harsh temper an honest zeal for the integrity of Scripture exposition, which they fear he is violating; and a benevolent apprehension lest souls may be ruined by a cry of "peace, when there is no peace." We can conceive that good men may be actuated by these motives in opposing our author, and yet feel all the solemn and yearning compassion for lost souls which

¹ This treatise appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, July, 1879, reviewing, 1. *Eternal Hope*. By Canon Farrar. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1878. 2. *The Death of Death*. By an Orthodox Layman. Richmond, Va.: Randolph & English. 1878.

he professes. And here is the answer to the charge he hurls constantly of the malignant harshness of the orthodox, that the worthiest and most deeply convinced men of that opinion have ever been the most self-devoted and affectionate laborers for the rescue of their fellow-men from the horrible fate which they believe awaits the disobedient. They have demonstrated their philanthropy by toils, sacrifices, and blood, much more valuable than the rhetoric of such as Canon Farrar.

His professed arguments against the orthodox view are many; his real ones are two. One is, that common Christians act so little like men who live among a race rapidly perishing with an everlasting destruction. This argument is, alas, just, not as against God's truth, but as against us; and it ought to fill us with wholesome shame and to stimulate us to remove the pretext by the love and faithfulness of our toil for souls. His other argument is purely sentimental: that his sensibilities reject an idea so ghastly as the endless perdition of creatures; he cannot admit a thing so awful. The awfulness cannot be exaggerated; but it is forgotten that perhaps, if *sin* appeared to his mind as abominable as it does to God, and if he appreciated the rights of God's holiness and majesty as a creature ought, he would see that the doctrine is as just as awful, and therefore likely to be realized under such a Ruler. Thus he might be taught to transfer his abhorrence *from Calvinism to sin*, as the proper object of the unspeakable awe and revulsion.

If the reader expects from so scholarly a source something new and better than the staple arguments of ordinary Universalists, he will be mistaken. He gives us only the old exegesis, in the main, so often refuted, and the old, erroneous ground-view of God's moral government, as utilitarian. In this brief review no attempt will be made to refute his points in detail; only the salient peculiarities of the book can be briefly noticed. We cannot honestly withhold the judgment that this book is foolish, uncandid, and mischievous. Its attempts at argument are weak and self-contradictory, its misrepresentations are patent, and its tendencies are to lull impenitent men into a false security, by the delusive prospect of repentance after death. For instance, the orthodox doctrine is uniformly painted as including the everlasting damnation of a majority of the human family, immensely larger than the number of the saved. If Canon Farrar knew

enough to entitle him to preach on this subject, he ought to have known that all the orthodox believe just the opposite. Although at some evil time or place the reprobate may outnumber the saved, they hold that by virtue of the redemption of the infants dying in infancy (nearly half the race) and of the teeming millennial generations, the major part of the race will ultimately be gathered into heaven, so that mercy shall boast itself against judgment.

He uniformly asserts that we hold all this immensity of penal woe embraced within the immortality of a lost soul as earned exclusively by the sins of his short life on earth. Surely Canon Farrar must know, that while we do not concur in his evident light estimate of sin, and while we do not think that man can commit a little sin against an infinite God, the orthodox always assign an everlasting series of sins as the just ground of endless punishments. If he does not know our express dissent from the papal dogma, that beyond death the soul cannot merit, his ignorance is without excuse. His scarcely veiled preference for the papal theology over the reformed theology of his own church suggests that probably he may hold some such error. But we do not. Hence, if the sinner persists in sinning everlastingly, justice may punish endlessly.

He represents the orthodox as teaching the odious idea that the saints will find an important element of their bliss in gloating over the despair and torments of those once their fellow-sinners. Among his proofs are citations from Thomas Aquinas, who says that the happiness of the saints will be enhanced by the law of contrast; and from Jonathan Edwards, teaching that the knowledge of the nature of the torments from which divine grace has delivered them will enhance the gratitude of the redeemed. Ought not an honest mind to have seen the difference of these statements from his charge? Canon Farrar, let us suppose, has been saved from a shipwreck, in which a part of his comrades have perished. But can he not apprehend how adoring gratitude and joy for his own rescue would be increased by comparing himself, reclining safe and warm before the genial fire, with the battered corpses tossing amidst the sea-weed, while yet his whole soul might be melted with pity for them?

He preaches a sermon to refute the notion, falsely imputed to us, that the redeemed will be the small minority. It is from the

text, Luke xiii. 23, 24: "Lord, are there few that be saved? And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate." Will the reader believe that he closes his sermon without alluding to the next words of our Lord? "For many shall seek to enter in, *and shall not be able.*" Had he permitted the last words to be heard, they would have refuted his Universalism; teaching the solemn truth of Prov. i. 28, that mercy may be defied until at last the selfish and unholy cry of remorse may be forever too late.

He labors in two places at least to prove that the Anglican Church designedly recognizes his doctrine, in that she did, A. D. 1562, remove from her Articles the forty-second, which rejected restorationism. Yet he knows that this indirect plea is fatally refuted by these facts, that the Litany expressly teaches the people to pray for deliverance from "thy wrath and *everlasting damnation*;" that the Prayer Book, in the Visitation of Prisoners, and also of Those Under Sentence of Death, most expressly teaches the orthodox view, and that the "Irish Articles of Religion," adopted by the Episcopal Church of Ireland, A. D. 1615, and approved by the government, Sec. 101, declares "that the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, *there to endure endless torments.*"

On page 78 he claims, with a taste at least very questionable, the right and qualification to tell us, *ex cathedra*, what αἰώνιος means: "the word in its first sense simply means *age-long*." Yet every lexicon in our reach concurs in saying that its probable root is αἰς—ever, and gives as the first meaning of αἰώνιος, "time long past and indefinite," and as the second, "of endless duration."

Canon Farrar feels much outraged at being called a "Universalist." He declares more than once that he does not deny the actual endless punishment of some sinners who remain obstinately rebellious. In other places he acknowledges that he does not know what he believes touching the duration of hell. Only, he is a firm believer in future punishments, to be (possibly or probably) ended by the repentance of the offenders; in the case of how many, who die impenitent, he does not know. The sum of his theology seems to be here, that he will not believe in any more future punishment than he can help, because he does not like to believe it. Would not the common good sense of men

decide that one whose own belief was in this fluctuating state should not attempt to teach others, lest if perchance the future should turn his doubts into certainty, he might find that he had misled his fellow-sinners to their ruin? Many of his violent dogmatisms are offensive when thus connected with his avowed uncertainty. Thus, among many admissions, page 84: "I cannot preach the certainty of Universalism." Yet he tells us of wicked men who declared that the doctrine of an endless hell, instead of restraining their sins, inflamed their indignation and sense of injustice against (the Calvinist's) God. With this feeling he evidently sympathizes. The language certainly bears the appearance of taking part with these sinners against the representation of God given in the doctrine. Now, as he has confessed that there may be men sinful enough to be endlessly punished, would it not have been best to refrain from thus taking the culprit's side against justice, lest he should even be found to fight against God? He admits that a man may be bad enough to receive endless punishment. Yet in other places he denounces the horrors of the doctrine as intolerable to the loving mind. Here, again, let it be supposed that the all-wise may see that all who die impenitent are bad enough to be justly punished forever. Can the author safely claim such an acquaintance with the evil of sin as to pronounce that supposition impossible? But should it turn out the true one, where will his argument be? He declares that the doctrine of punishment is wholly hardening and depraving in this world. Yet his hope of the salvation of multitudes after they go to a (temporary) hell, is founded solely on the expectation that they will be so sanctified and softened by the punishment as to embrace the Christ there whom they wilfully reject here! His main argument is, that he cannot believe God's infinite placability can be limited by a few years and a separation of the soul from an animal body; so that if the sinner in hell repents, God will surely stay his punitive hand. But he is careful not to advert to the vital question: *Will any such repent?* Thus his Pelagian leaning is betrayed. Again, his whole theory of punishment is utilitarian; he cannot conceive of penalty as inflicted for any other end than the reformation of the sufferer; and for penalty inflicted to satisfy justice, his softest word is "arbitrary." It is evident that he knows too little of the "systematic theology" which he despises, to be aware of the fatal

contradictions and absurdities into which his theory leads him. The fact of the evil angels' condemnation to endless punishment is, too evidently, fatal to his whole argument. This needs no explanation for Presbyterian readers. It is sad to see the evasion. He informs us quietly near the close, that he made up his mind not to complicate the inquiry into human destiny with that about the fallen angels. Had he done so, his whole structure would have tumbled into ruins.

The most prominent feature of Canon Farrar's attempted argument is, that he ascribes the belief in endless punishment to the seeming force of a few texts. But he would have us found doctrines, not on particular texts, but on "broad, unifying *principles* of Scripture," (page 74). On the next page he cries: "I protest at once and finally against this ignorant tyranny of insulated texts," etc. Proof-texts seem to be his especial bane (except such as he shall be allowed to interpret for us in his own fashion). The naughty orthodox prove too many things by them which he does not like. They have even refuted by them his darling abolitionism! Now, while we all admit that a proof-text is only valid in the sense the Holy Spirit meant it to bear, and that in finding that sense we ought to give much weight to "the analogy of the faith," yet we see in this outcry an injustice to the orthodox, and an absurdity. It was the author's duty to tell his hearers that the orthodox never have considered their doctrine of endless punishments as based only on a few "texts;" they always claim that they find themselves constrained, with reluctant awe and fear, to recognize it as based on the "unifying principles" of the whole Bible, as taught in many forms and implied in many of the other admitted doctrines. And again, as the general is made up of particulars we cannot conceive whence we are to draw those "unifying principles" except from the collecting and grouping of particular texts. If the author rejects each stone individually as a "text," of course he can reject any arch built of stones, no matter how firm.

In fine, his theology is not only against the texts, but it impinges upon God's attributes, the fundamental principles of theology, and the facts of Bible history. It overlooks God's sovereignty and majesty, the true nature of sin, the true nature of guilt and penalty, the true condition of man as dead in sin and wholly disabled for any spiritual good accompanying salva-

tion. It builds on the "benevolence theory," and makes man's welfare, instead of God's glory, the ultimate end.

The second work named, although anonymous, bears designed internal marks of being written by an Episcopalian. While its theory differs but little from Canon Farrar's, its author assures us that it is wholly independent of him. The exact position which the writer wishes to occupy is not clear. For when charged by an objector with a denial of "eternal punishments," he disclaims this construction, and says that he only held that "a hopeless punishment is nowhere taught" in Scripture. This would seem to give the following position: that on the one hand no sinner's doom condemns him inexorably at death or the judgment day to everlasting woe, and whenever a sinner in hell relents from his impenitence and prays for reconciliation, he will receive it; yet, on the other hand, it is still always possible, and even likely, that some will suffer everlastingly because they will in fact for ever postpone repentance. This is the only sense we can attach to punishment *everlasting* and yet *not hopeless*. Yet the author afterwards declares that his "theory embraces in the harmony of the universe *every* creature of God, whether he be a human being or a fallen angel." He belongs, therefore, to that class of restorationists to which Origen is generally referred. While regarding his argument as inconclusive, we must concede to him a pious and reverent spirit. Every trait of his book bespeaks the good man, the devout Christian, and the gentleman. In every respect save the erroneous logic, in true eloquence, temper, and vigor of thought, he stands in favorable contrast with his clerical comrade in Westminster Abbey. We conclude, with the *Charleston News and Courier*, that, "although the argument burns with the fervor of impassioned feeling, it never ceases to be argument; while it rises at times to lofty eloquence, it never suggests, as does Dr. Farrar's, the suspicion of rhetorical display."

Our review must again, for lack of space, omit all detailed examination of particular expositions and arguments. We limit ourselves, at this time, to the notice of one feature. This is the evident affinity between the Restorationist scheme and Semi-Pelagianism. We find both these advocates attempting to give their doctrine respectability by quoting the names of Greek Fathers who advocated or at least tolerated it. Prominent among

these are Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Well, these are the very men whose theology was most infected by the arrogant views of Neo-Platonism touching the powers of human nature, and who were swayed by that pagan philosophy to deny or depreciate total depravity; and accurate readers of church history know that Theodore, the true father of Nestorianism, expressly adopted the view of Pelagius and Celestius, then becoming current among the Greeks, and conformed to it his conception of the hypostatic union. Our author reveals the logical tie again in a startling manner. He informs us that his scheme is expressly the sequel and application of Dr. Bledsoe's "Theodicy," which he lauds in the main to the skies. He dissents from him, in that Dr. Bledsoe was a firm assertor of everlasting punishments.

Now the readers of this Review remember that this theodicy of God's permission of sin is, that he cannot necessitate with absolute certainty the continuance in holiness of any rational creature, because such necessity would destroy his free-agency. Hence, he claims for God that he may plead he has done all for every lost spirit, human or angelic, which even omnipotence could do, compatibly with its nature as a rational free agent. Because free agency consists in the contingency and self-determination of the will.

This theory the author adopts with all his soul. On it he builds his hope of universal restorationism. While his lack of acquaintance with theological science prevents his use of its accurate nomenclature, his scheme, stated in that nomenclature, is the following: No sinner ever loses his ability of will to true faith and repentance, even amidst the obduracy and long-confirmed habits of hell. It is a part of his rational and moral *essentia*. Since death does not change this *essentia*, the "faculty of repentance," as he sometimes calls it, cannot be terminated by death. Indeed, no sinner can ever lose it, for in doing so he would lose his essential identity, and so his responsibility. Now, then, reject the horrible doctrines of "election and reprobation," claim Christ's sacrifice to be universal in design, dispense with the necessity of an effectual call, and suppose the gospel offer of reconciliation in Christ to be held forth for ever, and our author reaches his conclusion, that whenever the souls in hell repent, as sooner or later all will, they will be pardoned out of it. Thus, page 87,

he denies that sin is naturally and certainly self-propagating; hence he holds there is no ground for saying that sinners after death will never repent.

This unscriptural view of human nature is evidently the cornerstone of his system. But if the Bible doctrine is true, that man is "dead in trespasses and sins," that "no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him," then all the author's suppositions may be granted, without reaching his conclusion. He is sure, from his conviction of God's placability and fatherhood, which are immutable, that the day can never come, to all eternity, when the worst sinner who repents will be refused pardon in Christ. But will any who die impenitent ever truly repent? None truly repent here except they be moved by efficacious grace; their original sin will not be less there. The "faculty of repentance" is not natural to man's *essentia* here; he cannot lose what he did not possess; it is a gift of special grace. Hence the very hinge of the whole debate is in the question *whether Christ will give* effectual calling to the condemned in the state of punishment. On that question the Scriptures say at least nothing affirmative. Would it not then be better for us all to be silent where we have no authority to speak, and to avoid the risk of encouraging sinners to procrastinate repentance by a hope of amendment after death which they will find illusory.

The travesty which is given of the doctrine of predestination shows that the amiable author only knows it in the caricatures of its enemies. If he will study it in the statements of its recognized advocates, he will find in it none of the abhorrent features he imagines.

The author overthrows the "Theodicy" of his own teacher, Dr. Bledsoe, in a most instructive manner. He argues that if men can and do abuse their free agency, in spite of God's strongest moral restraints, so as to make everlasting shipwreck of their being, then Dr. Bledsoe's defence of God is worthless. For, although his omnipotence be not able to necessitate their holiness consistently with their free-will, his omniscience must have foreseen the utter shipwreck. So that the frightful question recurs as to the origin of evil. Why did not God *refrain from creating* these reprobate souls? Thus the author demolishes Dr. Bledsoe's "Theodicy." But now, he argues, let his scheme be added, that God's omniscience foresees no souls finally reprobate,

that all penal evil is remedial to the sufferers, and that God will make hell itself a means of grace to all the lost, and he has a true theodicy. Alas that this also should be demolished as quickly as the other! If God's end in the creation of the universe is beatistic, as his whole argument assumes, then why did not God also *refrain from creating* all such souls as he foresaw would require these frightful means for their final restoration, and stock his worlds with only such souls as would follow holiness and happiness, like the elect angels, without being driven into them by this fiery scourge? Surely the author will not attack God's omnipotence by denying that he was able to do the latter. Then we should have had a universe containing all the good which he supposed will be finally presented by the existing one, *minus* all the woes of earth and hell. These, including the penal miseries of those who die impenitent, which the author thinks may continue for multitudes of the more stubborn, through countless, though not literally infinite, years, make up a frightful aggregate. Why did God choose a universe with such an addition of crime and woe when he had the option of one without it? The author is as far from a theodicy as Dr. Bledsoe.

The speculations of both these writers are obnoxious to this just charge, that in assuming an *a priori* ground of improbability against endless punishments, they go beyond the depth of the created reason. They tell us that when the everlasting penalty is properly estimated, it is found so enormous that they cannot be convinced that God is capable of inflicting it. Are they certain that they know how enormous an evil sin is in God's omniscient judgment? Does not the greater crime justify the heavier penalty, according to all jurisprudence? Before this question, it becomes us to lay our faces in the dust. But such writers would exclaim, if sin is indeed such a thing as to necessitate this fearful treatment by a "God of love," and if so many of our race are actually exposed to it, then should all men take wholly another view of this world and of life than that taken by the most serious believer. Then we ought to regard our smiling world as little less dreadful than a charnel house of souls. Then every sane man ought to be, as to his own rescue, "agonizing to enter into the strait gate!" Every good man ought to be toiling to pluck his neighbors as "brands from the burning," like men

around a burning dwelling which still includes a helpless family. There should not be one hour in this world for frivolous amusement or occupation; and all should be condemned as frivolous save such as bore, directly or indirectly, on the rescue of souls. The man not stony-hearted ought to "say to laughter, it is mad; and mirth, what doeth it"? on such a stage as this earth, where such a tragedy is enacting. Every just and humane mind ought to feel that it was little short of treason to human misery to expend on the pomps or luxuries of life one dollar of the money which might send a Bible or an evangelist to ignorant souls.

Well, if it should be even so? If it be so, the world is insane (Eccles. ix. 3) and the church is shockingly below its proper standard of duty. But is this an impossible supposition? Unless these writers are justified in saying so, they are not justified in leaping to the conclusion that the orthodox doctrine cannot be true because it is so awful. One thing appears evident: there has been *one Man* on earth who did appear to frame his whole life and nerve his energies in accordance with this solemn and dreadful view of human destiny. He seemed to live, and strive, and preach, and die, just as a good man should who really believed the sinner's ruin to be everlasting. And this was the *one Man* who knew the truth by experience, because he came from the other world and returned to it.

THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.¹

THIS is a posthumous work of Dr. Landis, Professor of Theology in the Danville Theological Seminary, Kentucky. It arose out of a discussion between him and the admirers of Dr. Charles Hodge, touching the doctrine of the latter about the manner of the imputation of Adam's sin to the race, which Dr. Landis conducted in *The Danville Review* and *The Southern Presbyterian Review*. He complained that the supporters of Dr. Hodge in the Northern Church, to which Dr. Landis belonged, resented all criticism of their leader, in a factious, tyrannical, and popish spirit, which refused to give a fair hearing to the truth, and even punished him for daring to assert that truth against their great man. Hence Dr. Landis felt that no resource was left him, in defending God's cause and his own good name, except the publication of his full views and their grounds. He therefore devoted the latter years of his life and the riches of his own magnificent theological library to the laborious and careful composition of this volume, which he rewrote seven times. He then bequeathed it to the Central University of Kentucky, as his literary executor, to which he also gave his collection of books. It is now published by the University, in fidelity to his memory and wishes. The intelligent reader will of course understand that the University considers itself by this act as only performing its engagement as to Dr. Landis's memory as a scholar and divine, and not as making itself a partisan on either side of the theological issue debated. That issue is one of those in which, as is generally avowed, honest Calvinists may differ without compromising their orthodoxy. We have, in our own day, seen on one side a Chalmers and a Hodge, and on the other a Landis, a Breckinridge, and a Baird. The University can therefore claim, indisputably,

¹ Appeared in *The Southern Presbyterian Review* for October, 1884, reviewing *The Doctrine of Original Sin, as Revised and Taught by the Churches of the Reformation, Stated and Defended*. By the Rev. Dr. R. W. Landis. Whittet & Shepperson, Richmond, Va. 1884.

that, in securing for Dr. Landis a full hearing, it has broken no obligation of courtesy or discretion resting on it as a Presbyterian institution.

Dr. Landis's whole discussion is directed to a single point—the strict theory of Dr. Hodge asserting the antecedent, immediate, and gratuitous imputation of Adam's sin to his race as (in the first stage of the judicial transaction) merely *peccatum alienum*. Readers of church history are aware that since the time of Placæus, about the middle of the seventeenth century, debate has existed among the Reformed whether this imputation was antecedent to the actual moral corruption of the race, and immediate, or whether it was consequent thereon, and mediate. The occasion for disclosing this question was an act of the French National Synod condemning any—meaning virtually Placæus and his followers—who should teach that the doctrine of original sin was limited solely to the hereditary subjective corruption of men, and should deny, as a part of the doctrine, the true imputation to men of Adam's first sin. Thereupon Placæus sought adroitly to evade the point of this condemnation by explaining that he did not deny that imputation, but only denied that it was “antecedent and immediate.” He held that it was only “mediate and consequential” on men's actual, personal, and subjective corruption.

Of this explanation the Synods seem subsequently to have taken no notice. But sundry of Placæus's brethren remained dissatisfied, and continued the discussion. In this discussion, antagonism of feeling not unnaturally developed and fixed the ill-starred distinction, which never ought to have been stated or discussed, between Placæus's idea of an imputation of Adam's guilt only mediate and consequent on the actual personal corruption of Adam's posterity derived to them merely by hereditary descent, and the opposite view of an imputation by God of the guilt of Adam's first sin to men, antecedently, immediately, and gratuitously, God conceiving them as initially holy in their personal estate at the time of this imputation, and then visiting on them, as the penalty of this imputed guilt, the initial depravation of their subjective characters, at least so far as the *privatio justitiæ* could go. Now, it has pleased Dr. Hodge to adopt this latter extreme view, and to push its consequences in the hardest manner, asserting, with his sternest dogmatism, that this, and

this alone, is the doctrine, and that all the great Calvinistic leaders are with him, and those who dissent are virtually not Presbyterians at all on this point. Dr. Landis undertakes to prove, on the contrary, that none of the great leaders or symbols are with Dr. Hodge in this extreme; that he has misrepresented or misunderstood them all; that the church has always rejected Dr. Hodge's extreme view as distinctly as she has discarded Placcæus's, has refused to entertain the mischievous distinction, and has always held that the imputation, while in a certain just sense "immediate," proceeded with even step with the actual personal participation of men in the race sin, and was not "antecedent" and "gratuitous" in Dr. Hodge's sense.

This issue may seem a narrow one upon which to write a large book. But it is the hinge question. Its vital importance proceeds from its corollaries and the other vital doctrines involved. These are such as the following: the relations of reason to revelation; the sovereignty and moral attributes of God; imputation; satisfaction for human sins; justification; believers' union with Christ; effectual calling and sanctification; God's providence over the posterity of wicked men.

We will let Dr. Landis define the question (p. 111, § 13):

"Dr. Hodge teaches that the sin of Adam was made common to the race by a forensic and gratuitous imputation; while, on the contrary, the Calvinistic and Lutheran communions have from the beginning always taught that sin was imputed *because it was common*—i. e., the sin alike of Adam and his posterity. This single point presents, in fact, the *nucleus* of the whole question. For if the sin becomes common only through the forensic or gratuitous imputation of Adam's *peccatum alienum*, or merely personal guilt, then the doctrine of our participation therein is a figment, and Dr. Hodge's theory is the true doctrine, and no alternative can remain to us but to accept it with all its fatal sequences as regards our theology, and to acquiesce moreover in the exegesis by which he claims that it may be supported. But if, on the contrary, the first sin was imputed because it was common, and if such be the unvarying doctrine of the church of God, then, of course, Dr. Hodge has left his brethren no alternative but to regard and treat his theory as a fundamental and fatal departure (as he himself has always conceded) from their cherished faith."

The older readers of this *Review* will recognize in Dr. Landis's criticisms and exceptions a close resemblance to those advanced in the review of Hodge's *Theology*, in the number for April, 1873.

Dr. Landis's extended discussion may be virtually reduced to three heads, in which he asserts that Dr. Hodge's exaggerated

doctrine is, (1), illogical; (2), unscriptural; (3), unchurchly, or against the uniform teachings of the church's symbols and leaders, from Augustine to Edwards.

I. The points wherein Dr. Landis asserts this doctrine to be illogical are chiefly these :

1. That Dr. Hodge, like other Calvinists, argues to the reasonableness of the imputation of Adam's sin to the race from that method of divine providence which now visits the sins of the parents on the posterity. But, says Dr. Landis, the essential condition of such providential dealing is, that the posterity are also actually and personally sinful. God only visits the parents' sins on the generations "that hate him." Were the case of Adam and the race, then, analogous to these providential dealings, it must be just the opposite of what Dr. Hodge represents it. For,

2. The latter asserts that, initially, the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed to men while as yet unfallen, pure, and guiltless, as behoves them to be when issuing first from the creative hand of God; for the first depravity comes upon infants *as the penalty* of that merely imputed guilt. Dr. Hodge must hold, as indeed he says, that the newly created soul has at least an instant of innocent and pure subjective being, not only logically but chronologically, prior to its condemnation for Adam's sin and to that initial depravation which is the penalty therefor. Now, this view leaves the doctrine of imputation opposite to, instead of analogical to, the other case of children suffering for parents' crimes. So that, for Dr. Hodge, this argument is absurd, and contradicts instead of confirming him. Next, his view is as stubbornly inconsistent with fact (in another direction) as was Placeus's view, and equally contradicts Scripture. For, according to this, subjective corruption is absolutely as early in each individual case. There are as many and as strong texts which say that man is corrupt from the beginning of his life, as that he is guilty from the beginning. So that, as Placeus uttered a solecism when he represented the young soul as depraved before it was guilty for imputed sin, so Dr. Hodge utters the counter-part solecism when he represents it as guilty before it is depraved. Scripture says it is both guilty and depraved from the very first. And, once more, Dr. Hodge sins against fact, Scripture, and the invariable teaching of our churches in not only rejecting, but

ridiculing the doctrine of our *actual participation* in the first sin. Dr. Hodge sneeringly asks, How could a person participate in an act done before he had any existence? He says it is nonsense. He insists that the only sense in which the individuals of the race could have participated in Adam's sin is the formal and forensic putative sense, and that this was the only participation the church ever held, or could hold, without stultifying herself. But Dr. Landis asserts, with equal stoutness, that the church always did hold to the actual participation of the individuals of the race in Adam's sin, in its criminality as well as its guilt; that our divines invariably teach this as a fact, and as the essential condition of the imputation; and while they admit it to be a mystery, inexplicable by human philosophy, they assert it as made possible by the race unity and community of nature between the head and the branches. And herein Dr. Hodge opposes scriptures such as John iii. 5, 6, and the Confessions, which assert that we "sinned in Adam" as well as "fell with him." Dr. Landis asserts, moreover, that his opponent is perpetually misled and misleads his readers as to what our divines mean by "Adam's sin" and the "first sin," by which they always mean that sin as common to Adam and the race, as actually, though mysteriously, shared by the race; while Dr. Hodge persists in regarding it as Adam's mere personal sin made common to men, in the first stage, by nothing but its formal imputation as *peccatum alienum*. This Dr. Landis abundantly sustains by profuse citations.

3. He asserts that Dr. Hodge's doctrine tends to make God "the author of sin." For if the initial subjective corruption is the penalty merely of the guilt of Adam's personal sin formally and forensically imputed to us, it is every way natural to conceive of God, the judge, *as inflicting the penalty* he pronounces. This is the only intelligible view of judgment and penalty: while the criminal brings about the crime judged, *the judge brings about* the penalty righteously affixed, either by inflicting it himself or efficiently procuring its infliction. This is what a judge is for. So that Dr. Hodge should consistently teach that the depraving of every soul since Adam is God's direct doing. Must he not do it with his own hand? Does he employ the holy angels to do it? Hardly. Or the devils? or the parents? The latter would be our doctrine of original race sin, which Dr. Hodge has

rejected. Again: if each soul is subjectively pure when it begins to exist, it is an insufficient explanation to say that each one regularly and invariably, though freely, depraves itself. This is too much like the Pelagian theory for accounting for the prevalence of actual apostasy. And how comes it that this multitude of initially holy wills should invariably choose corruption? Why does not the result turn out, if it were simple self action, as it did among the angels, where some chose to deprave themselves and some chose to remain pure? In another place, Dr. Hodge, floundering in the meshes of his erroneous speculation, seeks to avoid making God the author of our corruption by saying: If God saw fit simply to *withdraw* the indwelling of the Holy Spirit from the newly created soul, its depravation by the law of defect would follow. But the hard question for him is, Would God impute a *peccatum alienum* to a soul initially pure, and also privileged with the indwelling of the Spirit? And can any one believe, with the Bible in his hand, that creatures ever had that indwelling efficiently for one instant who were at that instant under the curse, "by nature children of wrath," "conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity"?

4. Dr. Hodge concurs often with all the Reformed divines and the Scripture in teaching that our federal and natural union with our head results, according to God's ordinance, in his first sin's affecting us (as being a common sin), both morally and forensically, as it affected himself. This, says Dr. Landis, is good doctrine. But now come two questions. Are we actually in race union with Adam holy, or with Adam corrupted? Certainly the latter; because Adam had no child until after his fall, and then he begat sinners, "after his image, in his own likeness." And in Adam's own person, which preceded, subjective corruption or judicial condemnation? A just God does not condemn a creature until after he sins, and in the overt sin corrupt motive must have preceded guilty action. Now, then, why do we not represent the seed, like their head, as condemned, because already actually corrupted?

5. But let us see Dr. Hodge's affirmative logic, by whose stress he feels compelled to strain his theory of imputation so high. It is, in substance, this: unless we hold that the imputation of Adam's guilt was immediate, gratuitous, and precedaneous, we cannot consistently hold the imputation of our guilt to a holy

Christ, nor of his righteousness to us vile sinners. For the three imputations must be held as exact parallels. This is implied in Romans v. 11–21, where the apostle illustrates justification in Christ's imputed righteousness by our (admitted) condemnation in Adam, and the honesty and soundness of the apostle's argument require us to suppose an exact parallel between the two imputations, both in fact and in mode. But the imputation of our sins to a holy Christ, and of his righteousness to us, are gratuitous, whence the apostle must have regarded the imputation of Adam's sin to us as equally gratuitous and immediate. Moreover, let the opposite doctrine as to original sin be held, and the exact parallelism be borne in mind, and our theory of justification must be the popish one; for as Placæus held that men's subjective corruption was prior to, and in order to, the imputation of Adam's guilt to them, so the Papists teach that the believer's inherent and subjective godliness must be prior to, and in order to, the imputation to him of Christ's righteousness. Thus Dr. Hodge urges with the utmost tenacity that unless we admit his extreme view, we cannot consistently be Christians at all.

To this showing Dr. Landis objects, that the assumptions made in it are all absolutely erroneous, and the inferences of no force whatever. Thus:

That the immediate and gratuitous nature of the imputations in expiation and justification do not at all imply a similar quality in the imputation of Adam's sin to men, because two grand differences in the two cases intervene. The imputation in the fall was one of *justice*, that in redemption is one of *mercy and grace*. A righteous ruler, in dispensing free gifts and favors, properly holds himself at liberty to exceed the bounds of strict desert. In administering justice, never. To overlook this difference, in order to force on us a favorite speculation, is an amazing oversight. And, second, an essential difference in the two cases is found in this: that Christ's coming under imputation of guilt was optional and voluntary on his part. And so his righteousness is imputed to no soul for justification until that soul freely accepts and chooses it in the act of faith. We must believe in order to be justified. True, it is the merit of the divine substitute, and not the merit of the believing, which justifies; but none the less is it absolutely true that the sinner must believe in order to have that divine merit imputed to him. So that in both the im-

putations involved in a sinner's redemption, that of his sins to Christ and Christ's merits to him, we find *this feature of free consent in the party receiving* the imputation to be an essential element, which, in the imputation of Adam's sin to us, would be totally lacking on our part were Dr. Hodge correct. Dr. Hodge unwisely insists on an exact parallel between the three imputations. Well, let it be settled, for argument's sake, that they are exactly parallel. Then we must hold that the free assent of each sinning person to Adam's act as his representative is essential in order to make the imputation of his guilt any parallel at all. And we find that assent only in the old Calvinistic doctrine of *actual participation* in Adam's sin, as in order to the imputation, which Dr. Hodge so rejects.

Our author in another place carries this point farther with great acuteness. Does Dr. Hodge urge that both holy and unholy creations begin existence with a subjective disposition certainly regulative of their feelings and choices; that this law of their character does not, and cannot, originate as the Pelagians vainly fable in an act of that creature's choice, and that, hence, as to his just responsibility for acting with that disposition, it is worthless to raise the question how or whence it came to him, and we only ask, Is it *his own* disposition, and does he freely act it out? Then he is justly responsible. True, says Dr. Landis, just so. And therefore all the cavils of ancient and modern Pelagians, that a created righteousness—in Adam's creation, or the believer's new creation—cannot be a responsible righteousness, are silly and worthless. But Dr. Hodge should have noticed that the subjective righteousness inwrought in the soul in regeneration *only becomes a true righteousness as it is accepted and freely preferred by the soul born again*. The causal source of it is external to the renewed will, almighty and supernatural? Yes, certainly. But none the less is the infused holiness the freely chosen preference of the soul from the very instant it is accounted by God as a true holiness. The rule of the divine work is expressed in the text, "My people shall *be willing* in the day of my power." The very essence of the divine work within the dead soul is that it renews and quickens *the will*, causing the soul to choose and pursue freely that godliness which, in the days of its bondage and spiritual death, it had as freely rejected. It appears, then, that in no case does God account holiness or un-

holiness to a creature, except as there is a voluntary participation in it by the creature's own will. So that, to establish the symmetry Dr. Hodge so ardently pursues, and to range the imputations of the two covenants in that exact parallelism he demands, he ought to have retained instead of discarding the good old doctrine that the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed to us, *because we sinned in him*, and have an actual participation of our free agency in his crime as well as its guilt.

This train of thought prepares the way for Dr. Landis to wrest Dr. Hodge's next point from him and turn it against him. Does he charge a tendency towards popish justification on Dr. Landis? Dr. Landis charges a more real tendency to Arminian and semi-Pelagian justification on him. For he insists that in original sin the guilt of Adam's personal sin as *peccatum alienum* is first immediately imputed to souls, viewed as so far personally pure and guiltless; and consequentially the first subjective corruption comes on them as penalty of that imputed guilt. And the three imputations must be strictly parallel! Then the application of redemption must, of course, be on this wise: first, the righteousness of Christ must be imputed to the sinner, he being still in his state of native spiritual death and sin. On this imputation is grounded his acceptance. And then, as the consequence of this acceptance, and as the first merited reward to this imputed righteousness, the new birth is bestowed, implanting spiritual life and subjective godliness. But *this is Arminianism*. This ill-starred tenacity of Dr. Hodge in adhering to his speculation, despite its bad consequences, receives a striking illustration in his last work, his *Theology* (Vol. II., p. 249). Ten years after he had been warned by Dr. Landis he prints these sentences as his description of the application of redemption: "It was by the disobedience of one man that all men are constituted sinners, not only by imputation (which is true, and most important), but also by inherent depravity, as it was by the obedience of one that all are constituted righteous, not only by imputation (which is true and vitally important), but also by the *consequent* renewing of their nature, *flowing from* their reconciliation to God." These words are dangerously incautious. Doubtless Christ has purchased for the elect by his priestly work all the blessings of effectual calling and sanctification from beginning to end. Doubtless all Calvinists hold that increase in sanctification is one of the

after-fruits of justification. But here Dr. Hodge says, not that subsequent growth in holiness, but the very *renewing* of the sinner's nature is "*consequent*" on justification, and "*flows from*" their reconciliation to God, apparently as though he would rather avouch the Arminian theory than recede from his favorite doctrine about imputation.

For if there is any one thing in which Calvinists are unanimous, it is that justification follows faith, and that faith is the act only of new-born souls following their renewal. And strong Arminians are equally unanimous in assigning this contrary order to the redemptive causations. First, common sufficient grace, evoking, with the synergism of the self-determined will, repentance and faith. Next, justification by faith. Then, as the consequence of justification, the regeneration of the soul. And then progressive sanctification. A synergistic system calls for this arrangement of the steps. And it is equally true that this arrangement implies synergism; for the sinner must believe in order to be justified, and be justified in order to be regenerated. Of course, then, faith is an exercise of soul which an unregenerate soul is competent to put forth. Of course, then, no unconditional election of grace, no almighty quickening is needed to decide the sinner for the gospel; he may decide himself in the sovereign exercise of a self-determining will, while grace follows on and coöperates in the good change which the human will has sovereignly instituted! Is that Calvinism? But Dr. Hodge says that such must virtually be the adjustment resulting from his theory of imputation. Then his is not the theory of the old Calvinists.

The difficulty he obtrudes as to our view and its resultant popish justification by inherent instead of imputed righteousness is easily solved. No Protestant ever denied, in opposition to Papists, that all justified persons have an inherent righteousness. Our denial is, that our inherent righteousness can be, at the beginning or ever after, the "formal cause" of our justification. We utterly deny that it is, or can be, the ground of justification by any merit of condignity or of congruity, not because we doubt whether the believer really has it at the time he is justified, but *because it is imperfect*, because a condemned creature *cannot merit*, and because the inherent righteousness is *due to God's inworking*, not to that of the man's own natural will. "What

hast thou, that thou didst not *receive*? Now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory in it as though thou hadst *not* received it?" But saving faith, on which justification instrumentally depends, is the exercise of none but a regenerate soul. The instituting of the vital union between the dead soul and Christ is absolutely needed in order to faith. Out of that union all our life, reconciliation, and holiness flow. Chronologically, both the new birth, which is the initiation of the process of sanctification, and justification instantly follow that union. But causatively Christ must quicken us first, through the union, in order that we may put forth the true faith which justifies. Were we inclined to insist upon a perfectly symmetrical parallel, then, between the steps of our fall in the first Adam and our redemption in the second, as Dr. Hodge insists, we should be led to a conclusion opposite to his; that in each case the subjective change is in order to the forensic.

But the great Reformers did not think that Paul's argument in Romans v. proceeded on the idea of such exact parallel. They all say, as Calvin, that the one topic illustrates the other; which supposes—the apostle being an honest reasoner—that the two imputations have something in common. But that, while they agree in the thing, they obviously differ in mode. Thus, Calvin, *Commentary*, on Romans v. 17, says: "Moreover, it is important to note here *two differences* between Adam and Christ," etc. Gomarus, the strict supralapsarian Calvinist: "Adam, by the force of nature (*vi naturæ*), communicates his sin to all and each of his natural offspring; but Christ communicates his righteousness and life to each of his renewed." "But the comparison is twofold, to-wit, of a resemblance and of a difference." Polavius of Bâle: "Bellarmine deceives himself in his exposition of the analogy contained therein (Rom. v.), since Paul *does not compare the modes* by which we are in ourselves either sinners or righteous, but the efficient causes whereby we become sinners or righteous before God." Andrew Rivet, the special opponent of Placeus, whom Dr. Hodge claims as wholly his own: "Yet there is nothing in this argument which forbids that we acknowledge the necessity of *inherent qualities*" (in order to imputation). "For it can only be proved" (from Paul's comparison) "that in Christ we have righteousness, as we have in Adam unrighteousness. But there is a comparison *of the causes* and *not of the mode* in which the

thing is communicated to us. For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation; but the righteousness of Christ by imputation. Therefore, the apostle *does not compare the modes* in which righteousness is received, but the causes, effects, and subjects of each." A. Willets, "Sixfold Commentarie upon Romans," speaking of the illustration of Romans v., mentions "the disparitie and unlikeness" of the two cases: "The *manner* how these things (death by Adam and life by Christ) are conveyed is *diverse*: Adam's sin is transmitted by natural propagation, but life and righteousness are conveyed by grace." Theodore Beza, the strictest of Calvinists, Commentary on Romans v. 12: "But this distinction plainly appears" (in the analogy) "partly, indeed, from the whole comparison of the unrighteousness of Adam with the righteousness of Christ, to-wit, of the former through propagation, of the latter communicated to us (believers) through imputation." And (unkindest cut of all to Dr. Hodge) Francis Turretin (Loc. 16): "Nor, if we are constituted unjust and guilty through the sin propagated from Adam, must we immediately be justified through inherent righteousness communicated to us by Christ through regeneration; for the method of each is most different. And Paul here institutes a comparison between the first and second Adam *in the thing, and not in the mode of the thing*." And yet Dr. Hodge claims Turretin wholly!

We have seen how Dr. Landis charges him with misconception of what the Reformers meant by "first sin." They, Dr. Landis holds, uniformly meant by this the breach of the covenant of works in paradise, not merely as Adam's personal act, but also as the common sin of the race. They have in mind always the mysterious fact of our actual participation in that breach. And whereas Dr. Hodge rejects this idea as "unthinkable," the Reformers uniformly advance it as a revealed mystery, above the comprehension of reason indeed, but not contrary to reason, and the very key to the whole doctrine of original sin. This is well summed up in these remarks of the recent Lutheran divine, Dr. Julius Müller: "This, therefore, is the point at which all the threads of the doctrine of the orthodox concerning hereditary sin meet, in which it must be dogmatically justified, if it is at all capable of such justification. It first of all appears as something quite incredible that in the fall of Adam all his natural posterity are supposed to have some participation. If, now, it may be

shown that this is only the paradox which every deeper connection of things has for ordinary thinking, then all further difficulties of the doctrine become involved of themselves." And Dr. Landis asks: Can the Trinity be rationally explained to our finite minds? Have not the apparent paradoxes involved in the "three in one" been the constant subjects of rationalistic cavil? Yet Dr. Hodge holds that this inexplicable mystery of the Trinity is the essential foundation of the whole doctrine of redemption, as we all do. So, says Dr. Landis, there may be an apparent paradox in the statement that "the race sinned in Adam;" the human mind may be incompetent to explicate the whole conception of a *race unity*, which is a real fact, and yet does not destroy individuality and personal responsibility. But it does not necessarily contradict the intuitive reason; and *it is a revealed fact*, and also *the clearest of experimental facts*, that *the race became actually and universally sinful* (except Jesus) *in Adam's sin*. And on this fact the doctrine of imputation hinges. The philosophic attempts made, from Augustine to S. J. Baird, to explain this fact have been failures; they have given us no real light; their failure probably shows—as did the failure of the scholastics to give the *rationale* of the Trinity—that the conceptions involved concerning such ultimate facts in ontology lie beyond the grasp of the human intellect. And the best philosophers see most clearly that this feature of our ontological beliefs *constitutes no objection whatever to their rational validity*. Could Sir Isaac Newton explicate the notion of gravitation? No, not at all. Has metaphysics ever explicated the notions of substance, as distinguished from essence, of power in cause? of the unconditioned notions, eternity, infinity, self-existence, abstract number? No; yet every thinker in the world adopts these notions as essential elements of his beliefs. How strangely has Dr. Hodge, then, here betrayed himself into that rationalistic position which everywhere else he so clearly and justly condemns?

For Dr. Landis asserts next that the peculiar features of his doctrine about imputation, and of his exposition of Romans v., are precisely those advanced by the Socinians, Arians, and Arminians in the Reformation ages, and sternly rejected and refuted by the Reformers. Socinus, Curcellæus, Whitby, Limborch, and their whole schools, deny the actual participation of mankind in the sin of Adam's fall; define original sin as consisting

in the gratuitous immediate imputation of the formal guilt (*reatus actualis*) of Adam's personal sin, and in that alone; describe God's act in thus imputing Adam's guilt as one of mere sovereignty, and not of real judicial righteousness; so that the evils and natural death which the race incur from this imputation are not properly penal, but the results of this arbitrary formal imputation. The same was the doctrine of the papal semi-Pelagians, Pighius and Contarinus, so sternly resisted by Calvin. And, accordingly, it is in the commentaries of these rationalists on Romans v. that we currently see those features of exposition on which Dr. Hodge insists, and in which he departs from the line of interpretation before current among the Reformed.

Now, the Socinians, Arians, and semi-Pelagians had certain doctrinal ends to pursue in setting up this theory of original sin, and they are ends thoroughly obnoxious to Dr. Hodge. Strange that he did not see whither his unnatural fellowship was leading him. The vital truths most hated by these Socinians and their sympathizers are these: that the human soul is naturally and decisively corrupted by a connate ungodliness; that hence man has no longer any self-determination of will to any spiritual good; that distributive justice is an essential and unchangeable attribute of God; that hence there is a strict moral necessity for real satisfaction to justice for the guilt of sins in order to their remission; that all the natural evils men suffer are properly penal, and thus their occurrence proves the criminality before a holy God of all that suffer; that so Christ's sufferings during his humiliation were properly penal, sacrificial, and expiatory; that the believer's justification is grounded in the real merit and acceptance of that vicarious satisfaction, and not merely in the arbitrary compassion of God. Denials of these are the very lineaments of the Socinian anti-Christ, from the Racovian Catechism to Dr. William Channing, as none know better than Dr. Hodge.

Let us now see how these heretics proposed to get rid of these doctrines by their tampering with the Reformed theory of original sin. Thus, if there is no actual criminality in Adam's posterity, but only the formal imputation of the mere guilt (*reatus actualis*) of a *peccatum alienum*, and God has really made that imputation and visited all natural evils on such a ground upon creatures wholly devoid of personal criminality or demerit, then it follows that natural evils may occur to responsible creatures which are

not properly penalties of sins. Then the famous argument of the Augustinians, that the sufferings of infants prove them sinners, is shown to be worthless; and then, moreover, it follows that God's dispensing of such sufferings is an act of his arbitrary will, and not of a righteous judicial will. And this plainly implies that *distributive justice is not his essential attribute.* And thus falls the main argument of the Calvinists for their dogma, the necessity of penal satisfaction in order to remission. Again, since Paul, in Romans v., establishes a strict parallelism between the two imputations, and also between the mode of the two, the imputation of believers' sins to Christ is like that of Adam's sin to his race: not a true judicial judgment, carrying over to Christ a righteous penal obligation, but a mere formal politic arrangement, dictated by God's arbitrary will, as moved by his general goodness; and Christ's sufferings were no more penal, in strict sense, than are the sufferings of sinless infants when they die under the imputation of Adam's guilt. Then there was no true sacrifice, expiation, and satisfaction for man's sins made on the cross; and the Reformed doctrine of justification founded thereon is senseless and false. These, unquestionably, are the logical ends which the rationalistic divines were pursuing when they vitiated the orthodox church doctrine of the fall in Adam in the manner described. So the Reformed divines apprehended their objects, and for that reason they resisted their expositions utterly. These are the objects distinctly pursued and claimed by the Socinians and their sympathizers in these expositions. Yet Dr. Hodge adopts these perilous expositions, so uniformly exposed and rejected by the Reformers, and that in the professed defence of strict Calvinism! What are likely to be the fruits among his blind admirers? It is not charged that he himself had any Socinian or semi-Pelagian leanings; his loyalty to the truth is here unquestionable. But he is loyal to it by a happy inconsistency; and the danger is that others may work out his principles to their mischievous results, and introduce Socinian rationalism into the huge church of which he was the Gamaliel.

II. We are now prepared to touch briefly upon the exposition of the classical passage (Rom. v. 12-21) on which this doctrine of imputation chiefly rests. The reader is requested to place the Greek of the following verses before his eye:

"12. Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned: 13. (For until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law. 14. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come. 15. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. 16. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification. 17. For if by one man's offence death reigned by one, much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ.) 18. Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. 19. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."

Now, as to the general scheme of exposition for this passage, Dr. Landis charges that Dr. Hodge, following the Socinian expositions of such writers as Curcellæus, Whitby, and Dr. Taylor of Norwich, insists on making the parallel exact between the two imputations in thing and in mode. But the current of the Reformed divines, from Calvin down to our day, as represented by Alford, Wordsworth, Schaff and Shedd, hold as does Dr. Landis, that the apostle compares the two cases, the fall and redemption, as two processes analogous in their sources and causes, but different in details of mode. In each case there is a great company of souls represented in its respective federal head, an imputation, a justification, and a condemnation of the individuals of the two companies through their federal heads' respective actions. So that men all sin and are condemned in Adam as truly as they are renewed and justified in Christ. But in the details diversities appear, some of which the apostle himself specifies:—as that the corruption passes from Adam to the race by natural participation (and along with it the imputed guilt), but the restoration is wrought through Christ's righteousness, gratuitously imputed; that the transaction in Adam was one of strict justice, that in Christ of free grace, that in the one case a single criminality was the source of death to a whole race, in the other a single righteousness was the source of life to all the elect. Still other differences (see Calvin's commentary on verse 12) exist, which the apostle does not specify, because it does not suit his purpose, as: "The first is, that in Adam's sin we are not condemned through imputation alone, as though the penalty of another man's sin were

exacted of us; but we thus sustain its punishment, because we are also guilty of fault (*culpa*) so far, to-wit, as our nature, vitiated in him, is involved in guilt before God. But through the righteousness of Christ we are restored to salvation in another mode." ... "The other difference is, that the benefit of Christ does not reach to all men, as Adam involved his whole race in condemnation," etc. So that the great current of the Reformed have held the fact that the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believing sinner is gratuitous was not meant by Paul to show that the imputation of Adam's sin was, in exactly the counterpart sense, gratuitous.

When we come to details of exposition, Dr. Landis claims that Dr. Hodge has followed the current of the rationalists in the following points, which he rejects, in company with the current of the Calvinists. In verse 12, "For that all sinned," ($\epsilon\psi' \omega' \pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma \alpha\omicron\sigma\iota\omega\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$), Dr. Hodge, with the opponents of Calvinism, makes the sinning not an actual, but merely a putative and forensic accounting as guilty, with the guilt of a *peccatum alienum*. While he admits that the usage of the verb makes against this construction, yet, as it gives the only rational sense, it must be adopted, and the exposition of the remaining verses squared to it. But the Reformed expositors, with Calvin, say that $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\iota\nu$ cannot bear that sense, that it is against all usage, and that the subjects of the verb must be held to have sinned in some actual sense. And the least we can get out of the proposition is, that death passed on all from the first sin, because all in that sin incurred subjective depravity of nature. Calvin actually enters into a specific argument to prove that the verb "to sin" may, according to Scripture usage, mean "to be subjectively a sinner;" which accords with the Reformed theology, by which subjective depravity is regarded as veritable sin, and, while not the result of previous volitions, yet personal and voluntary in the sense of being spontaneous.

On verse 14 the Socinian divines would have us understand that death's passing over on them "who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," means the forensic and formal denouncing of death on human beings personally sinless, merely for Adam's *peccatum alienum*. But the Reformed think generally that this means *infants*, who suffer and die, thus showing that they are condemned persons, while the difference be-

tween their personal sinning and Adam's is this: that his sin was overt as well as *in habitu*, while they have only a sinful disposition *in habitu*, being at the time the condemnation comes on them not capable of overt sin.

On the 18th verse, Dr. Hodge reads, οὐ ἐνὸς παραπτώματος, "by the sin of one man," making ἐνὸς masculine, and thus getting an implied support for his doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of Adam's personal sin. Dr. Landis, with the best Reformed, regards ἐνὸς as neuter, and reads, "by one transgression"—that is, by that one race sin, common by participation to Adam and his seed. And he claims the exegetical force of the ἐν ἐνὶ παραπτώματι in the exactly parallel expression of verse 17, which cannot justly bear the translation, "by one man's offence," given it in the received version.

Once more, when the apostle says, in summing up his comparison, verse 19, "By the obedience of one shall many be *made* righteous," Dr. Hodge still limits the result here stated by Paul to the putative and forensic estimation. He thinks δικαιωχαρασταθήσονται is equivalent to "shall be declared righteous." Dr. Landis, with Wordsworth and Schaff, thinks the words mean far more, constituting Christ's redeemed both forensically and actually righteous. Thus the concluding declaration is made to correspond with that of the same apostle in 1 Cor. xv. 22: "As in Adam *all die*, so in Christ *shall all be made alive*." Then the counterpart result of the first member of verse 19: "As by one man's disobedience *many were made sinners*," includes not only their putative, but their actual fall.

The fact to which Dr. Landis calls our attention is certainly worthy of note: that the traits which mark Dr. Hodge's cherished exposition of the passage, so far as they differ from the old current view of the Reformed, are the very ones which the Socinians advanced and the Reformed divines contested so strenuously.

III. The third position laboriously defended against Dr. Hodge is, that his doctrine is unchurchly; that it is an innovation upon the traditionary Reformed doctrine as taught by the great divines of the Presbyterian churches and by their Confessions of Faith. Here Dr. Landis's assertion is, not only that there is a discrepancy in the way of stating the doctrine, but that the peculiar features which Dr. Hodge claims to be essential to

the consistency of our Calvinism are expressly stated, and *stated to be rejected* by the great Calvinists. The tenor of his citations might receive, as a summary and homely paraphrase, the following statement: "This view of a gratuitous antecedent imputation of Adam's sin as *peccatum alienum* we find advanced by Socinians and Socinianizers, or we hear cast up to us as an absurdity; but we declare that it is not our view of the doctrine of original sin, nor that of our churches. We wash our hands of it." Dr. Landis, moreover, complains that his opponent astonishingly misleads his readers by asserting that such and such of the great Reformed divines are expressly with him, when in fact they are as expressly against him. This part of his work is, of course, chiefly a compilation of extracts. It is marked by profuse and laborious scholarship, and in most respects by fairness and discernment. He delights especially to quote against Dr. Hodge the highest Calvinists, as Beza, those who carried the federal theory to the greatest lengths, as De Moor, and those who especially entered the lists against Placæus and his theory of mediate consequential imputation. The reader has already seen instances of the first class in the citations made from Gomarus and Beza. This may be added, from John Owen's "Display of Arminianism" (Chap. 8): "Sin imputed by itself, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any one but Christ." And again: "Now, be the punishment what it will, never so small, yet if we have no demerit of our own, nor interest in Adam's sin, it is such an act of injustice as we must reject from the Most Holy with a God forbid!"

Under the second class, De Moor, although carrying the federal system to its greatest height, says (De Moor's *Marckii Medulla*), on the twelfth question of the Heidelberg Catechism: "Adam was considered as the representative head of the whole human kind, and we all, adorned in him with the gift of righteousness, sinned in him, so that those gifts were taken away judicially, and in the way of penalty, from us, on account of the guilt contracted in Adam, not less than from the first parent, inasmuch as we ourselves spontaneously dilapidated these gifts when sinning in Adam." As to its being Adam's particular sin, he replies: "The crime, nevertheless, is common."

As specimens of the third class, we may recall the declarations of Andrew Rivet, the leading opponent of Placæus. And we add

declarations from Des Marets, who is writing with especial reference to the Synod of Charenton and Placeus: "For divine imputation, seeing it is an act of justice, neither principally nor instrumentally produces native corruption, inhering in each one from his mother's womb." . . . "But it only subjects them to guilt and obligation to punishment on account of the sin of the first man, *which all committed in him.*" And from Wallæus, the colleague of Rivet, who endorsed his work as excellent: "The guilt of the first sin to condemnation (Rom. v. 16) cannot be imputed to posterity, unless that vitiosity of inherent sin intervene, seeing that the justice of God will not permit that the first sin should be imputed for condemnation to a posterity having no sin in themselves."

Sundry of the points of theology involved with the nature of imputation have been already indicated. Our author dwells especially upon two, among others. If Dr. Hodge's view of imputation is adopted, it must seriously modify our views of the divine justice and sovereignty. Instead of ascribing to him a full sovereignty, regulated by infinite reason and holiness, we must believe that an absolute physical sovereignty regulates his justice. We ought, in consistency, to lean to the supralapsarian dogma, that actions are simply right because God pleases to will them, instead of his willing them always because they are right. That God's mere will, in a word, is the sole source of right and wrong. Certainly the answer which Dr. Hodge recommends to the anxious objection, *How can it be right* for God to punish an innocent creature for the sin of another, to which he had not consented? savors of this harshness. God says he does so, therefore it is our business to believe it just.

The relations of reason and faith are also involved in this debate, and Dr. Landis charges that Dr. Hodge's extreme view concerning imputation has occasioned his falling into a dangerous inconsistency on this vital point. When dealing with Rationalists and Socinians, Dr. Hodge is usually firm and sound, repudiating their dogma, that comprehensibility by our reason is the test of revealed truth, and powerfully refuting it. But Dr. Landis complains that when he advances the great doctrine of our actual participation in Adam's sin—a truth he regards as being as essential to our anthropology as the Trinity is to our theology—Dr. Hodge rejects it as "unthinkable" and "nonsensi-

cal." And he justifies himself by saying that since the rational intuitions of the mind are as truly God's handiwork as revelation itself, no proposition of Scripture can contradict those intuitions. And this he claims for sound Protestant doctrine. But Dr. Landis replies that the human mind is now a fallen mind, belonging to persons who are "defiled in all the parts and faculties of the soul and body;" whence it is apparent they may err even in operations deemed intuitive. The history of opinion shows that such errors have often occurred, in fact. And when we concede, as Dr. Hodge seems to claim in this case, that the fallible man is to exercise the prerogative of deciding whether the pet opinion of his, which happens to clash with some proposition of the word, really is intuitive and necessary, we have nothing short of full fledged rationalism.

So stands the debate. Dr. Hodge has obviously been incautious. The reader will note, however, that Dr. Landis claims a right of judging some dogmas rationally impossible, similar to Dr. Hodge's claim. For while the latter pronounces the proposition of our actual participation in Adam's sin to be "unthinkable," the former pronounces, though with a less imperious dogmatism, that the gratuitous antecedent imputation of one person's guilt to another person wholly innocent conflicts with man's moral intuitions. Dr. Hodge's friends have doubtless said that his critic does the very thing which he condemns.

In fact, right reason has its proper prerogative, even in the presence of revelation. Did we not grant this, we should not be Protestants, but should be bowing with an implicit faith to the impossible absurdities of popish transubstantiation. Were it infallibly certain that a given judgment of the human intellect was intuitive and rationally necessary, then we should have a right to hold it, yea, be obliged to hold it, against all witnesses. Even when the clashing witness professed to be revelation, we should be obliged to say no. It could not be the true meaning of revelation, because the judgment held was the immediate and necessary prompting of laws of thought just as really established by God as the Bible itself. But the critical question remains: is this human judgment really the immediate and necessary result of man's constitutive laws of thought? Or is it merely a fallible opinion fondly cherished and unjustly elevated to the rank of an intuition by the pride and prejudice of the mind? The question

of the rights of reason all turns on that hinge. And, as Dr. Landis urges, we cannot grant to the individual fallible mind the right of deciding that question. To whom then shall we reserve that right of decision? If we say, to the document claiming inspiration, we seem to require, for the initial acceptance of that document, the mere blind, implicit faith of the Papist. Shall we refer the question, with Vincentius of Lerins, to the general *consensus* of Christians, and hold such judgments to be necessary and valid truths, *quæ ubique, quæ semper, quæ ab omnibus credita*? This famous platform, which so long satisfied the mind of the church, has in it an unquestionable element of truth. Could we define the *omnes* as the living elect, the real members of the invisible church, "who shall be all taught of God," we should be ready to accept it as a practical rule. But the invisible church is—well, *invisible*. It is not any *man's* prerogative to separate the "tares from the wheat," and to distinguish the minds really taught of the Holy Spirit from those who plausibly profess to be so taught. Tried by the rule of Vincentius, Dr. Landis is more nearly right than Dr. Hodge; for the former evidently has the *consensus* of the major part of the Reformers. There is no safer or better settlement of the rights of reason than that proposed by Turretin: that the reason has its prerogative, even concerning the things of faith, when it is not a carnal and inimical but a humbled and sanctified reason, and when its judgments are necessitated by the soul's constitutive laws of thought. Now, the individual believer may know, by the fruits of the Spirit and the witness of the Spirit, for himself whether he is truly humbled, sanctified, and truth-loving, and may thus know in himself that he is entitled to his conclusions as necessitated by the reason. But should he attempt to dictate his thought on only rational grounds to others, they would be entitled to reply: "Hast thou faith? Then *have it to thyself* before God."

Dr. Landis also proceeds to discuss the theory in its ethical relations, and argues that Dr. Hodge furnishes the basis for the following inferences: that a portion of the race was created in order to be damned; that the theory of restorationism is justified; that we should be willing to be damned for the glory of God; that God has introduced sin into the universe as a means for accomplishing the greatest good; that it obscures God's love towards his creatures and our true Christian conception of

his worthiness of our worship; that it subverts our view of God's justice and of human accountability, and thus undermines the obligation to repentance for sin. These consequences the friends of Dr. Hodge would of course deny with heat. No one supposes that he deliberately intended or approved them. It will be the business of the reader to judge whether his positions are really responsible for them.

We have thus attempted to put the reader in possession of the main thread of Dr. Landis's work, rather than to advance our own judgment of his doctrine.

We only say, in this direction, that he has left an able, acute, and learned work. He has shown himself in all these respects fully equal to the contest with his great opponent. The book should be in the hand of every Presbyterian minister. It is a *succedaneum* for many of the works of the Reformers on this cardinal subject, which are not generally attainable. Dr. Landis's learning and thoroughness were, in one respect, his snare. His discussion is in some degree repetitious, and consequently lacking in lucid order. All his reasonings, and even all his quotations, could have been compressed, by means of a closer method, into a smaller bulk.

In one particular he has, unintentionally no doubt, done scant justice to Dr. Hodge, in that he denies him any countenance for his extreme doctrine of imputation in the writings of the church divines. This does not appear to us true. Dr. Hodge could have quoted a number of them who seem to countenance him in his assertion of an antecedent, immediate, and even gratuitous imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin, and in the dogma that the very first initial subjective depravity of the infant human soul comes upon it *as penalty* of that imputed guilt of the *peccatum alienum*. So De Moor. Nearly all Dr. Hodge's positions may be found in the ninth chapter of Turretin's *Locus on Original Sin*. The true verdict on this history of opinion seems to us this: that a few of the more acute and forward of the Calvinistic divines were tempted, by their love of system and symmetry of statement and over-confidence in their own logic, to excogitate the ill-starred distinction of the antecedent and gratuitous imputation. Their error here was exactly like that of the supralapsarians, who thought they could throw light and symmetry on the doctrine of the decree by assigning what they thought was the logi-

cal order of sequence to its parts. But they became "wise above that which was written." They added no light to the mystery of the decree, but they misrepresented the moral attributes of God, and provoked a crowd of natural cavils and objections. The distinction of supralapsarians and infralapsarians ought never to have been heard of. Enlightened Presbyterians now rejoice that it is practically obsolete. So say we, this distinction of the antecedent imputation ought never to have been drawn. The eminent men who drew it, constrained by good sense, piety, and force of Scripture, usually contradicted it in substance by teaching along with the church that the original corruption and the imputation were coëval and inseparable, and by agreeing that a just and good God would not gratuitously impute the guilt of a *peccatum alienum* upon an agent personally innocent. And such was doubtless the conclusion of the great body of the Reformed and of their Confessions. They usually concurred in the statement of Stapfer, refusing to distinguish the mediate from the immediate imputation. But the difference with Dr. Hodge seems to have been this: his love of systematizing enticed him to adopt the extreme points of his great teacher, Turretin. But after they were adopted, the boldness and dogmatism of his temper and the confidence of his logic led him to follow them out hardily to their repulsive consequences. He scorns those amiable inconsistencies by which the others avoided the harsh consequences. The result was the extreme and exaggerated doctrine which has provoked several able protests, and last, this posthumous one of Dr. Landis.

With one more point this criticism will end, and this is a point by which it is humbly conceived the difficulty Dr. Hodge professed to find in the doctrine of our participation in Adam's sin may be relieved in some degree. Dr. Landis has asserted several times that not only do sinners of subsequent generations partake in Adam's sin, but partook in it *when he sinned*. He also claims that this is the teaching of the Reformers. If we understand him, his one authority for thus dating the epoch of our participation is the phrase in Rom. v. 12, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. He urges that this is *aorist*, and must mark a finished act completed in one definite past time. Hence, all the race actually sinned *when* Adam sinned, although none of the race except him then had any personal existence. Now, does he not herein unnecessarily

complicate and damage his doctrine? Does the apostle say that the common participation in sinning which he here teaches occurred as to the children of the nineteenth century, for instance, on the day Adam ate the forbidden fruit? No evidence appears of it. We surmise the apostle would be hugely surprised to hear that he had said so. The aorist does, indeed, describe definite past action. But when the agents are more than one, it does not describe the definite past actions as all occurring at one time. In the fifth chapter of Matthew, for instance, we have, again and again, an aorist to express *actions done at various past times by successive agents*. See verses 21st, 27th, 31st, 33d, ἐβόηθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις. If we translated these places, "Your ancients were *wont to say*," etc., it might be objected that we confounded with the aorist the more proper sense of the imperfect. But we must translate it virtually thus: "Your ancients" (succeeding each other in their generations) "said" (successively). So let us read in Rom. v. 12: "For that all successively sinned." When? *As soon as they began to exist and act*. Each human soul became an actual sinner when it began to exist. Then the apostle's reasoning will be, that the one man's sin (Adam's eating of the forbidden tree) brought death upon mankind, and so death passed upon all, not solely because the first man sinned, but also because all subsequent men like him sinned too. How much more simple is this reasoning? How much more accordant with fact and experience? We have no call to insist upon the "unthinkable" assertion that the soul born in the nineteenth century actually and literally shared the forbidden fruit by eating it while in Adam's loins sixty centuries before that soul had any personal existence at all. What the apostle says is: that the first man introduced death into the race by sinning in Paradise, and that this penalty judicially passed upon all men for this reason, among others, because all these men, like Adam, personally sinned also. Thus they adopted and endorsed their first father's rebellion. Thus their personal attitude exactly and invariably conformed itself to their federal attitude, and that freely. Thus it becomes just in God to associate them in the common associated guilt of their father. If the question be asked, How it came about that they all began existence with sinful wills and lives? the answer of the Scriptures and of the Reformed theology is, because it pleased a holy, wise,

just, and benevolent God, in creating *a race* existing by the tie of generation, to so make its first head the natural and federal head of all the members of the race as to let his action under probation equally determine for them the same legal state and the same moral state as for himself, and both in inseparable conjunction and with coordinate originality. Adam sinned, was condemned, and died. His natural seed are born equally dead in sin and condemned with him. So God ordained. This is our fall in Adam—a fall both judicial and moral; both moral and judicial.

THEOLOGY OF THE PLYMOUTH BRETHREN.¹

ATTENTIVE observers have not failed to note, that for the last twenty years a modified phase of the "Doctrines of Grace" has been presented in the Calvinistic churches of Great Britain and America; and this movement is easily traced to the sect (if that may be called a sect which has no recognized bond) named at the head of this article. The reader will readily grant that no great uniformity or consistency is to be expected in a company of Christians whose fundamental principles repudiate the divine authority for any catholic visible church, the existence of a regular order of ordained ministers, and the use of all authoritative creeds. Their common traits can amount to no more than a species of prevalent complexion. Nobody among them is responsible for anything, unless he has been found doing or saying it himself. Hence there arises an unavoidable difficulty in dealing with their system; and description or conviction can only approximate a correct application to individuals. There is also a large number of religious teachers in the other evangelical churches, who, without actual separation, have adopted the chief doctrinal views of the Plymouth Brethren, and are in sympathy with their spirit. Still, the features of the common family resemblance can be drawn with general accuracy.

To return to the sect itself, it is said to have originated with the eccentric movements of the Rev. John Darby, an excellent minister of the Anglican Church, about forty years ago. This

¹ Appeared in *The Southern Presbyterian Review* of January, 1872, being a review of—1. *God's Way of Peace*. By the Rev. H. Bonar. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1870. 2. *Müller's Life of Trust*. Edited by Wayland. Boston: 1870. 3. *Notes on Genesis*. By C. H. M., of Dublin. New York: Inglis & Colles. 4. *Scripture Testimony*. Edited by Charles Campbell. New York: James Inglis & Co. 5. *A Word to Young Believers*. By W. DeR. B. Dublin Tract Society. 6. *The Return of the Lord Jesus*. By J. G. Bellet. Dublin Tract Society. 7. *Waymarks in the Wilderness*. New York: Inglis & Colles. 8 vols., 12mo. 8. *The Witness*. New York: James Inglis & Co. 9. *Who are the Plymouth Brethren?* Mrs. H. Grattan Guinness. Philadelphia. 1861.

zealous man having been constrained to repudiate the prelatic figment of an apostolic succession, went to the extreme of discarding all regular ordination and visible church order. Forsaking the English Establishment, he began to preach as a missionary in England, and in time, with the converts and evangelists whom he gathered around him, spread his opinions from that country to Ireland, France, Switzerland, and America. The name given by the outside world to the sect is derived from Plymouth, England, where their strongest and one of their earliest meetings existed. If they can be said to have any form of church government, it can only be termed a rudimental independency; for Darby and his brethren supposed that the Scriptures recognized no such government, no regular power of ordination in any human hand, and no authority in any church court. But it is proper that believers meet for worship only, in congregations, to prepare for Christ's second advent, which they supposed to be near at hand. Their usual characteristics are the preaching of the doctrines of grace with what they claim to be unusual faithfulness and freeness, adult baptism, absolutely unrestricted lay preaching, and lay administration of sacraments, weekly communions in the Lord's Supper, the denial of all human creeds, and a passionate attachment to the doctrine of Christ's premillennial advent. The sagacious reader will hardly need to be told that these principles have, as was to be anticipated, produced a fruitful harvest of divisions and schisms among the brethren themselves. The Rev. Mr. Darby himself has ostracised and been ostracised by the larger part of his followers in England, who could not endure the stringent, autocratic rule of this reformer, who denied all ecclesiastical rule; and he has some time ago shaken off the dust from his feet against his rebellious native land, and confined his labors chiefly to the Continent. The Bethesda congregation of Bristol, famous for the presidency of the pious George Müller, has separated itself both from Darby and his adversary-brother, Newton. The Rev. James Inglis, of New York, their chief doctrinal representative in the United States, who was, we believe, first a Calvinistic Immersionist, and then a Plymouth Brother, seems to have been discarded by a part of the brotherhood. The sect has been, perhaps, most favorably represented in this country by the amiable and pious lay-preacher, H. Grattan Guinness, Esq., whose accomplished

wife has given to the American world a friendly view of the brotherhood. But the periodicals and books by which their opinions are most known are those which proceed from the press of Inglis & Co., of New York. These have obtained such currency that they are frequently spoken of as "The Inglis Literature," and the views of doctrine as "the Inglis Theology."

The better part of this sect, among whom we willingly include the names mentioned above, may be said to be characterized by many admirable and by some mischievous qualities. To the former we wish to do full justice. They profess to hold forth the doctrines of grace with peculiar simplicity, scripturalness, and freeness; and in many cases we can gladly accord that praise to them, and thank them for the clear light in which they set the sufficiency of Christ, the simplicity of faith, and the privileges of the believer's adoption, and for the fidelity with which they expose the covert self-righteousness of a half-gospel. Many of them also deserve all praise for the strength of their faith, the holiness of their lives, their alms-givings, and the disinterestedness of their missionary zeal. But, as we shall aim to evince, these excellent virtues are marred by a denunciatory spirit towards those who do not utter their "shibboleth," and by a one-sidedness and exaggeration of doctrinal statement, which has resulted in not a few positive errors. Not seldom are they found condemning the Reformed denominations for forsaking the true doctrines of faith and justification, when they themselves give us, in their better moments, the very same views of these truths which we hold and preach. In many cases they contradict themselves and the Scriptures by the extravagance with which a favorite point is pushed. But we especially desire to caution the reader against their tendencies in the following directions: Their wresting of the doctrine of faith and assurance, and entire depreciation of all subjective marks of a state of grace; their denial of the imputation of Christ's active obedience; their disavowal (in some places) of progressive sanctification, confusion of justification and sanctification, and assertion of a dual nature in the regenerate, suggesting to the incautious the worst results of antinomianism; their partial adoption of a fanatical theory of the warrant for prayer; and their ultraism upon the pre-advent theory, resulting in a depreciation of the being, duties, and hopes of the visible church, and of the dispensation of the Holy Ghost.

In the discussion of these charges, the traits of exaggeration and inconsistency which have been imputed to them will be abundantly evinced.

As disconnected specimens, the reader may, by anticipation, take the following: *Notes on Genesis*, page 39, pervert the words that Adam and Eve knew good and evil after they transgressed, as teaching that then only they acquired a *conscience*! The argument is, that they could not have had a judgment of the moral distinction until they had *experience* of both kinds of acts. How, then, can God have a conscience? Or, if it be said he is omniscient, have the elect angels a conscience? Again, the Scripture tells us that "God made man upright, and he sought out many inventions." A curious uprightness this, without a conscience!

On pages 69 and 74, we seem to be taught that Christians ought not to improve or ameliorate the state of this earth, which God has been pleased to put under his curse. Such lives as those of Jethro Tull, Sir John Sinclair, Jesse Buel of Albany, etc., are then unchristian!

On page 271, Jacob is greatly condemned, because, having prayed for deliverance from his angry brother, he used prudent precautions to protect his family. The author thinks "prayer and planning" very inconsistent. Bible Christians expect God to answer through means. Their maxim is: "Trust in providence, and keep your powder dry."

On page 153, the author denies all vicarious worth to all Christ's sufferings and works, save his pangs on the cross. His aim seems to be to show a valid reason why the sufferings of believers, in imitation of their Head, are not propitiatory. To us this seems a very bungling way of reaching that conclusion at the expense of contradicting the Scriptures, when reasons so much more valid might have been presented, in the fact that a believer's nature and person lack all those properties which fitted Christ to be a substitute and sacrifice.

I. In the *Waymarks in the Wilderness*, Vol. VIII., pp. 1-26, is a narrative of the labors of Dr. Cæsar Malan, of Geneva, founded on his biography by his son. The peculiarities of that excellent man are defended throughout, and his son is rebuked for not defending them all. The well known tracts, in which Malan's peculiar views of the nature of saving faith were taught,

are commended without reserve. Indeed, we believe that these treatises, and especially the one entitled *Little Foxes*, have always been favorites with those who sympathize with the doctrines of the Plymouth Brethren. The source of this error is no doubt that doctrine concerning faith which the first Reformers, as Luther and Calvin, were led to adopt from their opposition to the hateful and tyrannical teachings of Rome. This mother of abominations denies to Christians all true assurance of hope, teaching that it is neither edifying nor attainable. Her purpose is clear: the soul justified by free grace, and assured of its union to Christ, would no longer be a practicable subject for priest-craft and spiritual despotism. These noble Reformers, seeing the bondage and misery imposed by this teaching upon sincere souls, flew to the opposite extreme, and (to use the language of theology) asserted that the assurance of hope is of the essence of saving faith. Thus says Calvin in his Commentary on Romans: "My faith is a divine and spiritual belief that God has pardoned and accepted *me*." According to these divines, it is not enough for a penitent soul to embrace with all its powers the gracious truth, "Whosoever believeth shall be saved," while yet its consciousness of exercising a full faith is confused, and remaining anxieties about its own salvation mar its peace. Such an act of soul is not admitted by them to be even a true yet weak faith; they hold that until the believer is assured that *Christ has saved HIM*, there is no exercise of saving faith at all. This old error is evidently the source of Dr. Malan's view of faith, which, as visitors to Geneva twenty years ago remember, he was so sure to obtrude upon all comers. Now our Plymouth Brethren and their sympathizers have a contempt and mistrust for great ecclesiastical names and church authorities, which prevents their employing the recognized nomenclature of historical theology on this and many other subjects. Hence they prefer to express their peculiarities in terms of their own, less discriminating than the old. We do not find them indeed deciding that "the assurance of hope is of the essence of a true saving faith;" but we find them in substance reviving this extravagance of the first Reformers, and pressing its corollaries. Thus, if such is the nature of the assurance of hope, it is grounded in no rational inference, but it must be a primitive act of consciousness. Again, if this assurance is of the essence of faith in its first and its every

acting, then all means employed by the believer on himself for its increment, all self-examination to discover whether "Christ is in us, or whether we be reprobates," all subjective marks of a true work of grace in us, are worthless, and indeed absurd. We accordingly find Dr. Malan applauded (*Waymarks in the Wilderness*, Vol. VIII., p. 3) when he asked Dr. Ostentag, "Are you one of the elect?" "and pressed him not to rest his assurance of salvation on the sandy foundation of his own feelings and sentiments, or on *anything in himself*." Although the Rev. H. Bonar is a Scotch Presbyterian, yet his ardent sympathy with these religionists in the matter of pre-adventism, leads even him in his little work, *God's Way of Peace*, to some most one-sided and ill-judged statements. Thus, pp 23, 24: "The peace or confidence which comes from summing up the good points of our character, and thinking of our good feelings and doings, or about our faith, love and repentance, must be made up of pride." . . . "It does not mend the matter to say that we look at these good feelings in us as the Spirit's work, not our own." "Peace does not arise from *thinking about* the change wrought in us, but *unconsciously and involuntarily* from the change itself." On p. 34, the inquirer is rebuked for thinking "that unbelief is some evil principle requiring to be uprooted before the gospel will be of any use to him." We then have these most inadequate and misleading definitions of unbelief and faith: that the former is "a good opinion of one's self, and a bad opinion of God;" and the latter *vice versa*, a bad opinion of self, and a good opinion of God. On p. 39, the object of the Spirit's work is . . . "not to produce in us certain feelings, the consciousness of which will make us think better of ourselves, and give us confidence towards God." Here we have first a denial of the truth, and then a caricature of it. In *Waymarks, etc.*, Vol. III., pp. 245-263, is found a treatise on "Assurance of Faith" (by which the writer means *assurance of hope*). In this article, Jonathan Edwards' "Treatise on the Religious Affections" is scouted as not only useless, but mischievous; and the drift of the writer is to ignore all self-examination and cultivation of spiritual discernment as means of strengthening faith and hope. On p. 258, we find the following astonishing travesty of the truth: "The *object* and *cause* of faith is the testimony of God and demonstration of the Spirit; but if we appropriate the mercy of God in Christ upon evidences

in ourselves, faith and the testimony of God on which it rests are made void. For the marks so used must be such as, we apprehend, are peculiar to the favorites of God, and such as hypocrites and self-deceivers cannot possess, otherwise they will not serve for evidences; and if I apprehend that I have such certain evidences that I am a favorite of God, what has faith to do in the matter?" On p. 262, Dr. Bonar is approvingly quoted as saying: "The consciousness of moving accompanies motion, the consciousness of seeing accompanies looking, the consciousness of loving accompanies love; so the consciousness of believing accompanies the act of believing. If not, there is no certainty in anything." And again: "If I am liable to be mistaken as to my simple act of believing, I am much more liable to be mistaken as to my complex act of examination into my own feelings, motives and principles." These extracts sufficiently display the exaggeration and error of the school.

We place in opposition to them the sober and scriptural statements of our Confession, Chap. XVIII., not in the hope that either the Westminster divines, or our Assemblies, will carry much weight with them, but for the caution of consistent Presbyterians:

Sec. II. "This certainty" (that they are in a state of grace) "is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion, grounded upon a fallible hope, but an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the divine truth of the promises of salvation, the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God; which Spirit is the earnest of our inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption.

Sec. III. "This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties before he be partaker of it; yet, being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto. And therefore it is the duty of every one to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure," etc.

Now, in objecting to the ultraism and error of the statements concerning faith and assurance before us, far be it from us to depreciate the service which these authors do to truth. When they intimate that self-righteousness may, and perhaps often does, cloak itself under the attempt to find in ourselves the marks of a gracious state, we freely assent and admit the value of the caution. When they object to the intricacy and impractical character of much of Edwards' analysis, for the unlearned Chris-

tian, we assent again, remembering the sagacious remark of old Dr. Alexander, that the work of Edwards is "too anatomical." And the same master in Israel remarked, that the influence of self-examination upon the assurance of hope, in a truly humble and gracious mind, is rather indirect in actual experience than direct; for the search into one's own motives, affections and conduct, always reveals to the enlightened soul so much defect that the first result is rather to humble than to encourage. But thus the soul is led more thoroughly to renew its acts of faith and repentance, out of the conscious exercise of which hope and peace arise by a nearer reflex action. And what is this but the doctrine of Turretin, who makes this assurance of hope consist of the reflex consciousness of an acted faith, and the comfort thence arising? (See his Locus XV., Qu. 17.) Neither do we intend to deny that many an anxious and sincere weak believer has abused the means of self-examination, or even been abused by his pastor, in cultivating the acts of introspection too much; and that the proper remedy for them is to look out of sinful self to a gracious and complete Saviour. All that is scriptural and valuable in these protests of the "*Witness Theology*," we thankfully accept.

But just here begins our quarrel with it; first, in that these writers misrepresent the pastors of our Reformed churches, as though we hid these wholesome truths and they alone held them forth. There is in the books under review much of this unjust denunciation. It would be easy to find several instances in which they sharply charge the churches with hiding the truth; saying in effect: "Ye unfaithful watchmen, why do ye not, like us, hold forth the doctrine of adoption, of pardon, of the new birth, of perseverance, *thus and so?*" And then they proceed to tell us how *they* preach them. And lo! their own statements (in their better moods) are the same with those usually heard in our Reformed pulpits, and set down in our symbols, save that theirs have not the symmetry and scriptural accuracy of statements which our church teachers have given to our statements; and save that this "*Witness Theology*" is continually contradicting itself and the Scriptures by its exaggerations and perversions. We are told that the ministers who have imbibed these opinions are much in the habit of saying that the gospel has not been preached in its purity in our time, except by them; and that it

is another gospel which is usually heard in our pulpits. This is a type of modesty which church history teaches us is a pretty sure sign of doctrinal defection. Another characteristic of the *Witness* theology is to disparage all church teachers and church authorities who have reputation or influence, and to represent their human learning, pious writings, and fame, as simply a corrupting bane. These writers take great pleasure in admonishing us of this fact, and cautioning us, that if we would get at the real truth, we must roundly discard and condemn all the writers whom the church has revered (except their set!), and go direct to the Bible. Now, all this species of talk is set in a sufficiently ridiculous light by one word. What are *they* aspiring to be, when they print these books, save to become human church teachers, to acquire influence over believers' minds, to have authority with them? Do they go to all this trouble, designing to have everybody neglect or reject their "witness"? We trow not. Or will they say they write only to teach believers the true meaning of the Bible? Well, no Reformed divine ever professed anything else. And by what patent of sincerity shall these late writers claim that they alone are honest in such professions? The fact is, that no uninspired church teacher is infallible; but yet they have their use; which use, in the case of these writers, and the wiser fathers of the Reformation who have preceded them, is proportioned to their honesty, modesty learning, and correspondence with the infallible word. But there is another fact, that the tone of censoriousness we note is a symptom of an unhealthy mind; and that sensible people will not be very forward to adopt the writers who betray it as their special guides.

As we wish wholly to avoid the exaggerations which we lament in the "Plymouth theology," we begin our exposition of the true doctrine of faith and assurance by repeating the admission already made. The overweening attempt to ground our hope on introspection may involve self-righteous illusions; and if it does not, to the truly humble it is likely to bring little comfort. "The view to be urged upon the weak and doubting believer is, that he has the same grounds as the strong assured Christian for all his glorious hopes, if he only exercised that believer's faith. *He* does not ground his assurance primarily upon his gifts, his sanctity, his zeal, his abundant labors for Christ. He does not

trust in himself, but in the simple word of his Saviour; and he has fuller comfort than this weak Christian, not because he claims the credit of more works and graces, but simply because he exercises a stronger faith. Paul usually makes the abundance of his labors for Christ not the *cause*, but the *result*, of the assurance of hope. Perhaps some one may object that this is virtually to urge an Antinomian dependence; for he who does not find the fruits of holy living in himself has no right to an assurance of his interest in Christ. True. To conclude that you have hitherto been in Christ, while lacking the fruits of holiness which result from union to him, is Antinomianism. But to make this past absence of fruits a reason for projecting your mistrust into the future, this is legalism and unbelief. You weak Christian would say to an unbeliever, paralyzed by his mistrust from taking Christ's yoke, that his lack of comfort and other regenerate experiences might be very good proof that he *had been hitherto* an unrenowned sinner; but that it was sheer unbelief and sin to make his miserable past experience a ground for doubting and rejecting Christ's full and free salvation offered to faith. You, our weak brother, would require him to believe *in order* to experience the Christian graces. You did not indeed encourage him to believe that he was already reconciled while disobedient; but you told him that he might assuredly be reconciled and obedient in believing. So we reply to your discouragements, 'be not afraid, only believe,' and your joys and graces shall assuredly, in God's good time, follow as the *fruits*, and not as the *roots* of faith." The above we read from a practical sermon of one of our ordinary Presbyterian pastors, penned by him before he ever read a line of the Plymouth theology.

But now, on the other hand, it is sheer exaggeration to say, as we have seen Dr. Bonar and the Waymarks write, that assurance of hope cannot derive any of its comfort from the discovery of gracious principles and acts in ourselves, without forsaking faith and building on self-righteousness. Let the reader review our citations above. *They contradict Scripture, experience, and precepts.* And we take great pleasure in staking our issue on this test, because these writers cry so loudly, "To the Bible alone!" Thus, then, we find the apostle expressly *commanding* Christians to seek their assurance of being in Christ, partly in that very way which these writers condemn as legal-

ism and the very antithesis of faith. 1 Cor. xi. 28: "But let a man *examine himself*, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup." Why? Because "he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, [the very point to be settled by the examination,] eateth and drinketh judgment to himself." 2 Cor. xiii. 5: "Examine yourselves, *whether ye be in the faith*; prove your own selves. Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?" 2 Peter i. 10: "Give diligence to assure yourselves of your calling and election." Rom. v. 4: "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experience, hope; and hope maketh not ashamed." Again we find the Bible saints testing the nature of their faith, and their title to a union with Christ, by their subjective affections and principles. Ps. cxix. 6: "Then shall I not be ashamed, when I have respect to all thy commandments." 1 John iii. 14: "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." 1 John v. 2: "By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God, and keep his commandments." 1 John iii. 19: "And hereby" (*viz.*, by the fact that we love in deed and in truth—*i. e.*, by our works!) "we know that we are of the truth, and shall assure our hearts before him." So, 1 John ii. 3; and, chiefly, 1 John iii. 22: "And whatsoever we ask, we receive of him, because we keep his commandments," etc. Once more, we find the Scriptures full of marks or tests of a gracious state; such as that of our Saviour in John xv. 14: "Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you;" or of James ii. 20: "Faith without works is dead." The laying down of these marks evidently implies that believers are to apply them to themselves; and by that means, rationally, scripturally and spiritually ascertain the spuriousness or genuineness of their union to Christ.

Now, does it not seem strange that readers of the Bible should impinge so rashly upon scriptures so familiar and plain as these? The explanation is to be found in one-sidedness of temper; the overweening desire to push a pet idea (the immediate peace emerging out of the vigorous acting of simple faith) has made them blind to the fact that they had pushed it out of "the proportion of the faith," and the limits of truth. The truth is, that not only faith, but love, filial obedience, true repentance, Christian patience, forgiveness, (see Galatians v. 22,

23,) etc., are fruits, and so *marks*, of God's sovereign new birth in the soul. The only difference as to the matter in hand is, **that faith is related to the rest as a seminal grace.** The truth is, that the same God who has told us that true faith saves us has also told us that these subjective graces are signs of a saved state. Here appears strongly the extravagance of the assertion that the Christian has forsaken faith when he tries to ascertain by such *criteria* that he is a favorite of God. (*Waymarks*, Vol. III., p. 258.) How on earth can a modest believer be justly charged with forsaking the testimony of God, *because he believes God* testifying that such or such a mark is a sure sign of spiritual life? It is as much a part of the divine testimony as this, "that the life is in his Son." But the *Waymarks* object: unless the *criteria* are infallible, the whole process is vicious. We reply, very true. But to the believing soul whom God endows (by his union to Christ and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost) with *spiritual discernment*, the scriptural *criteria* are infallible. And it is a most inconsistent thing in writers who profess to exalt the doctrines of grace, thus to ignore the grace of spiritual discernment, as though it had no place in the regenerate soul, unless possibly as to the single grace of faith. It is objected: self-deceivers self-righteously fancy that they find in themselves these subjective marks in their frames and works. We reply, so they do; *and so most notoriously do they often fancy that they taste the immediate peace of believing.* Where is the genuine believer's safeguard? The Scriptures reply: in that grace of spiritual discernment which the Holy Ghost graciously gives to them, enabling them to distinguish *their faith* and all their other graces and works from the counterfeits. Dr. Bonar would have the whole matter decided by simple consciousness. "When we move, we are conscious of moving. So when we believe, we must be conscious of believing." And so, accepting the testimony of God, that he that believeth is safe, *that*, according to him, is the end of the matter, and the whole of it. This short view is solved by a very simple remark. There is a spurious as well as a genuine faith. *Every man, when he thinks he believes, is conscious of exercising what he thinks is faith.* Such is the correct statement of these facts of consciousness. Now suppose the faith, of which the man is conscious, turns out a spurious faith, must not his be a spurious consciousness? And

he, being without the illumination of the Spirit, will be in the dark as to its hollowness. But if Dr. Bonar's ideas are to be judged by his other declarations on the same subject, it is vain for us to hope that any rational light of scriptural truth applied by the Holy Ghost can avail here to save anybody from the cheat, for he tells us that the peace "does not arise from the change wrought in us, but *unconsciously and involuntarily from the change itself.*" In fact, these writers, after warning us very properly against mixing human philosophy with the theology of redemption, turn around and give us a philosophy of their own, to which plain Scriptures must be wrested. The only difference between them and other philosophic theologians is, that theirs is a false psychology, unscriptural, and so unphilosophical; for the psychology of common sense always agrees with the Scripture. Dr. Bonar evidently regards *consciousness* as a *supra-rational* (if not a non-rational) faculty. The truth is, that consciousness, just as much as the logical understanding, is a rational faculty. The only difference is that its acts are *primary* acts of the reason; while the logical deduction is a secondary or derived act of the reason. These writers will have the Christian's peace built, in no degree, upon any derived or deductive rational act of soul from subjective *criteria*, however scriptural. They cannot away with it. Why? Their psychology virtually replies: Because the peace comes directly from the consciousness of faith going out of self to Christ; and consciousness (like "the animal sense of departed pain and present ease," Dr. Bonar's own most vicious and false analogy,) is supra-rational. Digest their philosophy of the matter, and it comes to this. How short and plain is this refutation, in which both common sense and Scripture concur, viz.: Our whole salvation is instrumentally by the truth. But truth only acts on man by acting on his rationality. Hence, the whole process of salvation, however spiritual, must also be truly rational. The quickest consciousness which the soul has of its own faith (or other gracious acts) is yet truly rational, only it is an immediate primary act of reason. Hence there is no absurdity whatever, but the most perfect consistency, in the Scriptures representing such consciousness as cohering with, and strengthened by, the deductions of the reason, as guided by the Spirit's illumination from subjective marks and scriptural premises.

But let us return to the other branch of the objection: that to draw any confidence of hope from graces which we perceive wrought in us, is self-confidence, in other words, self-righteousness. Now to a plain mind it does seem a most astonishing and perverse argument, when the whole encouragement of hope which the believer infers hence is inferred from this premise, viz., that he could never work those graces in himself; but, if they are in him, they were wrought by sovereign and gratuitous power. The question to be rationally, scripturally, and spiritually argued is this: Is Christ my friend? The sober believer reasons thus: "Yes, Christ is my friend," (conclusion,) "because I find in myself changes which he alone can work," (premise,) "and changes which only his unbought love prompted him to work." How this is self-confidence, or self-righteousness, or how it leads to boasting, passes the comprehension of a plain man. But, as Dr. Malan insinuates, to place any of our confidence of hope thus, is building it on a sandy foundation. Why? The Papist would answer (very logically for him), "Because these subjective graces are all mutable, as well as imperfect." We ask, Do the *Witness* theologians believe in *the perseverance of the saints*? They loudly declare, yes! Then these subjective marks, if truly distinguished by the believer's spiritual discernment, through the witnessing of the Holy Ghost, are not a "foundation of sand," but of rock; for they are *God's peculiar work*, and the believer is arguing precisely as Paul does (Phil. i. 6), "confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in us will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ."

The sum of this matter, then, is this: That we cannot object to the believer's "examining himself whether he is in the faith" by his subjective marks, on the pretext that many have abused the process to self-righteousness or despair; for God has commanded it and laid down the marks. And it is by this self-examination, coupled with contrition, confessing and forsaking of the defects detected, renewed acts of faith (thus strengthening itself by exercise) and watchfulness and holy living, that the true, though weak, faith of the beginner grows to the assured hope of the mature Christian. Yet faith also is a characteristic Christian grace; it is thus itself a mark of a gracious state; it is a grace of prime importance, bearing a seminal relation to all the others, so that if it be present they cannot be wholly absent. Hence we

are glad to recognise this further truth, that the weakest babe in Christ, not yet conscious of any decisive action of the other graces, does derive, through his own consciousness of faith, some peace and hope, preserving him from absolute despair even in his most anxious moments. (See *Confession of Faith*, Ch. XVIII., § 4.) But we do not describe this first reflex act of faith as Bonar's inconsistent monster, an "unconscious" consciousness, or a non-rational action of soul upon revealed truth—truth, the supreme object of sanctified reason. And once more: we fully admit that, just so far as self-examination awakens the believer's anxiety concerning his own state by revealing to his repentance his indwelling defects, the proper remedy is to repeat our simple acts of faith, going out of sinful self to embrace a perfect Saviour and find rest in him. And this is doubtless one of the results which our Father designs in commanding self-examination. But, finally, the Bible also teaches us that in the maturer experience of God's saints they do find comfort of hope by recognizing in themselves the sure marks of God's work of grace, which comfort is neither unbelieving nor legal, but gracious and believing, and a true fruit of faith and holiness, yielding glory to God and excluding boasting.

It is very obvious to the attentive reader that these views of faith and assurance which we have examined ground themselves in the faulty definitions of saving faith which we received from the first Reformers. They, as we saw, defined saving faith as a belief that "Christ has saved *me*," making the assurance of hope of its necessary essence. Now, the later Reformers, and those learned, holy and modest teachers of the Reformed Churches, whose influence the Plymouth Brethren regard as so unhealthy for true religion, have subjected this view to searching examination, and rejected it (as does the Westminster Assembly) on scriptural grounds. We merely recite the commonplaces of theology in arraying their unanswerable objections. First, God's word gives us, as the real object of our faith in its first or direct acting, only this proposition: "Whosoever believeth shall be saved." But this overweening faith would substitute a different proposition, and one not in the Bible, as the object of faith, viz., "Christ has saved *me*, A. B." Second, inasmuch as the name of A. B. is not in the Bible and the only proposition there offered him is the general one, "Whosoever believeth shall be

saved," he can only come to the proposition, "I, A. B., am saved," indirectly through the general one, by means of this minor premise, "I am a believer, therefore I am saved." On the view of Calvin and Luther, faith, as a rational act of soul, is impossible; for the soul would be required to accept the proposition, "I am saved," in order to become saved. This is not only a logical contradiction, but is contrary to Scripture and experience; for every sinner comes to Christ by faith, as a person lost, and not saved. Such a faith is as unreasonable as requiring that a person shall bring himself into existence in order to exist; whereas he must be in existence beforehand in order to bring anything or effect any act. Calvin would doubtless attempt to answer this fatal objection by saying that true faith is not a rational, but a gracious, spiritual, and supernatural act of soul. The latter we grant, but not the former. It is a supernatural, spiritual, *and rational act* of soul—all the more truly rational because it is spiritual. The Bible tells us that God quickens the soul by his word. The word is the proper object of the rectified reason; the renewed actings of the soul are all the more rational because it is now begotten again to a nobler life by the *Spirit of truth and through the truth*. Hence we return to the charge, and urge that unless there is a special, immediate revelation to A. B. of God's purpose to save *him*, by name, there cannot be a rational belief that God has saved him, save as inferential from the gospel proposition that God certainly saves whosoever believes. Third, the experience of God's people in the Bible ages and since refute the scheme. See Ps. lxxiii. 13; xxxi. 22; lxxvii. 2; ix. 10. Fourth, were assurance of hope of the essence of a mere saving faith, God would not have commanded *believers* (addressed as such) to perfect their faith by going on to assurance, nor would he have assigned them the further means for doing so. Last, it does not appear how God could justly punish the non-elect (as he will) for refusing to believe. For they would be still punished for not believing that God *had saved them*, when their dire experience in hell was proving that, had they adopted that proposition, they would have adopted a glaring falsehood. The direct act of saving faith, then, is the embracing of the general gospel proposition, "Whosoever believeth shall be saved," and the moment the soul performs that act truly it is justified. The comforting hope, "I am in a state of safety," is the reflex consequence of this sav-

ing act, mediated by the rational self-consciousness as enlightened by the Holy Ghost through the word. But, as experience shows, all our acts of soul are not accompanied at the time by an intelligent and remembered act of consciousness. Rapidity of the mental acts, or confusion and excitement of mind, may prevent it. And, more important still, if the soul knows that there is a counterfeit faith as well as a true one, and if any uncertainty of view prevails in it as to what distinguishes them, its consciousness of its own actings cannot be more discriminating than those actings are. Hence the direct act of faith may have been really performed, and the soul may be by it in a saved state, and yet a clear consciousness of the act and full certainty of its result may be wanting. This is just the analysis of the state of the true but weak believer. The maturing of his faith up to a full assurance must be the work of self-examination, time and experience, especially in repeated direct actings of faith itself.

In dismissing this part of our discussion, we wish to utter a caution. We meet with many attempts in these books at novel and simpler definitions of faith. Let us assure the authors that there is no uninspired definition so safe and discriminating as that of the Shorter Catechism, Quest. 86: "Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel." Many of these novelties of definition and illustration run a great risk of suggesting fatal error. Thus, Dr. Bonar says, "Unbelief is simply our having a good *opinion* of ourselves and a bad *opinion* of God;" and faith is the reversed state of *opinion*. He seems, in another place cited, to make the assurance of hope as merely a *natural consequence* of faith, as consciousness of motion is of moving, or consciousness of seeing is of looking. Now, we suppose that none will be more prompt to assert the spiritual and gracious source of both faith and hope, as consequent on the almighty quickening of the soul and the illumination of the mind, than he is. We forewarn him that he may very probably find some of his admirers adopting these novelties of explanation as authority for that false and soul-destroying Pelagian view of faith advanced by the followers of Alexander Campbell. He describes faith and unbelief as two antithetic states of *opinion*; it will be easy for his followers to misquote him as saying they are

states of opinion merely. He seems to represent assurance as a merely natural and unavoidable result of consciousness, thus appearing to ignore the necessity for the gift of spiritual discernment, and making the believer's whole joy in Christ a mere matter of natural knowledge. Again, we find the *Waymarks* speaking currently of faith as a "*means of regeneration!*" (Vol. III., p. 331 ; II., p. 73.) Now, in the order of production, the means precede the result, so that this language suggests that faith begins before the sinner is born again. Then, it is a natural exercise of the soul as carnal, and we reach the same Pelagian conclusion ; whereas the Scriptures teach us that in the order of production the new birth precedes faith, and that none but the quickened soul exercises this gracious act of believing. Once more : we notice a most dangerous passage where the question is raised, what shall be said to the soul who anxiously desires to come to Christ for pardon, but is embarrassed by knowing that his desire for pardon is simply carnal and selfish ? The answer given is, in substance, that he shall be encouraged to come to Christ without analyzing his motive for coming, because the Redeemer is so kind that he will meet the sinner sincerely coming to him, no matter how prompted. And then the same false view is insinuated, that this coming will, through grace, become the "*means of regeneration,*" and of the implantation of new evangelical motives. So that this alarmed transgressor, who came to Christ at first (and was accepted!) only to gratify selfish fear, will remain to embrace him from filial gratitude and desire for holiness. All this is inexpressibly mischievous and unscriptural. True, "Christ receiveth *sinners.*" True, "God justifieth the *ungodly* who believe in Jesus." It is practically true that no man is regenerated apart from Christ, and that God's word (not a dead soul's dead faith,) is "*the means of regeneration.*" But it is not true that Christ has promised to bless a faith merely carnal and selfish. And the right answer to the convicted sinner whose case is supposed, would be, that the pure selfishness of his prayer and of his longing for pardon was the crowning proof of his utter death in sin, helplessness, and lost estate—that it behooved him to embrace Christ indeed, and at once, as an almighty Saviour, but to embrace him as much as a deliverer from this selfish desire and fear as a deliverer from wrath. There is a certain *gospel paradox* here : that the sinner who is

dead is bidden to come to Christ for *life*; and yet the life which enables him to come must be from Christ. The true solution is in the great truth of sovereign, quickening grace, "blowing where it listeth." Where God designs to save, he gives the precept, "Come," to the helpless soul, and also gives the secret inward strength to obey and to come, not carnally, but spiritually; and the elect sinner is quickened, believing, justified, all at the same time, yet all out of sovereign grace; and yet justified because he savingly believes, savingly believing because he is quickened. Let not the teacher of anxious souls attempt to solve that paradox by the expedients of Pelagian speculation, but let him utter the appointed promise and precept, and then "stand still and see the salvation of God."

In one particular the view of faith presented by this "*Witness theology*," while professing a high Calvinism, lapses distinctly into Arminianism. The *Waymarks*, Vol. VIII., pp. 272, 273, distinctly denies the imputation of Christ's active obedience to believers as the meritorious ground of their title to the adoption of life. "It may be necessary, however," says this writer, "here to advert to the distinction which has been made between pardon and justification, in accordance with the use of these words in earthly relations, and to the consequent division of the work of Christ into his *active* and *passive* obedience; the one for our pardon, and the other for our justification." "We have already stated our objections to the notion of a vicarious keeping of the law, as well as to the distinction which it makes between pardon and justification, and the grounds upon which either of them rests. The opponents of it may very well challenge its advocates to give a scriptural statement of it, or to produce a single passage which intimates that, while we have forgiveness in his blood, we have justification through his keeping the law perfectly in our stead," etc.

We can scarcely persuade ourselves that intelligent Presbyterians need a detailed discussion to enable them to repel this stale Arminian view; or that they will have any difficulty in answering the above challenge by "giving a scriptural statement" of our view. Such passages as these are at hand and too familiar: Zech. iii. 4, 5; Acts xxvi. 18; Rom. v. 1, 2; v. 19; Gal. iv. 5; John i. 12; Matt. iii. 15; v. 17; Rom. viii. 3, 4. Here we are taught that justification by faith was not only a

stripping off of filthy garments, but the putting on of a fair mitre and clean linen; that it is not only forgiveness of sin, but inheritance among all them that are sanctified; that one of the results of faith is title to be sons of God; "that Christ was made of a woman, *made under the law* (not under its penalty only, but under *the law*,) to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons;" that when justified by faith, we have not only peace with God, but access to a state of hope, joy, and glory; that we are made "righteous *by the obedience of one*," (Christ); that Christ does for us that which the law could not do in us, being weak through the flesh, namely, fulfil a complete obedience; for surely the law is very adequate to exact of man, in spite of his carnality, the due penalty. The souls in hell find it so to their cost.

But the confusion of language in the above scrap of Arminianizing is such as almost to compel us to believe that the author has no distinct knowledge of the doctrine which he imputes to Calvinists. He represents us as seeking justification one way, and pardon another way. Was ever a Calvinist heard of who did not hold that pardon is an essential element of justification? It would have been well for this writer to advert to the Westminster Catechism: "Justification is an act of God's free grace, *wherein* he pardoneth all our sins, *and accepteth us as righteous in his sight*, only for," etc. Justification includes both pardon and acceptance; these are its two inseparable elements. Without the latter element the sinner's salvation would be fragmentary; for to remit penalty is not the same thing as enduing with the title to the positive blessedness promised to obedience. He who has sinned, and (vicariously) paid the penal debt therefor, does not stand on the same footing of justice with him who, by not sinning, and, on the contrary, by actually keeping the law, has earned the franchise of reward. Unless the sinner's Substitute does the *latter* for him, as well as the former, he is not saved. He certainly cannot do it for himself. This Arminian view of justification betrays a most inadequate conception of the relation between the covenants of works and grace, and the believer's connection with the first Adam, and the Second Adam. When the first Adam entered under the covenant of works, he was guiltless; but not therefore justified. He was obnoxious as yet to no penalty; but he had no title to the adoption of life. *This*

he was to earn by obedience. The Second Adam promises to place his believing seed, not in the state from which the first Adam fell, but in that state to which he should have raised himself and his seed had he fulfilled the covenant of works. To accomplish this, Christ both pays the penalty and completes the obedience due under the covenant of works.

No intelligent believer, then, speaks of being *pardoned* by Christ's passive, and *justified* by Christ's active obedience. Pardon is a part of justification. The whole, complete, inseparable change, from condemnation to sonship, is made by the imputed merit of a whole imputed righteousness, which righteousness includes all Christ's acts in his estate of humiliation, by which he "fulfilled the law," penal and preceptive.

II. It is the aim of the "Plymouth theology" to foster a certain type of religious experience, from which all doubt and anxiety are eliminated. To this end is pressed their peculiar view of faith and assurance. Hence also is the *animus* which has betrayed them into the second group of errors, on which we are constrained to animadvert as more dangerous than the first. The Bible theology teaches that there is a dead and fruitless faith which neither justifies nor sanctifies, and whose uselessness is to be practically tested by its fruitlessness. The Bible distinguishes justification, a purely forensic change of legal *status*, from sanctification, a subjective or personal change of moral state. As the former act passes in the *forum* of heaven, a tribunal not now accessible to our view, it must be practically known, according to the Scriptures, by the fruitful or sanctifying quality of the faith which the believer professes. Others can test it only thus; the man himself must test it chiefly thus. Hence, obviously, his comfort of hope is connected with his progressive sanctification, through his faith working by love. Such is the scriptural system. But the new system condemns this as covert legalism and unbelief. It insists that hope must exist before "experience worketh" it. For the anxious babe in Christ to say, "I doubt my own faith," is, according to them, a criminal doubting of Christ. Faith must bear its fruit of assurance directly and immediately. Hence it is obvious some new view must be presented, modifying the old gospel view of the relations of faith, acceptance, sanctification, and hope; for if the old doctrine stands, the old inference from it is unavoidable.

Such we are convinced is the *motive* of the startling innovations which the Plymouth theology proposes in the doctrine of progressive sanctification. They shall state it in their own words. In "A Word to Young Believers," by W. De R. B., p. 52, we read: "'Ye are complete,' is a divine testimony. To add to this, to add to completeness, is to make a deformity, and this is what many are seeking to do. Men seek to persuade us that there is 'a progressive holiness' to fit us for glory," etc. P. 74: "The walk of a believer in relation to God, is in the same character as that of a child to his father, whether it be good or bad. What I mean is, that it is independent of his standing. A son ill-behaved or well-behaved is equally a son. So a Christian walking right or walking wrong is a Christian still; and that is the very reason it is of such consequence," etc. The deadly error of these views is unfortunately plain, notwithstanding its barbarously bungling style, and the error is that of Antinomianism. It cannot be better unmasked than by exposing the false analogy of the author's illustration. In natural parentage, if a man has a son, he is equally *his son*, whether reprobate or docile. Very true; because in our fallen nature *depravity descends by birth*. But in the spiritual birth, the glorious characteristic is, that it is always a *birth unto holiness*. What is it but simple impiety to imply, as this illustration does, that the Holy Ghost begets seed unto depravity? If he has begotten any soul anew, he has begotten him to holiness. Hence, if any pretended son is unholy in his walk, it shows him a "bastard, and not a son."

But take the following from the *Notes on Genesis*, p. 200: "Regeneration is not a change of the old nature, but the introduction of a new. . . . Nor does the introduction of this new nature alter in the slightest degree the true, essential character of the old. This latter continues what it was, and is made in no respect better; yea, rather, there is a full display of its evil character in opposition of the new element," etc. It is not hard to see how terribly all this may be carried out to a God-defying, carnal security, as others have virtually done. The notion of progressive sanctification is false, and the work not to be expected. The evil nature in me is not at all weakened by grace, but rather inflamed. If I have faith, I have the "*standing*;" and I am not to doubt my faith because of a supposed deficiency of fruits; because to conclude it a true faith by any frames in

myself, or works of self, is sheer legalism. What more does any Antinomian negro desire to encourage him in his foulest hypocrisy and most fanatical joys?

But see *Waymarks*, Vol. I., p. 70: "The impression seems to be that, after his justification, the believer must undergo a process of sanctification, and that for this reason he is left for a time amidst the trials and conflicts of a hostile world." This impression is then argued against. Again, Vol. III., p. 75: "It is remarkable that those who teach that sanctification is a great work to be accomplished subsequent to justification—a second conversion—a perfection to be attained in the flesh—when they attempt to sustain themselves by Scripture, almost invariably lay hold upon some unhappy rendering or ambiguous expression in the English version of the Scriptures." On p. 332, the writer complains against those believers who "speak of regeneration as a change wrought in the old nature—a mighty change indeed, which can be effected only by the influence of the Spirit of God. Perhaps it would be more correct to say, that they regard regeneration as the commencement of a change, the progress of which they style sanctification, by which the old nature is gradually transformed into a holy nature." Pp. 342, 343: "We conclude at present with a comprehensive statement of the truth regarding regeneration itself, with which some of our readers are already familiar. It is a new birth, the imparting of a new life, the implantation of a new nature, the formation of a new man. The old nature remains in all its distinctness, and the new nature is introduced in all its distinctness. This new nature has its own desires, its own habits, its own tendencies, its own affections. All these are spiritual, heavenly, divine. Its aspirations are all upward. It is ever breathing after the heavenly source from which it emanated. Regeneration is to the soul what the birth of Isaac was to the household of Abraham. Ishmael remained the same Ishmael; but Isaac was introduced," etc. Let the reader note the last sentences. On p. 80 we find these dangerous words: "Be warned that the old nature is unchanged. The hope of transforming that into holiness is vain as the dream of a philosopher's stone, which was to change the dross of earth into gold On the other hand, never be discouraged by any new proof that *that* which is born of the flesh is flesh. It is there; but it is condemned and crucified with its affections and lusts.

Reckon it so, and that therefore you are no longer to serve it. It is just as true that *that* which is born of the Spirit is spirit, and remains uncontaminated by that with which it maintains a ceaseless conflict." Similar assertions are made in *Waymarks*, Vol. V., pp. 29, 37, etc., and 302. In the last of these we find these remarkable words: "Thus two men there are in the Christian: so hath he evil; and so he hath not evil. If therefore he purge out the evil, it is his new man purging out his old man. Now these two men, within the control of the personality of the Christian, are real men, having each his own will, his own energy, and his own enjoyment. No one can read the seventh chapter of Romans and not see that this is true," etc. One is strongly reminded here of that which M. Bungener relates of Louis XIV., that this licentious and despotic king was wont to console himself for living a life of open adultery and cruelty, while devoutly practising all the popish rites, by singing, with great unction, a Romish hymn beginning, "*J'ai deux hommes en moi*," etc. And one might ask, at least plausibly, if the Christian contains two men, and the evil one lives in full force until death, is he very sure that *he* will come off safely when God proceeds to destroy the old man? A story is told of an emperor of Germany who bitterly rebuked a great episcopal feudatory for his violences, so inconsistent with his sacred character. The lord bishop answered, that he represented two men in one, being both clergyman and baron, and that the military acts complained of were done in his secular character as a feudal baron. "Well, then," replied the emperor, "bethink thee how the clergyman will fare when the devil is roasting the baron for his rapine and murder." The application is fair.

But, more seriously, we remark: 1st. That these professed *literalists* should at least have been brought to a stand by the fact that their favorite language concerning the nature of regeneration is nowhere found in the New Testament. This is especially just against them, because they boast so much in their consistent literalism, and taunt us with abusing the words of Scripture. Well, we challenge them to produce a text from the New Testament where it is said that regeneration is the implantation of a "*new nature*" beside the old; or that the renewed man has two hostile "*natures*," or any such language. Does Paul say, Romans vii. 23: "But I see another *law* in my mem-

bers, warring against the law of my mind"? And in Gal. v. 17: "For the *flesh* lusteth against the *Spirit*, and the *Spirit* against the *flesh*"? Very true. He teaches that the renewed man (one man and one nature still) is imperfect, having two principles of volition mixed in the motives even of the same acts; but he does not teach that he has become "two men," or has "two natures" in him. Paul's idea is, that man's one nature, originally wholly sinful, is by regeneration made imperfectly holy, but progressively so. And what is that *Spirit* which, in Gal. v. 17, lusteth against the flesh? Suppose we say it is the *Holy Ghost*. So interprets Calvin; and so reads Paul's context, verses 16 and 18. Where now is the argument? And it is a mischievous perversion to represent the apostle as holding forth the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh (verses 19 to 23) as permanently combined during life in one Christian, when it is the very purpose of the apostle to point to these contrasted works and fruits as tests to distinguish Christians from reprobates. See verse 24 for indisputable proof of this scope. And let us bring to the test of Scripture the doctrine which the Plymouth theologians intend by the proposition, "The old nature is unchanged" in regeneration and sanctification. For our part, we have to confess, in the simplicity of our minds, that if this is not what is changed, we know not what it can be. We, in all our reading of the Bible, thought that this was precisely what God intended to teach us; that the very object of these graces was to renew the old carnal nature. When we read, Col. i. 21, 22, "You, that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled . . . to present you holy," etc., it seems very plain to us that the nature that was alienated, etc., was the old nature. But this is what is made holy. So in Eph. iv. 23, in the midst of the very passage they pervert, "And be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind." See also Eph. ii. 1 or 5. What is it that is quickened? That which was dead in sins. So in verses 10 and 11: "We" (like the Gentiles in the flesh) "are created in Christ Jesus unto good works," etc. 1 Cor. vi. 11: "Such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified," etc. But why multiply texts so familiar? Will they return to the charge with the plea that these texts say, indeed, the sinful *man* is renewed; but that they do not say the *old nature* is renewed? Very true; for the Bible language is always more

accurate. But note: the Bible is still farther from saying that the renewed man has two "*natures*." For then he would be two men, unless every conversion is a miracle of hypostatic union, like Christ's incarnation. But the Bible clearly teaches that the carnal man is renewed *as to his moral nature*, if the word may be used in the unbiblical sense of the Plymouth writers. But of this more anon.

2. This theory flies flatly in the face of the Scriptures, both when it denies the idea of progressive sanctification, and when it rebukes the believer for finding comfort of hope in the evidences of such progress. On both points the Bible speaks exactly the opposite. We will not swell our pages by writing out all these passages, but beg the reader to examine such familiar passages as Heb. vi. 1; Eph. iv. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16; 2 Peter i. 5-10; 1 Peter ii. 2; 2 Peter iii. 18; 2 Thess. i. 3; Phil. iii. 14; 2 Cor. iii. 18; vii. 1; 1 Thess. v. 23; Acts xx. 32, ("The word of his grace . . . able to *build you up*"); Eph. i. 13, 14; 2 Cor. i. 22; v. 5. Shall it be said that all these are misunderstood by us ordinary Christians, and that the seeming support of progressive sanctification is due only to a various reading or a mistranslation? Here may be added all those images of Scripture by which the saint is compared to living and growing things—as a vine, a fruit tree, a plant of corn, a living body, an infant. Is not the rhetoric of the Scripture just? Then we must suppose that these images are selected as instructive, partly because of this very trait that growth is their attribute.

3. The best symbols of the Reformed churches expressly contradict this Plymouth theology. *Westminster Confession*, Chap. XIII.: "They who are effectually called are regenerated, having a new heart and a new spirit created in them, are *further sanctified*, really and personally, through the virtue of Christ's resurrection, by his word and Spirit dwelling in them; the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed, and the several lusts thereof are *more and more weakened and mortified*, and they *more and more quickened and strengthened*, in all saving graces," etc. Chap. XVIII.: Assurance is "founded upon . . . the *inward evidence of those graces* unto which these promises are made," etc., etc. And this assurance, section 4, may be "shaken, diminished, and *intermitted*, . . . by *falling into some special sin*," etc.

Thirty-nine Articles (Anglican Church), XII.: "Good works

are pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith; insomuch that by them a true and lively" (living) "faith may be as evidently known, as a tree discerned by the fruit."

4. This feature of the Plymouth theology is founded on a false psychology, equally at war with the Scriptures and common sense, and as dangerous as it is erroneous. It discards the idea of progressive sanctification, teaching that the "new nature," being the work of a perfect God, is as perfect from conversion as its author, only its action outwards is obscured by the counter action of the incurable old nature, somewhat as a lamp burning perfectly well might seem dim, because enclosed in a lantern of foul or besmeared glass. Now, on this we remark, that a newborn infant is the handiwork of a perfect Creator, but for all that, its body is not that of a perfect man, but is constructed to grow to perfection. Again, it is contrary to common sense to say that human holiness does not really grow; because all qualities of man, the mutable creature, must grow. Depravity grows (2 Tim. iii. 13) in sinners. So we must expect holiness to grow in saints. (Prov. iv. 18.) The laws of human nature, as ordained by the same God who sanctifies us, explain and necessitate the fact. Habits grow by exercise. Faculties strengthen by use. Affections become more dominant by their own action. Even the pagan Horace understood this: "*Crescentem sequitur cura pecuniam, majorumque fames.*" Hence, if sanctification is not usually progressive, the man in a state of grace must have ceased to be a reasonable creature, with affections, understanding and will developing according to the law of habit in his rational nature.

But worse than this, the theory we combat is a vicious *dualism*, as full of danger as the gnosticism of the second century, from which indeed it might very well have been borrowed. We have read this "Witness" theology, saying expressly, that "these two men within the control of the personality of the Christian, are real men, having each his own will, his own energy, and his own enjoyment." Did not this writer indulge too much contempt for the philosophy accepted among sound divines, to know the real drift of the language he was using, he would at least be aware that they must understand him as giving to this old or fleshly "man" in the Christian full personality. He makes him a separate, individual agent. For how is distinct personality

defined, if not by separate will and energy? But this is too gross; it contradicts the consciousness of every Christian, even the most unlearned; for just so surely as he has one consciousness, he knows that he is one indivisible personality, and that he is one agent and has *only one will*, swayed indeed by mixed and diverse motives. But even in its mildest form this doctrine is *realistic*, and gives actual entity (not to say personality) to the carnal and the renewed natures, as distinguished from each and every person whom these natures may qualify. Now what is this but the exploded philosophy of the schoolmen? Thus we have these most righteous and zealous denouncers of philosophy reinventing a merely human philosophy, and the falsest of all for the purpose of bending Scripture to their theories. What is a "*nature*"? Common sense answers, with sound philosophy, it is that aggregate of permanent characteristic attributes (that *essentia*) with which the man was *natus*. Now, in strictest speech, man's *nature* is never changed, either by the fall or by redemption; for if it were he would no longer be a *man*—he would become another animal, with a different *essentia* from that which made him a man. But there is a popular use (not found in the Bible use of the word φύσις) of the word "*nature*," and more frequently of the phrase "*moral nature*," which is neither a strict nor a philosophical use. But let that pass. Men mean by it the moral *habitus* or *disposition* which permanently qualifies the active powers of the soul for good or evil. Now this *habitus* is not a personality, it is not a separate entity, as abstracted from each person whom it qualifies; it is but an abstraction. Except it be a *quality of a person*, it is a mere idea. How far wrong, then, are they who assert that in an imperfect and mixed character the "*two natures are two real men*"?

Further. While the power which regenerates and sanctifies must ever be partly incomprehensible to us, the comprehension of the effect is so far easy, that the new birth *reverses* the moral *habitus* of the believer's will, prevalently, but not at first absolutely, and that the work of progressive sanctification carries on this change, thus omnipotently begun, towards that absolute completeness which we must possess on entering heaven. In the carnal state, the *habitus* of the sinner's will is absolutely and exclusively godless. In the regenerate state it is prevalently but not completely godly. In the glorified state it is absolutely and

exclusively godly. This statement implies that the believer's motives, in the militant state, are complex; and that while the subjective motives usually dominant are godly, yet there is a mixture of carnal motives, no longer dominant, but not annihilated, which carnal motives enter as part cause even into the renewed soul's holy volitions. And this complex of subjective motives, of which one part may be morally diverse from another, may result in a single act of volition—the volition strictly *one*, while the motives prompting it are mingled. Thus it is that an act may be (as Calvinism and the Bible teach) formally right in shape and prevalently right in intention, and yet not perfectly holy before God. And here is the explanation of that strife between the “law of the mind and the law in our members,” of which every Christian is conscious, and to which the apostle points in the 7th of Romans. Now in this prevalently sanctified, but imperfect character, there is a sense in which we may say the carnality and the godliness are complementary the one to the other. As sanctification eliminates the former, the latter extends. Or to speak more accurately, the extension of the principles of godliness *is* the corresponding exclusion of the principles of carnality, just as spreading light is the gradual removal of darkness, its opposite—a safe Bible similitude. (Acts xxvi. 19.)

Hence the reader may see how false and dangerous, both practically and scripturally, is the view given by this “*Witness*” theology of indwelling sin, and of the influence it ought to have on the Christian's hope and comfort. To us it seems clear that this new doctrine virtually represents matters thus: Neither regeneration nor sanctification changes or weakens the carnal “nature” at all. It cannot be modified or improved. The believer must make his account to have it act in him to the end with undiminished force, or even to have it enhanced in activity by collision with the “new nature.” Hence the presence, and even flagrancy, of indwelling sin, need suggest no doubts whatever whether his faith is a living one. Who can fail to see that there is terrible danger here of carnal security in sin? The darker danger, only less probable than this other, is, that the professed believer shall be taught to deny his responsibility wholly for the sins committed by this “old man,” who is “*a real man*,” with a “separate will and energy” from the “new man.” We know nothing in the antinomianism of the “Fifth Monarchy Men”

more alarming than this. The doctrine is positively false. The "old man" cannot continue unmodified in the presence of the "new man," because the one principle is the opposite and is exclusive of the other. To die unto sin *is* to live unto righteousness. The increment of light *is* the diminution of darkness. The waxing of the "new man" is the waning of the "old man." Hence (and this is the Bible view) if any professed believer has the "old man" as strong and lively as ever, it is proof positive that the "new man" has never entered at all; his faith is vain; he is yet in his sins. (James ii. 22, etc.) And if any professed believer finds the old carnal principle reviving, it is proof positive that his spiritual life is proportionally going backward at that time; just to the extent the recession goes has he scriptural ground to fear that his faith is, and always was, dead.

We find in the *Waymarks* this sophistical plea against the necessity of progressive sanctification, that some Christians, dying very soon after conversion, must, according to our own showing, have gone to heaven without this gradual process of preparation. The fact we of course grant. God, by his distinguishing favor, perfects in an hour in their souls that purification which in others he carries gradually towards completion by the experiences, trials, and efforts of years. It is certainly as true of those who die young as of any, "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord." But there is another reason why, for those who do not die immediately after conversion, progressive sanctification is still imperative. The principle of holiness, if genuine, is incapable of tolerating indwelling sin in peace. The struggle is inevitable in a true Christian, and as "he that is with us is more than he that is against us," gradual conquests, at least over indwelling sin, are the general rule of every genuine Christian life. Among the texts which seem to favor this dualistic view, none is claimed with more confidence than Eph. iv. 22-24, which speaks of "putting off the old man, and "putting on the new man." We note this as a specimen of the manner in which Scripture is overstrained, and an example of the way in which it may be cleared of these extravagances. One can hardly deny that, in this well-known passage, it is the most natural interpretation to regard the putting off of the old as *in order to* the putting on of the new; then the two are not coëxistent, but successive. But more decisively; Who is the old man, and who is the new? The ob-

vious parallel in 1 Cor. xv. 22, 45-49, shows that the "old man" is Adam, and the "new man" is Christ. The statement which we have to expound, then, is substantially this: that believers have "put off" Adam in order to "put on" Christ. That is, they have severed their connection with the first federal head, in order to enter into a connection with the second federal head. True, the moral, rather than the forensic, effects of the two covenants are here in view of the apostle's mind. We forsake Adam's "conversation, corrupt according to the deceitful lusts," and adopt Christ's conversation, who was "created after God in righteousness and true holiness," thus sharing the same new creation. But, says the apostle (1 Cor. xv. 46), "Howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; *and afterward that which is spiritual.*" How very far is all this from teaching us that depravity remains after the new birth a "*real man*," unchanged, coëxistent with a new, holy nature superadded thereto, which is also a "real man"!

We may group under this head several errors and conceits touching the believer's practical life which require exposure. In the *Notes on Genesis*, p. 17, etc., a doctrine is taught against the authority of the Christian Sabbath which seems to be virtually the same with that which has plagued and blighted the Lutheran and some of the Reformed communions of Europe. The anonymous writer there asserts, on grounds largely allegorical and fanciful, that the Sabbath is for ever abolished by the new dispensation; that the nature of this dispensation is such it is impossible that a Sabbath could longer be binding on believers; that therefore the Lord's-day, the first day of the week, should never be termed the Christian Sabbath, and that it should be observed as a Lord's-day, not from any preceptive obligation of the moral law, but on grounds of appropriateness and thankfulness only, as the commemoration of the joyful resurrection. The suitable mode of observance of the Lord's-day, of course, is not sabbatical and not strict. Christians are only bound to celebrate worship, and make it a day of praise and religious joy. We direct attention to this error, not for the purpose of opening up this extensive discussion, but of remarking the tendencies of this revived heresy. We see not how any Presbyterian can countenance it, in the face of the twenty-first chapter, sections 7, 8, of his Confession, the first chapter of his Directory, and the

one hundred and sixteenth question of his Larger Catechism. In these places we are expressly taught that the sabbatical obligation of the Decalogue is perpetual under all dispensations; that the Lord's-day has become, by divine appointment, "the Christian Sabbath," and that it is to be sanctified as such.

Another conceit of this system is, to teach us that believers ought not to pray for the Holy Ghost, because, if they are believers, he dwells in them already; and that they ought not to pray for the pardon of sins, because, if they are believers, their sins are already pardoned. Thus, *Waymarks*, Vol. VI., pp. 78, 79: "Prayers for a pentecostal outpouring of the Spirit may indeed only be a mistaken and unhappy form of words into which men may have fallen from imitation, while they mean nothing so unscriptural as their words imply; and the same may be said of other forms of expression which are painfully current. But making all allowance for this, it is not conceivable that a man should plead with God that he would send the Spirit, or entreat the Spirit to come, or that he should complain of the withdrawal of the Spirit, if he were consciously worshipping God in the Spirit, if he were believingly praying in the Spirit, and if in all service and testimony he were actually waiting upon the Spirit of God for guidance and power." See also Tract, *The Abiding Comforter*, J. Inglis & Co.

The first suggestion which comes into the mind in reply to these astonishing sentences is, What will the writer do with those texts in which the Bible represents believers as praying for the Spirit and for forgiveness? Psalm li. 11, 12: "Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me; restore unto me the joy of thy salvation, and uphold me with thy free Spirit." In Eph. i. 17, Paul prays God to give the believing Ephesians "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation." 2 Cor. xiii. 14: "The communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all." Psalm xxv. 11: "For thy name's sake pardon mine iniquity, for it is great." Matt. vi. 12: "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors." But as to the sophism by which these anti-scriptural rules are supported we would ask: Did the *Witness* theologians never hear of that principle enunciated by the Saviour: "He that hath, to him shall be given, that he may have more abundantly"? And can they not understand that the new-born soul is so actuated by grace as to respond in its breath-

ings to this principle? Surely they have forgotten that faith not only begins, but continues the new life, and that the practical union of the believer with his Head is maintained by continually reenacting those applications to Christ in which the life began. It is Christ himself who tells us to "do our first works." Nor do we find in the Scriptures that the assurance that God designed to bestow a gift repressed the spirit of prayer—it rather stimulated it. Thus Daniel tells us (ix. 2, 3) that when he understood from Jeremiah's books that seventy years were appointed to accomplish the desolations of Jerusalem, "he set his face unto the Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications" the very restoration predicted. The petitions of God's people are not an attempt to get what is contrary to his purpose; they are the responses of faith leaping forth to meet that purpose in its gracious bestowals upon them.

In conclusion of this head, the reader may see a curious evidence of the extreme to which these teachers are willing to follow their crotchets in the *Waymarks*, Vol. V., p. 37, etc. Such is their zeal to dissociate faith from its scriptural fruits, they there gravely argue that Simon Magus was a regenerate and saved man, because it is said he "believed" and "was baptized." What if he immediately betrayed the mercenary nature of his principles by endeavoring to make merchandise of the Holy Ghost? What if the apostle Peter devoted him and his money to "perish" together? What if he declared Simon yet "in the gall of bitterness and the bond of iniquity"? All this overwhelming evidence must be explained away, and Simon must be held a redeemed man, rather than accept the obvious explanations of the statement, "Simon also believed," which have satisfied all sober students of the Bible, either that a temporary faith is imputed to him, or that the historian only intends to be understood as stating what he professed. What is the motive of such an exegetical freak? We can imagine none but this: a desire to sustain their exaggerated and one-sided doctrine of assurance by a Bible instance of a true saving faith without any fruits. But this is the very thing which the apostle James condemns.

III. The theory of prayer advocated by the Rev. George Müller, of Bristol, England, connects itself with the theories of the Plymouth Brethren by at least a few points. This German min-

ister was, if we mistake not, once in full sympathy with them, and continues to hold most of their peculiarities. In the *Waymarks*, Vol. I., p. 3, 35, etc., we find an unqualified commendation of his work, and the theory upon which it is built; and the only objection made against the American editions of his *Life of Trust*, which is hinted, is, that they suppress the ardent attachment to the Pre-adventist doctrine, which it is said was the chief stimulus of Müller's zeal in his orphan-work. And in the *Word to Young Believers*, p. 67, the same overweening theory of trust seems to be expressly inculcated. The author is commenting on a special revelation which God made to Samuel, in the course of his peculiar prophetic privilege, by which he was made to recognize Saul as the intended king. And as though all Christians might aspire to be literal prophets, he concludes: "Beloved, if we walked in communion with God, waiting on him for guidance, we should always know when to act, and never would we make mistakes." But it should be said, in justice, that these writers in other places dissent from a part of the objectionable theory of our warrant for trust; and especially would we mention in the *Waymarks*, etc., Vol. I., p. 42, a paper entitled "The Prayer which God is Pledged to Answer," which contains many things very praiseworthy.

There have long been Christians who, on the apparent absoluteness of such promises as Matt. vii. 7; Mark xi. 24, found the following theory of prayer: That the only reason any prayer of a believer, actuated in the main by pious motives, is not specifically and infallibly answered, is, that it is not offered in faith and that wherever such a one *fully believes* that he will receive what he asks, he shall literally receive it without fail. Such prayer it was the fashion to dignify with the title of "Prayer of Faith." Müller's *Life of Trust* discloses a theory which involves the seminal error of this. He tells us in his surprising narrative, that he resolved to form an orphan-house, among other enterprises of piety, which he subsequently enlarged, until it contains two thousand orphans, and has expended largely over a million of dollars. According to his express determination, it has never had a penny of endowment; nor has any human means been employed, according to him, for collecting donations to it. He has not even permitted the wants of the institution to be made known outside of its doors, when they were most

urgent. The sole means has been prayer; he has simply asked God in secret for the money which his projects required. He tells us that the result has been, that while the enterprise was often in sore straits, and reduced to its last shilling, especially in its earlier years, it never actually suffered for money. And the motive which he professes was, that the success of this great charity might be to all men an ocular evidence that "God is a living God," who does truly watch over his people and sustain them. He has also refused to employ any human means for providing a salary for himself as minister, and to lay by any provision whatever for his own wants or his family's; yet God has always sent him enough for subsistence. Many Christian readers evidently regard the remarkable success of Müller's enterprises as demonstration of his theory of trust. They argue: He has used absolutely no agency, invoked no causation whatever to influence any creature or second cause; whence it must follow that the whole work is God's direct answer to his prayers.

Now, in dissenting from this theory of trust, we wish to make cordially all the admissions which are his due. If the statements made of this wonderful charity are correct, (and we know of no testimony to refute them,) then no one can refuse his admiration to the founder's philanthropy, disinterestedness, and executive talent. Nor would we intimate that he is in his religious character a mere fanatic. We have no doubt that he is a man of great Christian excellence, sincerity, faith, and devotion. We can go farther and say, that it would be a happy thing for the church, and for individual believers, if they had more of the simple trust in God's faithfulness which seems to inspire him. If, like him, they were readier to "devise liberal things" from truly godly motives, they would more often find that "by liberal things they should stand." God would no doubt often honor such zeal and confidence, for his own glory, and in love to his children. Nor do we for a moment suppose that this enterprise of Müller has reached its present state without the permission, favor and superintendence of a particular providence.

But when it is argued that the result shows God's approval of the founder's theology in every particular, because no second cause has been employed by him, nothing but secret prayer to God for what the project required, we beg leave to demur. Müller did not employ the usual machinery of collecting agents,

charity sermons, and newspaper appeals; but he has employed a set of means most adroitly adapted to the temper of British Christians, and, whether with intentional cunning or not, better calculated to influence the *natural principles* of such a people than all the machinery above mentioned. He tells us that he did not make known to the public his wants, and was so scrupulous that, even when without a shilling, he declined to answer questions as to the wants of the orphan cause. *But he usually published an annual report*, which was circulated over England, and even on the Continent, mentioning every donation in such a way as to satisfy the interest of the anonymous donor at least; detailing with great particularity what had been done, and his purposes for the future; as well as publishing very carefully the remarkable and exciting features of his plan. Let the reader realize how he would be interested by the sight of such an institution, and of a great company of tidy orphans thus provided for; by the appearance of the strange, saintly founder, and the display of rare, of almost miraculous faith; and by the eager *encomiums* of the admiring widows, who, as nurses and teachers, had profited by Mr. Müller's success. We may be sure, that if the reverend man refrains from uttering his own praises, *these* do not fail to trumpet them to the multitudes of good sight-seers, whom curiosity or philanthropy draws to the Asylum. When the appearance of self-abnegation and the romance of all this are considered, it is very plain that it has more worldly wisdom, as a means for drawing money, in Müller's unique case, than all the drummers who could be hired. It must be remembered that Mr. Müller has this field to himself as yet. Let us suppose that it had become the ordinary plan of all the religious agencies in Great Britain, does any sensible person suppose that it would succeed thus with all? Obviously, with the loss of its singularity, the larger part of the romance would be lost, and with it the most of its efficiency.

It is doubtless true also (to Mr. Müller's credit), that his success may be, to a certain extent, accounted for by his own executive talent and purity of character. He is evidently, with all his enthusiasm, a very shrewd and practical person, a capital economist of time and money, a sharp judge of human nature, an indomitable worker, and endowed highly with the talent of command. His enthusiasm is itself a power. And many a ten-pound

note has been drawn from the thrifty British Dissenters by the snug, commercial consideration, that Mr. Müller was *the man* to make it go the farthest in the subsistence of an orphan. His success is, therefore, not wholly unaccountable on natural principles, however dependent on Providence.

We now proceed to analyze the overweening theory of the warrant for prayer above described, without imputing to Mr. Müller, or to the Plymouth Brethren, all its errors. We do so because we shall thus see best how their peculiar error is connected with the truth. We hold, then, that there is of course an implied limitation in the seemingly general promise of answer to prayer. This limitation is stated with perfect accuracy in 1 John v. 14: "If we ask anything according to his will, he heareth us." To the question, How we may determine which are the things according to his will? we reply: *It is known, if at all, by the Scriptures alone.* We distinctly repudiate the theory that these things may also be certainly determined by our own frames in praying, or by any anticipative speculations on providences. (Events actually effected are of course revelations of God's providential will, so far as they themselves or their uniform and necessary effects go.) Now the Scriptures divide the objects for which a good man may pray into two great classes: temporal good things, ordinarily desirable, but not universally declared to be for man's ultimate, highest good; and the spiritual good things pertaining to redemption. To the former class belong such objects as health of body, restoration out of sickness, competent subsistence, fruitful seasons, prosperity, peace, etc. To the later class belong the pardon of sin, adoption, sanctification, strength for duty obligatory on us, and such like. Now, of the latter class the Scriptures speak expressly, that it is according to God's will always to bestow them on believing petitioners. Let the reader see, for instance, such declarations as John vi. 37; 1 Thess. iv. 3; Luke xi. 13; Psalm lxxxiv. 11; James i. 5. There may be what we suppose delay; or the channels of the blessings may be unexpected; but with these exceptions, we believe that the soul which seeks this class of gifts in Christ is warranted to expect his answer with all the literal certainty claimed by the strongest advocate of the "prayer of faith." But as to the other class, we have no such guarantee. God has not expressly informed us that it is "according

to his will" to give them in each specific case; nor does he intend that we shall, by any other sign, always know it. For while these secular objects are innocent in themselves, and naturally desirable, and therefore properly asked and sought, God has not informed us when they may become, on the whole, practical evils to the soul. He reserves to his superior wisdom the power of refusing them in such cases, even to the truest saint. Does the opponent reply: "Then there is a class of objects for which we are to pray in uncertainty? How can this consist with *faith*, which is the soul of true prayer?" We reply: Exactly so. In our view, the Scriptures are full of just such prayers. It is only to these extremists that there appears any solecism in praying in an uncertainty of a specific answer. For the sober believer knows that in any event he has this specific promise, that, whether the petition be granted or withheld, all shall "work together for his good." And this is enough for a submissive faith.

To proceed now to direct refutation, our first objection to the theory before us is, that it calls its unwarranted petitions "prayers of faith;" but unless there is a warrant there is no basis for faith. Have we a warrant *set down in the Scriptures* for demanding of God explicitly the raising up of a valued ministerial comrade off a dying bed, as Luther is said to have done in the case of Melancthon?—for explicitly claiming of God that he shall make his people put their hands in their pockets and give us all the money for rescuing two thousand little negroes from the temporal and eternal ruin to which Yankee philanthropy (?) has consigned them?—for curing us of the rheumatism or the fever? We trow not. But if we unwarrantably work ourselves into a persuasion that we have such a pledge, this is not faith; it is *presumption*! It is in its nature not honorable to God, but dishonorable. It is not amiably and humbly pious, but wilful and arrogant. God is very forbearing with his wayward children. He may even answer such improper petitions, sometimes passing over their arrogance to bless their zeal and disinterestedness for the sake of his dear Son. But this is far from proving that he sanctions the theory.

2. The actual experience of the best believers in our day refutes the theory, for they often and earnestly deprecate temporal evils, or seek innocent goods, which are not warded off or bestowed according to their prayers. Shall all the Christian

widows and parents who interceded in agony, yet in submission, beside the bedside of sick husbands and children be told that those prayers were graceless, because their loved ones died? Away with the cruel arrogance!

3. We have a sure refutation in the actual experience of Bible saints whom we know to have prayed graciously. Of David (2 Samuel xii. 16-19), praying for the life of his infant, which did not live; of Paul (2 Cor. xii. 8-10), praying for the removal of his thorn in the flesh, which was not removed; and, above all, the venerable and hallowed instance of our Redeemer, who prayed, "being in an agony," "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me," and yet drank it to the dregs. Truly, it is "enough for the servant to be as his Lord."

4. The Bible doctrine of affliction refutes this theory. "God scourgeth every son whom he receiveth." Surely he does not always do this by tearing away *sinful* objects claimed by the saints; it is not the characteristic of saints to demand sinful joys of their God. No; he usually chastises by taking away legitimate joys. But unless the privation were felt by the victim it would not be chastisement. The rod which does not *smart* gives no correction to the child. But in the approach of this privation the Christian is an active free agent. The possession being legitimate and dear, he will of course exercise his Christian privilege of interceding for it. Hence, were this theory true, God's hand holding the rod would be uniformly arrested; the true believer could never meet chastisement.

5. We may know, *a priori*, that God would not commit himself to any such theory of prayer, because the effect of it would be to deprive his children of the benefit of his own omniscience. Whenever a Christian came to him in a filial and trusting spirit, asking for a thing not positively illegitimate, God's hand would be tied. He would be compelled by his engagement to give it, though he saw it was on the whole injurious. For the reader must note, the possession of a filial, trusting spirit does not by any means make all good people infallible in judgment. Witness the vagaries of the good brethren under discussion! Now, do prudent human parents make such rash promises to even amiable children? Still less will our heavenly Father.

But from this conclusive demonstration our brethren have an evasion. They refer us to such Scriptures as Romans viii. 26,

27, teaching us that believing, pious, filial petitions are such as are suggested by the Holy Ghost. But this Holy Ghost has the same omniscience and covenant love with the Father and Son. So that the contingency supposed can never happen, namely, that of a desire, filial, believing, and pious, and yet mischievous. They argue, moreover, that the believer may know infallibly when he has an object before his heart which the Holy Spirit prompts him to seek, by the character of his emotions. If, say they, the desire is very strong and abiding, returning after many postponements; if the conscious motives are godly, when tried by a faithful search of the heart; if the temper of the soul, while thus exercised, is amiable and filial towards God, it is supposed that by these signs the saint may know that the omniscient Spirit, whose will is in absolute harmony with the Father's, has set him upon this petition, and so he is sure to get it.

Now, it is at this place that the theory of prayer prevalent with the Plymouth Brethren connects itself with the scheme under discussion. Just such are their speculations. We shall not of course deny that accepted prayer is prompted by the infallible Spirit. Nor shall we deny that such experiences in praying as are above described give comfortable evidence of a gracious state. (This is just the theory of the grounds of assurance which we assert, and the *Witness* theology impugns.) Nor that they even raise some probable grounds of hope as to the specific answer. But from these premises the desired result does not follow. First, because no Christian can certainly discriminate in his consciousness, in advance of the event, those desires or affections which a nature *generally* sanctified prompts of itself, and those which the Holy Spirit himself prompts. That this is so, every honest Christian must admit from his own experience. That it must be so, is certain from this law, that the Holy Spirit, as our Paraclete, does not act *across*, but *with*, our normal faculties of right feeling and judgment. He does not supersede, but rectifies, enlightens, and employs the natural faculties of understanding, will, and affection. Hence the most distinctly gracious action of soul must wear a perfect *naturalness* to the saint's own consciousness, as to its normal rise and exercise, as *his action*. Only "by their fruits shall ye know them." For instance, this *persistency of desire*, which is advanced as proof that the Holy Ghost is suggesting the object, how is the good man to know in-

fallibly that it is not the mere result of the natural trait, a determined will which grace has not destroyed, but only curbed? This conscious *disinterestedness of motive* may not infallibly be from the present, specific acting of the Spirit; for carnal men have done disinterested things. This *amiability* of frame may be as much from human love as from divine. And *what degree* of these indefinite measures of desire or feeling shall amount to proof? But second, it does not follow from such gracious frames that God intends to give the specific gift, because in the Bible his Spirit has several times *given the frames and withheld the gifts*. Paul doubtless prayed for the removal of his "thorn" with just such frames; but it was not removed. We have a more sacred instance in the prayer of Gethsemane. Does one ask, how can God consistently communicate such frames to the petitioner when he does not intend to grant the petition? We answer, it may very well be that *he communicates them to prepare his saints to profit by the refusal*. (Vide 2 Cor. xii. 10.) And these are the grounds which sustain us in saying that, so far as the believer can certainly know what petitions are "according to God's will," he learns it from the written Scriptures alone, and from no anticipative surmises about the "leadings of providence," or the frames of pious feeling observed in himself.

IV. But the *Locus Palmarum* of the Plymouth theology is the pre-millennial advent of Christ. Pre-adventists, though claiming a *literal* scheme of interpretation for the unfulfilled prophecies, differ much among themselves. But the Plymouth theologians in America appear to agree in the doctrine of two resurrections, separated by the *millennium*, the first of the elect dead, with the change of saints then living; the second coming of Christ (as in Acts i. 2) at the former date; the destruction at that date also of all unbelievers, save elect Israel, who will be converted by the advent; the personal reign of Christ in Jerusalem, with the risen saints in glorified bodies; the resurrection of the non-elect and general judgment at the end of that reign; and especially the belief that all the prophecies preliminary to Christ's return are now fulfilled, or nearly so, insomuch that every saint should expect to see that advent in his day, rather than bodily death. This present expectation seems to be made by them the test of a vigorous faith and pious "love for the Lord's appearing."

We do not design, in the end of a discussion already too long,

to go into a full refutation, or to establish an opposite scheme of explanation for unfulfilled prophecy. Our remaining purpose is rather to leave a declaration and dissent in the form of a few statements.

In our view, the Pre-adventist scheme of exposition is in reality no more *literal* than ours, and it solves no difficulties in the understanding of unfulfilled prophecies, while it raises some insoluble ones. The effects claimed for it, as to edification and experimental faith, are wholly illusory; and it involves some consequences inconsistent with Scripture, and injurious to God's cause. We claim that if the old scheme be completed by this proposition, viz., that this earth regenerated will be, *after the final consummation*, the everlasting home of the church and her Messiah (according to 2 Peter iii. 13; Rev. xxi. 1-3), then that plan will have every advantage in reconciling the prophecies claimed for Pre-adventism, without its difficulties. But—

1. It requires us to do violence to many predictions of events yet to be fulfilled before Christ's return. And it cannot be necessary to the highest edification and "love of the Lord's appearing" for us, in our day, to expect the advent rather than our death, because Paul, Augustine, Calvin, could not have done so. Had they cherished that hope, time has now stubbornly proved that they would have erred. Was *delusion*, then, a desirable means of Christian edification?

2. It is unfavorable to a faithful performance of ecclesiastical duties, as witness the disorganizing tendencies of the Plymouth Brethren. If no visible church, however orthodox, is to be Christ's instrument for overthrowing Satan's kingdom here; if Christ is to sweep the best of them away as so much rubbish, along with all "world-powers," at his advent; if it is our duty to expect and desire this catastrophe daily, who does not see that we shall feel very slight value for ecclesiastical ties and duties? And should we differ unpleasantly from our church courts, we shall be tempted to feel that it is pious to spurn them. Are we not daily praying for an event which will render them useless lumber? See how the *Waymarks* almost argue this conclusion, and confess the lamentable influences upon the usefulness of such men as Malan and the Haldanes, (Vol. VIII., pp. 7, 8.) But has not Christ ordained a visible church with its officers and duties? How else can it be constituted than by denominations,

misnamed "sects"? If all of ours are too bad to be retained, and reformed even, let the Plymouth Brethren organize a better one and stick to it, as Christ commands.

3. The Pre-advent scheme disparages the present, the dispensation of the Holy Ghost, and the means committed to the church for the conversion of sinners. It thus tends to discourage faith and missionary effort. See how, in the *Waymarks*, Vol. VI., pp. 252, 253, our hopes of further prosperity of the church are travestied, as though they were mere carnal expectations. Whereas Christ represents the presence of the Holy Ghost, and this his dispensation, as so desirable, that it was expedient for him to go away, that the Paraclete might come. (John xvi. 7.) Pre-adventism represents it as so undesirable that every saint ought to pray for its immediate abrogation. Incredulity as to the conversion of the world by the "means of grace" is hotly, and even scornfully, inferred from visible results and experiences, in a temper which we confess appears to us the same with that of unbelievers in 2 Peter iii. 4: "Where is the promise of his coming?" etc. They seem to us to "judge the Lord by feeble sense," instead of "trusting him for his grace." It is an essential and cherished idea with them that to the end the elect are to be a "little flock" among men. The only object they profess for missionary exertions is to gather out this elect seed from the mass, so as to clear the way for Christ's coming to destroy it. Such expectations are unfavorable to missionary spirit. No man can use the means of grace which he habitually disparages as means for the world's conversion as heartily as he should. In order to be as zealous where his best expectation is to be to his fellowmen "a savor of death unto death," the evangelist must be more or less than a man.

4. This scheme is unfavorable to the promise of Israel's ingathering so clearly stated in prophecy. True, it teaches that Israel will be saved after (immediately after), and by means of the advent, but most inconsistently. For first, Paul says, they are to come in "with the fulness of the Gentiles;" but Pre-adventism expects no such fulness. Second, he says they shall be regrafted into "their own olive tree," which is the visible church. But Pre-adventism holds that Christ's coming will abolish the visible church. Third, where shall unbelieving Israel be put during the terrors of the first resurrection and uni-

versal fires which are to destroy all other unbelievers? Last, the scheme is unscriptural in expecting Jews, whom the truth of the word cannot impress, to be savingly impressed by outward catastrophes. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Christ's first advent could not convert Israel; why should his second?

5. The Pre-advent theory tends to two errors, a sensuous or animal happiness in the millennial state, and a disparagement of the blessedness of Christian souls in their disembodied state. According to that scheme, the latter state is less desirable or blessed than the millennial; for Pre-adventists insist that we should hope and pray for an entrance into the *millennium* far rather than into the disembodied state of the blessed dead. Again, they must admit that the millennial grade is lower than the heavenly state which follows the final judgment; for then the Bride enters into the marriage supper of the Lamb. The millennial state, then, is lower than the heavenly, and the disembodied state lower than the millennial. This last must then be quite low indeed. Thus is explained the tendency seen in many millenarians, as Bickersteth, and the *Waymarks*, Vol. VIII., p. 152, etc., to depreciate the blessedness of the departed. Some tend to make it an unconscious, or at most, a semi-conscious state. Again, in the heavenly or higher state saints are "equal unto the angels, neither marrying nor giving in marriage." But the millennial is an inferior state to this. Therefore it may be surmised that, in it, the saints will marry! The reader should know that many British Pre-adventists, at least, boldly avow this and other sensuous features, to a degree worthy only of an ancient Chiliast.

6. Pre-adventists usually claim that their expectation of the Lord's coming is peculiarly promotive of spiritual-mindedness, strong faith, and close walking with God. A Christian who had not adopted their scheme is represented as exclaiming, when it was unfolded, "If I believed so, I must live near my Saviour indeed!" If he did, he exclaimed foolishly. For, first, did not God give one and the same system of sanctification to us and to primitive Christians? But these could not have cherished the expectation of seeing the "personal advent" before death; for stubborn facts have proved that it was not less than eighteen

hundred years distant. Second, every Christian, even if he is a Pre-adventist, must know that it is far more probable his body will die before the "advent," than that he will live to see it. All admit that in a few years the body must die. Then the season of repentance will be done, the spiritual state of our souls decided forever, and our spirits reunited to a glorified Redeemer in a better world than this. Now, if there is faith, these certainties contain more wholesome *stimulus* for it than can possibly be presented in the surmises of any Pre-adventist theory. The only reason the latter is to any persons more exciting is the romance attaching to it; the same reason which enabled the false prophet, Miller, to drive multitudes into wild alarm by the dream of approaching judgment, who were unmoved by the sober certainty of approaching death. The hope of us common Christians is to meet our glorified Lord very certainly and very soon (when our bodies die) in the other world. It passes our wits to see how a less certain hope of meeting him in this world (a worse one) can evince more "love for his appearing."

7. We close with the remark, that Pre-adventism is directly against our standards. So far as we can now remember, the word *millennium* does not occur in them; and, on the question whether the whole race of man will be converted in the latter day, they observe a wise silence. But they distinctly teach one resurrection, and the only remaining advent of our Lord at the judgment-day. They utterly ignore the Pre-adventist's "personal reign of Christ" on earth. See *Shorter Catechism*, Quest. 28; *Confession*, Chap. VIII., Sec. 4, ("shall return to judge men and angels at the end of the world.") Chap. XXXII., Sec. 2; *Larger Catechism*, Quest. 53, 56.

We would humbly submit, then, that the Presbyterian who desires to be a Pre-adventist, is bound in candor to move for a revision of our standards on these points.

THEOLOGY OF THE PLYMOUTH BRETHREN.¹

REV. AND DEAR BROTHER :

IN your issue of March 14th, your correspondent, M. N., makes strictures upon my review of the Plymouth Theology, which are unjust to it and to the truth. It is only in the interests of the latter that I wish to correct some of them. His article is one among the increasing evidences that my review was timely, and that the unscriptural excesses of the writers I exposed needed correction and are doing mischief. The best corrective in my power, perhaps, would be to procure the insertion in your paper of the whole of this passage of my review. When read as a whole it would speak for itself.

First, M. N. is unjust in his citations, in this, among other things, that he attaches to some one, and perhaps least offensive, statement of the error I review, a strong expression of disapproval from me; which virtually refers to a number of erroneous statements taken together. Had M. N. arrayed before your readers all the dangerous propositions which my review arrayed before him, as quoted from these writers (not to say all that passed under my eye), no sober Bible reader would have thought my warning too strong. *Second*, M. N. misrepresented me, as though I taught that no new-born soul ever has at first a faith so vigorous as to entitle him to an assurance of hope; that the strongest, as well as the weakest, must wait for it, and come gradually to it, through self-examination and experience. I only assert this of "a true, though weak faith." Will M. N. deny that there is "a true, though weak faith," which may be and long remains without this assurance of hope? Hardly; if he does, let him read the *Confession of Faith*, Chap. XVIII. Sec. 3. *Again*, he misrepresents me, as teaching that self-consciousness, when guided by the word and Spirit, cannot testify to the presence

¹ This letter was in reply to certain strictures on the foregoing article, and was published in the *South-Western Presbyterian*, addressed to the editor.

of faith in us; but only to the presence of other, kindred graces, which are signs of faith. In the review, I teach the exact opposite. *Once more*, M. N. says I have failed to make or use the distinction between "the assurance of faith," and "the assurance of hope." In another part of the review the distinction is expressly named by me, and my whole discussion is framed in accordance with it, as will appear in the sequel. Nor was it necessary to quote Calvin, to prove against me that the only object of faith is revealed gospel truth; that it is not only a set of theoretic propositions, but a gracious *Person*, on which true faith relies, etc. All this I of course hold, and shall show that it all bears for me, and against Calvin, and against M. N. But to proceed to more important points, I assert:

1. That Calvin and Dr. Malan, and the Plymouth Brethren, hold a definition of the nature or essence of saving faith which is, in one respect, contrary to the Westminster Confession and to the Scriptures, as well as to the great body of the confessions of the Presbyterian Churches, and of their divines since Calvin's day. I said, by way of apology for the earliest Reformers, and most notably, Luther and Calvin, that they were betrayed into this partial error by a praiseworthy zeal against the opposite and mischievous error of Rome, who seeks to hold believers always in doubt of their salvation. This explanation is true (to Calvin's credit). In his *Commentary*, on Romans, as on viii. 16; and on 1 Cor. ii. 12; 2 Cor. xiii. 5, he places his peculiar definition over against the popish dogma, that the Christian can have only a "*conjectura moralis*" of his safety; and this he does elsewhere, with a pertinacity that becomes amusing. Dr. Wm. Cunningham of the Free Church gives the same account of the occasion of this error in his work, *The Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*, p. 119, etc. So does Dr. Hodge, *Commentary*, on 2 Corinthians, xiii. 5. So does the great Owen, *Justification*, p. 98, etc. Now I give this explanation of Calvin's partial error to save his credit. M. N. will not have it so; then he will needs have his admired leader discredited, for as sure as truth is in history, Luther and Calvin did fall into this error, which the Reformed churches, led by the Westminster Confession, have since corrected.

But, not to be misunderstood again, let me define. The *assurance of faith* is a full practical certainty, that the gospel promise

in Christ is true and trustworthy. This the Reformed churches hold, as do I, to be necessary to the being or essence of a living faith; and it is the work, through the word, of the quickening Spirit. The *assurance of hope* is the full, practical certainty that I am myself a true believer, and so renewed, and an heir of heaven. This latter form of assurance is not necessary to the being or essence of a living faith; but is a reflex consequence, which faith yields when strengthened to its higher grades. Our *Confession* (Chap. XIV. Sec. 2), in its formal definition of what necessarily belongs to the essence of a saving faith, expressly omits it; and in Chap. XVIII. Sec. 3, it says expressly, that it "*doth not so belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long,*" etc. The assurance here spoken of is termed in the title of the chapter, "The Assurance of Grace and Salvation," is defined as men's being "certainly assured that they are in a state of grace," and is called "*which hope.*" This is just as I have distinguished the "assurance of hope."

Now, I assert that Calvin, while not employing, so far as I know, this pair of phrases, was incautious enough to fall into the erroneous statement, that no faith was a living faith which did not include essentially both the assurance of faith and the assurance of hope. He is not satisfied that even the weak, new believer shall say, "I believe, with head and heart both, that Christ saves *all who truly come to him*, and I accordingly try to trust him alone for my salvation, and so far as I have any hope, rest it on him alone." He requires every one to say, in substance, I believe fully that Christ *has saved me*. Amidst all Calvin's verbal variations, this is always his meaning; for he is consistent in his error. What else is the meaning of that definition which M. N. himself quotes from the *Institutes*: "Our steady and certain knowledge of the divine benevolence *toward us.*" But I will show, beyond all dispute, that the theological "Homer nodded," not once, but all the time, on this point. See then *Institutes*, Book III., Chap. II., Sec. 16. "In short, no man is truly a believer, unless he be firmly persuaded that God is a propitious and benevolent father *to him*, . . . and feel an undoubted expectation of salvation." *Commentary*, on Rom. viii. 16: "The opinion consequently stands, that no one can be called a son of God *who does not know himself to be such.*" On Romans viii. 34: "Because our faith is naught *unless we cer-*

tainly persuade ourselves that Christ is ours, and that the Father is propitious to us in him." On 1 Cor. ii. 12: "Let us know, therefore, that this is the nature of faith, that the conscience has from the Holy Spirit a certain testimony of the divine benevolence towards itself." On 2 Cor. xiii. 5: "Paul here testifies, *that whoever doubt whether they possess Christ, are reprobate.*" Is M. N. satisfied? *Heidelberg Catechism* (not written by Calvin, but by two of his pupils): "What is faith?" (Qu. 21) "A certain trust," "by which I acquiesce in God, certainly concluding that remission of sins, and eternal righteousness and life, *have been bestowed, not on others only, but on me also,*" etc. *Genevan Catechism* (written by Calvin himself): It is "a certain and stable knowledge of God's paternal benevolence *towards us.*"

When I represented Calvin's view of faith, as substantially set forth in his *Commentary on Romans*, as amounting to this: "My faith is a divine and spiritual belief that God has pardoned and accepted me," M. N. said that if it were so (which he disputes), "Homer must have been nodding when it slipped in." Have I not showed that it is there, and everywhere in Calvin, and that it did not "slip in," but is his deliberate opinion? M. N. has *confessed that it is untenable.* Why then should there be any more difference between us, except that while I cherish a great, I do not feel an *indiscriminate* admiration for this Reformer?

I will complete this part of my proof as to Luther also, who shared Calvin's error. The *Augsburg Confession*, written by Melancthon, but under Luther's eye, says, Art. IV., the Lutherans also teach that men are "justified gratuitously on account of Christ by faith, *when they believe themselves* to be received into grace, and their sins to be pardoned on account of Christ."

This then, in substance, was the one error of these first Reformers about faith, that they required an assurance of hope as essential to the being of a living faith; whereas the Scriptures teach that it is not so, but is the happy reflex consequence of a more vigorous faith. And the former, in substance, is the view asserted by Dr. Malan and the Plymouth brethren and their admirers, as their boasted characteristic. True, these modern teachers are not usually wise enough to state it in the recognized theological formulary, most probably because they cherish so much disfavor for the current teachers of the great Calvinistic theology. But that it is their characteristic is plain to any

one who will examine my review with candor, and will be yet clearer to one who will examine their books. They also deduce from this, their pet dogma, certain corollaries, very naturally following, but far more mischievous; and which Calvin, whose sagacity seldom failed him, would have been very sure to repudiate with earnestness. Some of these connected consequences I endeavored to expose in the subsequent parts of my review.

2. I shall now prove that this peculiar Calvinian view of faith was soon reviewed by the great body of the orthodox Reformed, was found self-contradictory, unscriptural and mischievous, *and was dropped*. And first, as to the history of opinion. In Calvin's own day, all the Reformed theologians did not go with him, but some saw and refused the erroneous element in his definition of faith. Among these I will now mention Musculus and Peter Martyr. But the first Reformers had to see the lineaments of truth amidst the heat and dust of the great battle for existence. When we come to the seventeenth century, when time had elapsed for accurate comparison, we find the view which I hold was almost universally adopted by the Reformed. Andrew Rivet is the only really influential name I now remember, who still stickled for Calvin's peculiarity in this point. That I may not be suspected again of misrepresentation or confusion, I will borrow the statement of Witsius (*De. Ec. Fed.*) one of the soundest and most revered of Calvinistic writers. (Bk. III., Ch. IV., Sec. 14.) Having defined that which is essential to faith, expressly omitting the assurance of hope, he adds, "*After the believing soul has thus received Christ, and given himself up to him, he may and ought thence to conclude that Christ and all his saving benefits are his, and that he shall certainly be blessed by him, according to this infallible syllogism, or reasoning of faith: Christ offers himself as a full and complete Saviour to all who are weary, hungry, thirsty, to all who receive him, and are ready to give themselves to him. But I am weary, hungry, etc., therefore Christ has offered himself to me, is now become mine, and I his, nor shall anything ever separate me from his love. This is the eighth, and the reflex act of faith, arising from consciousness or reflection.*" He had attempted to enumerate seven elements in the "precedent and essential actings." See also Sec. 27.

Or if you choose, take the great Turretin, *Locus*. xv., Qu. 8,

Sec. 4: "First, there comes a two-fold act of faith, to be distinguished; the one *direct*, the other *reflex*. The *direct* is exercised about the object itself which is offered to it, but the *reflex* is occupied about the direct action. By the direct act a man believes on the promises of the gospel; but by the reflex, a man, viewing his own faith, knows that he believes," etc. Then having analyzed the direct act (with its precedents) into five elements, (Sec. 10), "The sixth is the *reflex act* arising out of the sense of faith, by which the soul which thus receives Christ, being turned back upon itself, and seeing its direct act of persuasion of the gospel truth refuge, and embracing, in its own heart, concludes that it believes; and because it believes that Christ certainly died *for it*, and, with all its benefits belongs *to it*, and that through him it is certainly going to be blessed," etc. Then, (Sec. 12), "And this last act *does not* properly enter into the essence of faith, and constitute, as it were, its form." Such, not in all the same words, but in substantial meaning, is the doctrine of Peter Martyr and Musculus, among the first Reformers, of the celebrated Englishman, William Ames, professor in Franeker; of Zanchius, of Wittichius, professor in Leyden; of the English divine, Perkins; of the French Reformed, Peter Molinaeus, father and son, Peter Jurieu, Louis Le Blanc, Sieur de Beaulieu, professor at Sedan; the famous pastor and divine, Mestrezal, Joshua Placæus, and Charnier; of Bishop Davenant, and all the Anglican commissioners to the Synod of Dort; of Robert Baronius, the Scottish professor in Aberdeen; of Gill, the great Baptist theologian and expositor (*Practical Divinity*, Bk. I., Ch. VI., Secs. 6 and 7); of John Owen, *quicunque vult*, (see *Treatise on Justification*, Chap. I., p. 97); of Dr. Thomas Scott and Newton, Wither- spoon, Chalmers, Dick, Dr. Wm. Cunningham; of Edwards, Dr. Charles Hodge, Dr. A. A. Hodge. Must I cite chapter and verse of this great "cloud of witnesses"? If necessary, it can be done, provided, Mr. Editor, your columns will hold them.

I may add as further evidence, that the great popish divine, Bossuet, in his *Variations of Protestantism*, charged this change of definition upon the Reformed, and endeavored to twit them with it, as one of the instances of instability in their teachings; that the first Reformers made assurance of hope of the essence of faith, and that the later did not.

But the best evidence of the state of the doctrine is that of the

Confessions of the Reformed Churches. As we have seen, the *Augsburg Confession* and the *Genevan* and *Heidelberg Catechisms* embody Calvin's error. But from the *Gallican Confession*, the *Belgic Confession*, the *Declaration of Thorn* (of the Reformed in Poland), the *Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican Church*, and *The Articles of Dort*, Calvin's peculiar view is carefully omitted or eliminated, and by the *Westminster Confession* it is expressly repudiated. So, the *Lambeth Articles* modify all that is objectionable in the definition.

3. But none of the theologians or assemblies were infallible. Let us then try the truth by the Scriptures. I shall show that Calvin's second chapter of Book III., if a mighty sword, has a flaw in it. The intrusion of his ultra and unscriptural view has introduced confusion and contradiction into his discussion, just as it has into the teachings of the Plymouth Brethren and their admirers, and into the criticisms of M. N. *First.* The latter gives this as his and Calvin's view, that "*it is God in Christ showing himself gracious, and making us promises, that is the object of saving faith.*" Agreed. "Faith has a perpetual relation to the word." "Take away the word, then, and there will be no faith left." Agreed. And for *that very reason* the assumption "that *I am a true believer,*" however properly taken up, cannot be the object proper of saving faith; for it is not a part of the word. How can any fair mind fail to see that the doctrine of Calvin changes the object of faith before the believing sinner's mind; from the promise of the word, to a subjective consciousness of his own? Hence, it introduces confusion and inconsistency. M. N. is obviously involved in similar confusion. He urges that the assurance of faith, which is essential to the being of the grace, has as its object this proposition, That God in Christ "is propitious to us." One question is the touchstone. *Who are the "us"?* Whom do the Scriptures entitle to believe assuredly "God is propitious to *us*"? Such believers as Simon Magus and the stony-ground hearers? All who erroneously flatter themselves, but confidently, that they have faith? Notoriously there are such people. It is impossible for M. N. to give any except a negative answer; and then, if he is consistent, he cannot help defining the "*us*" as we do, and as Calvin in his fortunate inconsistency does: those who show their faith by their works.

Second. The Scriptures ascribe living faith to persons who do

not come up to Calvin's definition: the Psalmist, lxxiii. 13, "Verily I have cleansed my heart *in vain*"; the believer of Isaiah l. 10, "That feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the voice of his servant, that *walketh in darkness, and hath no light*"; the afflicted father of Mark ix. 24, who could only "cry out with tears, Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief." Can these cases be fairly brought within Calvin's postulate, "Paul testifies that *whoever* doubt whether they possess Christ *are reprobate*"? Hence this author, when reminded of such Bible saints, has to resort (Sec. 18) to as sorrowful a piece of evasion and special pleading as any to be heard from a good man. His unscriptural dogma has involved him in an inconsistency. Not only the Bible, but every man's pastoral experience, presents cases which cannot be brought within the demands of Calvin's definition; humble, distressed saints, harassed with doubts, yea, at times with despair of their own acceptance in Christ, which all their brethren see to be needless. Does M. N. tell such saints that they "*are reprobate*"? We know not who he is, but we feel sure that he is too good a man and pastor to be guilty of such cruelty. This, then, is another insuperable objection, that it is cruel to a multitude of good, but weak or tempted believers whom God loves. But there is another objection on the other side; the extreme of this definition is equally hazardous of fostering presumption in "stony ground hearers." M. N. and Dr. Bonar, and all their sympathizers, may be assured that the popular construction which such hearers put on the definition is just this: "If you can bring yourself really to fancy you are saved, *you are saved*." We see, and do know, that where such views of faith are preached, they fill the church with crowds of persons who live, and it is to be feared die, with "a lie in their right hands." Now, very probably, M. N. will profess astonishment again at the above arguments, and say "that of course he admits all that." Of course he does; unless he were blind he could not help it. But this is my point, that having admitted it he cannot fairly reconcile it with Calvin's definition of faith. The explanation cannot be made satisfactory.

Third. If the necessary nature of living faith is such that "whoever doubts whether he possesses Christ is reprobate," then it is entirely inconsistent for the Scriptures to propose, for the use of persons addressed as probably or possibly not reprobates, *other criteria*, and processes of self examination. For if

Calvin is right, the presence of the doubt, or at least its persistent presence, settles the case. The fact that there was a need for inquiry about it would settle it by itself. The fact that the doubt stuck long enough to make it necessary for the man to go about applying other *criteria* deliberately; would of itself prove that he need not trouble himself to apply them; the case decided itself, that he had no faith. But the Scriptures are full of such *criteria* for the use of believers, and they command us expressly, "Examine yourselves," and that upon the very point, "whether ye be in the faith," whether ye have "knowledge to discern the Lord's body." Now some of the sympathizers with the Plymouth movement are hardy enough in their consistency to fly in the face of the Scripture, and to teach and intimate that all inquiry on that point by such *criteria*, other than the consciousness of faith itself, is carnal unbelief, pride, and self-righteousness. But Calvin was not so rash, and hence another happy inconsistency; as when he says (Sec. 11), "In the meantime the faithful are taught to examine themselves *with solicitude and humility, lest carnal security intrude itself instead of the assurance of faith.*" Excellent doctrine! But it contradicts his other doctrine, in which he teaches that a "solicitude" on the question whether one's supposed faith may not be carnal security, is incompatible with true faith.

Fourth. M N. thinks the statements of my review about the nature and action of consciousness "the most astonishing thing in the article." To prepare the way for removing that astonishment, let us resume the line of remark in which that subject entered. I was criticizing the postulate of Dr. Bonar, that wherever faith acts upon the gospel promise, the nature and genuineness of its acting is, in every case, infallibly and immediately revealed to the believer himself by an act of self-consciousness, which he described as not only necessary and immediate, but suprarational, or rather irrational, and *instinctive*. I showed that he not only likened this self-consciousness to that which accompanies muscular motion and corporeal sensation, but declared it to be "unconscious and involuntary," and was even absurd enough to say that it is "like the animal sense of departed pain and present ease." (Review, pp. 7, 15.) I objected to these statements as dangerous and incorrect. Admitting that the reflex self-consciousness of one's own faith might, in case the faith were

clear and strong in its acting, rationally and scripturally at once assure a believer that *he was saved*, without waiting for other *criteria* (as in cases of faith less clear and strong, but genuine), the self-consciousness of other graces, which are also discriminating marks of spiritual life, may be blessed by means of the gift of spiritual discernment, to build up that weaker faith to an assurance of hope. I demurred from Dr. Bonar's extreme view for several sound reasons. One of these is: (see Review), "Experience shows all our acts of soul are not accompanied at the time *by an intelligent and remembered act of consciousness.*" This, we are to infer, made M. N. "gape and stare," for he says it would make "all the philosophers" do so—they being, we suppose, not well-mannered people. He says, "co-existing with every act of mind there is always a self-consciousness." To this, he says, agree the teachings of McCosh, Sir Wm. Hamilton, "and indeed of every philosopher since the days of Des Cartes." On this I have two or three remarks. May it not be that when the current of psychologists say an act of self-consciousness attends each of our mental modifications, they only mean to be understood of the general rule, and of mental modifications, which possess ordinary deliberation and clearness? Every man's common sense would answer, without examining their pages, surely this must be what the psychologists mean, because the exceptions are so manifest. Everybody knows, who reflects on what passes in his own mind, that there were mental modifications undoubtedly experienced by him, the consciousness of which, if he had any, was not distinct nor remembered. These exceptions occur, notably, when the mental state is mingled with others to a degree of great *complexity*; or when the mental states succeed each other with great *rapidity*; or when the mind is in *intense agitation*. Has not everybody heard of soldiers in the heat of battle, unconsciously, as we say, putting two or three cartridges into their muskets, so that afterwards they were wholly surprised to find them there? The pianist, reading off a piece of new music rapidly, is not conscious, as we say popularly, of his visual perception of a certain note on the scale. Yet he must have had that perception, for what else guided the volition to put his finger on the corresponding key of the piano, which he did? Does not M. N., in the "torrent, tempest, and as I may say whirlwind of his passion," use most expressive gestures and tones, without

having a distinct and remembered consciousness of selecting them? Now then, if all the philosophers in the world contradicted my statement, I should believe it in spite of them all, and so would M. N.

But none of them contradict me. While they assert the general power of consciousness, as stated by M. N., they also note the very exception which I claim. See Dr. Thomas Brown, Lecture 31; Hamilton's edition of *Dugald Stuart on Attention*, with his notes; Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lecture 14. "I stated that attention is consciousness applied to an act of will or desire, under a particular law." "This law is that the intension of our knowledge is in the inverse ratio of its extension; in other words, that the fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our knowledge of them." Dr. Wayland maintains "that consciousness does not necessarily invariably accompany all mental action," and gives such instances as I cited above. So President Mahan. Haven admits the facts, and explains them (*Mental Philos.* p. 41) thus: "The mental activity exerted in such cases, if there be any, is so very slight as to escape attention, and we are unconscious of it, simply because there was little or nothing to be conscious of." But I especially commend to M. N. the following testimony from one whom he seems to believe in (Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Note on Hamilton's Reid*, Edin. Ed., p. 551): "Stuart has not studied the Leibnitzian doctrine of (what has not been well denominated) *obscure perceptions or ideas*; that is, acts and affections of mind which, manifesting their existence by their effects, *are themselves out of consciousness* or apperception. The fact of such latent mental modifications *is now established beyond all rational doubt*." This asserts more than is needed for my defence. I, not wishing to encumber my reasoning by raising either of the abstruse questions which are in debate among philosophers as this, whether these mental modifications above mentioned by Hamilton are really not attended by an act of self-consciousness, or whether only the act is too obscure to be remembered, intentionally limited myself to asserting that some of our acts of soul "are not accompanied by an *intelligent and remembered* act of consciousness." This is all that was needed for my purpose; and I am borne out in it by universal experience, and more than borne out by Hamilton and Leibnitz. M. N. also seems greatly surprised at my asserting

that our self-consciousness of our rational states is, while a primitive, a *rational act*. Does not he himself adopt the language of McCosh, calling consciousness in general, without this limitation, "intuitive"? Surely intuitions are rational. What are they but the *primary judgments* of reason; the logical sources of all the rest? And does M. N. know that it is a pet doctrine of his favorite Hamilton that consciousness is not a distinct faculty at all, but is identical with the cognitive powers themselves?—a question with which I do not wish to encumber my theology at this time. If that is true, then it is inevitable that every consciousness of a rational mental state, such as faith, must be a rational act.

Having now, I trust, consoled M. N.'s "astonishment," let me endeavor to explain and strengthen my objections to Dr. Bonar's position as detailed above. One objection is, that the mind may be greatly hurried, or vehemently agitated, or confused by complexity of thoughts and emotions, at the time it exercises an act of faith on Christ. And then it may well be that its consciousness of its act will be too indistinct and too quickly lost from memory to be the foundation for a safe state of assurance of hope. Isn't that clear? A second objection is: Consciousness reveals to me precisely my own subjective mental states, if it is clear in its revelations. Is not that correct? But the question I have to settle, in order to entitle myself to the assurance of hope, is this, viz.: Whether this my subjective mental state is the faith which saves; for notoriously there is a temporary faith simulating the real. That act of self-consciousness does not decide this question; it only presents *the thing to be compared*, namely, my subjective state. The standard of comparison is the Word. When I think I believe, I am but conscious of exercising *what I think is faith*. That is all which this immediate act of self-consciousness contains. *Whether I think right*, in thinking that to be true faith of which I am conscious, is a question of comparison *to be settled by the Word*, which describes the true exercise.

M. N. has virtually admitted this, saying: "My feeling towards God, and belief as to Jesus Christ, are known *to me* immediately by my consciousness. What the significance of these are *in the eyes of God* I learn from the teachings of his word, and *can know in no other way*." This is excellent.

doctrine, being precisely that of my review. But add now the simple truth, that God is the being who accepts or rejects us; and M. N. is brought precisely to my conclusion. There is a true and a spurious faith in the world. My consciousness tells me that I have an exercise, which *I think* is true faith. *Whether God thinks so too* must be settled by comparing my consciousness with God's word. But this is what Dr. Bonar dislikes.

Let me add as a third reason against Dr. Bonar's position one which is borrowed from Chalmers' *Institutes of Theology*, Vol. 2, Chap. VII., where it is so admirably expounded. The presence before the mind of the *object* of an affection is the essential condition for the prevalence of that affection in the mind. Hence, as soon as I begin to inspect my consciousness of my mental affection, I withdraw my mind from the object thereof, and thereby unavoidably terminate the present exercise of the affection inspected. The necessary object of faith is a gracious Saviour; while my soul looks at him, faith may be in exercise. I wish to inspect my consciousness of the faith exercise. Then the affection of which I was conscious becomes the object; the gracious Saviour ceases to be, for the time, the object of attention, and the affection, as the present exercise, vanishes under the inspection. How clear is it, hence, that the thing whose nature I really judge is the *remembrance* of my consciousness? If then the consciousness was to any degree indistinct or its remembrance dim, trustworthy inspection cannot take place. But I proved in the previous paragraph the necessity of this inspection or self-acquaintance in order to the assurance of hope. What follows? I infer, with Chalmers, that imperfect but genuine believers may often have actings of faith of such kind that their self-consciousness of them does not ground an assurance of hope; and thence that it is useful and important for their peace to compare with scripture their remembered consciousness of other gracious actings, which, the word tells them, are also marks of a saved state. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses" they gain the solid advantage of concurrent evidences.

Fifth. After M. N. charged me with falling into grave error as to the distinction between assurance of faith and assurance of hope, he should have laid down that distinction himself, and then observed it. But he does neither. He quotes texts to prove *that there is* an assurance of faith and an assurance of hope, but

he does not tell us what they *are*. Nor does he separate them consistently. First he says that “we set out with the assurance of faith,” but we work up to the assurance of hope. Right! He says the latter process is “*slow, laborious, painful*, toiling in the work and labor of love toward the name of God,” etc. Here he goes farther in opposition to the Plymouth theology than I desire; he “out-Herods” this wicked Herod, the reviewer. For I believe God has blessed many of his children by carrying them rapidly and happily through the assurance of faith to the assurance of hope. But when I teach his own doctrine in my poor way, he cannot away with it. When I write that “the true, though weak faith, of the beginner”—describing the admitted case of the beginner who is weak—not that of the beginner who is strong, of whom, blessed be God, there are at least some, “grows to the assured faith of the matured Christian,” meaning, obviously, the faith crowned with assured hope, “by self-examination, coupled with contrition, confessing and forsaking the defects detected, renewed acts of faith and watchfulness and holy living,” he exclaims that it wearies him even to think of it. But he is not wearied to think of his own way, “slow, laborious, painful”!

The question is launched at us, “What is to attest my faith, bright-eyed, far-seeing, swift-winged, world-conquering, heaven-scaling, heaven-born,” etc? Well, if it is all that, it needs nothing to attest it. But *whether it is all that* must be *attested by the word and Spirit of God*. This is M. N.’s own answer in a previous paragraph. As to the supposed alternative attestation, that of “our loathed works and ragged righteousnesses,” I remark first: since the works which are the fruits of true faith are precisely as “heaven-born” as the faith, both are the work of the Spirit. I do not quite understand how the work should be “loathsome,” and the faith so admirable. The works done in faith are indeed imperfect; but being the fruits of the Holy Spirit, it appears to me, the Christian, instead of loathing them, should humbly rejoice in the grace which wrought them. I remark second: that no scriptural believer relies on his works “to attest” his faith; but, on the contrary, he relies on the infallible word and Spirit to attest his works and faith both.

It is asked again: “Was this the way, viz., that described by me above, in which Old Testament and New Testament saints reached assurance of hope? I answer, yes. So those saints say

themselves. Owen is quoted as the prince of theologians in M. N.'s eyes, saying: "Assurance is based, not on the work of the Spirit in us, but on the communication of the Spirit to us, etc." If Owen means what M. N. understands the Bible saints, then in other places he contradicts himself, as here. These say (Psalm cxix. 6), "Then shall I not be ashamed, when I have respect unto all thy commandments." Psalm lxxxvi. 2: "Preserve my soul, for I am holy." 1 John iii. 21, 22: "Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God. And whatsoever we ask, we receive of him, because we keep his commandments." James ii. 18: "Show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." Jesus Christ, in John xv. 14: "Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you." 2 Peter i. 5-10: "Give diligence to assure yourselves [Greek] of your calling and election." How? By "giving all diligence to add to your faith, virtue," etc. 1 John iii. 14: "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." See also 1 John ii. 3. See Review.

This oldest wine is best!

REVIEWER.

HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.¹

WE have here this long-expected work at length completed, in three portly volumes, royal octavo. They are handsomely printed on firm, white paper of excellent body; but they are bound in flimsy muslin, in the flimsiest style of that despicable binding. Why will our modern publishers give the most weighty and enduring works to the public in a dress appropriate only to some worthless fiction, to be quickly, almost as quickly as it deserves, worn out and thrown away? This outrage upon the rights and the tastes of readers is aggravated by the fact, that the publishers have doubled the prices of their books upon us within the last ten years. Is double pay, for shabbier work, to be one of the signs of modern progress? So it seems.

Our general verdict upon the work of Dr. Hodge may be expressed very fairly by saying, that it is such a book as the Presbyterian public expected of him; for that public has been long accustomed to recognize, and, whenever writing upon a subject in his own proper department, to value very highly Dr. Hodge's characteristics. We find the work, then, learned, perspicuous, nervous, dogmatic and orthodox. The doctrine which it asserts is distinctly Calvinistic, without being ultra-Calvinism. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the work is the fulness of its refutations of the materialistic and atheistic infidelity on the one hand, and of the pantheistic speculations on the other, which are the banes of the recent movements in science. It seems apparent that the book has been enlarged, and the range of discussion widened, for the special purpose of dealing with these forms of skepticism. Among the other characteristics of this treatise which present themselves to a cursive examination may be noted the following:

1. Dr. Hodge asserts that our knowledge of God is "intuitive," and then argues for the proposition that there is a God. This

¹This article appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1873, reviewing *Systematic Theology*, by Charles Hodge, D. D. Charles Scribner & Co. 3 vols. 8vo.

argument, ignoring the usual theistic method in a manner rather marked, relies chiefly upon the ethical *phenomena* of the soul, from which it reasons with unusual fulness and force.

2. Those who have had the privilege of Dr. Hodge's conversation are aware that the denunciation of the claims of philosophy to be a true science has been rather a favorite topic with him; and this opinion is not obscurely indicated in his theology. Yet we know of no standard Reformed treatise which makes so much use of philosophy, or contains so large a proportion of philosophical speculation.

3. The author, under many heads of divinity, displays the multifarious forms of error with more fulness than his own views of what is true.

4. If we might judge by the author's citations in what directions his theological reading chiefly lay, we should conclude that German heresy, in its different forms, had received more of his attention than any other department, orthodox or heterodox. Next would come the works of the continental Protestants, Lutheran and Reformed. The teachers and leaders of Scotch and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism are very scantily noticed; and, so far as we now remember, there is not a single reference to the theology of the Anglican Church, or its great masters, to intimate that the author had ever heard of them. So American theology appears chiefly in the names of its heresiarchs, and for purposes of refutation.

5. Another marked peculiarity of the system is, the authority which it gives to the evangelical *consensus* of the children of God of all denominations, as presented in their hymnology, prayers, and devotional writings, rather than their technical and controversial. The author seems to elevate this almost into an authoritative, Protestant *tradition*. Discarding the folly of an infallible tradition in the bishops, through an apostolic succession, he claims that true believers—not in virtue of any ritualism or sacramentarian superstition, but in virtue of their effectual calling—are all infallibly taught of God. Hence, so far as we can discriminate the true from the spurious believers, and eliminate the modifications induced on their spiritual consciousness by accidents of training and prejudice, we have in the consciousness common to them all a correct representation of revealed truth. This source of authority, obviously, should be appealed to with

great caution. That it cannot be made a "rule of faith," coördinate with the sacred Scriptures, is very plain from this fact, that the parties to any debate would never agree as to the extent to which the qualifications which are stated above should be applied.

Since we have commended the general orthodoxy of this work, the points must of course be very few upon which we should feel constrained to dissent from the author's conclusions. We propose, with this cursory view of the merits of his work, to confine our remaining remarks to but two points of doctrine. The first, considered by us in a single aspect, is a point, to our apprehension, both intricate and important, and we venture to dissent from Dr. Hodge with diffidence; the more, because his views are supported by not a few of the great Reformed divines. And indeed his statement and arguments on the point we design to bring into debate are, in some respects, safer and more moderate than theirs.

In Vol. II., pp. 254, 255, the specific seat of original sin in man is discussed. First, the erroneous doctrines are discarded which place it primarily in the body, or in our senses and animal appetites. The author then proceeds: "A third doctrine is, that the heart, considered as the seat of the affections, as distinguished from the understanding, is the seat of natural depravity. This doctrine is connected with the idea that all sin and holiness are forms of feeling or states of the affections. And it is made the ground on which the nature of regeneration and conversion, the relation between repentance and faith, and other points of practical theology, are explained. Everything is made to depend on the state of the feelings. Instead of the affections following the understanding, the understanding, it is said, follows the affections. A man understands and receives the truth only when he loves it. Regeneration is simply a change in the state of the affections, and the only inability under which sinners labor, as to the things of God, is disinclination. In opposition to all these doctrines, Augustinianism, as held by the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, teaches that the whole man, soul and body, the higher as well as the lower, the intellectual as well as the emotional faculties of the soul, is affected by the corruption of our nature derived from our first parents."

This extract not only presents the point we wish to debate,

but gives us also a very characteristic specimen of Dr. Hodge's method as a debater. Under an appearance of simple Saxon straightforwardness, he most adroitly modifies, and by modifying, disparages the view he designs to assault, and gains credit for his own by associating it with unquestioned truth, and claiming for it, with a quiet dogmatism, the uniform adhesion of the orthodox learned. He seems to suggest that his answer to the question, Where is the specific seat of depravity? is that of Augustinianism, that it is the *soul*; whereas, the view which he really argues is, that the ultimate seat and source of depravity is in the intellect, as distinguished from the will. This is clear from the tenor of his arguments, as will appear. It is clear from his subsequent teaching on regeneration. Manifestly, wherever we place the ultimate seat or source of depravity, there also we must place the primary, quickening touch of regeneration. Now, in Vol. III., p. 17, while we find Dr. Hodge saying, "It is the soul which is spiritually dead; and it is to the soul that a new principle of life, controlling all its exercises, whether of the intellect, the sensibility, the conscience, or the will, is imparted," we see him add these words: "In the order of nature, knowledge or spiritual discernment is *antecedent* and causatively related to all holy exercises of the feelings and affections." These words disclose his real theory; and this is the theory which he really holds and argues in the place first cited; there coolly assuming that it is the theory of the Reformed Confessions and divines. These do indeed teach that "the whole man" is depraved, and that the soul, more specifically, is the seat of depravity; but we are yet to learn that they unanimously, or even generally, countenance this peculiar theory of Drs. Hodge, Alexander and Dick, which makes the intellect, as distinguished from the will, the ultimate source of depravity in man. Take, by the way, this from a doctrinal declaration of the Reformed Church of France, at the National Synod of Alençon: "Nor doth he only powerfully illuminate the understanding by the Holy Ghost. But by the effectual power of the same spirit of regeneration, he *pierceth even into the inward recesses of their souls, openeth the heart, and infuseth new qualities into their will.*" This plainly teaches that the evil *habitus* of the sinner's will is not only distinct from the blindness of his understanding, but is a more interior evil. So the familiar words of

our own Confession, on effectual calling, tell us that God not only "enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ," but also "renews our wills." The latter work, surely, is not a mere natural consequence of the former?

So when Dr. Hodge would describe the doctrine he seeks to overthrow, he suggests that its advocates believe the soul is depraved or regenerated, not as a *monad*, but by parts or faculties. They hold no such thing; they only dissent from his order of causation between the soul's respective faculties in their depraved or their sanctified actings. He represents them as reducing all sin and holiness to "forms of feeling or states of the affections." What they really teach is, that sin or holiness, in its last analysis, is a wrong or a right *habitus* (not *consuetudo* merely) of the will; which *habitus* is the rudimental cause, or regulative principle of all the "forms of feeling." He charges upon them that the "only inability" they can consistently hold is "disinclination" to the things of God. They hold that the root of inability is in this hostile *habitus* of the will, out of which as a source all "disinclinations" to duty arise; and that blindness of mind is also a consequent part of the sinner's inability, so real as to require divine grace to remove it. Is not this the analysis of the best and greatest of the Reformed divines, as Turretin?

But we beg leave to re-state our view in our own way, instead of Dr. Hodge's. The soul is a unit, *a monad*, not constituted, as material things are, of parts or members, but endowed with faculties which are *distinct modes of its indivisible activity*. These, according to the psychology of the Bible and of common sense, fall into the three divisions of intelligence, will and sensibility—the latter class being passive powers. By the word "will," in this discussion, we mean, not the specific power of volition, but that which the Reformed divines and our Confession mean by it, the whole active powers of man's spontaneity; what Sir William Hamilton terms "the conative powers"; *i. e.*, the whole faculty of active desire and purpose. While the soul is simply passive only in its sensibilities, and its functions of intelligence are its own self-directed functions, yet it is by its will, or conative powers, that it is an agent, or puts forth its spontaneity. Now, the soul is depraved as a soul, and is regenerated as a soul; not by patches or parts, seeing it has no parts. But we

conceive that this obvious fact is entirely consistent with the proposition, that sin (or holiness) affects the soul as to one of its faculties more primarily than the others. And let us remark here once for all, that it is entirely inconsistent in Dr. Hodge, to object the simplicity of the soul to those who think, with us, that sin affects the soul rudimentally in the faculty of will, and consequentially in those of understanding and sensibility, when he himself teaches, *vice versa*, that sin affects it rudimentally in the faculty of intelligence, and consequentially in those of will and sensibility. For, if the fact that the soul is a unit refutes us, it equally refutes him. Both opinions would in that case be out of the question equally, and the debate impossible. Again: Dr. Hodge, and those who think with him, dwell much on the complexity of the soul's acts, as involving at once two or more of its faculties or modes of function. They tell us that an act of understanding accompanies every act of desire or choice. True. But they themselves go on to assert a relation of causation between the intellective element and the conative element, as to the production or rise of the concrete act of soul. Why, then, may not we assign a causative relation to the one or the other of these two elements, as to the moral quality of that concrete act of soul? We shall find the divines we indicate (as Chalmers, A. Alexander and Hodge), when hardly bestead to sustain their peculiar views on this point, resorting very freely to the statements, that the soul is a unit; that it is depraved or regenerated as a unit; that it acts as a unit; that it performs one concrete function often through two or more faculties, which act, not separately as members, but only distinguishably as modes of function. We repeat, all this is granted; but it is irrelevant. For it would, if it proved anything in the case, as much preclude the one causative order as the other. It would be as unreasonable to say "the understanding guides the will," as to say "the will sways the understanding." Let this be remembered.

We have thus disencumbered the issue which we wish to examine. It is this: In defining depravity, are we to place the rudimentary element of the sinful nature in the blinded understanding misleading the spontaneity, and thus qualifying the soul as a whole morally evil? Such is the view of the divines named. Or, are we to find it rudimentally in the perverted *habitus* of the will, causatively corrupting and blinding the

understanding, and thus qualifying the soul as a whole morally evil? Such is our understanding of the Scriptures and of the Reformed theology. The question is, as we shall see, not a mere psychological curiosity, but has important consequences. If the opinion of Dr. Hodge is correct, then regeneration is primarily illumination, and secondarily and consequentially, revolution of will. If our opinion is right, then regeneration is rudimentally and causatively revolution of will, and consequentially illumination. And, moreover, if Dr. Hodge's opinion is the true one, it would be more consistent for him to teach with Dr. A. Alexander (*Thoughts on Religious Experience*, Chap. VI.), and with Dr. Dick (Lecture 66), or even with Claude Pajon of the French Church, that the Holy Ghost operates only mediately, through the truth, in revolutionizing the will. If our opinion is the true one, then it is consistent to teach, with the French Reformed, and the whole current of the great Reformed divines, that the Holy Ghost operates not only mediately, but also immediately and supernaturally, in revolutionizing the will. On this point Dr. Hodge is in one place (Vol. III., p. 17), consistently erroneous, as it appears to us; but in Vol. II., under the head of "Efficacious Grace," he emphatically and largely teaches what is inconsistently correct. For he there asserts a regeneration by immediate grace in the strongest and most satisfactory form, and even declares himself almost ready to say with Owen, against Dr. Alexander and the Reformed European divines, that it is a "*physical*" effect of supernatural grace.

But that we may do no injustice, let us distinguish. Among those who explain depravity and regeneration by the theory that the understanding universally leads the will, there appear to be four grades of opinion. The lowest is that of the Pelagian, who denies all evil *habitus* of will, regards regeneration as a mere self-determination to a new purpose of living, and holds that it is wrought simply by the moral suasion of the truth. This virtually leaves out the Holy Ghost. The second is that of the semi-Pelagian, who holds that the will is not indeed dead in sin, but that it is greatly corrupted by evil desires, cares of this world, bad example, and evil habits, [*consuetudines*, not *habitus*]. Hence gospel truth never engages the soul's attention strongly enough to exert an efficacious moral suasion, until the Holy Ghost calms and fixes the mind upon it by his gracious, suasive

influence. The truth, thus gaining access to the soul, regenerates it. The third class, disclaiming all semi-Pelagianism, hold that the truth ought to, and would control the will, if clearly and fully seen; but that, in virtue of the natural blindness of the understanding, which they regard as the source of depravity, the truth cannot be thus seen until the mind is divinely illuminated; and this illumination, a true, gracious, spiritual and efficacious work, is regeneration. As soon as that is done, the truth spiritually seen revolutionizes the will by its natural power; for the will must always follow the prevalent dictate of the understanding. Such was most probably the scheme of Claude Pajon. The fourth class is that of Dr. Alexander, Dr. Dick, and we presume, of Dr. Hodge. Holding that the rudiments of our depravity are in the blinded understanding primarily, and in the perverted will derivatively, they also hold that illumination is regeneration; but they add that, in order for this illumination, a supernatural operation on the mind itself is necessary. And that operation is the causative source of conversion. This distinguishes their scheme from that of Pajon. This also saves their orthodoxy; yet, we repeat, it seems to us an inconsistent orthodoxy in one particular. We ask them: Is that immediate operation of the Holy Ghost—that prerequisite of illumination—the sovereign and immediate revolution in the *habitus* of the will? And they answer, No; for that would imply the view which we hold, and they disclaim it, as to the radical source of moral quality in the soul. What then is the operation? They reply: We do not know; it is inscrutable, being back of consciousness. But to us it appears, that if illumination of the understanding is the whole direct efficiency of the Holy Ghost in regeneration, it is more natural and consistent to stop where Pajon stops, with a mediate conversion through the truth.

The second doctrinal application must be to determine the nature of faith. If intellectual blindness is the ultimate trait of depravity, and supernatural illumination is the essential work of regeneration, then faith, which is the characteristic action of the soul as regenerated and instrumental organ of its redemption, must be a simple belief of the truth. But if our view is held, then regeneration is primarily a sovereign, immediate revolution of the will (having illumination as its divine attendant), and faith is a receiving and resting upon Christ for salvation. Dr.

Alexander is thoroughly consistent. He says boldly: Yes, saving faith, separated from its adjuncts, is simple belief of truth. It differs from historical faith, saith he, not in the *nature* of the function of mind, but in the *degree of strength* with which the mind of the renewed man grasps the gospel truth. The man of dead faith accepts intellectually the same truths which sanctify and save the believer, but with too unsteady a grasp. When he is reminded that man "believeth *with the heart* unto righteousness," and that the gospel's essential proposal is rather of spiritual good to the choice than of speculative truth to the assent, he resorts again to his plea that the soul is a *monad*. Intelligence and choice, he argues, are but two modes of function of this unit soul. May not the two functions be differentiated only objectively? There is no moral appetency or choice without intelligence. May not all the difference between the soul seeing and the soul choosing be the objective difference? May not the function of intelligence be as essentially a moral one, as that of appetency and choice; be, in fact, the same function? This strikes us as exceedingly subtle and ingenious. Indeed, he stands, to our apprehension, unrivalled in such *acumen*. But it is erroneous. The soul is one; yet its modes of function are truly more than one; and they are differentiated subjectively, as well as objectively; truly, as well as seemingly. An apparatus to measure caloric is a thermometer. An apparatus to measure moisture is a hygrometer. The latter could not become a thermometer merely by being applied to the measurement of caloric. The difference of the two objects is great enough to require an essential difference of mode in measuring the two. So it is obvious to common sense and to consciousness, that while moral desire and choice are intelligent, choice and desire are not intellection, and intellection is not choice. The evasion is vain; and Dr. Alexander's definition of faith as simply belief of truth, while consistent with his and Dr. Hodge's premises, is defective and unscriptural. Here we might appeal to the arguments usually advanced by theological text-books, to show that, according to the Scriptures, faith is an act of the soul performed both by the will and the intelligence; but to the well-informed reader it would be superfluous.

Dr. Hodge, on this point, departs from the teaching of his venerable predecessor with a fortunate inconsistency. In defin-

ing faith, he tells us, first, that the rudimental idea of the word, in both the sacred languages, is *trust*; secondly, that religious faith, in its generic aspect, is conviction of the truth on divine testimony; and, thirdly, that saving faith is, specifically, both assenting to and embracing the gospel promise on the authority of that testimony. We give, not his precise words, but his abbreviated thought.

The third point of doctrine involved in this debate is the relation of faith and repentance. If the rudimental element of depravity is blindness of mind, and regeneration is primarily illumination, then faith should be defined as assent to gospel truth simply, and repentance should be defined as the consequence of saving faith, and invariably subsequent to it. To this last point Dr. Hodge would assent. But if our scheme is the true one, that depravity is rudimentally a perverted *habitus* of will accompanied by a consequent blinding of the mind, and regeneration is primarily an almighty revolution of the will resulting in illumination, then faith is a "receiving and resting upon Christ for salvation," ("with the heart man believeth unto righteousness,") and *μετάνοια*, or a turning of the heart from sin to God, is implicitly involved in the specific act of saving faith. And this we believe to be the teaching of the Scriptures. Let us not be misunderstood; we know that every moral emotion implies, as its condition, a corresponding act of intelligence; so that there can be no godly sorrow in the heart where there is no light in the head. We suppose that what Dr. Hodge calls "generic faith," conviction of truth on divine testimony, is implied as *a priori* in evangelical repentance. But, on the other hand, some affection of godly sorrow is implied in the specific action of saving faith embracing Christ for salvation. For saving faith receives his salvation, not as a speculative truth to be assented to, but a spiritual good to be embraced. Will the soul embrace it, except as it values and desires it? Surely not. Hence this appetency of the will for salvation prompts the faith. And what is this appetency but *μετάνοια*? For, as our Confession hath it, faith embraceth Christ "as he is offered to us in the gospel." But he is offered to us as a *Saviour from sin*. He who embraces him must do it, therefore, because, feeling sin to be an evil *per se*, he desires deliverance from it, and not from its penalty merely. But that feeling, we repeat, is *μετάνοια*, at least

in rudiment. It thus appears that the essential difference between saving faith on the one hand, and historical or temporary faith on the other, is, that the first has repentance implicit in it as its *a priori* condition. When we say this, we do not at all deny that faith also reciprocally stimulates repentance. Nor do we deny that from the moment faith begins to work, hope, gratitude and love, in view of the cross, become new and powerful incentives to repentance, and thenceforward characterize it with new tenderness. Such seems to us to be the representation of the Scriptures. See those numerous places in the Old Testament, where "to turn" (שׁוּב) is the instrumental condition of salvation (as "believe" is in the New Testament), as Ezek. xviii. 32; Jer. xxxi. 19. See also those like Acts ii. 38, where the apostles seem to be as willing to answer the question, What must be done in order to be saved? with "Repent," as with "Believe." How are these answers to be explained? Are there two different ways for sinners to be saved? Surely not. Then, repentance and faith must be much nearer the same thing than those represent them who make repentance an emotion, and faith a mental conviction. We can only explain them by saying, that both involve a function of the regenerate will, and that repentance is implicit of faith. Again, is it not significant that, in so many places where the two are mentioned, repentance is named first? Mark i. 15; Acts ii. 38 ("baptism for remission" expressing faith); Acts v. 31; xx. 21. Lastly: The Scriptures expressly speak of faith as prompted by repentance, or as conditioned on it. Matt. xxi. 32: "And ye, when ye had seen it, *repented not afterward, that ye might believe him.*" So in 2 Tim. ii. 25: "In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if peradventure God will give them *repentance to the acknowledging of the truth.*" So, again, God traces the unbelief, which is the opposite of faith, to the hatred of the good as its cause. 2 Thes. ii. 10-12; and Rom. i. 28. That hatred is the opposite of repentance.

We may be reminded that it is a peculiarity of the Arminian theology, that they make repentance precede faith in the order of production. This is true; but they make both repentance and faith precede regeneration; and therein is the dangerous feature. Let us say, with the Scriptures, that repentance and faith are both the exercises of a regenerate soul, and of none other; this danger will then be gone.

Having thus shown the theological results of the question under debate, we return to it in order to present the more immediate arguments, logical and scriptural, for our view of that question. The sketch which we have presented, of its bearings upon the four doctrines of original sin, regeneration, faith and repentance, contained, unavoidably, several anticipations of these arguments. The careful reader will be able to make the application of them for himself; and we will avoid repetition of them as far as is practicable.

When we distribute the powers of the soul under their three heads of intellect, will and sensibility, it seems obvious to mature reflection, that depravity and holiness have their primary seat in the will, as related to the intellect and sensibility, rather than in the intellect as related to the will. It is *the soul*, and not a faculty separate from the soul, which is depraved or sanctified; yet this diseased or healthy state of soul qualifies it as to its function of spontaneity primarily, and of intellect and sensibility consequentially. In support of this, we advance this simple argument: by its function of intelligence the soul *sees*; by its will it *acts*. Some philosophers have disputed the justice of our making the conative powers the *active* powers of the soul; and they say that the soul as truly acts in conceiving, or judging, as in desiring or choosing. This is ambiguous. True, the soul, in conceiving and judging, *is performing a function of its own*; but it is not therein intrinsically exerting its spontaneity. The sophism is here: When the soul conceives or judges, there is an exercise of its spontaneity, oftentimes, *in directing its attention by will* to a particular object of conception or judgment. But that directing of the attention is not strictly cognition; it is a function of the conative powers accompanying cognition. Set aside this, and it will be evident to any man who examines his own consciousness, that cognition is not *an act* of the soul in the sense in which the conative functions are; and that is the sense of this argument. Now, does not common sense teach us, that moral responsibility attaches to those acts and states of soul which it puts forth from itself, by its spontaneity, more primarily than to those with which it is affected by causes out of itself?

Dr. Hodge, in one place, attempts to show that moral responsibility does not primarily qualify our acts of spontaneity, but rather our acts of intelligence, by this view: Brutes and maniacs

have spontaneity, but they have no moral quality. Why? Because their spontaneity is irrational. It is only when you have intelligence guiding spontaneity that you find moral quality. We reply: the fact is as alleged. The presence of intelligence is a condition requisite to moral action. But that this is short of proving the intelligence to be the primary seat of the moral quality appears very simply thus: The presence of conative power is also a condition requisite to moral action. Dr. Hodge would doubtless admit that a mere power of conceiving notions, without dispositions, preference or choice, could not be a *person* at all, nor have character. Yet Dr. Hodge would not admit that the conative function was the seat of the moral character. Now, we ask: What is it that completes our idea of personality? It is will. Cognition, merely as such, abstracted from acts of voluntary attention—which may, or may not attend it—is an involuntary function. Witness the fact that multitudes of percepts and concepts affect our minds without any movement of desire or volition whatever, the former from objective sources, the latter from the instinctive law of suggestion. *This* is the decisive feature which, according to common sense, forbids our regarding the cognitive acts of the soul as those by which it is primarily qualified with moral character.

This naturally introduces to our notice another attempt which our author makes to argue his view, from the fact that men are morally responsible for their opinions and beliefs. He says, that to make the will the primary seat of moral character involves the vicious conclusion, that intellectual belief is irresponsible—a proposition contrary to all Scripture and sound ethics. This instance, when examined, will be found against him. The truth is, that some of our opinions and beliefs *are* morally indifferent; for many of them we are strictly responsible. And these last are precisely the opinions *which involve a moral element*. No man becomes more *virtuous* by ascertaining that the two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. But a man does become more *vicious* by persuading himself that trust, obedience and gratitude towards Christ are not his duty. Now, when the skeptic comes and argues that he is not responsible for any opinion heartily adopted, because intellectual conviction is the involuntary consequence of evidence seen, how do we refute him? By showing that *no morally erroneous conviction*

could be heartily established, without an immoral, voluntary cause. This is the true, analytic answer to his licentious inference! So that these very cases confirm our view,—that the moral character of our intellectual convictions, of which many do have such character, has its source in the voluntary states and acts of the soul.

The view we contest, on the other hand, seems to endanger the destruction of our responsibility, by making sin an involuntary result of intellectual conditions. For such are man's moral intuitions, that if he is taught that a certain action was the regular, certain and involuntary result of a mental view with which neither disposition nor choice could have anything to do, in such a sense that, the mental view being what it was, the action must still have inevitably been what it was, no matter how right the feelings, disposition and choice may have been, he will certainly answer, "Then the agent cannot be blamable."

Dr. Alexander criticizes those who argue our conclusion from the assertion that the action of the will is moral, and that of the intellect is not, and who call the will the "moral faculty" in man. He remarks very correctly, that this is erroneous, that neither intellect nor will is the "moral faculty" in man; for not one in a hundred of the acts of either have properly any moral character. The ratio is probably stated too strongly. He then adds that there is a third faculty, which alone deserves to be called "the moral faculty;" and that is *conscience*. We conceive that Dr. Alexander might have increased the plausibility of this part of his argument very much, by proceeding to argue, as he does in his *Moral Science*, that conscience, so far as it is a judging faculty, and distinguished from its emotional element, which is secondary, is itself a function of the intelligence—a rational function. He might then have put his conclusion thus: "Conscience is the true and only moral faculty in man. But the judgments of conscience—the rudimental part of its function—are rational; therefore the reason is the true seat of sin or holiness." This would have been consistent. Yet it would have laid him open to this refutation, which is also implicitly in his own statement: that therefore the moral goodness of a good man is primarily in this, that he has a *true conscience*; and the moral badness of a bad man primarily in this, that he has a *false conscience*. That is: it would follow from Dr. Alexander's view,

that the opposite moral states of the two men were primarily in their opposite moral judgments. But now, it is not true that good and bad men always, or even generally, have opposite moral judgments. The two men probably have the same judgments of conscience in the main; and the difference mainly is, that the good man *obeys*, and the bad man *disobeys* those common judgments. It is true that conscience is the faculty which is our moral guide; but then our moral quality as persons is in our conformity or enmity to that guidance. What is it, in us, that is conformed or opposed to that guidance? *Primarily, the will.* And this brings our debate, it appears to us, up to that scriptural test which is the decisive one. It so happens that the Holy Ghost has given us an exact definition of the idea of sin. ‘*Ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, (1 John iii. 4), which our catechism imitates. The νόμος, the standard, is, first, the law of our moral nature written on our hearts by our Creator; and, secondly, his revealed precepts taught to our intellects. The sin consists, according to John, in lack of conformity to that standard. We repeat the question: What is it in sinful man which is not conformed to that standard? Every sinner's consciousness answers: *partially the reason*, but *chiefly and primarily the will*, and thence consequentially, the animal appetites and bodily members. The soul has three classes of powers: the intellectual, the conative and the passive sensibilities. These last are passive powers—*susceptibilities*, rather than *faculties*; hence the root of sin cannot be primarily in them; for they are acted on, rather than act. The first, the intellectual powers, by their moral judgments, furnish us the standard of reference; and our rational intuitions are, that so far as conscience, the rational faculty applied to moral objects, accompanied with its peculiar sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, is correctly informed by God's precepts, and is not misinformed by the will, this conscience is the correct and the imperative standard of right and wrong. There remains, then, the second class of powers, the conative, the will; in which must be found the spring of personal, moral character; of good character, if the will is conformed, of bad character, if it is opposed to the rational standard. This scriptural view is confirmed by one remark: Let any one collect as many as he can of those acts of men to which the Scriptures and theologians appeal as *a posteriori*

proofs of native depravity, and he will find that they all fall under this common predication, that in them the will opposes itself obstinately to the soul's own moral judgments. This, in fine, is the analytic statement of that universal fact in which the moral disorder and ruin of man's soul manifests itself.

The reasonings which we have attempted to answer seem to us to involve this illusion: that because man is a reasonable agent, his spontaneity is but a modification of his reason. But is this so? Is not this sufficiently refuted by the fact which Dr. Hodge cites against us, that other creatures have a spontaneity which have no reason? In truth, spontaneity is an ultimate fact of human consciousness, and an ultimate power of the soul, as much so as reason. It is coördinate in primariness and simplicity with the power of reason. It has its own original *habitus*, its "disposition," which re-acts on the reason as truly as it is acted on. Against this view some may cry out: "Then the action of a man's spontaneity might be no more a rational action than the pulsation of his heart!" We reply: The instance is unfair, because the will is not a separate member, like that muscle called "heart" in the body; but it is a mode of function of the soul, a spiritual unit. And that soul which wills is a *rational unit*; so that all action of will is the action of a rational agent. But we concede that spontaneity is sometimes unconsciously irrational; and *that is lunacy*. Oftentimes it is contra-rational; and *that is sinfulness*. Sometimes, by God's grace, we find it truly conformed to reason; and *that is holiness*.

But the favorite plea of the fathers who differ from us is, that it is the recognized doctrine of all sound philosophers, that the will follows the prevalent judgment of the intellect. They say: "Man feels as his mind sees; the view of the mind therefore must direct or govern the feeling; and the prevalent last judgment must decide the will." It is from this statement Dr. Hodge infers that depravity and holiness must be ultimately traced to the intellect; Dr. Dick infers that the revolution of the will, in effectual calling, is the natural effect of true illumination; and Dr. Alexander infers that a faith which is simply full conviction of the truth is all we need to make the soul embrace salvation and duty. This psychological law we fully admit: it is what defines man as a reasonable agent. That is, granted that the prevalent judgment of the intellect be of a given nature on

a specific subject, then the feeling and choice of the soul on that subject will of course correspond. But the analysis stops one step too short. Whence the kind of view and judgment which the intellect is found to have on that given subject? Is it always of a purely intellectual origin? This is tacitly assumed, but erroneously. Let the subject be one of a moral nature, involving an object of choice or desire, and it will be found that *there* the heart has taught the head; the opinion is the echo of the disposition; the power of spontaneity, coördinate with that of intelligence, has announced its own original *habitus*. Let us explain: A child tastes experimentally, candies, sweetmeats, honey, sugar. In each case his palate is gratified. On this similarity of power to gratify the palate his mind constructs a generalization, forms the class of "sweet things," and concludes the general judgment: "Sweet things are good." Now, this general judgment may be as truly and purely accounted an intellectual process as the arithmetical one that a larger subtrahend must make a smaller remainder. And it may be said that in every subsequent desire and purpose to seek the "sweet things," the child's will follows this intellectual judgment. Very true. And yet it is none the less true, that the judgment is itself a generalization of a series of acts of appetency—the mere echo of the instinctive verdict of an animal appetite. So that in its last analysis, the causation of the choice is traced up, through the intellect, to a law of the spontaneity.

We shall be reminded that the instance we have chosen gives us only an animal appetite, a phenomenon of animal spontaneity; whereas the thing in debate is moral emotion and choice, which is always rational emotion and choice. This we fully admit, and we advance the instance only for an illustration. Perhaps it is a clumsy one. But has not the will as real, and as original, appetencies as the palate? When we call the former rational, moral desires, what do we mean? That disposition is nothing but a modification of thought? We apprehend that our meaning is this: the intellect is *the faculty by which* we conceive the object of the moral appetency; as in the case of the animal appetite, the nerves of sensation are the *medium* by which we perceive the sweet object. Yet in the moral phenomenon there is an original disposition of will, which is as truly a spiritual appetency as the bodily appetite is an animal appetency. If we are correct

in this, we shall find that the judgments generalized in the mind, as to the desirableness of moral good or evil, however purely intellectual, when abstracted from their source, are yet but the echoes of the original, or regenerated appetencies of the will. Let us now apply this analysis to the sinner's conversion. Why does the renewed sinner embrace Christ as a Saviour from sin, by his faith; and new obedience instead of sin, by his repentance? Because his understanding, illuminated by grace, now judges clearly that salvation and new obedience are not only the obligatory, but the preferable good. Such is our brethren's answer; and we fully assent. Were it not so, the new choice would not be rational, and so not spiritual. But now, one question more: How came this illuminated intellect to judge the salvation from sin, and the new obedience, the preferable good, when the original, native disposition of the will was to prefer the sin and dislike the obedience? It was only because the Holy Ghost sovereignly revolutionized the disposition of will. *This* was the primary cause; illumination the immediate consequence; and faith and repentance the practical result. Thus the profound Pascal, (*Pensees*, 1re Partie., Sec. III.): "God alone can put divine truths into the soul, and by the mode which pleases him. I know he hath willed them to enter from the heart into the mind, and not from the mind into the heart, in order to humble the proud power of reasoning, which presumes to be judge of the things the will chooses, and in order to heal this infirm will, which has wholly corrupted itself by its unworthy attachments. And hence it results, that while, in speaking of human affairs, men say: One must know in order to love, which hath passed into a proverb; the saints on the contrary say, in speaking of divine things: One must love in order to know."

But the decisive appeal should be, not to philosophy, but to the Scriptures. These would seem to sustain our view in a multitude of places, where sin and depravity are traced to an "evil heart," a "hardened heart"; and holiness to a "pure heart"; or where regeneration is a cleansing of the heart, a giving of a fleshly heart. But we are reminded that the Hebrews, and after them the New Testament writers, used the word "heart" in a comprehensive sense, equivalent to that of "soul," or "inner man." We are pointed to the numerous places in which the functions

of intellect are referred to the "heart," as in the phrases, "an understanding heart"; "blindness of heart"; "thoughts of the heart"; "laying up (*scil.*, a remembrance) in the heart." Thus it is sought to prove that all the declarations of the Scriptures about "a good or an evil heart," may mean no more than a good or an evil mind, or soul. Now, upon this class of passages we remark, that the word "heart" is used with great frequency in the Scriptures. Its first literal meaning is, the corporeal organ; and its first tropical or immaterial meaning is, the feelings, desires, and volitions of the soul. Thence it means, secondly, the "inner man," regarded from the point of view of that which is invisible, enclosed within, as the bodily organ is. Thus, in 1 Peter iii. 4: "Let the adorning [of the Christian woman] be the hidden man of the heart." Thirdly, "heart" hence comes to mean soul, the spirit which feels; and it has this meaning often when the soul's cognitive function is the thing predicated. But it should be noted, that *this occurs usually when the subject of thought is moral*; as in the classical text, God saw that "every imagination of the *thought of man's heart was evil*." Now, the extensive use of the word "heart" for "soul," the agent which feels and thinks, must certainly be explained by admitting an intimate relation between these two faculties; and a relation especially intimate when the objects of thought and feeling are moral. But does this fact authorize our brethren to say that the Scriptures intend to assign right thought as the source of right feeling, instead of the reverse? Hardly. Were we to seize upon this phrase, "a feeling mind," in their writings, to prove that they meant to teach that feeling is the source of intellect, they would demur. Then, the counterpart phrase, "a thinking heart," does not imply that thought is the source of feeling. It only implies an intimate relation of the powers of thought and feeling.

But there are Scriptures which not only do this, but do also assign an order; and with reference to moral objects, the order of relation is *from the heart to the head*. Here we claim all the texts already cited touching the relation of repentance to faith. We claim also Mark iii. 5, where Jesus disapproved the Pharisees' theory of sabbath observance; and this because he was "grieved at the hardness of their heart." So, in Eph. iv. 18: Gentiles "have the understanding (*ὁράουσα*) darkened, being

alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness (or hardness, *πώρωσις*) of their heart." Here the apostle distinctly traces sinful ignorance to the heart for its source. Nor can this be evaded by saying that heart here means "soul," "mind"; for this would be flagrantly violent exegesis. When the apostle has designedly introduced a distinct reference to the state of the cognitive faculty by his own most discriminative word, *δάνοια*, and then evidently designs to refer to the conative faculties of the soul by the recognized word for them, *καρδία*, will any one say he shall not teach what he aims to teach? Had he still meant "understanding," we presume he would have still said "*δάνοια*" in the last member of the verse. Permit such interpretation, and next *we* shall meet this fate, viz.: that when we are trying our best to say that, in spiritual things, "the heart leads the head," we shall be told: "No, you do not mean that; you use the word 'heart' in the comprehensive sense of 'soul'; you mean that the head leads the head!"

We are also referred to many passages where, as our brethren understand them, regeneration is described as illumination, and depravity as blindness. "To turn them from darkness to light." "God," says Paul, "was pleased to reveal his Son in me." "The eyes of the understanding being enlightened." "Sanctify them through thy truth." "Renewed in knowledge after the image," etc. "God hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." We reply that regeneration doubtless includes illumination, as an essential and glorious part thereof. But it is a different thing to say that regeneration is only illumination. Should we force these Scriptures to assert the latter, we should only make the Bible contradict itself, when it describes a quickening or revolutionizing work of divine grace, which is in order to illumination, and therefore prior in causation.

We are thus led back to that application of our theory which is at once its best illustration and most important use; its bearing upon the doctrine that the Holy Ghost in regeneration operates, not only mediately through the Word, but also immediately and supernaturally. This Drs. Hodge and Alexander stoutly and sincerely assert, along with all sound Calvinists. What we claim is, that we can assert it more consistently than they, with their peculiar theory of sin and holiness. For, to re-

peat, if sin has its rudimental seat in the intellect, then the quickening which begins the conversion from sin must operate in the same place. If blindness of mind is the radical source of moral error, light is the proper remedy; and that light is revealed truth. That blindness too is spiritual blindness, for the sinner is not a lunatic; he is in possession of his natural faculties, and can perceive secular and scientific, and even some moral truths. From this point of view, it appears to us, the theory of Claude Pajon that the Holy Ghost needs to operate only through the truth, in producing spiritual vision, is more consistent than the orthodox one of Drs. Alexander and Hodge. Dr. Alexander, referring to Ps. cxix. 18: "Open thou mine eyes that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law," justly remarks, that two things are needed to effectuate actual vision in a blinded eye: first, the surgeon's agency restoring the faculty of vision; and, secondly, the presence of light, the proper *medium*. Now this is a just thing for us to say, but not for him; because he cannot explain what it is that the spiritual surgery needs to remove from the intellect in order to the admission of the *light*. For he does not hold to a corruption of will as cause of the darkening of the mind.

The theory of Pajon, and its rejection by the Reformed divines, are so instructive in this connection that we beg leave to state it more fully. Chaufepié (*Historical and Critical Dictionary*) gives full and authentic explanations, often in the words of that distinguished divine. Pajon repudiated the phrase, "mediate operation," which his adversaries applied to his doctrine, and preferred to state it thus: "Regeneration is one sole and the same act, which should be referred to the Holy Ghost as principal cause, and to the Word, and other means of grace, as organs, of which he serves himself to act on us." In a private conference with the distinguished J. Claude, Messrs. Lenfant and de La Bastide, in Paris, Pajon explained himself in the following propositions: 1. Men are born sinners. 2. This original sin is strengthened by all actual transgressions, until God converts them. 3. This corruption is too deep for any sinner to be converted, without efficacious grace working in him to will and to do. 4. The efficacy of this grace is not dependent on the self-determination of the man, but is in the grace itself, and is invincible. 5. This grace is not merely an exterior, but an *interior*

light, penetrating the understanding, necessarily filling it with knowledge of the true good, *which knowledge necessarily leads the will from the world to God.* 6. Although this grace is invincible, yet the conversion which it works is a movement of the man's free-will; because the will is drawn or necessitated to follow the gospel precepts *only by this gracious knowledge of our true good.* So that it is possible the man might resist it if he chose; but it is impossible that when this grace is applied he shall choose to resist. 7. In giving us this knowledge of our true good, which necessarily works our conversion, the Holy Ghost usually employs the ministry of the word; which is for that reason called the "seed of our regeneration" and "ministration of the Holy Ghost." 8. Besides the word, God also employs providential means (as *e. g.*, good examples, chastisements, removals of temptation, etc.), all of which, along with the word, God so dispenses as to make them efficacious organs, in each given case, of conversion.

It was this statement of Pajon from which M. Claude and his friends, after mature reflection, dissented, as virtually involving the Pelagian errors of moral suasion, mediate foreknowledge, and universal call; and as contrary to those Scriptures which, like Acts xvi. 14; Ps. cxix. 18; Eph. i. 17, 18, teach that God performs on the heart an immediate sovereign work, which is *in order to the entrance* of saving truth. Two or three Provincial Synods, the government not allowing any National Synod to meet, joined in this condemnation. We add to this point, so justly taken, these other testimonies: Jer. xxxi. 33; Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27; Luke xxiv. 45.

We argue, secondly, against this conception of depravity and regeneration, and in favor of the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost, that were the former scheme true, even as set forth by Dr. Dick, faith would be in order to the regeneration of the will. However he might eliminate any sequence of time, if "this gracious knowledge necessarily leads the will from the world to God," it remains clear, that faith as cause must precede this first renewal of the will. But the Scriptures make faith the *fruit* of renewal.

Thirdly. The analytical exposure of the absurdity of the Pelagian scheme, regeneration by moral suasion, results ultimately in this, namely: that the state of disposition determines

a priori whether any given object presented to the soul shall be of the nature of objective inducement or not. Moral suasion is that influence over the will which objects of natural or moral excellence presented from without are supposed to have as inducements to right feeling and choice. Now, any object whatsoever is not inducement to any being whatsoever. One cannot attract a hungry horse with bacon, nor a hungry man with hay. Whether the object shall be inducement depends upon its relation to the existing appetency of the being to be influenced. And that state of appetency is obviously related, as cause, to the influence of the inducement as occasion. Hence, if the sinner's will is naturally indisposed and disabled to all spiritual good, that good cannot exert moral suasion over that will, for the simple reason that the effect cannot reverse its own cause. Such is the argument, and it is exhaustive. But now, who does not see that this analysis proceeds upon our theory: that the will has its own disposition, original, characteristic? If the *habitus* of the will is nothing else than a modification of the intelligence, and the sinner's intellect is adequate to the mere intellectual apprehension of moral truth, as it is, we see no reason why moral suasion might not be expected to "lead the will necessarily from the world to God."

Fourthly. Dr. Hodge expounds, with peculiar force and fulness, the solemn fact that there is a "common grace" of the Holy Ghost (which is not "common *sufficient* grace") convincing men of sin and misery up to a certain grade, but not renewing them. Now this partial, spiritual light in unrenewed minds must be correct light as far as it goes, for it is the Spirit's. Yet it does not even partially subdue the enmity of those minds to God and duty. The usual effect is to inflame it. See Rom. vii. 8, 9. It appears, then, that light, without immediate grace revolutionizing the will, does not effect the work. Nor is the evasion just, that this conviction of duty inflames the carnal enmity, only because depravity has made it a distorted and erroneous view of duty. We assert that convicted but unrenewed souls fight against God and duty, not because he is misconceived, but because he begins to be rightly conceived. There is of course distortion of mental view concerning him as long as sin reigns; but he is now feared and hated, not only because of that error of view; rather is he the more feared and hated because the sinful soul now

begins to see him with less error, as a sovereign, holy, just, pure Being.

Fifthly. We infer the same view of sin and new birth from the regeneration of infants. They cannot be renewed by illumination, because their intellects are undeveloped. Yet they are renewed. Now we grant that there is a wide difference in the circumstances and means of their redemption and that of adults. Yet are they delivered from a state of original sin generically the same with ours, and delivered by the same Redeemer and Sanctifier. Must not the method of the renewing power be the same intrinsically?

Lastly. This view gives us a consistent *rationale* of that impotency of the natural man to receive the things of the Spirit of God, which are foolishness unto him, described in 1 Cor. ii. 14, and elsewhere. This impotency too plainly exists. Dr. Dick cannot define wherein it consists. See his sixty-sixth Lecture. Does it consist in the absence of any substantive revelation which the believer gains? No; this would be perilous fanaticism. Does it consist in the hiding of any esoteric sense of the Word, to which the believer has the key? No; this would be Origenism. Does it consist in the loss of a cognitive faculty by the fall? No; that would suspend his responsibility. Whence this impotency? They have no answer.

But we have one. The will has its own *habitus*, regulative of all its fundamental acts, which is not a mere modification of the intelligence, but its own coördinate, original character; a simple, ultimate fact of the moral constitution. Hence an inter-action of will and intellect. On moral and spiritual subjects the practical generalizations of the intellect are founded on the dictates of the disposition of the will. But now, these practical judgments of the sinner's understanding, prompted by the carnal disposition, contradict certain propositions which are premises to the most important gospel conclusions and precepts. No wonder, then, that such a mind cannot apprehend them as reasonable. For example: The sinner's real opinion, taught by a carnal heart, is, that sin in itself, apart from its penalty, which self-love apprehends as an evil, would be the preferred good. A gospel is now explained to him, proposing deliverance from this sin, through the instrumentality of faith. But the plan postulates the belief that the sin is *per se* so great an evil that deliverance

from it is a good greatly to be desired! No wonder, then, that as this postulate breaks upon the understanding of the sinner, he is obfuscated, stumbled, dumb-founded! He is required to act on a belief which his carnal heart will not let him believe. His action, to be reasonable, must assume sin to be hateful. But he loves it. He feels that he naturally loves it, and only hates its consequences. "He cannot know the truth, for it is spiritually discerned." Were a sprightly child allured to approach the reader by the promise of "something good," and told that he should have it upon holding out his hand for it; and were he to perceive just then, that the thing you held out was a nauseous medicine, of whose utility to himself he was ignorant, he would be struck with a similar "inability." There would be a sense in which he would become unable to hold out his hand even; he would not know how to do it. He would stand confused. Now this child is not becoming idiotic, but his native appetencies repel that which you propose as an attraction; and hence his obstinate apprehension of the unreasonableness of your proposal.

Thus, as it appears to us, the simple psychology which is assumed in the Bible is found to be the truest philosophy, and throws a flood of light upon the doctrines held in common by us, and by the respected fathers whom we review.

The only other point we discuss is at least as intricate as the one just attempted, and even more abstract, technical, and limited. But for other principles which have been connected with its discussion, chiefly through exaggerations and confusions of thought, it would indeed lie within very narrow bounds, both of extent and importance, in so far as it is debated among Calvinists. It is Dr. Hodge's doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin to us. (Vol. II., Chapter VIII.) The questions drawn into the discussion are the relations of the divine sovereignty and righteousness; the rudimental idea of sin and criminality, imputation, justification, our union to Christ, God's providence in visiting the sins of parents upon posterity, and the rights of man's reason in problems where the divine righteousness is a party. Dr. Hodge strongly advocates the theory adopted by Turretin. It is, that in the order of causation, the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin on men precedes, transferring that guilt upon them conceived as at first otherwise

innocent and guiltless; whereby a privative moral corruption of soul is by God visited on Adam's children as the penalty of that imputed guilt, and, in the first instance, of it alone. From this view we to a certain extent dissent. The reader of Dr. Hodge's present work will find it stated more moderately than in his previous ones. There is a pleasing absence of that imperious dogmatism which characterized his earlier polemics on this favorite point, such as his review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*. But his theory is the same.

We are, of course, not oblivious of the difficulty of getting a considerate hearing against a speculation adopted by Turretin and Hodge, and sustained—though, as we shall show, to a very limited extent—by Dr. Thornwell. The last is himself witness, (See Review of Breckinridge), that our *Confession of Faith* does not speak in favor of that speculation. Nor has it any direct Scripture support, being but a human inference from a peculiar interpretation of a much-contested passage in Romans v. We shall therefore presume that an humble minister in the Presbyterian Church, who recognizes no infallible standard but the Bible, and has bound himself by no doctrinal covenant but our Confession, may credit his brethren with enough independence not to permit Turretin or Hodge to do their thinking for them. We shall certainly claim this liberty, especially when we recall some specimens of erroneous thinking which they have given us: as Turretin's labored opposition to the Copernican system, and his adoption of the latent Pantheism of the Dominican theory touching God's providential *concursus*; or Dr. Hodge's views of popish baptism, the "Idea of the Church," and subscription to our creed, which were such as to compel the dissent of almost all his own denomination.

As in the previous discussion, so here we shall find the history of the question instructive. The French National Synod of 1645, at Charenton, found it necessary to adopt the following enactment against Joshua De La Place, or Placæus, a theological professor in Saumur. Quick's *Synodicum*:

"There was a report made in the Synod of a certain writing, both printed and manuscript, holding forth this doctrine: That the whole nature of original sin consisteth only in that corruption which is hereditary to all Adam's posterity, and resides originally in all men; and denying the imputation of his first sin. This Synod condemneth the said doctrine, so far as it restraineth the nature of original sin to the sole hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, to the excluding of the im-

putation of that first sin by which he fell. And it interdicteth, on pain of all church censures, all pastors, professors, and others, who shall treat of this question, to depart from the common, received opinion of the Protestant Churches, who (over and besides that corruption) have all acknowledged the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity," etc.

Placæus, to evade the implied condemnation of this decree, afterwards said, that he only disputed "an antecedent and immediate imputation" of Adam's guilt; but admitted "a mediate and subsequent imputation," through the criminality of each man's own inherent corruption. This many of the Reformed conceived as a virtual denial of that imputation, inasmuch as they supposed Placæus to mean, that men are virtually made obnoxious to penalty only on account of their own corruption. But on this history several very instructive remarks are to be made. One is, that no National Synod of the French Church pursued Placæus, either with discipline or any further legislation. This would seem to imply that his explanation was held sufficient by the supreme church court, though very unsatisfactory to his antagonists, and especially to Andrew Rivet, their leader.

The second remark is, that this ill-starred distinction, and this pair of ambiguous terms for expressing it, *were the invention of Placæus*; they were no part of the theology of the Reformers. So far as we know, they were never heard of before. So says the *Princeton Review*, (October, 1839). The distinction was evidently a *ruse*, adopted by him to shelter himself and entrap his accusers. Had they been discreet they would not have been misled by controversial heat to step into the trap thus prepared for them by one whom they themselves charged with *malu fides*. They should have refused the ensnaring distinction in both its branches, and should have asserted, with the Synod of Charenton and all the previous Confessions, neither an "antecedent immediate" nor "mediate consequent" imputation, but simply a true and proper imputation of Adam's sin. The distinction is like that of supralapsarian and infralapsarian, an attempted over-refinement, which should never have been made, which really explained nothing in the decree, and which only led to corollaries dishonorable to God. We state briefly the grounds of this assertion, as a foreshadowing of our train of discussion.

The alternative adopted by Placæus is incorrect, because, like the Arminian scheme, it offers the fact that God should have extended the law, "Like begets like," to man's moral nature and

will, as an explanation of the fact. Natural laws are of God's institution and sustentation; what they effect, he ordains. The question therefore recurs: On what judicial *basis* did this ordination, to propagate hereditary depravity in men, rest? Secondly: Placæus's scheme is false to the facts of the case, in that it represents God as though he conceived of Adam's posterity as having an antecedent depraved existence, at least for a moment, before they passed under condemnation; whereas the Scriptures tell us they are *born condemned*. See Eph. ii. 3. The opposite alternative is untenable, not only because it encumbers the doctrine of original sin with unnecessary difficulties, when the unavoidable ones are in all conscience, serious enough, but because it connects itself with erroneous views of justification, and the mystical union to the second Adam, and especially that it also is false to the facts of the case. It represents man as having a separate, undepraved, personal existence, for an instant at least, until, *from innocent*, it is turned into depraved by God's act, as a penal consequence of Adam's guilt imputed; whereas, in fact, man now never has any personal existence at all, save a depraved existence. As he enters being condemned, so he enters it depraved. This over-refinement therefore leads to an inaccuracy, which is the counterpart of that resulting from the opposite scheme. Now, when both of the alternatives in this attempted distinction lead thus to error, the argument is as strong as can well be conceived to show that the distinction should never have been made.

Will the stringency of this argument drive any advocate of immediate imputation, so called, to deny that this scheme involves the conception of Adam's posterity as penally made depraved from undepraved, on the exclusive ground of imputed guilt? If that denial could be substantiated, we should have, so far, no ground of difference with him. But it cannot. If his "immediate precedaneous imputation" only meant a true and proper imputation, we should be agreed, so far. But it does not. This is obvious from the logical order of thought. In that order, though perhaps not always in the order of a temporal succession appreciable by our senses, every cause goes before its effect. If imputed guilt is the sole cause, and depravation the penal effect, then, in that sense, the recipient must have the imputation before the depravity. What else does "immediate

precedaneous" mean? Again. The friends of immediate imputation went along with us very sociably in charging the exact counterpart as a result of Placæus's theory, that it would follow, the soul must be first personally depraved in order to become guilty. Impartiality must make the same objection against Dr. Hodge's theory. Thirdly: Turretin fully asserts, and Dr. Hodge favors, "Creationism." Now, if God creates the soul, it must be created innocent; for a holy God cannot create depravity. Hence, there must be a conceivable instant, as this soul passes from its Maker's pure hand into the putatively guilty human person, in which instant it undergoes the penal transition from innocent to depraved. And lastly: The advocates of the scheme consistently make an express admission of what we charge. Chalmers's *Theological Institutes*, Vol. I., page 485: "We have been all dealt with as sinners, and *this anterior to any personal or actual sin of ours.*" "We have *been made corrupt*" (he means, *turned into* corrupt persons), "because we had sinned in Adam, and so are held guilty as he was, and treated accordingly." (Page 486.) So on page 497: "Or rather, if we speak according to the order of cause and effect, or the natural prece-dency of guilt to punishment, we have been held so *anterior to infancy.*" So Thornwell, Vol. I., page 346: "Hence, in the order of thought, his sin must always be conceived as imputed before they can be conceived as depraved." Page 347: "Hence the Scriptures teach explicitly, that we are first charged with the guilt of Adam's sin, and then, as the legal consequence, are born with natures totally corrupt." Page 349: They "*are still personally innocent, while putatively guilty.*" Hodge on Rom. v. 13: "It" (the penalty) "comes on men before the transgression of the law of nature, *or even the existence of inherent depravity.*" *Theology*, Vol. II., page 210: "The guilt, in the order of *nature and fact, precedes the spiritual death*, which is its penal consequent." Page 203: "Penal evils . . . come upon all mankind *prior to anything in their state or conduct* to merit such infliction." Can anything be plainer? Shall we be told that these writers also say, and imply, that putative guilt and corruption are simultaneous in first action, as the Scriptures say? Very likely. That is to say, they contradict themselves; a very natural result, when good men are betrayed into a position contrary to Scripture.

Let us repeat, that it is only against the peculiarity of Dr.

Hodge's doctrine as thus evolved that we have any debate. And it is in this sense that we firmly assert it is not the peculiarity of the Reformed theology, but an exaggeration into which a few of its distinguished names have been betrayed. Any impartial mind examining Rivet's *Consensus* sees that, as supports for the peculiarity above depicted, his array is a failure. The Reformed Confessions all assert an imputation of Adam's guilt; as does the decree of Charenton; but as to the point to which we except, *not one* speaks in favor of Dr. Hodge's position. A few theologians, like the supralapsarian Beza, sustain him explicitly; the great current, like Calvin, stop short of or even repudiate his peculiarity. Passing to more recent times, we find Stapfer, the great Edwards, and Breckinridge, against Dr. Hodge. The two first of these may show how much more of assertion than of research we meet upon this subject. Dr. Hodge has said that Stapfer and Edwards adopt the vicious theory of Placæus; and many others, echoing Dr. Hodge, say the same, but *all erroneously!* Let us hear the men themselves. Stapfer's *Polemic Theology*, Vol. IV., Chapter XVII., §78, Note: "The whole of the controversy they" (the adversaries of the doctrine of original sin) "have with us about this matter evidently arises from this, that they suppose the *mediate* and the *immediate* imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as *immediate*, and abstractedly from the *mediate*; when yet *our divines suppose that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I CHOOSE NOT TO USE ANY SUCH DISTINCTION*, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject; but have only endeavored to explain the thing itself and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore *I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable*, and judged that one ought never to be considered without the other. While I have been writing this note, *I have consulted all the systems of divinity which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair; and I found they were of the same mind with me,*" etc. Edwards, Part IV., Chapter III., *Original Sin*, says: These things "said by Stapferus are in several respects to the present purpose."

Another weighty protest against the exaggeration of Dr. Hodge

appears in a large body of Calvinists, represented by Dr. Samuel J. Baird, Dr. W. G. T. Shedd, and the venerable father, Augustine, to whom Dr. Thornwell finally gave in his virtual adhesion, whose views Dr. Hodge repudiates as realism. These hold, as we do, a true and proper imputation; but they are so unwilling to accept the peculiarity of the theory of Rivet, Turretin, and Hodge, that to avoid it they resort to the theory of "generic identity." The race sinned in Adam, because the *whole nature* was in him when he sinned; and we each have that *same nature*, and so each one truly and literally sinned in that first sin. The nature they define as an *entity*, but not a *substance*, being, namely, the aggregate of all the moral and intellectual forces transmitted by generation, and qualifying each person of the race as a moral agent. We have no mission to defend this theory, not holding its peculiar feature. But it cannot be called *realism*. It expressly says that the nature, as separated from each individual, is neither substance nor person, yet not a mere abstraction. It may be unintelligible, but it is not realism; for the corner stone of that theory was, that generic ideas are *res*. We are only interested in the scheme of generic identity as a protest against Dr. Hodge's peculiarity.

As another witness to the true complexion of the doctrine in the Protestant theology, we quote D. G. Sohn, Professor in Heidelberg, 1590, commended by Dr. Archibald Alexander, as a representative of orthodoxy. Commenting on Rom. v. 12: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," he says: The apostle "does not mean merely that Adam had become a sinner, but that it had come upon all his descendants, that is, upon all the men in the world; for he does not say in this place that *guilt* had entered, but that *sin* had entered into the world. And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the same verse, 'in whom all have sinned,' or, 'for that all,' etc. Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, it is a just inference that they are all partakers of his sin, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the 19th verse it is said: 'By the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners.' Now to be constituted sinners includes the idea, not only of being made subject to the penalty, but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from the stain of sin cannot with propriety be

called sinners. . . . Infants are depraved, 'children of wrath,' and guilty on account of their own personal depravity."

Vogelsang, quoted by De Moor, *Commentarius*, Vol. III., page 275, says: "Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia, propter inobedientiam protoplasti, nisi mediante cognata perversitate."

Marckius, in *De Moor*, says: If Placeus meant nothing more by mediate imputation than that, "hominum natorum actualem punitionem ulteriorem non fieri nudo intuitu Adamicæ transgressionis, absque interveniente etiam propria corruptione, et fluentibus hinc sceleribus variis, neminem orthodoxorum possent habere obloquentem." But that is just what Calvin, Stapfer, and their company, do mean, and nothing more.

Let us add a testimony from among the Westminster divines. Samuel Rutherford, in his *Trial and Triumph of Faith*, says: "And truly it is bad divinity for Dr. Crispe to say, 'As we are real, actual sinners in Adam, so here, God passeth really sin over on Christ; for we sinned intrinsically in Adam, as parts, as members, as being in his loins; and we are thence 'by nature children of wrath.' (Eph. ii. 3.) But it is blasphemy to say that our blessed Saviour sinned intrinsically in us, or that *he is a Son of God's wrath, for sin intrinsically inherent in him* as it is in us," the latter being Rutherford's conception of our sinning in Adam,

But our most explicit witness is the greatest—John Calvin. Dr. Thornwell first gives him up, and then, on grounds of inference, claims him. We indulge in no inferences as to what is meant, but cite his express words. Dr. Hodge apologizes that some of the Papists pushed the putative element of original sin so exclusively that the Reformers of Calvin's day were constrained to exaggerate the hereditary element to restore the balance; and that thorough discussion and analysis had not then taught them the bearings of the question between mediate and immediate imputation. *Je me moque de tout cela!* Calvin did not exactly know what he was about, quoth 'a! Let us see whether he does not look the matter fully in the face, and give an intentional and intelligent decision. In his *Commentary*, on Romans v. 12, "*Sin entered into the world*," we read: "Observe what order he places here; for he says that sin preceded, death followed from it. For there are persons who contend that we are ruined by Adam's sin in such a way as though we perished by no fault of our own; thus, as though he only had sinned in

us. But Paul affirms distinctly that sin is propagated in all who pay its penalty. And he then urges that more closely, when, a little after, he assigns the reason why all Adam's posterity is subject to death's empire. To wit, saith he, because we all have sinned. That '*peccare*,' moreover, signifies to be corrupted and vitiated. For that natural depravity which we bring from our mother's womb, although it yield not its fruit so quickly, is nevertheless sin before the Lord, and deserves his vengeance. And this is what is called original sin. For as Adam at his first creation received the endowments of divine favor as well for himself as for his posterity; thus, upon apostatizing from the Lord, he corrupted our nature in himself, defiled, depraved, ruined it; for when fallen from God's likeness, he could only beget a seed similar to himself. We therefore all sinned, in that we are all imbued with natural corruption, and so unrighteous and perverse."

So, on verse 15, Calvin says: "What the apostle delivers, 'perished through the offence of one,' understand thus: that corruption is transfused from him into us. For neither do we thus perish by his fault as though we were ourselves without fault; but because his sin is the cause of our sin, Paul ascribes our death to him. Our sin I call what is inborn in us," etc. On verse 17, "For if by the offence of one," he says: "Moreover, it is important to note here two differences between Adam and Christ, which the apostle did not thus omit because he deemed they should be neglected, but because it did not at all concern the present argument to enumerate them. The first is, that in Adam's sin we are not condemned through imputation alone, as though the penalty of another man's sin were exacted of us; but we thus sustain its punishment, because we are also guilty of fault, so far, to wit, as our nature vitiated in him is involved in guilt before God. But, through the righteousness of Christ, we are restored to salvation in another mode. For it [Christ's righteousness] is not thus held to be accepted by us, as though it were within us, but because we possess Christ himself, bestowed upon us by the Father's generosity, with all his benefits. Accordingly, the 'gift of righteousness' signifies not a quality with which God imbues us, as some erroneously interpret, but a gratuitous imputation of righteousness; for the apostle is expounding what he understood by the word *grace*. The other dif-

ference is, that the benefit of Christ does not reach to all men, as Adam involved his whole race in condemnation. And the reason is at hand ; for since that curse which we draw from Adam is derived into us by nature, it is not surprising that it embraces the whole mass. But in order to come to a participation of the grace of Christ, we must needs be inserted into him by faith." Calvin repeats the same view under verse 19.

The grounds upon which Dr. Hodge rests his peculiar theory, against Calvin and the current of the Reformed divines, may be included in two. He assumes, first, that the imputation of Adam's sin to us must be not only a true imputation, which we fully admit, but that it must be exactly identical, in all its circumstances, with the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us. He assumes, secondly, that the correct interpretation of Rom. v. 12-21, demands his peculiar view, the exact identity of the two imputations granted. And he argues his interpretation chiefly from the premise of that identity ; thus reasoning in a circle. Now, as to this much belabored passage, we are free to say that Calvin's exposition seems, on the whole, founded on the truest insight into the apostle's scope, and the fairest and most scholarly. But we have no theoretic motive to reject Dr. Hodge's exposition ; for his exegetical conclusions contain nothing inconsistent with our doctrine. But we shall show that the doctrinal use which is attempted to be made of the passage is not only unnecessary to the analogy of the faith, but untenable and self-contradictory.

Dr. Hodge would ask, Whether the covenants of works and of grace are not both grounded in the principle of imputation? We reply, *Yes*. And whether we can deny it in the one without overthrowing the other? Again we answer, *No*. But stay ; we do not concede his postulate above. It is a principle fundamentally involved in both covenants, that under the government of a sovereign and righteous God, guilt may be justly transferable from one moral agent to another under certain conditions ; but not therefore under any conditions whatsoever. We have never seen a system which denied the latter. Dr. Hodge concedes it. (Vol. II., page 196. *Turretin*, Loc. IX., Ques. 9.) Let us suppose that when Satan fell, Gabriel had been far distant, in the holy and perfect performance of the mission of love entrusted to him by his divine Master, and that when he re-

turned he had been told that he must be cast into hell for the sin of Satan, because it was imputed to him, while there was no tie of race nor dependency between them, and he was not consenting to, or even cognizant of the sin. Does any one hold that the righteousness or benevolence of our God could justify this dispensation? We can only say, that were we to meet with a man who held thus, we should certainly not attempt to reason with him. That is a case in which the conditions of a just imputation are certainly lacking.

Let us suppose again, that Achan's children had been personally as holy in nature and conduct as Adam was before he fell; does any rational man suppose that they would have perished under the law of Exodus xx. 5? These instances, ordinary and extraordinary, where God visits the iniquity of fathers upon the children, are cited by Dr. Hodge as though they implied this, and were identical with the case of Adam and his posterity. And yet Dr. Hodge knows that all Calvinistic doctors teach that the two cases present only an analogy, and not a perfect parallel. A parent now is not a federal head under a covenant of works. Our relation to our fathers is not identical with our relation to Adam; the guilt of their sins is not imputed to us precisely as Adam's first sin is. Yea, we are taught that the guilt of none, even of Adam's sins after the first, is thus imputed to us. In this visiting of parents' sins on posterity, we have a different case, of just imputation, yet requiring different conditions. The children must be already sinners—already personally obnoxious, at least for inherent depravity, to God's holiness. Moses tells us, Exod. xx. 5, Deut. v. 9, that this visiting of parents' sins is upon the third and fourth generations *of them that hate God*. Our Saviour (Matt. xxiii. 32-35), teaches the same; telling the Pharisees that their "filling up the measure of their fathers" was the condition of their inheriting the penalty of all the righteous blood shed from Abel to Zacharias. The prohibition in Deut. xxiv. 16 proves the same thing; human magistrates might not put the children to death for the fathers' sins. Is it said that God still did it, as in the case of Achan's and Saul's posterity? True, and the explanation exactly confirms our argument. A magistrate may not slay a criminal's children, because, to him, in the limited sphere of his jurisdiction, they are not offenders. But God may, because in his

wider sphere of judgment they are sinners. God never does injustice "that good may come;" but when the righteous ends of his providential rule dictate it, he justly makes sinful children suffer with sinful progenitors. While the penal infliction is occasioned by the progenitors' crimes, yet a community of sinful character between the children and them is the condition requisite for a righteous imputation in these cases. The latter point Turretin reluctantly teaches, against the interests of his own erroneous logic. (Loc. IX. Ques. 9.) Thus we find in this extensive class of providences cases of what Dr. Hodge deems, and correctly deems, true imputation; but the conditions are not identical with the imputation of Adam's sin to us.

We approach the issue more nearly in our third case, that of the imputation of our guilt to Christ. This Dr. Hodge would make his strong point, urging that if we do not admit his exaggerated view of immediate imputation, we cannot admit the imputation of our guilt to Christ. And, since there is no other way of justification for sinners, he intimates that the man who will not go all lengths with him, cuts himself off from all hope of heaven! Does not this appear to be the very wantonness of dogmatism, when we remember that the Scriptures expressly make two cardinal differences between the conditions of the imputation in Christ's case and Adam's? In the case of the imputation of our sins to Christ, Dr. Hodge urges that the guilt of that which was purely and solely *peccatum alienum* is transferred to Christ on the ground of a community of nature, without his having a particle of personal depravity or sin common between him and the sinful race. True; but the Scriptures tell us the propriety of it was grounded in two other conditions also, totally peculiar. *Christ volunteered to assume the penalty*; he having, what no creature could have, autocracy of his own being and powers, authorizing him to make the voluntary offer. Will any one be rash enough to say that a community of nature alone would have ever prompted the sovereign holiness and justice of the Father to lay the load of imputed guilt on the God-man, his co-equal Son, if *he had dissented from the sacrifice*? Again we say, that with such a man we should not dream of reasoning. Every system of theology we ever read treats Christ's voluntary consent as an essential condition. He says so himself in John x. 18. Dr. Thornwell, in his admirable missionary sermon on that

text, says: "It [Christ's covenant of redemption] binds, not by virtue of a right to command, but by virtue of a consent to obey." See also Butler's *Analogy*, Part II., Chap. V., Sec. 7: "Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection [that vicarious sufferings cannot be just], it would be stronger in one respect against natural providence than against Christianity; because under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others, whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The world being under the righteous government of God does indeed imply that finally and upon the whole every one shall receive according to his personal deserts; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government." So concludes Chalmers—honest man!—against the interests of his own false logic. See *Institutes of Theology*, Vol. I., p. 498: "For there is an element in the latter [Christ's] which does not belong to the former imputation. *Christ was willing*," etc. See also Owen on *Justification*, p. 194: "And this voluntary sponson was one ground of the imputation of our sin to Christ. He took on him the person of the whole church that had sinned, to answer for what they had done against God and the law. Hence that imputation was *fundamentaliter ex compacto, ex voluntaria spon-sione*; it had its foundation in his voluntary undertaking," etc.

The other essential difference between the two cases of imputation is that pointed out by the apostle in Rom. v., 16–19, and Rom. vi. 23. The one was a transaction of strict judicial righteousness; the other of glorious free grace. "The *judgment* was by one to condemnation; but the *free gift* is of many offences unto justification." God displayed liberality in proposing to lift Adam and his race from the condition of servants to that of sons forever, on the easy terms of a temporary obedience. So the covenant of grace involves a vicarious obedience and sacrifice, by which the law is satisfied, while its captives are ransomed. But the Scriptures still correctly say, that the first covenant was a transaction of law, the second of grace. "For Moses describeth the righteousness *which is of the law*: that the man which doeth those things shall live by them." (Rom. x. 5.) "And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace." (Rom. xi. 6.) Now can any righteous judge be imagined

who would allow himself equal latitude in his judicial convictions with that he allows himself in his acts of beneficence? Would not every such judge answer, that *in condemning* he felt himself bound by justice within the strict merits of each case; but that, in his benefactions, he was accustomed to give way to the generous impulses of his heart, provided no principle of righteousness inhibited him, and to bestow more than the recipients could claim of right? It may be praiseworthy to dispense blessings above the deserts of the beneficiaries; it cannot be other than injustice to dispense penalties beyond the deserts of the culprits. Here then is a second essential difference between the two Adams in the two covenants. While there is a true and proper imputation in each case, this prepares us to expect a difference in the circumstances conditioning them.

There is still another difference in the two cases not mentioned by Calvin. In the case of the first Adam, the representative's action as federal head preceded the sin. In the case of the second Adam, the sin preceded not only the action of Christ as substitute, but preceded even the constitution of his person. We may find that this circumstance will have to be regarded in our adjustment. Lastly, there is the difference pointed out by Calvin: The imputation of Adam's guilt goes with the blood; all who are naturally descended from him share it. The federal connection with Christ does not go with the blood; it is limited to believers, and its benefits applied through faith, which is an intelligent, voluntary act of the beneficiaries' souls. We may find that this circumstance will have to be regarded in our adjustment.

To Dr. Hodge's second line of argument, then, for immediate imputation in his peculiar sense of it, we have several answers. The argument is: That we must make an exact parallel in all particulars between Adam and Christ; that if we do not represent God as visiting the penalty of corruption on Adam's posterity solely at first for his imputed guilt, they being conceived as otherwise initially guiltless and sinless, we must be consistent, and represent justification as first, in order of thought, an infusion of inherent sanctification, and thereupon, secondarily, an imputation of the righteousness of Christ's satisfaction. But this is *precisely the popish theory of justification*. Now, the first answer is, that the apostle did not mean to institute an exact parallel in every circumstance between Adam and Christ. Both

are federal heads. From both there is an imputation, and a proper one. But the imputations are inevitably differentiated, in some conditions, by the differences of the two cases. Of these the apostle mentions some. Calvin suggests others. And among these he expressly asserts that very difference which Dr. Hodge denies, between imputation of sin and imputation of righteousness, and expressly repudiates that popish theory on the latter point, which, Dr. Hodge says, any one in Calvin's position is bound to accept. We differ from the Princeton divine in remarkably good company,

But our second answer is that an assertion of the exact parallel which Dr. Hodge wishes to establish will inevitably lead to erroneous results, which he and every other Reformed divine must anxiously repudiate. If this is the order of thought in immediate imputation: that we, conceived as otherwise personally sinless and guiltless initially, receive Adam's guilt by imputation, and then inherent depravity as the penalty, at first, of that alone, then the theory of justification which must result from a rigid parallelism must be this: That we are personally depraved and dead in trespasses and sins at the epoch of our justification, and afterwards, in the order of causation, we receive quickening grace, as the first fruit and effect of justifying righteousness imputed. But as justification is instrumentally by faith, faith must be in order to justification, and of course *in order to quickening!* That is, the sinner has true faith first, and is regenerated afterwards! Every one who has a *modicum* of theological knowledge knows that this is precisely Arminianism. A moment's reflection shows that it is inevitable synergism. Every Calvinist distinguishes between inherent and legal righteousness; as does Dr. Hodge excellently well, Vol. II., page 195. As to the merit of a personal inherent righteousness *worthy to procure our acceptance before God*, we have none at all at the time of our justification, *nor ever after*. But as to subjective condition, the believer is not spiritually dead at the instant of justification. All the Reformed divines, so far as we know,¹ with Dr. Hodge, fix the following order of sequence. 1. Quickenings

¹ *Calvin's Institutes*, Book III., Chap. XI., § 10. *Owen on Justification*, Chap. IX., pages 236-7. *Boston's Fourfold State*, pages 195-6. *Turretin*, Loc. XV., Ques. 15, § 4. *Ridgeley*, Vol. III., pages 45, 47. *Confession of Faith*, Chap. X.; Chap. XI., first sentence; Chap. XIV., § 1; *Larger Catechism*, Ques. 66, 67, 69.

of the dead soul, or regeneration in its strict sense, by which Christ's spiritual life and holiness are initially implanted. 2. Saving faith is exercised. 3. The union to Christ is thereby constituted, which divides into legal union and spiritual union. As we are legally united to him, we are justified; as we are spiritually united, we "convert" (Isaiah vi. 10), and the work of sanctification proceeds in us. We thus see that Dr. Hodge must relinquish the theory of an exact parallelism, or he finds himself in a *dilemma*, whose two horns are Arminianism and the scheme of Placens, both abhorred by him and by us. We advise him to retreat from his exaggeration, and find the safe position alongside of John Calvin and the great current of Reformed divines, with his humble reviewer. It is too late for him to escape the dilemma, by pleading that the only thing discussed in Rom. v. 12, etc., is the legal relation of the two Adams to their federated bodies, and that the spiritual relations should be left out of the debate. *Leave them out then*, and nothing can be proved from this passage, against our view or for Dr. Hodge's. We repeat: if the spiritual and subjective relations of the represented to the representatives are out of the debate, this whole argument is as irrelevant for Dr. Hodge as for us. But he will not leave those relations out; he cannot; they must come into the argument, and then it is in our favor.

For, thirdly, if there is in every particular an exact parallelism between the two cases of imputation, then it must hold in this: that *both are conditioned on a parallel union* between the represented and the representatives. In *this* particular we claim the parallel. Dr. Hodge cannot demur; because he says there must be a parallel in *every* particular. Here then, for once, shall we travel together sociably? Let us see. Dr. Hodge says, Vol. II., page 196: "The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine above stated, is the union between us and Adam." Also on page 211: "These consequences come on his posterity in the same order," (as on Adam): "first, the loss, or rather destitution, of original righteousness; and secondly, corruption of nature; and thirdly, exposure to eternal death." So also Thornwell, Vol. I., page 346: "If there were not a real unity between Adam and the race, the covenant of works could not, by an arbitrary constitution, treat them as one."

One application which we make of this excellent doctrine is to explain the valuable and instructive remark of Jonathan Edwards: that we should so conceive of our sin and fall in our federal head, according to our close natural and federal union with him, as to place the two elements of inherent depravity and guilt in the same relation, in ourselves and in him. This Dr. Hodge expressly admits, as we have thus seen. Now common sense tells us, that when a holy creature committed his first sin, the depravation of his heart and the falling under guilt were, temporally speaking, synchronous; but that, causatively speaking, the depravation, or subjective corruption, must precede, and the guilt follow. The reason is plain: It is sinful acts which incur guilt. But the character of acts is decided by their intention, to speak popularly; decided by their subjective motive, to speak philosophically. The thing which qualified Adam's act in plucking the forbidden fruit as evil, was the evil emotion that prompted it. But in the order of causation, motive precedes volition. This is but to say that a holy being cannot perform an unholy act; he must begin to become unholy in order to do so. Any other view is simply absurd. It is very true that, after Adam became a customary sinner, the series of sinful acts fostered the sinful disposition; yea, that his very first wrong act gave an impulse to the wrong affection which prompted it. But the other truth remains: that a sinful act must imply a sinful motive as *a priori* to it in the order of production. We can scarcely imagine that any one will be so thoughtless as to object that this would represent God as bringing the penal evil of subjective corruption on Adam before he found Adam guilty. The answer is too plain: That it was not God who did it; but Adam brought it on himself. That is to say, God did not corrupt Adam; he corrupted himself. Having found this order of relation between Adam's first corruption and his first guilt, we have the authority of both the rival parties to this discussion for saying we should find the same order in the case of his posterity. That is, we should describe them as temporally guilty when corrupted, and corrupted when guilty; and causatively, in the initial determination of matters, guilty because corrupted, rather than corrupted because guilty.

We proceed now to apply the concession of a union between Adam and his posterity in another point of view. All are agreed

that the imputation of Adam's guilt is conditioned on our natural as well as our federal union with Adam. Now we raise the very simple question: *In what nature* are we united to Adam?—his holy or his fallen nature? Will any one say, In both? Then, we must have had a literal preëxistence for six thousand years! For, let the reader notice, the question is about our *natural union* with Adam, not our federal. *We are naturally united only to Adam fallen*; for he had already fallen before he had posterity. All divines agree that, if Adam is redeemed, his regenerated holiness does not federally concern us; that is not his natural, but his supernatural quality. There is, then, no moral nature of the first Adam to which we can be naturally united, save his fallen nature. To this emphatically agree the Scriptures. Gen. v. 3: "And Adam . . . begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, and called his name Seth." 1 Cor. xv. 48, 49: "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy. . . And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." "Put off . . . the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, . . . and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." (Eph. iv. 22–24.) These words, in requiring conversion, allude to the two unions; the first, corrupt; the second, holy. (Compare Col. iii. 9, 10.) Our opponents have expressly conceded—not bethinking themselves what they were conceding—that the imputation of Adam's guilt to us is conditioned on a *natural* and a federal union. Now it turns out that the one of these conditions is a union in a depraved nature. It is too late for them to recoil. We forewarned them that there was a *difference of fact* between the first Adam's covenant and the second Adam's; that the first representative was before the sin; but that the sin was before the second representative. We now see that a difference of adjustment, in this particular, is inevitable from that fact.

It is vain for Dr. Thornwell to seek escape from this conclusion, by saying that each individual sinner of us has had a federal existence before we were conceived; that we bore a covenanted or legal relation before we existed. If this language means anything more than a reference to the divine foreordination and foreknowledge about us, it is incorrect. Common sense will decide with us, that nothing can be truly related un-

til it exists; a nonentity cannot be party to a relation. Before we individually began to exist, each of us was nonentity, save in the foreordination of God viewing us as *in posse*; and before we began to exist, the only true relation connecting each of us individually with Adam, or with anything else, was the one subsisting in God's prescience and purpose. Let the clear, convincing language of the Confession of Faith, touching the counterpart subject of justification, illustrate this statement. Chap. XI., Sec. 4: "God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect; and Christ did, in the fulness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification; nevertheless they are not justified until the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, actually apply Christ unto them." By parity of reasoning, we hold that God did, from all eternity, decree to condemn all men descended from Adam by ordinary generation; and that Adam did, some time after his creation in holiness, sin and fall for them, as well as for himself; nevertheless, individual fallen men are not condemned in him until such time as their existence doth actually unite them to Adam. And then it is a corrupted Adam to whom they are united.

Can any escape from this be gained by saying that the whole covenant of works ceased and was revoked as soon as Adam broke it once; and that the legal union of subsequent men must therefore have been before that date? The premise is expressly untrue, tried by Scripture or common sense. The statement is precisely as preposterous as this: "A given murderer broke the statute of murder at a given time; and consequently that statute was thenceforward abrogated and wholly revoked as to him, as a legal covenant." We presume that when hanging-day came, the murderer would be very much mystified to know under what law he was to be hung on that theory. How could that statute hang him, if it was abrogated as to him? No; the simple truth is, it has not been abrogated by his breach of it; but abides in full force over him in its condemning power, only, it has ceased to be a possible rule of justification for him. See Rom. iii. 20. So the broken covenant of works is still in force over Adam's race as a rule of condemnation. It is for that reason that "*we* are all by nature children of wrath, even as others." *God's elect* are born under the force of that covenant as a rule of condemnation, "even as others." It passes human wit to see how, if the

covenant of works were wholly revoked as soon as broken by Adam, sin is still imputed under it in "this year of grace" 1873; how in the "year of grace" 1, our Lord Christ was placed under both its preceptive and penal terms as a surety; and how, in thirty-three years thereafter, he so repaired and fulfilled it as thereby to purchase for the elect the very "adoption of sons" which that covenant had first proposed to Adam. See Gal. iv. 5: "These be the two covenants, the one from Mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar. For this Agar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and answereth to Jerusalem *which now is, and is in bondage with her children.*" Does not every Reformed expositor explain that the Sinai covenant, as perverted, broken, and misapplied by legalists, reverts into the *covenant of works*? We never heard of any other way of explaining the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. They uniformly represent that there are two covenants, and only two: of works, of grace; that all men are born under the first, and *born condemned, because they are born under it*, its breach in Adam having rendered it a ministry of condemnation; that we all live under it, until, by union to the second Adam, we pass under the other, the covenant of grace. The epoch of transition is when we are effectually called and believe. Rom. vii. 6: "But *now* we are delivered from the law," etc. When? When we are "married" to Christ. The truth remains, then, that our natural union to Adam is a union to a corrupted nature; and it is confessed on all hands that such union is one of the essential grounds of the imputation of his guilt to us. We return, then, to that view of this imputation presented by Calvin in the citations given above, as the consistent one.

But Dr. Hodge, following Turretin, urges, that unless we accept their strained view of immediate imputation, we really get no imputation at all. The whole *residuum* is, that men are punished in no sense for Adam's sin, but exclusively for their own concurrence of will and conduct in that sin. Now we reply to this: First, it is strange that so large a number of the greatest, clearest, and most orthodox minds, like Calvin's, Vitringa's, Stapfer's, Rutherford's, Edwards', should have deceived themselves with so sheer a cheat, and should have supposed that they had a true imputation, when there was none. They teach that a community of evil nature is the concurrent condition of

this imputation. Dr. Hodge's charge is, that it excludes all real imputation. Let us see. We reply, secondly: All the Reformed divines agree that the mystical union with Christ, establishing a community of spiritual life with him, is the essential concurrent condition for the imputation of his righteousness. Here is the parallel case. Do they, does Dr. Hodge, therefore concede that there is therefore no proper imputation of Christ's merits; and that believers are justified after all on account of the infused spiritual life? Not one of them. In the other case, the imputation of our sins to Christ, it is conditioned on his natural union with the race, and his optionary assent. But no theologian ever argued thence, that the real transference of guilt was obscured or lost, and that Christ was really punished on account of his act in consenting to assume humanity. The view of the Reformed churches is plain enough as to original sin; it makes the elements one coëtaneous complex. The Shorter Catechism says: "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of *Adam's* first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature," etc. The word guilt here must be intended by the Westminster Assembly in the sense of "potential guilt," including the idea of criminality; for it is a part of a "*sinful estate*." Actual guilt alone, mere obligation to penalty for "*peccatum alienum*," is no "sinfulness of estate."

The doctrine of original sin is acknowledged by all divines to be difficult, mysterious and awful. It is liable to cavils which are hard to explode, at least with such a full solution as will satisfy the unrenewed mind. The objections to the righteousness of such a dispensation, as we suppose, may virtually be resolved into two: one aimed against the justice of God's providentially placing us in our subjective condition; the other, against the justice of his imputing to us *Adam's* guilt. Under the first head, it is argued that it cannot be just to hold us guilty for a state which is natural, nor for any actions necessarily flowing therefrom, seeing it was not selected for us at first by our own choice, but imposed from a source above or before our wills. To this cavil we shall not now advert further than to approve the positions of Turretin and Hodge: That this corrupt estate, while not the result of an act of personal choice by us, is yet voluntary in us, in the sense of being *spontaneous*; and that this being so, our reason always holds a moral agent meritorious for what he

spontaneously is, without asking how he came to be such; as witness our judgments touching God, eternally and necessarily holy; angels created holy; and Satan fallen, we know not how. Under the second head, it is argued that it is intrinsically unjust to punish one creature, without his consent freely given, for another's act. And this is the great cavil, hurled perpetually at our doctrine by rationalists, Socinians, Pelagians, modern papists, now usually semi-Pelagian; and, in a word, by every unbelieving mind. Here are specimens of the way they put the cavil: "Suppose a murder done by a man over whom you could have no control, in your absence, without your approval; suppose that the magistrate was about to hang you along with the murderer, on this fiction of imputed guilt and against your earnest protest! Could any sophistical refinement make you regard it as anything else than a monstrous iniquity? Such appears the orthodox theory of original sin." We give the cavil, not as our own, but as the unbeliever's.

Now, the last objection we urge against Dr. Hodge's presentation of immediate imputation is, that it is *unwise causelessly to exasperate a difficulty*, even seemingly besetting the truth. We have shown that this exaggeration of the angles of the doctrine is *causeless*. The logical and exegetical necessities by which Dr. Hodge supposed himself constrained are imaginary. The fifth of Romans does not demand it. The imputation of our sins to Christ and his righteousness to us, the great corner stone of our salvation, does not require it. Then why increase the ground of cavil causelessly?

We remark that all the writers who incline to the extreme theory of imputation betray a profound sense of the difficulty involved, by their anxious resort to expedients to evade it. But their expedients, if they satisfy themselves, do not satisfy each other. That adopted by Turretin, (Loc. IX., Ques. 9, § 14) and by Dr. Hodge, Vol. II., page 211, is as follows:

"The punishment which Adam's sin brought on us is either *privative* or *positive*. The former is the lack and privation of original righteousness; the latter is death, both temporal and eternal, and in general all the evils which are sent upon sinners. Although the second, from the nature of the thing, always follows the first, except the mercy of God intervene, nevertheless it should not be confounded with it. As to the first, we say that Adam's sin is imputed to us *immediately* for the privative punishment, because it is the cause of the privation of original righteousness, and so ought to precede the corruption, at least in the order of nature;

but, as to the latter, it may be said to be imputed *mediately* with reference to the positive penalty, because to that penalty we are not obnoxious, except after we are born and corrupted."

Dr. Thornwell shall answer this evasion for us. *Works*, Vol. I., page 333: "This theory . . . takes it for granted that there is no contradiction to God's holiness in treating a being as a sinner who has never sinned, but there is a contradiction to his holiness in making him a sinner. But where is the difference? Suppose the being as coming from the hands of God is in fact spotless, how can he be treated as a sinner? If not treated as a sinner, then there is no guilt; and if no guilt, then no need of withholding original righteousness."

"In the next place, to be destitute of original righteousness is sin. That a moral, rational and accountable being should exist without a disposition to love God and to reverence his holy law is itself to be in a positively unholy state. Want of conformity with the moral law is as truly sin as open and flagrant transgression. When these very men are arguing against the doctrine of the papists, they insist upon the impossibility of an intermediate condition betwixt sin and holiness; and yet when they wish to explain the mode of the propagation of sin, they distinguish between simple nature and the moral qualities which perfect and adorn it. I do not see, therefore, that this theory obviates any difficulty at all." So far, Dr. Thornwell.

This is unanswerable. It shows that Turretin, under the stress of the difficulty which his exaggeration had raised for him, resorted to one of those very Pelagian principles which he himself explodes so completely. In addition, we object, that if, "from the nature of the thing," the positive depravation "always follows" the privative or negative, then in immediately visiting the latter on the exclusive ground of *peccatum alienum*, God has virtually visited the latter also. If, "from the nature of the thing," the man who is pushed over the edge of a precipice always goes to the bottom, then it seems to us that he who pushed him over also broke his bones.

The expedient adopted by Dr. Baird in his *Elohim Revealed*, is that which Dr. Hodge classes, with others, as substantially realistic. As stated by Dr. Thornwell (Vol. I., page 561), it is, "that we had a being in our substance, but not in our persons, which has determined the attitude of that substance." Of this he re-

marks, "that it removes the difficulty, but it substitutes a greater one."

Of himself, Dr. Thornwell says, page 334: "I confess that to me the whole difficulty lies in what to these divines presents no difficulty at all—in the imputation of guilt." It is after he looks this doctrine steadily in the face that he feels himself constrained to seek a solution of this difficulty, in substantially the same theory which a few years before he had condemned in Dr. Baird. On pages 349, 350 we find these words: "On these grounds I am free to confess that I cannot escape from the doctrine, however mysterious, of a generic unity in man as the true basis of the representative economy in the covenant of works. The human race is not an aggregate of independent atoms, but constitutes an organic whole, with a common life springing from a common ground." "There is in man what we may call a common nature. That common nature is not a mere generalization of logic, but a substantive reality." "As, then, descent from Adam is the exponent of a potential existence in him, as it is a revelation of a fact in relation to the nature which is individualized in a given case, it constitutes lawful and just ground for federal representation." Here, after all, the stress of the difficulty on Dr. Thornwell is so great that he adopts a theory even more realistic than the one he had refuted. Dr. Baird never said that human nature was "*a substantive reality*." He said that it was an entity, but not a substance, and defined it as the aggregate of all the constitutive moral forces of man's *essentia*, which are transmitted by generation from our first parent. Thus, in this case, Dr. Thornwell answers Dr. Thornwell. He convinced us, in his earlier publication, that the notion of a substantive, generic unity is deceptive; and we have the misfortune to remain convinced. True, Adam was "the root of all mankind." There is between us and him an all-important community of race and nature, which is one of the essential conditions of imputation, as our Confession states. But that the nature, apart from each person who has it, is a moral entity, we see not; still less that it is a personal entity; and does not responsibility for guilt require personality in its subject? If this generic unity is so substantive, it connects us equally with Christ; and why do we not obey and atone in him as essentially;

as we sinned and fell in Adam? And why is not the imputation of Christ's righteousness also as universal as the nature?

The rational difficulty presented by our adversaries recurs, then. We are compelled to consider the question, Whether such an imputation, without our complicity or consent, is not inevitably unjust. It has been Dr. Hodge's wont to override that question. Is this right? Is it wise? The answer is: "God does it, therefore it must be right." To this "short method" there are two objections: 1. It is not so certain that God does it, seeing that Dr. Hodge can quote no express Scripture, nor even any human creed, to prove it, but only his own inferences. 2. If a thing is *impossible to be right*, then any man's saying that God did it would be a demonstration that that man misrepresented God. Let us state a few of those propositions in which all the Reformed divines agree. Revelation is to be accepted, though it teach mysteries entirely *above reason*. But it could not be accepted, if it taught inevitable contradictions, which are *against reason*. For no man could believe, were he to try, against those intuitive laws of thought which constitute him a thinking and believing creature. But in applying this criterion to revelation these *caveats* must be observed: The Scripture proposition which is accused of outraging reason must exist in express terms; if it is only a human inference, it may be that the fallible expositor, and not the Scripture itself, is responsible for the outrage. Secondly, the rational conviction outraged must be a primitive, necessary, and universal judgment of the reason; because, if it is only an inferential conclusion, the source of collision may be in the fallible reason, and not in the infallible book. Thirdly, the mind which presumes to charge such inevitable contradiction on the Bible should be a sanctified mind, not arrogant and hostile to God and his truth, but holy, humble, and enlightened by God's Spirit. The carnal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit: they are foolishness unto him. But we repeat: provided these conditions are observed, the occurrence, not of a mystery above reason, but of an inevitable self-contradiction against reason, necessarily releases the mind from the obligation to believe. (See Turretin, Loc. I., Ques. 10.) One would suppose that a moderate tincture of theological knowledge would secure the admission of these familiar rudiments of the science; but we cite authority, lest some may suppose us to

utter, even in this alphabet of admitted principles, some dangerous novelty.

Now the advocates of the greatest theological absurdities never, in fact, assail these principles. Their plea is that their favorite propositions are only mysteries, and not contradictions. Thus the Papist seeks to excuse transubstantiation, the old-school Lutheran consubstantiation, the Mercersburg school, the spiritual, yet literal communion in Christ's corporeal body, which yet is not ubiquitous. Along this line, whether the dogma is only a mystery above reason or a contradiction outraging reason, have been fought all the battles of superstition. The discrimination should always be made with caution and deliberation.

But may not that which it would be wrong for man the creature to do be right in God the infinite Sovereign? The equally plain answer of the alphabet of theology is: Sometimes, but not always. God's infinite wisdom, proprietorship and sovereignty often render it right and holy for him to exercise a breadth of discretion in applying righteous principles of action which we could not presume on without crime. But his own glorious perfections ensure that, however sovereign, he will never act on a principle intrinsically wrong. And while we admit a wide, almost an infinite difference arising out of God's perfections and sovereignty, between the boundaries of his righteous discretion and ours in details; yet we must hold that the righteousness enjoined on us in his precepts, and written by his creative hand in our consciences, is identical in its intrinsic principles with his righteousness. This is manifest, because otherwise God and we could never understand each other as ruler and subject; because man was made in his rational and moral image, and is restored towards it by sanctifying grace; and because he tells us that *our holiness is to be in imitating him*. Let us, then, suppose a case where a given action would be intrinsically wrong in principle, no matter how the details of its circumstances might vary, where such was the unavoidable, intuitive primary judgment of the unbiassed human conscience; then, in that case, we pronounce that God's perfections make it as impossible that he should do that act, however sovereign, as that it should be right for us to do it. And that is so plain that it is almost a truism. If any man, professing to be a doctor or a prophet, told us that it was our duty to believe God had done that act and made it right for himself to

do it, our consistent answer would be: "Then you, Mr. Prophet, have rendered me absolutely incompetent to have intelligent knowledge of moral perfections in God, and of moral obligations on me; you have derationalized me; I am now on your basis just as suitable a subject of religious relations as the horse I ride." For what can be plainer than this, that if the very ground principles which are the constitutive norms of our moral judgments are contradicted, an intelligent, moral judgment becomes for us impossible?

Now the unbelieving rationalist says, that if Dr. Hodge's theory of imputation were true, we should unquestionably have just such a case. He claims that the injustice would be as inevitable as though a peaceable, righteous citizen of a commonwealth were hung under its laws for the putative guilt of another man, over whom he had no control, of whom he had even no knowledge, who had murdered a person without any consent or complicity whatsoever on his part. The rationalist claims accordingly, that it is impossible God should have made such an imputation. The reader may ask whether on this point we hold with the rationalist? We reply explicitly that we do not. That is to say, while we regard it as unnecessary, rash and incorrect to dogmatize with Dr. Hodge upon it, we regard it more rash and incorrect to dogmatize with the rationalists upon it. But such appears to be the jealousy of some of the advocates of the exaggeration which they call immediate imputation, that they will hardly venture to admit an intrinsic unrighteousness in the case of secular imputation which the rationalist cites above, lest they should compromise their favorite speculation. And yet God does not hesitate to denounce the intrinsic unrighteousness of such an act of secular government. (See Deut. xxiv. 16.) So far we have good countenance.

Now, to return, while we will not dogmatize with the rashness of the unbelieving caviller upon this point, we cannot but believe that his difficulty is needlessly and rashly enhanced by the dogma which we criticize. The great advantage of Calvin's view of the matter—in other words, of the scriptural view—is this, that it takes the imputation of Adam's sin manifestly out of that category in which the rationalist's illustration puts it, and in which, *if it really belonged there*, its unrighteousness would be inevitably self-evident. Calvin's view shows that the

Illustration does not contain a true parallel, and is therefore inconclusive. Calvin's view lifts the case of imputation of Adam's sin into a category where it stands by itself, and is wholly unique; where it has no illustration whatever among the usages of secular governments, whether just or unjust. Surely that is a solid advantage. For while this view leaves original sin enveloped in a mystery, which, as Dr. Thornwell declares, no man will ever solve in this world, it places the doctrine in a *status* where no man can convict it of intrinsic, self-evident injustice. And *then comes in* the legitimate application of the devout principle, acquiescing in our unavoidable ignorance, and saying, "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." This advantage attending Calvin's view appears in two ways: First, man reasons chiefly by parallel instances. His reasoning is comparison. Consequently, where there is no parallel, while he may not comprehend, he cannot convict. The case is above his grasp; he has no scales in which to weigh it. Secondly, the case of original sin, as stated by Calvin, differs as to the essential trait wherein the caviller finds, in the case of his pretended parallel, the self-evident injustice; and Dr. Hodge's view seems to concede the presence of that trait and the correctness of the parallel. Suppose the peaceful citizen charged, under human laws, with a putative guilt of a murder to which he had not consented. Every thoughtful mind sees the line of argument on which wise counsel would defend him. The argument would be: "May it please the court, our statute of murder, under which my client has lived and is now tried, has its alternative sanctions: To him who murders, it threatens death; to him who respects the life of his fellowmen, it promises immunity. That statute is of the nature of a covenant with the citizens. Now here, may it please your honor, is our impregnable ground: MY CLIENT HAS PERSONALLY KEPT THAT COVENANT. *He has thereby earned and is in possession of an existing title to immunity, with which he was invested, by virtue of his innocency, before this murder was committed, and therefore he can only be divested of it by his own personal, criminal act or his own consent.*" Now this is impregnable. But let us represent the imputation of Adam's guilt as the Scriptures do, and the sinner condemned in Adam has no such argument to use. He does not approach the judicial issue clothed with the existing, personal title to immunity derived from a

previous innocency of personal existence under the covenant of works. For, previous to his condemnation in Adam, he has no innocent existence personally, not for one moment, not even in the metaphysical order of thought, for he has no actual existence at all. He enters existence corrupted, as he enters it guilty. He enters it guilty, as he enters it corrupted. This is the character of the federal union between him and Adam: that Adam's conduct should determine for his posterity precisely this result, namely, that their personal existence should absolutely *begin* in that moral estate and under that legal relation which Adam procured for himself; that the two elements of this result should be mutually involved and coëtaneous, as they were personally in Adam. 'This statement is strictly correspondent to the revealed facts. And now, this is its advantage, that it leaves the sinner fallen and condemned in Adam no pretext to complain that he has been stripped of a personal title to immunity by thus bringing him under putative guilt and inherited depravity; for he had no such personal title to be stripped of, seeing he has had no personal existence prior to the depravity and guilt. This dispensation of God then remains unique, without any exact parallel in human events, solemn, mysterious; but it is placed where it is impossible to convict it of any injustice. Why God should ordain such a federal union in his righteous sovereignty, which he foresaw would result in the determination of a depraved and condemned individual existence for a whole race of creatures, none should presume to speculate. We see that he has done so. We can only perceive this ground of propriety for it in the light of natural reason: that it appears to be the most natural constitution for a company of creatures united to a first parent by that tie of race and propagation which is so fundamental a feature of humanity, and, comparing us with God's other rational creatures, so peculiar a feature of our existence.

GOD'S INDISCRIMINATE PROPOSALS OF MERCY,

AS RELATED TO HIS POWER, WISDOM, AND SINCERITY.

IF God makes proposals of mercy to men, who he foresees will certainly reject them and perish, and whom he immutably purposes to leave without effectual calling, how can his power and wisdom be cleared, save at the expense of his sincerity? or his sincerity at the expense of his wisdom or power? This is obviously the point in the Reformed or Augustinian theology most difficult of adjustment. The excogitation of the scheme of the "Hypothetic Universalists" among a part of the French Reformed, and the intricate discussions between them and the Genevans, evince the fact. It is also disclosed in the proposal of this problem by Sir Robert Boyle to John Howe, as a proper subject for the exercise of his sanctified acumen. The result was his famous treatise, *The Reconcilableness of God's Pre-science of the Sins of Men with the Wisdom and Sincerity of his Counsels*, etc. It is against this point that the most persistent attacks of Arminians are still made. "It is at this point," says Dr. A. A. Hodge's *Atonement*, "very wisely, as we think, the Arminian erects his main citadel. We freely admit that just here the advocates of that system are able to present a greater number and variety of texts which *appear* to favor the distinguishing principles of their system than they are able to gather in vindication of any other of their main positions." . . . "Then gathering together their scriptural evidence for the general and indefinite design of the atonement, they proceed with great appearance of force to argue inferentially against the outflanked Calvinistic positions of unconditional election and efficacious grace. In this manner Richard Watson, in effect, puts the strain of his entire argument upon this one position."

The occasion for calling in question either God's sincerity, or his wisdom, or power, upon the supposition of an uncon-

ditioned decree, arises from three classes of scriptures. One is the indiscriminate offer of salvation. Another is the ascription of Christ's sacrifice to love for "the world" as its motive, and the calling of him the "Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," "giveth himself for the world," etc. The third is composed of those which represent God as pitying all sinners, and even those who are never saved. Every reader's mind will suggest texts of each class. Now, it is notorious that these furnish the armory from which the Arminians equip their most pertinacious attacks on Calvinism; that it is on these texts the Calvinistic exegesis labors most and displays the most uncertainty; and that the usual Calvinistic solutions of them are scornfully denounced by their opponents as inadequate. These facts, of course, do not prove that the Arminians are right; but they evince the occasion for, and utility of, more satisfactory discussion.

The attempt of the "Hypothetic Universalists" was to reconcile all the scriptures by ascribing to God two acts of will concerning human salvation—one general and conditional volition to send Christ to provide expiation for all men, and to receive them all to heaven, provided they would believe on him; the other, a special and unconditioned volition to call the elect effectually, and thus insure that they should believe and be saved. Then they supposed that all the texts in question could be explained as expressions of the general and conditioned volition. But Turretin's refutation (for instance, Loc. IV., Qu. 17) is fatal. He urges that the only merciful volition of God in Scripture is that towards the elect; and "the rest he hardeneth;" that it is inevitably delusive to represent an omniscient and omnipotent Agent as having any kind of volition towards a result, when, foreseeing that the sinner will certainly not present the essential condition thereof—faith—he himself distinctly purposes not to bestow it; that the hearing of the gospel (Rom. x. 14) is as means equally essential, and God providentially leaves all the heathen without this; and that it is derogatory to God's power and sovereignty to represent any volition of his, that is a volition, as failing in a multitude of cases. It is significant that the Reformed divines of Turretin's school seem usually to conduct this debate on the assumption, sometimes tacit, sometimes expressed, that as God had no *volition* towards the salva-

tion of the non-elect, so he could not have any propension or affection at all towards it.

The perspicacious eye of Howe saw this assumption, and he made a tentative effort to expose it. To him also belongs the honor of rejecting and exploding that dogma of God's prevenient, efficient *concursus* in sinful actions, which the great Protestant scholastics had borrowed from the Dominican school and defended with a zeal so perverse. And now we find a Thornwell and a Hodge discarding this *dogma* as an unhappy excrescence on the Bible doctrines of the decree and providence. Howe (§ xxii.) is answering a supposed objector, who, like Turretin, urges the inconsistency of "an ineffectual and imperfect will" (in the Almighty) "which doth not bring to pass the thing willed." His answer is, "That imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the divine will, merely for its not effecting every thing whereto it *may have a real propension*." He then proceeds to describe this propension towards an end which is short of an effective volition as a "mere velleity," and declares that he is more ready to assert of God "a will not effective of the thing willed," than fly in the face of the many Scriptures which ascribe to God a pitifulness towards the lost. He then endeavors to vindicate God from this seeming paradox by saying that, while the salvation of all men is, *per se*, an object proportionable to a proper propension of God's will "by only simple complacency," other "more valuable reasons" may weigh with God not to purpose the salvation of all, "with the higher complacency of a determinative will." "Since the public declarations of his good-will towards all men import no more than the former," his sincerity is thus reconciled with his immutable pre-science.

The candid mind feels that there should be a truth somewhere in that direction in which the "Hypothetic Universalist" was vainly groping. Has not Howe here caught a glimpse of that truth? And why have the eyes of Reformed theologians been so often "holden" from seeing it distinctly? These questions deserve inquiry.

The direction in which the answers are conceived to lie may be best indicated by an analogical instance. A human ruler may have full power and authority over the punishment of a culprit, may declare consistently his sincere compassion for him,

and may yet freely elect to destroy him. A concrete case will make the point more distinct. Chief-Justice Marshall, in his *Life of Washington* (Vol. IV., Chap. vi.), says with reference to the death-warrant of the rash and unfortunate Major André: "Perhaps on no occasion of his life did the commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and of policy." In this historical instance we have these facts: Washington had plenary power to kill or to save alive. His compassion for the criminal was real and profound. Yet he signed his death-warrant with spontaneous decision. The solution is not the least difficult either for philosophy or common sense. Every deliberate rational volition is regulated by the agent's dominant subjective disposition, and prompted by his own subjective motive. But that motive is a complex, not a simple modification of spirit. The simplest motive of man's rational volition is a complex of two elements: a desire or propension of some subjective optative power, and a judgment of the intelligence as to the true and preferable. The motive of a single decision may be far more complex than this, involving many intellectual considerations of prudence, or righteous policy, and several distinct and even competing propensions of the optative powers. The resultant volition arises out of a deliberation, in which the prevalent judgment and appetency counterpoise the inferior ones. To return to our instance: Washington's volition to sign the death-warrant of André did not arise from the fact that his compassion was slight or feigned, but from the fact that it was rationally counterpoised by a complex of superior judgments and propensions of wisdom, duty, patriotism, and moral indignation. Let us suppose that one of André's intercessors (and he had them even among the Americans) standing by, and hearing the commanding general say, as he took up the pen to sign the fatal paper, "I do this with the deepest reluctance and pity," should have retorted, "Since you are supreme in this matter, and have full bodily ability to throw down that pen, we shall know by your signing this warrant that your pity is hypocritical." The petulance of this charge would have been equal to its folly. The pity was real, but was restrained by superior elements of motive. Washington had official and bodily power to discharge the criminal, but he had not the sanction of his own wisdom and justice.

Thus his pity was genuine, and yet his volition not to indulge it free and sovereign.

The attempt to illustrate the ways of God by such analogies is too obvious to be novel. What, then, are the objections on which Calvinists have usually set them aside as unsatisfactory? In approaching this question it is instructive to notice the manner in which the extreme parties deal with the parallel case in God's government. Says the strong Arminian: "Since God is sovereign, and also true and sincere, therefore I know that, when he declares his compassion for 'him that dieth,' he has exerted all the power that even omnipotence can properly exert on 'free-will' to turn that sinner to life." Thus this party sustain God's sincerity at the expense of his omnipotence. The party of the other extreme says: "Because God is sovereign and omnipotent, therefore we know that, were there any pity in him for 'the sinner that dieth,' that affection would inevitably have applied almighty grace, which would have turned him without fail to life; so that we must explain the merciful declaration as meaning something else than it seems." They thus save God's omnipotence and sovereignty at the expense of his sincerity. The two parties, while in extreme opposition, fall into the same error—the sophism of the imagined accuser of Washington. Their common mistake would, in the case of a wise and good man, be exploded by explaining the nature of motive and free rational volition. The correct answer to the Arminian is to show him that the existence of a real and unfeigned pity in God for "him that dieth," does not imply that God has exhausted his divine power in vain to renew the creature's "free-will" in a way consistent with its nature, because the pity may have been truly in God, and yet countervailed by superior motives, so that he did not will to exert his omnipotence for that sinner's renewal. The other extreme receives the same reply; the absence of an omnipotent, and inevitably efficient, volition to renew that soul does not prove the absence of a true compassion in God for him; and for the same reason the propension may have been in God, but restrained from rising into a volition by superior rational motives.

Evidently, then, if this parallel could be used safely, it would relieve the difficulty of the problem, and conciliate extremes to the scriptural truth involved. The supposed obstacles seem to

class themselves under three heads. 1. The difference between a finite and an infinite almighty governor makes the parallel worthless. 2. Such a theory of motive and free agency may not be applied to the divine will, because of God's absolute simplicity of being, and the unity of his attributes with his essence, the total lack of "passive powers" in his glorious nature, and the unity and eternity of his whole will as to all events. It is feared that the parallel would misrepresent God's activities of will by a vicious anthropomorphism. 3. No such balancing of subjective motives takes place without inward strivings, which would be inconsistent with God's immutability and blessedness.

None will deny that the discussion of God's nature and activities should be approached with profound reverence and diffidence. One of the clearest declarations concerning him in the Scriptures is, that we may not expect to "find out the Almighty unto perfection." Should a theologian assume, then, that his *rationale* of God's actings furnished an exhaustive or complete explanation of them all, this alone would convict him of error. It must be admitted, also, that no analogy can be perfect between the actions of a finite and the infinite intelligence and will. But analogies may be instructive and valuable which are not perfect; if they are just in part they may guide us in the particulars wherein there is a true correspondence. And the Scriptures, which do undertake to unfold "parts of his ways," will be safe guides to those who study them with humility.

Turretin, entering into discussion with the "Hypothetic Universalists," remarks that the foundations of the faith remain safe, so long as it is firmly held on all hands, 1st, That the corruption of men's souls is universal, and every man's inability for delivering himself from it universal and invincible without the efficacious grace of God; 2nd, That there is a sovereign and particular election of the saved, unconditioned on their foreseen graces, and a preterition of the rest of mankind; 3rd, That there is an efficacious grace, the gift of this election, working saving faith, without which in action no one truly chooses godliness; 4th, That gospel revelation is the necessary and only sufficient means of working saving grace. These, saith he, are the capital dogmas of the faith, on this subject, which all the Reformed defend amidst their minor diversities against all forms of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism.

1. It is objected against all use of the explanation suggested, that, while it applies to a human ruler, who is not omnipotent, it does not apply to God, who is almighty. Washington was restrained from indulging his compassion towards André by remembering the dangers and mischiefs which would result from the impunity of a spy. But if he had possessed an omnipotent control over all hearts and all events, by which he could with perfect facility obviate all those mischiefs, then his compassion must have gratified itself, if truly felt, in André's release. God, it is urged, has that omnipotence. If he feels any propension of mercy towards the sinner "that dieth," and bethinks himself of the dangers to his moral government which would arise from a sinner's impunity in guilt, he also knows that it is infinitely easy for him to obviate all such possible dangers by sanctifying the sinner himself, and also all others who might be tempted to sin by the example of his impunity, just as he actually does sanctify his justified elect.

Now, it is obvious that this reply proceeds on the following assumption: that if the obstacle of physical inability be removed in God, by his consciousness of omnipotence, there cannot be any other rational ground, in the view of God's omniscience, that may properly counterpoise or hold back the propension of mercy. But the statement of this is its sufficient exposure. It must always be exceedingly probable that an all-wise mind may see, among the multifarious concerns of his vast kingdom, good reasons for his action of which we cannot have the least conception. Let us select a specific case, that, for instance, of Judas Iscariot. Would not he be a rash man who should assert that the infinite God could not see, in his own omniscience, any other ground for his volition not to attempt his effectual calling than one of these two, either an entire indifference to his misery, or a conscious inability to renovate his soul? The logic of the objector is, moreover, optimistic. It proceeds on the assumption that we are entitled to hold that God's ultimate end in the government of the universe is the greatest aggregate well-being of creatures. But we are not entitled to hold thus. We know that his ultimate end is his own glory. But we do not know all the ways in which God may deem his glory is promoted. All that we can say is, not that God must procure that state of the universe which is on the whole the *best*, *i. e.*, the most benevolent,

but that he will of course have that universe which most completely satisfies the set of ends which have commended themselves to his perfections as most proper for him to pursue. But we are not qualified to say what all those ends are. It may be that it is proper they should not include the happiness of the largest possible number of sinners, but something else still more worthy of God. When we have admitted this, we have virtually admitted that God may see, in his own omniscience, a rational ground other than inability for restraining his actual propension of pity towards a given sinner. The first objection, then, however plausible in appearance, is found to be empty. And it is especially to be noted that, while it professes a zeal for God's infinitude, it really disparages it. Our position is, after all, the modest and reverential one.

Let us interpose here this definition to preclude misunderstanding: that the phrase "divine will," which we are about to use, is meant not in its narrow sense of the faculty of choice; but in the wider sense of the active powers, or "conative" powers, so well established among Calvinists.

2. The attempt to illustrate the action of the divine will from the rise of rational volition in man, has doubtless been prejudiced by the scholastic explanations of God's absolute simplicity. They would have us believe, not only that this excludes all composition and aggregation of quantitative parts, but all true distinction of essence and attributes. They would have the idea of God as absolutely devoid of construction in thought as his substance is of construction in reality. We must in his case identify essence and attributes. God is *actus purus*. Any attribute is God, and hence one attribute is differentiated from another only by our apprehension of it. With him cognition and effectuation are identical. It does not satisfy them to say that God is an infinite monad, as the rational human soul is a finite monad; and that his attributes, like man's essential powers of intelligence, sensibility, and will, are not limbs or parts attached to the Spirit, but essential modes of functions with which he is endued. They require us to identify God's attributes with his essence in a way inconceivably closer than we do man's essential powers with his essence. Now, if this speculation be correct, the attempt to apprehend the action of the divine will by the human must be wholly erroneous. There could be no such distinction, as is true of man, between

motive and volition, or between the optative powers and the power of choice. Nor could there be any sense whatsoever in which God's subjective motive could be complex.

But we deny that the speculation is correct, susceptible of proof, or possible to be valid to the human mind. Evidently the cognition of such a being is inaccessible to man's intelligence. The only way he has of knowing substance is through its attributes; and the only cognition we have of it is as the intuitive notion, which the reason necessarily supplies, of the *subjectum* to which the attributes perceived must be referred. Hence, to require us to think substance as literally identical with each attribute rationally referred to it, is to forbid us to think it at all. Again, reason forbids us to think different attributes as identical. We intuitively know that thought is not conation, and conation is not sensibility; it is as impossible to think these actually identical in God as in ourselves. Last, this speculation brings us too near the awful verge of pantheism. Were it true, then it would be the shortest and most natural of steps to conclude that God has no other being than the series of activities of the several attributes with which they seek to identify the being. Thus we have the form of pantheism next to the gulf of nihilism. If the attributes are identical with the being of God and with each other, and if it be thus shown that God's thought makes the object thereof, then, since God is eternally, necessarily, and infinitely intelligent, these results must rigidly follow: that all objective being known to God must be also as eternal and necessary as God, and that it must be as infinite as he is. What more would Spinoza have desired to found his mathematical proof of pantheism? The speculation is not true any more than it is scriptural. The Bible always speaks of God's attributes as distinct, and yet not dividing his unity; of his intelligence and will as different; of his wrath, love, pity, wisdom, as not the same activities of the Infinite Spirit. We are taught that each of these is inconceivably higher than the principle in man which bears the corresponding name; but if the Scriptures do not mean to teach us that they are distinguishable in God, as truly as in man, and that this is as consistent with his being an infinite monad as with our souls being finite monads, then they are unmeaning.

In the rational creature, notwithstanding the simplicity of the

spirit, judgments of the preferable and conative propensions are not identical with the volition in which they result. In him subjective motive is complex, and a given element of motive may be truly present, and yet not separately expressed in the volition, because over-preponderating motives prompt the agent freely to restrain that element. Then, the absolute simplicity of God does not forbid our ascribing to him an inconceivably higher mode of action of will, which is yet truly analogous.

We may be reminded that the *Confession* declares God to be "without passions." So the theologians tell us that we must ascribe to him no "passive powers"; for then he would not be immutable. He acts on everything; but is acted on by none. He is the source, but not the recipient of effects. This is indisputable. But we should not so overstrain the truth as to reject two other truths. One is, that while God has no passions, while he has no mere susceptibility such that his creature can cause an effect upon it irrespective to God's own will and freedom, yet he has active principles. These are not passions, in the sense of fluctuations or agitations, but none the less are they affections of his will, actively distinguished from the cognitions in his intelligence. They are true optative functions of the divine Spirit. However anthropopathic may be the statements made concerning God's repentings, wrath, pity, pleasure, love, jealousy, hatred, in the Scriptures, we should do violence to them if we denied that he here meant to ascribe to himself active affections in some mode suitable to his nature. And it is impossible for us to suppose an agent without active principles, as well as cognitive, as we could not believe that the compass could move the ship without any motive power. The other truth is, that objective beings and events are the real occasions, though not efficient causes, of the action both of the divine affections and will. Are not many divines so much afraid of ascribing to God any "passive powers," or any phase of dependence on the creature, that they hesitate even to admit that scriptural fact? But why should they recoil from the simple statements of his Word on this point, unless they were confused or misled by the old sensualistic view, which regarded the objective impression as somehow the efficient, instead of the mere occasion, of the following activities of the percipient soul: "God is angry *with the wicked* every day" (Ps. vii. 11); "But

the *thing that David* had done displeased the Lord;” “My delight is in *her*” (Is. lxii. 4); “*In these things* I delight, saith the Lord” (Jer. ix. 24). Is all this so anthropopathic as not even to mean that God’s active principles here have an objective? Why not let the Scriptures mean what they so plainly strive to declare? But some seem so afraid of recognizing in God any susceptibility of a passive nature that they virtually set Scripture aside, and paint a God whose whole activities of intelligence and will are so exclusively from himself that even the relation of objective occasion to him is made unreal, and no other is allowed than a species of coincidence or preëstablished harmony. They are chary of conceding (what the Bible seems so plainly to say) that God is *angry because* men sin; and would go no farther than to admit that somehow he is angry *when* men sin, yet, because absolutely independent, angry only of himself.

Now, our rational nature compels us to think these active principles relevant only when they act towards their proper objectives. If the wise and righteous reason does not perceive something that has, or is to have, actuality that is wicked, it does not have indignation; the legitimate condition for the action of this affection is wholly absent. If it does not see some being approvable, it does not feel the love of moral complacency. Why should not this be most true of the perfect reason, all of whose activities are most absolutely true to the actual? Nor is there any danger of sacrificing God’s independence or immutability, or of imputing to him “passive power,” or of tarnishing his nature with the fluctuations and agitations of passion. For, first, since his will was eternally sovereign, there can be nothing holy or unholy, in all time, in the actual objective universe, which was not decreed freely by his effective or permissive will. Thus, while it is true that what God looks at objectively is the unfailing occasion in him of the appropriate subjective affection; it is also true that there cannot be any thing actual for him to look at save such things as he freely chooses to permit to occur or exist. Second, there is no truth in this point of the sensualistic creed, either for God or man; the object is not efficient of the affection directed upon it, but the mere occasion. The affection is from the inward spontaneity. And, third, God’s omniscience is declared in the Scriptures to be infinite and eternal; so that no amiable or repulsive object can be a novelty to

his mind. The treason of Judas was as clearly seen and comprehended, in all its hateful features, in God's infinite intelligence, before the foundation of the world as the moment it was perpetrated; nor has there been one instant since in the divine consciousness when the mental comprehension of that crime has wavered, or been forgotten or displaced, or even obscured by other objects of thought. Thus, the object being stable in the divine intelligence, the appropriate affection has been equally changeless in the divine will. The truth we must apprehend, then, is this—we cannot comprehend it—that God eternally has active principles directed towards some objective, which combine all the activity of rational affections with the passionless stability of his rational judgments, and which, while not *emotions*, in the sense of change, or ebb or flow, are yet related to his volitions in a way analogous to that which obtains between the holy creature's optative powers and his volitions. Can we picture an adequate conception of them? No; "it is high; we cannot attain unto it." But this is the consistent understanding of revelation, and the only apprehension of God which does not both transcend and violate man's reason.

God's absolute unity and simplicity may be supposed by some to furnish another objection to the hypothesis that his propensions and his volition are distinguishable in his consciousness as truly as in a holy creature's. It may be urged that this would imply an actual sequence in the parts of the divine will, and the acquisition by him of additional acts of will. Let this be considered. In a finite rational spirit there is unquestionably a partial parallel between volition and deduction, in this: that as this finite mind, in its logical process, advances from premises to conclusion, making a literal (though possibly rapid) *sequence* of mental acts; so, in its acts of choice when rationally conscious, it proceeds from motive to volition, making a *sequence* of voluntary activities equally literal. Now, all are agreed that the infinite intelligence cannot have logical processes of the deductive order. Its whole cognition must be intuition. For else it would follow that omniscience was not complete at first, and receives subsequent accessions of deductive knowledge. (This is one fatal objection to the Molinist scheme of *scientia media*.) So, it may be urged, the activity of the divine will must be absolute unity; if we represent volition as arising out of motive, and

the divine consciousness as discriminating the one from the other, we shall have the eternal will acting in succession, which is untenable.

This comparison of the intellectual and active powers will lead us to a solution. It must undoubtedly be admitted that all of God's cognition is immediate intuition, and that he can neither have nor need any deductive process by which to reach truth. But does it follow therefrom that he has no intuitions of relations? Let the reader reflect that many of our surest intuitions are of truths of relation, as of the equality of two magnitudes of which each is equal to a third and the same; that a multitude of things which exist do exist in relation; and that it is the very glory and perfection of God's intelligence that it thinks every thing with an absolute faithfulness to the reality known by him. He will not be rash enough to question the fact that among God's infinite cognitions are a multitude of intuitions of truths in relation. Again, since all God's knowledge is absolutely true to the actual realities known, wherever he knows one thing as destined to depend on another thing, there must be a case in which God *thinks a sequence*. Let the distinction be clearly grasped. The things are known to God as in sequence; but his own subjective act of thought concerning them is not a sequence. How can this be? Our limited intelligence cannot realize it in thought; God can, because he is infinite. We *must*, then, to avoid wronging God on the one hand or the other, in our apprehension of his omniscience, acquiesce in this statement: that while the infinite capacity of the divine mind enables it to see coëtaneously by one all-including intuition every particular truth of his omniscience, his absolute infallibility also insures the mental arrangement of them all in their logical and causal relations, as they are destined to be actualized in successive time. Ὁ βᾶθος πλότους καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως Θεοῦ! Thus all must admit, for instance, that in the rational order of thinking, we think cause as *in order to* effect. It is an intuition. Now, is this an infirmity or a correct trait in the finite mind? Surely it is a correct trait. Will God's infinite mental superiority, then, prevent his doing this correct thinking, conceiving cause as *in order to* effect? Surely not. Yet he sees both cause and effect by one coëtaneous intuition, and does not need, like us, to learn the cause by inference from the effect, or

the effect by inference from the cause. So the rational order of thought is, that the object is in order to the volition. The hunter must see the animal in order to aim his weapon. Does not the infallible mind of God see the object, and act in the same rational order? Doubtless; but he has no need, like us, of a chronological succession. God's cognitions, then, while devoid of sequence in time, doubtless preserve the appropriate logical order.

Now the same considerations will lead us to the proper conclusion touching the order of motive and volition in God's infinite will. This is not irrational, because infinite. From our point of view, subjective motive is in order to volition; they are related as cause and effect. We cannot think them otherwise. However rapidly we may conceive a spirit's spontaneity to act, we cannot help thinking that when it formed a rational volition it did so because a rational motive went before. There is no ascertainable sequence of time; but none the less does our reason insist on putting the motive and volition in a causative sequence. Again, I ask, is this an infirmity or a correct action of our reason? If our reason acts correctly in insisting on this causative order, does God's infallible reason signalize its infinite superiority by refusing to think the order aright? Surely not. Here, then, we are shut up to the same apprehension, that while the action of the divine mind in rational volition is not successive, yet its infinite capacity preserves the proper causal subordination and distinction of rational motive and resultant volition. It thus appears that the unity and eternity of all the acts of the divine will do not preclude the proper discrimination and relation in the divine consciousness of motive and volition, affection and action. We see that, if we insisted on that dogma, we should sacrifice the rationality of the divine will in the needless attempt to preserve its unity.

The justice and value of this conclusion may be illustrated by the light which it throws on the supralapsarian scheme of predestination. Because a rational mind determines first the ultimate end, and then the intermediate means, and because that which is last in effectuation is first in thought, therefore these divines insist on this sequence in the parts of the decree: 1st, God selects, out of men *in posse*, a certain number in whose redemption he will glorify himself; 2d, As a means to this ulti-

mate end he determines to create mankind; 3d, He determines to permit their fall; 4th, He decrees to send his Son in human nature for the redemption of his elect. Sublapsarians, perceiving the harshness and unreasonableness of this, propose the opposite order of sequence (but still a sequence). God decreed, 1st, to create man holy; 2d, to permit his fall; 3d, to elect out of fallen mankind his chosen people; 4th, to send his Son for their redemption. Supralapsarians retort that this scheme makes God's decree as truly conditioned on the creature's action as the Arminian, though on a different condition. So the debate proceeds.

But he who apprehends the action of the infinite mind reasonably and scripturally at once, sees that, while the sublapsarian is right in his spirit and aim, both parties are wrong in their method, and the issue is one which should never have been raised. As God's thought and will do not exist in his consciousness in parts, so they involve no sequence, neither the one nor the other. The decree which determines so vast a multitude of parts is itself a unit. The whole all-comprehending thought is one coëtaneous intuition; the whole decree one act of will. But in virtue of the very consistency and accuracy of the divine plan, and infinity of the divine knowledge, facts destined to emerge out of one part of the plan, being present in thought to God, enter into logical relation to other parts of the same plan. As the plan is God's thought, no part precedes any other. But none the less those parts which are destined to be, in execution, prior and posterior, stand in their just causal relations in his thinking. One *result decreed* is to depend on another result decreed. But as the decree is God's consciousness, all is equally primary. Thus there will be neither supra nor infra-lapsarian, and no room for their debate.

To this whole view of God's active principles, it may be replied by some that it is too anthropomorphic. We may be reminded of the rebuke of the 50th Psalm: "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself; but I will reprove thee." It has been pungently said, that "whereas the Scriptures say man was made in the image of God, some would have a God made in the image of man." This should justly remind us of the need of much humility and care, lest we should ascribe to him any vicious anthropomorphism. Is there no safe guile?

May it not be found in these rules: that we shan on no pretext ascribe to God any defect of the creature, or any self-contradiction; and that we bow implicitly to the declaration he makes of himself in the word, as honestly interpreted by the "analogy of the faith"? And so much may be justly claimed for the views above defended, and whether speculative, or abstruse, or not, their whole application is, not to wrest God's declarations of himself, but to restore them to a more natural and unforced exposition; to make them mean more simply what they seem to mean to the plain reader.

Now, there is a sense in which all our apprehensions of God, as well as of everything else, must be anthropomorphic. It must be that cognitions be according to the forms of man's reason. If we are forbidden to think after human norms, we cannot think at all. Again, the Scriptures assure us that our spirits were created after the rational, and moral, image of God. Man un-fallen was a correct miniature of the infinite Father. And so far as we can be certain that a specific law of thought or action is unperturbed by the ruins of our fall, we have in that law a finite pattern of God's infinite law of thought or action. If we would not fall into the bottomless gulf of universal skepticism, we must hold that truth is eternal and uniform in heaven and earth. So far, then, as we are sure of a process of mind as leading to pure truth, we are sure that in that process we are akin to all other minds, created and uncreated. It thus appears manifest that a certain degree of anthropomorphism, so far from being suspicious, is the necessary signature of true conceptions concerning all other rational beings. The mind must *be conscious* in order to have cognitions about any thing. So it *must construe its own consciousness* in order to formulate its objective knowledge. Psychology must underlie logic. Sir William Hamilton has shown that it must at least implicitly underlie our natural theology.

Especially may it be urged that every intelligent Calvinist, when stating and establishing the nature of the human will and free agency, has appealed to God's freedom for illustration. Is not this one of the main arguments we use against the Arminian dogma, "contingency of will essential to freedom"; that God's will never was contingent, but eternally determined to holiness, and yet is he the truest and noblest of all free agents? And

what is effectual calling, which restores the lost image, in its central work, save a rectification of man's free agency after the pattern of God's? And does not every sound divine teach that just in degree as the activities of the human will are rational, in that degree they approach the pattern of the divine? Let it be noticed, then, that in seeking the analogy by which to illustrate God's will in its actions touching the disputed cases, we selected the most rational and righteous human will; and we found that the more completely it became such, the better it fulfilled our purpose of aiding us to apprehend God's will.

3. The remaining difficulty to be noticed is, that the conception presented of the divine affections and volitions would involve the idea of a strife in the divine bosom. Such is doubtless the result of deliberation between competing motives in the human breast. The reaching of the final choice is attended with agitation and pain. And such strife must not be ascribed to God. But let it be considered whether this inward struggle arises from the fact that motives are complex, or from the fact that the affections which enter into our motives are passionate? The latter is evidently the true statement. We cannot picture in our minds active principles which shall have, on the one hand, all the impulsive energy of affections, and on the other, all the immutable equanimity of deity; yet we must ascribe just these principles to God. But we can conceive that, just in degree as a man's affections approximate that steadiness and purity, the adjustment of them into the rational and righteous volition involves less inward struggle. This is sustained by observation. We have seen how wisdom, justice, and patriotism in Washington's breast strove with and mastered the pity which pleaded for the life of the spy who had nearly ruined America. But the majestic calmness of that great man did not desert him. Had a weaker nature been called to perform the painful duty of signing that death-warrant—the gallant but frivolous Gates, for instance—he would have shown far more agitation; he would perhaps have thrown down the pen and snatched it again, and trembled and wept. But this would not have proved a deeper compassion than Washington's. His shallow nature was not capable of such depths of sentiment in any virtuous direction as filled the profounder soul. The cause of the difference would have been in this, that Washington's was a grander and wiser as well as a more feeling soul.

Dying saints have sometimes declared that their love for their families was never before so profound and tender; and yet they were enabled by dying grace to bid them a final farewell with joyful calmness. If, then, the ennobling of the affections enables the will to adjust the balance between them with less agitation, what will be the result when the wisdom is that of omniscience, the virtue is that of infinite holiness, and the self-command that of omnipotence?

4. Another line of argument will lead us to the same conclusion, that the absence of a volition in God to save does not necessarily imply the absence of compassion. This may be made perspicuous thus. When we teach that God's election to life is unconditioned, Arminians often leap to the conclusion that it must be therefore capricious and partial. When we point them to God (Rom. ix. 11) determining that the elder, Esau, should serve the younger, Jacob, "before the children were yet born, or had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth;" and when we take this as teaching that God's selection of Jacob was not conditioned on his foreseen penitence or faith, Arminians reject our construction, and exclaim that this would be mere omnipotent caprice and injustice. But no intelligent Calvinist admits this. He declares that by an unconditioned act of divine will he does not mean a motiveless act. To ascribe any motiveless volition to God would contradict the Scriptures, which declare that all his actions are done in wisdom; and the *Catechism*, which teaches us that his decree is a purpose "according to the *counsel* of his will." We doubt not but that God had his most wise, holy, and sufficient ground and reason for selecting sinful Jacob, rather than sinful Esau, to receive the inworking of faith and repentance. All we know about that reason is, that God did not find it in any foreseen piety that was to exist in Jacob, because the only piety there would ever be in Jacob to foresee was that which was to result from his election. Where God found his motive we know not; there was room enough, unimaginable by us, in the views of his infinite mind ranging over the affairs of his vast kingdom.

This truth should be familiar to the Calvinist, but it may not be amiss to make it clearer. A wise commander has his army in the presence of the invader. He has been regularly guarding

his approaches by keeping one regiment from each five out as pickets for twenty-four hours. The duty is full of hardship and danger. The morning has come for the fifth regiment of a particular brigade to take its turn; but there appears an unexplained order from the commander to spare this regiment, and send back another, which has already had its turn. At once all is surprise and discontent among these men. They demand to know the reason of this injustice. Is it because the commander has a pique against them, and takes this way to punish them? The messenger assures them that this is not the commander's motive. Is it, then, because he confides in their vigilance and bravery so much more than in the fifth, so that the new order is a mark of confidence? Again the messenger answers, No; it is certain that the commander's motive is not connected in any way with the respective merits or faults of the men in the two regiments. "Then tell us," they exclaim, "his real ground." The messenger replies: "I am not able; all I know is that I was told to deliver this positive order; it is yours to obey." The next morning the mystery is solved thus: at daybreak messengers fly from the commander to every brigade, ordering all to get under arms, and to prepare to deliver battle at sunrise. The general of this brigade is ordered to select the fifth regiment to cover the front of his other four as skirmishers, and receive the first shock of the onset, *because they alone, in that brigade, have rifles of long range suitable for the service.* Now it is seen whether the strange order of the previous morning was capricious! After a day and night of sleepless watching, these men would have been unfit for their arduous and perilous duty on the all-important day. Yet this wise ground had nothing to do with the respective merits of the men; all were good soldiers. Why, then, did not the commander publish his reason along with his order, when it would have saved so much angry surmise? It was not only his right, but his sacred duty to conceal the purpose out of which that reason grew, else its premature publication would have enabled the vilest deserter to advertise the invader, who would adopt measures which would cost the blood of hundreds of brave men. Such an instance is worthless for revealing to us the specific nature of the grounds on which he acts whose "glory it is to conceal;" but it may teach us how certainly he has adequate grounds for every volition, and how it befits the honor of his

vast government "to give no account of his matters to any man."

We are not to suppose, then, that because God's predestination is unconditioned, it is motiveless, unreasoning, or capricious. Returning now to the case of Rom. ix. 11, and interpreting it scripturally, we learn that God's rational ground for selecting Jacob was not the foresight of his piety, but some ground unknown to us which commended itself properly to the Lord's wisdom and holiness. The question which we wish to press just here is this: Did not God feel, notwithstanding this properly overruling rational motive, the abhorrence for Jacob's foreseen original sin and actual meanness, suitable for an infinitely holy nature to feel, and naturally tending, had it not been counterpoised, to Jacob's righteous rejection? The Scriptures answer this question for us. (See Ezek. xvi. 5, 6; Neh. ix. 27; Jer. xxxii. 31, 37; 1 Peter iv. 17.) Indeed, neither our good sense nor the admitted principles of theology allow us to answer in the negative. For the former decides that moral principles must act impartially, raising similar sentiments when similar objects are presented; and we cannot conceive how a rational and ethical nature could be sensible to the demerit of A's act, and insensible to the very same demerit of B's act. The latter distinguishes that while God acts all things freely, some of those free things he acts "necessarily," that is, by the moral necessity of his own perfections, while others he acts optionally. In neither class of activities can there be any "coaction," because he is always absolute sovereign and first cause. But to some activities he is determined with eternal certainty by his own perfections, while to some he determines himself "arbitrarily" (by which is meant, of course, not tyrannically, but *libertate meri arbitrii*). Thus, "God cannot lie," but God had the liberty *meri arbitrii* to make four moons to the planet Earth and one to Jupiter, or four to Jupiter and one to Earth. Now, having grasped this distinction, we must say that, while God has this liberty of mere option whether or not to *execute* his affection of pity or reprobation towards any of his own creatures, he has not this liberty of option about *having* the appropriate affections of his moral nature towards any of them. Is this because an exterior superior agent compels him to feel them? By no means; but because the regulative control of his own immutable perfections

absolutely insures the consistent action of his own principles always.

God doubtless felt then a similar moral reprehension for Jacob's foreseen supplanting falsehood to that which he felt for Esau's heady self-will. Yet he elected Jacob and passed over Esau. How was that? We are now prepared to answer. Because that moral reprehension, whose natural propension in either case was to righteous rejection, was, in Jacob's case, overruled by a good and sufficient motive; and because that motive, in Esau's case having no application, left the moral reprehension to issue naturally and righteously in his rejection. An absolute but benevolent monarch has to pass on the fate of two murderers. A is a skillful physician; B is ignorant of that art. The law-abiding people are grievously scourged by pestilence, and suffering sore dearth of medical aid. The king finds both A and B odiously and equally guilty; yet he reprieves A that his medical skill may be used for the suffering sick. For what is B hanged? For murder only. But was not A, who escapes, also equally guilty of murder, and does it not follow that B was really hanged for his ignorance of medicine? A child can see the sophism, and can give the obvious solution: that B was hung for the guilt of his murder solely, and that the medical consideration, which weighed against A's equal guilt, had simply no application to B's case. Thus we resolve that supralapsarian perversion, which so much prejudiced the doctrine of predestination with so many moderate minds: "that Esau's guilt or evil desert could not have furnished the motive of God's preterition of him, because, since all fallen men have evil desert, that motive, if operative, must have prompted the rejection of all." Now, the plain reader of his Bible naturally supposes that evil desert is *the very thing* for which a holy God would be prompted to reject a sinner; and we see that the plain reader is right. All fallen men have evil desert. But the hinge of the doctrine is here: in the case of the elect, God has a secret rational motive, which has no application to the non-elect, outweighing the motive to reject presented in their evil desert; in the case of the non-elect, this latter motive, finding nothing to counterpoise it, prompts its natural and righteous volition, deserved rejection.

This being made clear, we reach our next step by raising this question: Is not compassion for the miseries of his own lost

creature as natural to a God of infinite benevolence as moral indignation against all sin is to a God of infinite righteousness? And when two guilty creatures are suffering similar miseries, equally deserved in both cases, can the divine immutability, consistency and goodness be reconciled with the belief that the compassion which exists in the one case has not even the slightest existence in the other case? If this particular position be assumed, then the charge of unaccountable partiality, which the Arminian unjustly casts against predestination, will have some fair application. Not that either sufferer has a personal right to either compassion or succor as against God. But the anomaly will be this: how comes it that an essential principle of God's nature should act normally towards one object, and refuse the similar exercise towards the precisely parallel object? This is God's absolute sovereignty, answers the supralapsarian. But a sound theology answers again, no; while God is perfectly free in every exercise of his essential principles, yet he freely does some things necessarily, and other things optionally; and God's optional liberty is not whether he shall *have* the propensions of his essential principles, but whether he shall *execute* them by his volitions. The counterpart truth, then, must be asserted of Jacob and Esau. As God had the natural and appropriate affection of disapprobation against Jacob's ill desert, and still elected him, which he had against Esau's; so, doubtless, he had the same affection, appropriate to his infinite goodness, of compassion for Esau's misery, and yet rejected him, which he had for Jacob's deserved misery. If any compassion for Esau existed in the sovereign mind, why did it not effectuate itself in his salvation? We answer with a parallel question: why did not the righteous reprehension against Jacob's ill desert, if any of it existed in the sovereign mind, effectuate itself in his damnation? All of us have agreed to the answer to this latter question; we dare not say that God could distinctly foresee all Jacob's supplanting falsehood and feel no disapprobation whatever; it would come near to blasphemy. We must reply: Because this disapprobation, while existing in the holy mind, was counterpoised by a wise, gracious, and sovereign motive unrevealed to us. Well, let the parallel answer be given to the parallel question: the divine compassion existing towards Esau's misery was counterpoised by some holy, wise, and sovereign motive unrevealed to

us ; so that righteous disapprobation for his sin remained the prevalent motive of righteous preterition.

When we say that God's prevalent rational motives in his predestinations are unrevealed, we mean it as to their specific or particular nature. One general fact is revealed as to all these motives, that they tend to God's ultimate highest glory.

The truths which we have attempted to illustrate concerning the nature of the divine will may be recapitulated thus : man, when holy, was formed in God's rational and moral image. Holy man's subjective motive for each rational volition is complex, because God's is also complex. This fact must follow from the very infinitude and constancy of God's attributes. The operative and intellectual elements of motive co-exist in God's unity in an ineffable manner, to the comprehension of which our finite consciousness is not competent, but which his infinitude renders consistent for him. While God is absolutely free in all the exercises of his essence, his optional freedom, or *libertas meri arbitrii*, is concerned not in his having, but in his executing any given element of his natural propension ; for it belongs to his essential perfection to have all of them, with an immutable constancy and impartial uniformity, the appropriate objects thereof being before his omniscience. While the active elements of his subjective motive are absolutely passionless, yet are they related to his volitions in a divine and ineffable manner, as man's affections are to his holy volitions. And we have shown that this does not clash with his absolute simplicity of essence, or his omnipotence, or his blessedness and divine peace.

The best support to this view is that which the Scriptures themselves give, in that it furnishes an exposition of all the passages declaring God's sentiments towards sinners which is consistent with their plain, obvious meaning, and which relieves at a touch all the exegetical throes and writhings inflicted on those texts. For if God actually has a state of pity towards the sinner that dieth—although it does not rise to the executive grade of a volition to save him—why should he not say in his word that he has it? It is the exact expression of the state of the case. Washington had a sincere sentiment of compassion for André, which patriotism, wisdom, justice, restrained from the release of the criminal. Why should he not express it? Why should he not permit it to prompt him to send the condemned man com-

fortable food from his own table, and to protect him from every needless indignity? He would be an impertinent caviller, indeed, who should ask, *Cui bono?* or should argue that these manifestations of magnanimous tenderness were futile or deceptive, because still they permitted the destruction of their object. *Cui bono?* Who does not perceive *these* good ends: that the virtue and philanthropy of him who was to be the great pattern of American manhood might have their appropriate manifestation; that the claims of the divine attribute of pity might be illustrated for us all in our provocations by the homage of a Washington; that the unavoidable rigors of war might be mitigated so far as justice allowed. Now, our God is as high above the noblest human ruler as the heavens above the earth. But we see not why this fact destroys the propriety of his glorifying his own infinite goodness in the parallel way. Being omniscient, he is able to hold all the multifarious ends of his vast kingdom, from its foundation to its everlasting future, together in his mind. His government is, therefore, just so much the more a connected whole than that of any wise creature. Must it not follow that there is far more of inter-adjustment in his own views and aims? Among all those countless subordinated aims, the honor of his own character, as infinitely holy, equitable, true, and benevolent, is properly the ultimate convergent end. Hence it is worthy of him, not only that he should so reveal himself as to secure the salvation of the particular objects of his mercy, but that he should so fulfil his legislative functions, irrespective of men's choosing to hear or to forbear, as to clear all his attributes of purity and goodness at once. Just as it is most right and worthy that he should tell men their duty correctly, whether he foresees their obedience or disobedience, so it is most worthy of his truth and benevolence that he shall acquit himself by exhorting men from their own self-destruction, whether they reject or accept his mercy.

But it may be that some still have the idea of futility haunting this representation of God's providence. When we urge the question, Supposing God actually feels, according to his infinite benevolence, natural propensions of pity towards persons whom his wisdom restrains him from ever purposing to save, why may he not give truthful expression thereto in either words or acts exactly expressive of the state of those propensions? they recoil

as though we ascribed to God inefficacy. Let it be considered, then, that a given optative element of motive may, by an agent's own wisdom, be self-restrained from what would be its natural end but for that restraint, and yet find an end in another effectual volition not opposed to that wisdom. Washington was actuated by a real compassion for André. Had he been innocent, the natural outworking of that pity would have been his deliverance from destruction. But from this Washington was self-restrained by his justice and wisdom. Must pity remain, then, fruitless of any appropriate volition? No; there was another end, against which neither wisdom nor justice pleaded, which gave a true expression to pity, the mitigation of the criminal's fate. Propensions thus self-regulated, while actually felt, are then not futile; and their direction to a subordinated end (when what would be their natural end, were there no superior restraining motive, is not willed) displays neither vacillation, change, nor weakness, but the most consistent wisdom. And lest it should be again objected that this picture, however consistent for a ruler of limited powers, is inapplicable to one absolute and almighty, let it be remembered that God is not absolute from the regulative influence of his own attributes; and that, however he may have absolute physical ability to indulge every propension of his nature in execution, he may not have the license of his own wisdom and holiness. And that concurrences may arise in his vast commonwealth to prompt him freely to judge so, has such exceeding probability that it would be a rashness almost insane to dispute it.

Let us now re-present to ourselves the large number of texts in which God entreats sinners to turn from the ways of destruction. They are addressed by him to all men, without distinction of elect and non-elect. When, for instance, the Redeemer commands us to "preach the gospel to every creature," it is impossible by any exegetical pressure to make the words mean, "every elect creature," because he adds in the next verse (Mark xvi. 16), "He that believeth not shall be damned." This possible subject is among the "every-creature" body to whom the overtures of mercy are to be made. But no "elect creature" can be damned. Now, no straightforward mind can ever be satisfied that the utterance of entreaties to shun destruction is not the expression of compassion, if they come from a sincere

person. The explanations of the gospel calls to the non-elect which do not candidly recognize this truth must ever carry a fatal weight with the great body of Christians. The Reformed confessions do indeed usually teach, with Dort, "*Quotquot per Evangelium vocantur. serio vocantur.*" Some of the theologians, however neutralize that concession, by applying here the distinction of God's will of *ἐλπίστια*, and of *ἐδόξια*, in a manner which betrays a bondage to the scholasticism we have attempted to expose. That there is a just distinction between God's decretive and preceptive will no thoughtful person can deny. But let the question be stated thus: Do all the solemn and tender entreaties of God to sinners express no more, as to the non-elect, than a purpose in God, uncompassionate and merely rectoral, to acquit himself of his legislative function towards them? To speak after the manner of men, have all these apparently touching appeals after all *no heart* in them? We cannot but deem it an unfortunate logic which constrains a man to this view of them. How much more simple and satisfactory to take them for just what they express?—evidences of a true compassion, which yet is restrained, in the case of the unknown class, the non-elect, by consistent and holy reasons, from taking the form of a volition to regenerate.

There are, again, passages which are yet more express, represented by Ezekiel xviii. 32; xxxiii. 11; Psalm lxxxi. 13. Here God seems to express a yearning compassion for sinners whose contumacy and ruin under gospel-privileges are demonstrated by their actual experience. The Calvinist is the last man who can doubt whether the lost sinner of Ezekiel xviii. 32, or Psalm lxxxi. 11, was non-elect at the time the divine lament was uttered; for our creed is, that election is invariably efficacious and immutable. What mode of reconciliation remains, then, after the overweening logic has been applied that, since God is sovereign and almighty, had there been any compassion for this sinner, it must have eventuated in his redemption? Can one resort to the plea that God willed that man's rescue with the will of *ἐλπίστια*, but willed his damnation with the will of *ἐδόξια*? The plain Christian mind will ever stumble on this fatal question, how can a truthful and consistent God have two opposite wills about the same object? It is far more scriptural, and, as we trust has been shown, far more logical to say, that an immutable and sov-

ereign God never had but one will, one purpose, or volition, as to this lost man; as a faithful God would never publish any other volition than the one he entertained; but that it was entirely consistent for God to compassionate where he never purposed nor promised to save, because this sincere compassion was restrained within the limits God announced by his own wisdom.

The yet more explicit passage in Luke xix. 41, 42, has given our extremists still more trouble. We are there told that Christ wept over the very men whose doom of reprobation he then pronounced. Again, the question is raised by them, If Christ felt this tender compassion for them, why did he not exert his omnipotence for their effectual calling? And their best answer seems to be, that here it was not the divine nature in Jesus that wept, but the humanity only. Now, it will readily be conceded that the divine nature was incapable of the *pain* of sympathetic passion and of the *agitation* of grief; but we are loath to believe that this precious incident is no manifestation of the passionless, unchangeable, yet infinitely benevolent pity of the divine nature. For, first, it would impress the common Christian mind with a most painful feeling to be thus seemingly taught that holy humanity is more generous and tender than God. The humble and simple reader of the gospels had been taught by them that there was no excellence in the humanity which was not the effect and effluence of the corresponding ineffable perfection in the divinity. Second, when we hear our Lord speaking of gathering Jerusalem's children as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and then announcing the final doom of the rejected, we seem to hear the divine nature in him, at least as much as the human. And third, such interpretations, implying some degree of dissent between the two natures, are perilous, in that they obscure that vital truth, Christ the manifestation to us of the divine nature. "He is the image of the invisible God;" "He is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person;" "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father?" (Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3; John xiv. 9.) It is our happiness to believe that when we see Jesus weeping over lost Jerusalem, we "have seen the Father," we have received an insight into the divine benevolence and pity. And therefore this wondrous incident

has been so clear to the hearts of God's people in all ages. The church has justly condemned Monothelism more than a thousand years ago. Yet, while we are none of us Monothelites, we cannot admit any defect of concert and symphony between the will of the perfect humanity and that of the divinity. It is, indeed, in this harmony of will that the hypostatic union most essentially effectuates itself, "yet without conversion, composition or confusion." For it is in the will of a rational essence that its unity consummates itself, as the combination and resultant of its prevalent states of intelligence and of activity. The divine and human will was, so to speak, the very meeting-place at which the personal unity of the two complete natures was effected in the God-man.

Some better solution must be found, then, of this wondrous and blessed paradox, of omnipotent love lamenting those whom yet it did not save. Shall we resort to the Pelagian solution, and so exalt the prerogatives of a fancied "free-will" as to strip God of his omnipotence over sinful free agents? That resort is absolutely shut; for knowing assuredly that man is originally depraved and in bondage to sin, we see that the adoption of that theory undermines the hope of every sinner in the world for redemption, and spreads a pall of uncertainty and fear over heaven itself. The plain and obvious meaning of the history gives us the best solution; that God does have compassion for the reprobate, but not express volition to save them, because his infinite wisdom regulates his whole will and guides and harmonizes (not suppresses) all its active principles.

This view of the divine nature also aids us in the many difficult passages where the relation of Christ's design in his own sacrifice to the destiny of all men is taught or implied. At the outset we saw an eminent divine virtually confessing that this is the *crux* of the Reformed theology. The persistent movements of the Hypothetic Universalists among the French Reformed, the laborious tomes written on this subject, and the unceasing attacks of Arminians disclose that fact. He would be a rash man indeed who should flatter his readers that he was about to furnish an exhaustive explanation of this mystery of the divine will. But any man who can contribute his mite to a more satisfying and consistent exposition of the Scriptures bearing on it is doing a good service to truth.

Let us begin by laying down a simple basis, which all Calvinists will and must accept. The sacrifice of Christ *was designed by the Trinity to effect precisely what it does effect*—all this, and no more. If God regulates all his works by his decree, and is sovereign and omnipotent in them all, then the historical unfolding of his providence must be the exact exposition of his purpose. What, then, are the results which Scripture shows to be effected by Christ's sacrifice? 1. The manifestation of God's supreme glory, and especially that of his love (Luke ii. 14; Eph. ii. 10, 11). 2. To ransom, effectually call, and glorify an elect people infallibly given to Christ (John xvii. 6–11). 3. To procure for the whole race a temporal suspension of doom, with earthly mercies, so as to manifest the placability and infinite compassion of God towards all sinners, leave those who are finally impenitent under the gospel without excuse, and establish an everlasting concrete proof of the deadly malignity of sin in that it infallibly rejects not only duty and obligation, but the most tender and sincere mercy, wherever it is not conquered by efficacious grace (Rom. ii. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 15).

Again, the way must be prepared by pointing out another scriptural truth, by which many minds are confused from lack of due consideration: that it is God's prerogative to propose to himself two alternative results of the same set of means, leaving, in his permissive decree, a certain free agency to man, *and to effectuate both the results in turn*. The wise physician, for instance, gives his patient a medicine, designing, first, to make it only a palliative of pain; or, second, to use it as a part of a treatment for radical cure, in a certain probable turn of the disease. Either end is benevolent. But this supposes a contingency in the physician's prescience whether the disease may take the other turn? Yes; he is a finite agent. But if his prescience were perfect in this case, there might be a condition of things in which it would be reasonable for him to ordain so. The objector may exclaim here: but suppose him omnipotent in the case as well as omniscient! Must not whatever motive prompted action to palliate pain necessarily prompt a radical immediate cure; so that he would pursue only the latter alternative? We reply, if we were certain that it was impossible this omniscient physician could have any kind of motive except philanthropy for this patient, yes. That is to say, *to the thorough-*

going optimist this cavil would have weight. But, as has been distinctly stated, Calvinists are not optimists. And as soon as the scriptural and reasonable statement is made, that God will direct his whole manifold providence to that set of ends which, as a total, commends itself to his perfections, of the parts of which we know but little, and which certainly includes much else besides the creatures' selfish well-being, we see that it is infinitely possible the Divine Physician may see a sufficient reason for mitigating a pain he does not radically cure, other than conscious inability; and to deny this would be, for a creature, an almost insane rashness. It cannot be denied that God does effectuate both, in turn, of two alternative results, and this without implying in his prescience any contingency or in his power any limit, because he virtually does so whenever he "brings good out of evil." This a moment's consideration will show. Does he not glorify his justice by punishing the evil, after he has overruled it for good? It is, then, but the application of this method when God makes the sincere offer of mercy through Christ to a Judas first glorify his infinite love and placability, and then, when it is slighted, as was permissively decreed, illustrate the stubbornness of Judas's sin as a deadly voluntary evil, and also God's clear justice in destroying him. This is just what God says he does, under the gospel (John iii. 17-19). But does not God's effectuating the second of the alternative results imply that he could not be sincere in the first? This is the shape in which this obstinate cavil will return on us. Now here the theory of the divine will which we have unfolded gives the answer. No; it does not. It is not necessary to repeat the explanation. It enables us not indeed to comprehend, but to apprehend, how God may be sincere in the first alternative, and, omniscient of its result, may permissively ordain to let Judas reject the mercy, and also be righteous in the latter alternative. Thus, we can take all the gospel declarations concerning Christ's sacrifice to mean just what they express, and we are relieved from the necessity of all tortuous exegesis.

It has been a favorite argument with extremists to urge that, because the greater includes the less, therefore a compassion for Judas, which was strong enough to make the sacrifice of Calvary for him, could not possibly stop short of the easier gifts of effectual calling and preservation. Therefore, since God did not

actually bestow the latter, he never felt any of the compassion for Judas; and when he seems to say so, his words must be explained away. We reply, the greater does include the less; and therefore the *loving volition* to satisfy for Judas's guilt must, *a fortiori*, have included the volition to the easier work of his calling and preservation. When this argument is used to prove the perseverance of the saints, from the love of the sacrifice, it is perfectly conclusive. But if the divine nature, like a holy creature, has in some ineffable way propensions of benevolence which are not beneficent volitions, and yet are sincere, then, as to them, the argument is invalid.

We may best exemplify the manner in which the correct view applies by that most important and decisive passage, John iii. 16-19. Here is the most plausible exposition of it which can be presented on the supralapsarian side. When "God so loved *the world* that he gave his only begotten Son," "the world" must mean only the "body of the elect": 1, Because there is no greater gift that could evince any greater love to the elect; 2, Because this chief gift must include all the rest, according to Rom. viii. 32; 3, Because "the world" of the whole passage is that which God sent his Son (verse 17) not to condemn, but to save; 4, The foreseen preterition of many to whom the gospel is offered expresses nothing but divine hatred, such as is incompatible with any love at all.

But now, *per contra*, if "the world" in verse 16 means "the body of the elect," then, 1, We have a clear implication that some of that body may fail to believe and perish; 2, We are required to carry the same sense throughout the passage, for the phrase, "the world," which is correct; but in verse 19, "the world," into which the light has come, working with some the alternative result of deeper condemnation, must be taken in the wider sense; 3, A fair logical connection between verse 17 and verse 18 shows that "the world" of verse 17 is inclusive of "him that believeth" and "him that believeth not" of verse 18; 4, It is hard to see how, if the tender of Christ's sacrifice is in no sense a true manifestation of divine benevolence to that part of "the world" which "believeth not," their choosing to slight it is the just ground of a deeper condemnation, as is expressly stated in verse 19. Are gospel-rejecters finally condemned for this, that they were so unfortunately perspicacious as not to be af-

fectured by a fictitious or unreal manifestation? It is noticeable that Calvin is too sagacious an expositor to commit himself to the extreme exegesis.

How shall we escape from this *dilemma*? Looking at the first and second points of the stricter exposition, we see that, if it were a question of that efficient degree of salvation from which every logical mind is compelled to draw the doctrine of particular redemption, the argument would be impregnable. Yet it would make the Saviour contradict his own exposition of his statement. The solution, then, must be in this direction, that the words, "so loved the world," were not designed to mean the gracious decree of election, though other scriptures abundantly teach there is such a decree, but a propension of benevolence not matured into the volition to redeem, of which Christ's mission is a sincere manifestation to all sinners. But our Saviour adverts to the implication which is contained even in the very statement of this delightful truth, that those who will not believe will perish notwithstanding. He foresees the cavil: "if so, this mission will be as much a curse as a blessing; how is it, then, a manifestation of infinite pity?" And the remaining verses give the solution of that cavil. It is not the tendency or primary design of that mission to curse, but to bless; not to condemn, but to save. When it becomes the occasion, not cause, of deeper condemnation to some, it is only because these (verse 19) voluntarily pervert, against themselves, and acting (verse 20) from a wicked motive, the beneficent provision. God has a permissive decree to allow some thus to wrest the gospel provision. But inasmuch as this result is of their own free and wicked choice, it does not contravene the blessed truth that Christ's mission is in its own nature only beneficent, and a true disclosure of God's benevolence to every sinner on earth to whom it is published.

In conclusion, the reader is entreated to take note again, that this theory of the nature of God's active powers is advanced in the interests of the integrity of Scripture; and that its result is not to complicate, but to relieve the exposition, and to enable the Christian to hold the Bible declarations concerning God's providence towards our sinful race in their most natural sense.

THE SYSTEM OF ALEXANDER CAMPBELL:

AN EXAMINATION OF ITS LEADING POINTS.¹

MR. CAMPBELL proposed, as his main enterprise, to remove the evils of "sects," by gathering a Christian communion without any creed of human construction, with no other bonds save faith on Jesus Christ as Saviour, and obedience to his laws; that is, every one must be admitted, were this basis laid down consistently, not only as a member, but teacher, who *says* that he believes and obeys the Scriptures. Mr. Campbell, misapplying the words of John xvii. 20, 21, says that only two conditions are necessary for the conversion of the world—*Truth and Union*. He deems that the reason why truth has not done its work is to be found in the divisions of professed Christians. Of these he regards human creeds as causes, instead of results. He strictly requires us to show a divine command or authority for their composition, and for the exaction of subscription to them; and he charges that, failing in this, if we exact such subscription, we are guilty of most criminal usurpation and will-worship. He urges that, to add a human creed to God's word, as a test of correct doctrinal opinion, is virtually to make the impudent assertion that the uninspired creed-makers can be more perspicuous than the Holy Ghost. But on the contrary, since men uninspired are all fallible, their creeds will inevitably differ from each other, in differing from the truth; and in these differences, factiously supported by their several partisans, is the grand source of the divisions which have so weakened Christianity. Moreover, these human compositions being the work of men and parties, are fondled by their authors with the selfish pride of paternity, and they become the shibboleths of religious factions and bones of contention. The simple remedy for this brood of mischiefs, he deems, would be a return to what he supposes was

¹ This article appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for July, 1880.

the apostolic basis, union and communion upon the word of God alone, without human creed, and the requirement of nothing but the fundamental points of belief on Christ as Saviour and obedience to his commands. The mission of Campbellism, then, is to absorb all sects into this one apostolic communion, and thus to prepare the way for the *millennium*. The usual charges are also freely made by him and his followers, that subscription is an infringement of spiritual liberty, a remnant of popery, etc.

The most obvious method will be to define, first, the proper use of human creeds; for thus the most of these views will be obviated, and the objections will fall away of themselves. It is true that the Roman and Greek churches always, and some Protestant churches sometimes, have used creeds in connection with religious tyranny and persecution. To all such uses we are as strongly opposed as Mr. Campbell. We accept and are responsible for only the following view of their use. As man's mind is notoriously fallible, and professed Christians who claim to hold the Scriptures, as they understand them, differ from each other notoriously, some platform for union and coöperation must be adopted, by which those who believe they are truly agreed may stand and work together. It is the only possible expedient, in the absence of an inspired living umpire, such as the pope claims falsely to be, by which fidelity to truth can be reconciled with coöperation. A creed, then, is such a means for enabling Christians to understand each other. It is a human exposition of what is supposed to be the exact meaning of the Scriptures; and differs from those usually delivered from the pulpit only in being more carefully and accurately made by the assistance of many minds. Its setting forth is an exercise of the church's ordinary didactic function. It must advance nothing which its compilers do not honestly suppose to be fully sustained by the Scriptures; and no authority is claimed for it, in any respect, save that which they believe is communicated by the word of God. It is set forth, not as Mr. Campbell rashly asserts, to *anathematize* dissentients, a thing which our church never does, but to give a rallying point for those who are in accord, without which they could neither efficiently coöperate in spreading the gospel nor enjoy profitable Christian communion. And further, as the apostle has commanded us to receive into the school of Christ "those who are weak in the faith," for purposes of instruction, even this

modest application of the creed is made only to the rulers and teachers of the church, except as to those fundamentals which Mr. Campbell himself would exact.

1. We argue, then, in the first place, that the Presbyterian Church now offers to the whole world precisely that basis of union which Mr. Campbell professes to desire. We ask of lay members no profession save of faith on Christ and obedience to his laws. That more should be asked of those who aspire to the responsibility of teachers and rulers among us, we shall show. In truth, we carry out Mr. Campbell's plan more sincerely than he does himself. For it is notorious that, whatever profession one might make of agreement in faith and obedience, if he only asked to receive baptism by affusion, he should be strictly refused. If, after submitting to immersion, he should ask the same sacrament for his infant children, he should be expelled.

Mr. Campbell would reply to the first point, that according to the Scriptures affusion was not baptism, and its performance in that way was not "obedience to Christ." He would say that one's baptizing his infant children was not Christianity, because they cannot believe that Christ is the Saviour of the world. But one may believe that affusion is, according to Scripture, baptism; and that the parent's faith, according to Scripture, entitles the infants to baptism; and he may claim that he has examined the Scriptures as honestly as Mr. Campbell. Now, Mr. Campbell cannot maintain on his own principles that he is entitled to construe the Bible and another man is not. This would be popery. Yet his construction of the Bible, which is nothing but a human creed, is applied as a test of church communion to exclude another, notwithstanding his profession that he accepts the terms of salvation required by Mr. Campbell, as he honestly understands them. Here, then, Mr. Campbell does the very thing which he condemns. According to his own confession he does it in the most objectionable form, for he has admitted that an unwritten creed, used for creed purposes, would be worse than a written one. And this is obvious, for the written one is more fair, stable, and intelligible than the unwritten. The latter gives room for endless misunderstandings, wranglings and inequalities.

The application of this simple touchstone, then, shows that the Campbellite is utterly inconsistent; that he as truly has a

human creed as we. And this inconsistency is indeed inevitable. Christian union in the same denomination is impossible between men divided by certain differences. Such differences are inevitable while human reason remains fallible. Protestants admit no pope, no infallible human umpire. The only conceivable alternative is the distribution of Christians who are agreed into denominations upon the basis of human creeds. Campbell's self-contradiction was, then, fated.

2. Mr. Campbell himself remarks in his *Christian System*, page 103, that if the result of his reform should be only to add another to the number of the sects, it would be every way to be deplored. This was the predestined result, and it has notoriously been accomplished. The body he has formed possesses every sectarian feature in its most exasperated form. The Campbellite is usually known as an ecclesiastical Ishmaelite. Their leader was more divisive, more denunciatory, more exclusive, than any of the sects he reviled. He excluded more Christians from Christ's church than are excluded by all the avowed creed-holding churches in America,—Christians who, according to their professions, were already upon his platform of faith, baptism and obedience. And the societies founded by him, while independent in church government, hardened at once into a religious denomination of rigid bigotry.

That Mr. Campbell's is virtually a creed-holding church, is confirmed by several evidences. For instance, he himself, in the very introduction to his *Christian System* (page 10), says that, "admonished from the extremes into which some of our friends and brethren have carried some points, I undertake this work with a deep sense of its necessity, and with much anticipation of its utility in exhibiting a concentrated view of the whole ground we occupy," etc. Here we have the very purposes of a creed avowed. He then tells us that his work will be divided into three parts, of which the second is, "*The principles on which all Christians may form one communion.*" What is the statement of these but a human creed? For, of course, these "principles" are simply *those on which Mr. Campbell supposes* "all Christians may form one communion." It is equally obvious that in putting forth his *Christian System* he designed and expected it to have more force than an expression of his personal opinion; he hoped it would be a doctrinal basis of agreement to his sect for the

heterogeneous complexion of which he felt so much concern. He designed it, in other words, for a creed.

Another incident exhibits the same fact, that his societies are, after all, based upon a creed. A Dr. Thomas, an Englishman, a professed member and preacher of his sect, began to teach materialism, the sleep of believers' souls until the resurrection, and the annihilation of infants and unbelievers. Mr. Campbell very properly travelled all the way to Amelia county, Virginia, called him to account, exacted of him a written agreement to preach these doctrines no longer; and, on his breaking over this, published to the world his exclusion from Mr. Campbell's communion. These measures naturally and necessarily resulted in the formation of a separate sect of "Thomasites," or "Disciples," who not only hold a distinct communion, but actually re-immersed Campbellites! Now Thomas and his party all the while professed the platform which Mr. Campbell exacts of men, held believers' immersion with all the strictness he could desire, and declared that they believed just what was in the Bible. Yet Mr. Campbell had some standard of measurement other than that declaration by which he extruded them. What was it? Evidently nothing else than his nuncupative creed: a thing which he himself confessed is worse than a written one. These instances show, in the most conclusive manner, how impossible it is, practically, for a Christian communion to be really formed on the no-creed basis. The inevitable force of necessity has at once driven from it the very "comprehension" which was to make it its chief glory.

3. But let us now resume the facts noted: that all nominal Christians are ready to declare, "We believe what the Bible teaches;" that yet they differ so much that it is preposterous for them to coöperate in the same communion; and that each man, in ascertaining the concord or disagreement of others with himself, resorts to *his construction* of what the Scriptures mean. This construction is obviously *his human creed*. Mr. Campbell makes a weak attempt (*Christian System*, pages 18, 109,) to escape this, by saying that the testimony of the apostles gives us, as fundamentals, only a set of "facts" (*facta*, things done). "But all these modes of faith and worship are based upon a mistake of the true character of revelation, which it has long been our effort to correct. With us, revelation has nothing to do with opinions

or abstract reasonings; for it is founded wholly and entirely upon *facts*. There is not one abstract opinion, not one speculative view, asserted or communicated in Old Testament or New." Mr. Campbell immediately refutes this preposterous statement himself; for, after making a similar one on page 18, he adds: "These facts reveal God and man, and contain within them the reasons of all piety and righteousness." "The meaning of the Bible facts is the true biblical doctrine." Now what are those "reasons of piety and righteousness *contained in the facts?*" this "*meaning*" of them, which is the true biblical doctrine? They are precisely those principles which he had just before stigmatized as "abstract opinions," or "speculative views." To pass from the facts to them requires that very work of construction whose inevitable result is a "human creed," *i. e.*, human in terms of expression, though still scriptural and divine in substance, if we construe faithfully. So, on page 111, "The power of any fact is the meaning. . . . All moral facts have a moral meaning," etc. Then, to make men experience the power, we must construe the meaning to them. So that we are again led to the same despised "speculative" truths. But it is not true that the Scriptures state only "facts." What is 1 John iii. 4, for instance, but a general abstract *definition* of sin? What shall we make of the doctrinal epistles, or of the sermons of Christ and the apostles, with their numerous principles, logical processes, and definitions? We conclude, then, that, were it true the Scriptures contained only facts, Mr. Campbell's inference against doctrinal systems would, by his own confession and practice, be false; but, secondly, that the assumption is glaringly untrue.

4. To all our pleas for the utility of creeds, for bearing our testimony to truth, as we conscientiously understand it, or for ascertaining our harmony with those with whom we propose to coöperate in the gospel, or for guiding the instruction of gospel pupils in sound doctrine, Mr. Campbell's cavil is, that these pleas arrogantly assume that our creed-makers are able to be more perspicuous or correct than inspiration; which is profane as well as false. If, argues he, we revered the Scriptures as we should, as the work of the Holy Ghost, we should wish for nothing more; these would be to us the *ne plus ultra* of correctness, perspicuity and certainty.

One answer to this is, that it proves too much. By the same

reason, Mr. Campbell should never have found occasion to draw up his *Christian System*; he should never have composed any exposition of the sacred Scriptures or a sermon; his whole testimony and work as a church teacher should have been in citing men to the words of sacred Scripture and simply reading it to them. We might retort the same cavil, with the same bitterness: "Mr. Campbell, why do you presume to expound Paul or the Saviour? It implies the arrogant assumption that you can be more perspicuous or correct than they!" A second answer is this: Mr. Campbell says his belief is precisely what the Bible teaches. We declare that our belief is precisely what the Bible teaches. Yet he and we are notoriously disagreeing! We now present a second statement of our doctrinal beliefs, which is, to us, an equivalent one: "We believe just what the Westminster Shorter Catechism teaches." Thereupon Mr. Campbell parts company with us. He knows so well, and everybody else knows so well, that he does not believe with our catechism, that he does not pretend it. His resort is, on the contrary, to fight it. Our catechism has, therefore, demonstrably some fitness to detect and unmask the doctrinal differences between these two professed Bible believers which the Bible has not. And one reason of this fitness is, that our catechism *is* human. Did Mr. Campbell recognize it as inspired, he would mask his real disagreement from it, as he does his real disagreements from God's word, under his expositions; he would say of the catechism, as he does of the Bible: "Oh, I believe just what it teaches, provided it be expounded aright;" *i. e.*, expounded as he wishes it to mean. But now that our catechism claims to be only a human and fallible work, he is bold to reject it; and thus his disagreement with the truth, as we understand it, is disclosed.

This evident fitness of the creed for this work does not at all imply a superior skill or perspicuity of its authors over the sacred writers. Scripture was designed by God for a different end—to be the ground of all creeds, and the rule of faith for all ages. It is no derogation to the supreme excellence of Scripture to say, that something else better answers a particular end for which Scripture was, in its very nature, not designed nor adapted. If it were, then no preacher or teacher could ever consistently give his exposition of Scripture; he should rather read to the people the words of Scripture themselves, as being better adapted than

his words. Another illustration may be found in that *ascertainment* of the construction of statutes which is made by the adjudications of courts. All civilized people value such judicial expositions of the statute, and attach some authority to them. This is not because judges are better masters of law language than legislators, but because in all language general enough for a statute of general application, a possibility of ambiguity is inevitable. But when an issue is raised, in a concrete case, as to the meaning of the statute, and settled by some agreed umpire, that ambiguity is excluded. In a word, erroneous interpretation, or competing interpretations, having *actually presented themselves*, any intelligent person can then select terms and frame a statement which shall settle the point raised. Further; lapse of time and flux of current usage cause a need of new definition for words of older date or of a dead language. This definition contemporary words can give. Thus, "atonement," in the English of Sir Thomas More and Henry VIII., was at-one-ment. Among modern Calvinists it has come to mean "penal satisfaction for guilt." This ability to define by more recent terms arises not from their superior intrinsic accuracy, but from the circumstance that their meaning is at the time technically settled. These remarks explain the utility of human expositions and comments, and they equally justify human creeds. Thus, Mr. Campbell believes "immerse" is more unambiguous than "baptize." Hence he gives us his human (Latin) word for the inspired one. That is, he gives us here his human creed as a substitute for the word of Scripture. In a word, a creed is a concerted *exposition of Scripture* upon its more important points, made for certain purposes of edification. Now, if those purposes are lawful, as we have shown, this species of exposition is also lawful, unless it can be proved that all exposition by man is unlawful.

5. This leads us to notice the plea, on which Mr. Campbell lays so much stress, that Christ has *not authorized* the rulers of the church, by any revealed precept, to make human creeds and demand subscription of them. But God has expressly enjoined church rulers *to guard the doctrinal purity* of the church, and especially of its teachers. (Gal. i. 8, 9; 1 John iv. 1; Rev. ii. 2; Titus i. 9-11; 2 Tim. ii. 1; i. 13; Heb. xiii. 9; 2 John 10.) If it be practically found that this cannot be done without drawing up a human declaration of what is the pure doctrine—as was the

case with Arius—then the obligation involves the right to employ this expedient. So, the church is commanded to teach. If experience shows that this involves the building of houses to teach in, then the church rulers properly apply a part of the people's oblation of their substance to brick and mortar. The charge of usurpation of power to the detriment of the spiritual rights of Christ's people is further completely dissolved, when we observe that the proper use of creeds, for which alone we contend, does not authorize us to persecute any who differ from our creed, however extensively, nor even to unchurch any who differ from it in things not fundamental. Of all these latter, Methodists, Lutherans, Immersionists, Episcopalians, etc., we only determine, by the application of our creed, that they are not of *our denomination* in the church. We cordially recognize their places in Christ's church catholic; we recognize their ordinances and discipline; we join them in every act of Christian fellowship and love consistent with the testimony which our consciences constrain us to bear. We neither desire nor attempt to estop their liberty in serving God after their preferred way. And against even those who, like Pelagians and Unitarians, deny the vitals of the faith, we hurl no *anathema*; we aim no persecutions; we only bear our testimony, and leave them to their Master in heaven. Thus, the employment of this human expedient does not assail or infringe any man's liberty, but only protects our own.

Here, again, Mr. Campbell is fated to illustrate the falsehood of his own cavil in the most crushing way. He will scarcely assume that the Bible, written by the Holy Ghost in Greek, contains any precept to translate the word *baptize* by the Latin word *immerse*, and to exact of all Christians an agreement in this definition as the strict term of their admission to the church of Christ. But this is precisely what Mr. Campbell does, with a ruthless severity and tyranny unknown outside of Rome. For he not only repels the Christian who demurs from this application of his human creed from his Campbellite communion, but excommunicates him from the church of Christ!

6. Mr. Campbell's chief objection against creeds is that they are divisive. His favorite weapon is an exposition of our Saviour's prayer, John xvii. 20: "That they also may be one in us; that the world may believe," etc. He says that we are here

taught, 1, That "*the testimony of the apostles is the only and all-sufficient means of uniting all Christians;*" and, 2, That "*the union of Christians with the apostles' testimony is all-sufficient and alone sufficient to the conversion of the world.*"

Such is his formal *creed* on this point. It is unscriptural and false in both its members. Christ expressly defines the union or oneness which was desired as conducive to the world's believing as a *spiritual oneness*. Mr. Campbell blindly degrades it into an ecclesiastical and formal union. Christ does not say that the "apostles' word" was to be "the only and all-sufficient means of uniting all Christians" in any sense; least of all in Mr. Campbell's sense. He prays for the spiritual oneness of all who were to believe through the apostles' word, by his very prayer shewing that *the oneness would require something else than their "word"* to constitute and preserve it. Moreover, when Christ refers to their word as a means of their believing, has he authorized Mr. Campbell to say that it can only be such means when not presented in the form of one species of exposition called by Mr. Campbell "*human creed*"? We trow not. Had Christ been speaking of organic union at all, he would never have said that the apostles' testimony was all-sufficient for it, so long as human creeds were kept away. For the apostles' testimony *did not unite all professed believers in their own day!* Nor in the two hundred years following, when Mr. Campbell is very certain Christendom was innocent of creeds. Again, it is false that a universal union, conjoined with the New Testament, is sufficient for the world's conversion. One proof is, that multitudes have lived in such lands as Scotland, where the population was homogeneous, so that while they had the New Testament teachings they were utterly unconscious of any adverse influences arising from denominational divisions, because they were conversant with none. Yet those people were not converted! Mr. Campbell would exclaim that one of his conditions was lacking: the New Testament was *not* faithfully taught them. Ah, sure enough, it was put into their hands unaccompanied with Mr. Campbell's "human creed" of "immerse." Again, there are neighborhoods in this country, where Mr. Campbell's teachings are so triumphant that "the sects" are as thoroughly exploded and contemned as though they were annihilated. Does everybody get converted there? This absurd proposition is Pelagian. It ignores the

deadness of sinner's souls, and the necessity of sovereign grace above all *means*, however good.

In proceeding with the question whether creeds are divisive and retard the world's conversion, let us expressly concede that all persecutions and uncharitableness, all unchristian dogmatism and bigotry, all angry abuse, all arrogant exclusiveness and unchurching of those whom God receives, have this tendency. This is not because they imply denominational distinctions, but because they belie the Christian spirit, and so dishonor Christ and grieve the Holy Ghost. And we know of no one man who has done as much of this mischief in our day as A. Campbell. He has displayed more arrogant dogmatism, more uncharitableness towards dissentients, more railing and harsh judgments towards sincere followers of Christ; he has divided more congregations, peaceful before his incursions; he has aimed totally to unchurch larger multitudes of creditable Christians, only for dissenting from his human shibboleth of immersion, than any one this side of Rome. Here, again, he gives himself the most pungent refutation. He is the "no-creed" reformer; and he has created more division in American Christianity than any man on the continent!

But that the orthodox creeds of Christendom have not produced the divisions is demonstrated by this fact: there were divisions before there were creeds. Mr. Campbell says the Nicene was the first. Epiphanius, in the fourth century, enumerated eighty heresies, the most of them before Arius. Mr. Campbell evidently mistakes an effect for a cause. Human creeds are the results, in some form the inevitable results, of religious differences. The causes of those differences must be sought far deeper in the infirmities and blindness of man's head and heart. And the remedy for these differences must accordingly be found in a deeper cause than the mere removal of creeds. As long as the carnal mind is enmity against God, his method of redemption will be misunderstood and differently understood. The prompting to formulate these competing views in creeds is the result, not the cause, of the mental disease. Men differ in a similar manner about anything which concerns their passions and interests. It is, for instance, notoriously thus about politics. Mr. Campbell should hold, that instead of parties making platforms, platforms make parties; and that the only and all-suffi-

cient means of securing civil concord and power is for all political principles to be sunk, and for virtuous citizens to vote promiscuously for any and every candidate of safe or of mischievous opinions, who *says* that he reveres the constitution.

Mr. Campbell argues, with some show of plausibility, that creeds stimulate the spirit of dogmatism and faction, in that they give points around which pride of opinion crystallizes itself. The creed-makers are touchy and sensitive about their work, because of the pride of paternity. The adherents acquire a factious spirit by associating their symbol with the selfish feelings of party. We reply, that the infirmities of human nature have doubtless abused a lawful expedient here, as they abuse more or less everything which man employs. No ordinary mortal can draw up an exposition of sacred Scriptures without feeling the same pride of paternity and jealousy. No man can be a vigorous and successful leader in the church without having *his person* become such a rallying point of faction, far more than any abstract creed. Certainly Mr. Campbell has not done so. The substitution of a creed in place of a personal leader is the wisest expedient known to man for attaining the wholesome and righteous position of "principles, not men," which is the very watchword of enlightened liberty. Since Mr. Campbell's no-creed party has exhibited the very results of division, dogmatism, faction and strife, in the most deplorable degree, we think that the most feasible way to lessen them is to have a carefully prepared creed, and present *that* as our view of the Scripture meaning, instead of a personal party leader.

7. We object, in order to take the aggressive, that a communion of Christians collected on the "no-creed" principle must be what is popularly known as a "broad church." This Mr. Campbell both confesses and boasts as to his communion. He deplores in one place that in his connection "almost all kinds of doctrine are preached by all sorts of men." Not very consistently he often justifies and glories in the fact that his *is* a "liberal" church in tolerating great diversity of opinion under a union in a few fundamentals. Barton W. Stone, one of his most powerful coadjutors in Kentucky, was an Arian, if not Socinian, to his end. Others of his preachers were Pelagians. A few were professed Unitarians and Universalists. A few were and are evangelical and orthodox. Thus every legitimate objection against

the broad-church theory is applicable here: (1), It is impossible for a broad or no-creed church to be a faithful witnessing body for the truth. But this is a prime function of the church. (Ps. lxxviii. 5, 6; Is. lix. 21; 1 Tim. iii. 15; Rev. xii. 17; and especially John xviii. 37.) The church is a "candlestick" (Rev. i. 20). If any further evidence is needed, it is found in a very short deduction. What is the church for? The end of its corporate existence is "the gathering and perfecting of the elect." This is effected through the instrumentality of the truth. It would seem, then, as clear as any deduction that the church should bear a corporate testimony for the truth. Hence, as the ministry and rulers of the church are her only corporate agency, the official testimony of each minister is a part of that corporate testimony, and each one is officially responsible for the *tolerated* official testimony of the others. Now, if the church or an officer thereof performs the witnessing duty merely by saying, "We testify whatever the Bible means," it is naught. For notoriously all errorists save infidels, all Papists, Socinians, Universalists, and Campbellites, concur in saying so. It amounts to absolutely nothing. To give any *edge* to our testimony, we must be provided with an answer to the question, "*What* do you regard the Bible as meaning?" What can that answer be but a virtual creed? Mr. Campbell might admit the necessity of meeting the question, and attempt still to say, "Let the answer be each minister's faithful exposition of Scripture." This will not do. So the broad-churchman says, "Let each minister have liberty, *in the same tolerant community*, to utter his own full and honest testimony to what he deems the truth. So truth will have as full opportunity to correct error as though they were separated into hostile camps." We reply, this scheme is impracticable and self-destructive. For, on this plan, where is the *corporate testimony* of the church as a whole? On this plan one's official responsibility for the official testimony of the comrade whom he helped to clothe with this office-power, is preposterously and wickedly betrayed. On this plan the collisions of truth and error would assuredly become more bitter, provided there were any sincerity of conviction, when occurring in the bosom of the same communion. The only condition which would make the real application of a broad-church theory possible is a faithless indifferentism. And in fact there is no communion on earth consistently

broad. Certainly not Mr. Campbell's. He could tolerate Arianism, Pelagianism, Universalism, and could thus betray the very foundations of God's honor; yet he was not "broad" enough to tolerate baptism by affusion. Thus the pretended broad-churchism only results in betraying fundamental truths to stickle for some formalistic error and in expelling for some unimportant point those whom God accepts, while embracing those whom God abhors for their denial of essential truth.

(2). It is impossible for a broad church to be "a pillar and ground of the truth," which is the church's function, because of the logical interdependence of the Christian system. The enemies of orthodoxy suppose that they are uttering a sneer when they say that it is "remorselessly logical." This quality, if taken in its true sense, is its glory. Any system which is true must have its parts interdependent. Hence, when one truth is surrendered, however minor, some risk is incurred of the undermining of all the others. The dropping out of one stone from the abutment may loosen the key-stone of the arch itself. While we heartily admit the distinction between essential and non-essential truths, we can only concede, as to the non-essential error which impugns the latter, that, though it does not, like fundamental error, subject its victim to the necessity of destruction, it certainly creates some liability to pass on to the fundamental error, and so to perdition. Hence, no sound Christian can be willing to give it ecclesiastical rights, as broad-churchism does.

In conclusion, the "no-creed" position of Mr. Campbell prejudices most mischievously the investigation of truth. By stigmatizing the orthodox propositions as "human creeds" he has steeled the minds of his followers against the scriptural arguments on which the truth rests. This outcry, with most of his people, has been sufficient to condemn in advance all that is distinctive of Presbyterianism.

II. *The Rule of Faith.*

Campbellism, like all other types of Anabaptism, betrays its dishonest interest in denying the existence of a gospel and church in the old dispensation. This denial is unavoidable to rid themselves of *infant membership* in the church. The Campbellite is bolder and more consistent in his error than the evangelical immersionist. The former admits the inspiration of the Old Testament, and yet roundly denies that it is a rule of

faith for us. Their authors use such language as this: "The former Testament is abrogated." "The authority of the Old Testament has ceased." "It is no book of authority to teach *us* what to do." "The gospel is not found in it except in type and promise—precisely the forms in which it cannot have authority." The purposes of God in inspiring the Old Testament writers are represented as these: as the development of the true religion was necessarily gradual, the Old Testament was designed to give a delineation of the imperfect or partial religion given to earlier ages. It contains historical preliminaries which assist us in understanding the completed religion, the gospel, now that it has come. It presents a record of God's moral government of the race. It contains types and promises of the coming salvation, designed for the instruction of the New Testament age. It reveals permanent and useful moral principles.

The arguments by which this error is sustained are such as these: that the two Testaments contain not *two dispensations* of the same religion, but *two different religions*; for thus they understand the two *διαθήκαι*, misquoting such passages as Heb. viii. 13; that a new testament *supersedes the old*; that a "will is not of force until after the death of the testator;" that when the three disciples, on the mount of transfiguration, proposed to set up three tabernacles, one for Moses, one for Elijah, and one for Jesus, the divine voice answered, "This is my beloved Son, hear him," meaning thereby to prohibit their attending to the teachings of the law and the prophets, represented in Moses and Elijah, and to recall them exclusively to Christ.

These positions, when coupled with the fact that the ancients were sinful and guilty in the same sense as we, obviously consign them all to perdition, if consistently urged. And here is a sufficient and damning evidence of their falsehood. For we know that there are Old Testament saints redeemed (see, for instance, Heb. xi.) by divine testimony more certainly than we know New Testament saints are. The motive of these representations is, not only to get rid of infant membership, but of all distinction between the visible and invisible church, of salvation without immersion, of all recognition of Old Testament sacraments, in order to escape those decisive condemnations of the *opus operatum* in baptism, which are contained in such passages as Rom. ii. 26-29; 1 Cor. x. 1-5.

In refutation of this heresy let us present briefly a few plain points. *First*, The same God would not have two religions for sinners of the same race. The depravity and guilt to be provided for are the same. The obstacles are the same. The divine perfections to be reconciled are the same. Hence we conclude, *a priori*, that there is but one religion for sinners published to this world. To this agree the Scriptures. (Acts iv. 12; Gal. iii. 7, 8; Rom. iv. 5, 6 and 11; iii. 30.) The faith of the ancients (Heb. xi.) is the model of our gospel faith, etc. Now, then, whatever is said of the "two covenants," *δύο διαθήκαι*, etc., must be understood of two dispensations of one promise. For the adoption of the phrase, "two covenants," "new covenant," and "old covenant," the Campbellite has no authority above an uninspired version; and it is perfectly manifest that our translators used the word in the sense of two phases of the one covenant.

Secondly, The notable argument from the idea of a "testament" or will is exploded in the same way. It is the same word, *διαθήκη*; and there is no good critical authority for translating it, in the places where it is written, "new testament." The single passage (Gal. iii. 17) is by itself abundantly sufficient to explode this notion, where the apostle argues precisely the contrary, that the *διαθήκη* which was first confirmed with Abraham could not be disannulled by a subsequent one. Again, suppose a subsequent testament *repeats* the larger part of the provisions of the previous one, how then?

Thirdly, The asseveration that the Old Testament contained the gospel only in type and promise is false, and the inference that in those forms it could not have authority is silly. Is the precept, "Kiss the Son," only a type or a promise? Or this of Isa. xlv. 22, "Look unto me, and be ye saved"? And a promise, we assert, is precisely the form in which the gospel does have authority. Abraham's faith, the model of the gospel faith by which we are saved, exhibits its virtue precisely in this, that "he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief." Promises are precisely the things which the New Testament holds forth to our faith now. Types, explained by such promises as we quoted from the Old Testament, are admirably adapted to authorize and confirm faith.

Lastly, Our Saviour and his apostles sufficiently refute this wretched error by commanding us to search the Old Testament

for our salvation. . (John v. 39; Acts xvii. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 6, etc.) They must be hardly bestead, indeed, to shun the hated truths of infant membership, etc., when thus driven to fly into the face of God's word. Their evasion is to say that the Old Testament is useful for the historical illustration of the gospel, when once that gospel is revealed in the New. Mr. Campbell, who is less rash and candid than his followers, says, "The old was so full of the doctrine of the new institution" that the apostles "apply everything they quote from the law, the prophets, and the Psalms, to the Messiah, etc. . . . Every one, then, who would accurately understand the Christian institution must approach it through the Mosaic," etc. Now surely, common sense would say that illustrations so full of the gospel as these must teach the gospel! For whom did these Old Testament institutions and promises first illustrate the gospel? The Campbellite would answer, with the Remonstrant of the seventeenth century, only for the readers of the New Testament age. But this is expressly contradicted by God. His word declares that by means of those Old Testament teachings the fathers exercised the same faith and grasped the same salvation as ours.

The New Testament is admitted to be more valuable than the Old, in that it gives a history of the fulfilment of a part of that which the Old had promised, and in that it goes into more perspicuous details. For this we should be thankful; but we must by no means make it a pretext for throwing away any part of the revealed rule of faith.

III. *The Campbellite doctrine of the Trinity.*

Mr. Campbell, while illustrating his contempt for the learning and opinions of the church, by the repudiation of the terms "consubstantial," "eternal generation," "procession," and even in one place (*Christian System*, pages 124-5) of the word "Trinity," yet proposes to be orthodox as to the proper divinity of the three persons. He signalizes the insincerity of his professions, as to the distrust of human speculation, by making a lame revival of the scholastic *rationale* of the personal relations, saying that the Word is in God as speech is involved in thought, and that the Holy Ghost is related to God as man's spirit or soul is to his person. And he seems to speak many honorable things of the Holy Ghost as the "immediate author and agent of the new creation and of the holiness of Christians." The characteristic

of his trinitarian theory is that, while he admits an eternal personal relation between the Father and the Son, he denies that it is one of eternal generation. The second Person, according to him, is Son only as incarnate. His previous name should be only that of "Word." "Before the Christian system, before the relation of Father, Son and Holy Ghost began to be, his rank in the divine nature was that of the WORD OF GOD."

In refutation of this error it is sufficient to refer here to the general argument for the eternal generation of the Son in the simple fact that Scripture should have chosen this pair of words, *the Father* and *the Son*, to express the relation between two persons of the adorable Trinity. There must have been a reason for the choice of these terms—there must be something corresponding to the well known meaning of this pair of names, else eternal truth had not employed them. Of course that meaning must be compatible with God's immateriality and eternity. It must be stripped of all elements arising out of man's corporeal finite nature and temporal existence. In the baptismal formula, in the apostolic benediction, and in all such passages as Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; John v. 22; x. 33-37; Rom. viii. 32, the name *Son* is so used in immediate connection with the name *Father* as that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the one is *reciprocal* to the other. The Son is evidently *Son* in a sense answerable to that in which the Father is *Father*. The two first passages enumerate the three Divine Persons as making up the Godhead in its most distinctively divine attitude of receiving the highest acts of our worship. The other passages bring to view acts wherein the Father and the Son mutually share honors which are essentially divine. If the *paternity* is something characteristic and permanent, so is the *filiation*. If the Father is eternally *Father*, the Son must be eternally *Son*.

IV. *The Campbellite theory of the "Application of Redemption."*

This is so stated as to disparage the forms and nomenclature of theology as much as possible. This dress of the new theory is due, perhaps, partly to ignorance and partly to the desire of contemning the existing learning of the church. It may be stated, in brief, that the result of all is a combination of Pelagianism with an *opus operatum* theory of baptismal redemption. It is virtually contained in the following propositions:

1. All the terms by which other Christians suppose the application of redemption to be denoted, Mr. Campbell declares, mean a "change of state," or a "change of relation," and *not a change of character or moral quality*. This, he holds, is as true of the terms, *new birth, regeneration, adoption, sanctification, redemption*, as it is of the term *justification* or *remission*. And, like other Pelagians, he limits justification to remission. The grounds on which he holds this definition seem to be these: (1), That all these terms are predicated interchangeably of the saved; whence he seems to infer, with evident sophism, that they are synonymous; and as justification and adoption are indicative of a change of relation, so must be the rest; (2), That the word *regeneration* (*παλιγγενεσία*) occurs but twice in the sacred Scriptures—Matt. xix. 28; Titus. iii. 5; in the former place meaning "a change of state," or dispensation of the church, and in the latter, being defined by baptism; (3), That personal regeneration is described by "new birth"; but birth does not change the nature of the *fœtus* which existed before as a *human* embryo (not equine, canine, etc.), and is at birth only introduced into a new state. Of the second ground, we remark, that this is a mere verbal quibble, grounded in the fact that modern Christians have happened to adopt the English word "regeneration" as the equivalent, not of *παλιγγενεσία*, but of what sacred Scripture calls *γεννᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν*. How obvious this is, appears when we remind Mr. Campbell that the *Westminster Confession*, which he so hates, does not use the English word with this ambiguity, but calls the spiritual change "effectual calling." Where, now, is his argument? But in Titus iii. 5, the regeneration, or *παλιγγενεσία*, is the spiritual change. For the "washing of regeneration," or, as Mr. Campbell will have it, *bath* (*λουτρόν*), is explained by the "renewal of the Holy Ghost" (*ἀνακαινώσις*), which is unquestionably a spiritual change. As to the last ground, that also is a wretched quibble; for, unfortunately for Mr. Campbell, the word in the Greek is *γεννᾶσθαι*, which expresses *begetting* rather than parturition, the origination of existence, and not a change of state.

Mr. Campbell argues, speculatively, that all these terms must express change of state merely, because a change of character or moral quality must be the result of the motives which the change of state presents. That is, the privileges and blessings of the

Christian state are the efficient of the affections of the Christian character. The well-informed student will see at a glance the affinities of this view with Arminianism. It is essentially a Pelagian theory of regeneration by the power of motive primarily.

No well-informed student needs to look far for the proofs of the utter unscripturalness of all this definition. Nothing is more clearly settled by the Word than that, while justification changes the legal relation, quickening and sanctification revolutionize the character, or introduce and propagate a new moral character. Man's ruin includes two main parts, depravity and guilt; his remedy in the gospel includes the two corresponding parts, justification and moral renovation. Again, the latter is also described as a quickening of souls *dead in sin*, an illumination, a "begetting from above," a "new creation unto good works." The result in which it everywhere issues is *holy character*. But we feel that we almost insult the reader by seeming to judge argument needful against this absurdity. Such texts as these may be advanced against it with peculiar force: Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Deut. xxx. 6; Ps. li. 10; Eph. v. 26; Matt. v. 8; Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10; Rom. vi. 5, 6; 1 Thess. v. 23.

2. All Campbellites teach that this change of state, by which the man is brought into *the saved state*—call it forgiveness, repentance, conversion, or what you please—must be instituted *in order* to the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus Richardson, *Principles of the Reformation*, pages 74, 75: "The notion that the Spirit may be received before faith is vague and unscriptural. It is not until the heart is purified by faith that the Holy Spirit may enter to dwell therein." "Peter taught, 'Reform and be baptized [*Christian System*, page 64] for the remission of sins, and you shall (then) receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.'" Their main reliance is upon the words of John xiv. 17—"whom the world cannot receive"—which they understand to teach that a man must be converted from the world before he can be subjected to spiritual influence. Says Richardson, with astonishing effrontery, "It is nowhere stated that the Holy Ghost was *given* to any one to make him a believer or a child of God." The reader will be reminded at once of such passages as Eph. i. 19 (to us-ward who believe); ii. 8-10; John vi. 63, 44, and 45; xvi. 8; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5; Rom. viii. 7, 8, 14, 2; 2 Cor. iii.

17; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 14; Heb. x. 29; 1 John v. 1; and most expressly, 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9; ii. 12.

But, if the Holy Ghost is not the agent who first inworks faith, who or what is? Their answer is, the gospel. Here they misapply all such passages as the parable of the sower; 1 Cor. iv. 15; 1 Peter i. 23. That is, saving faith is, according to them, the effect of gospel inducement alone, operating upon the will; and thus all their seeming concessions that the Holy Spirit is the agent of the new creation are reduced to this miserable evasion, that he inspired the apostles and evangelists, who thus give us an authentic gospel offer, to be the sufficient and sole cause of faith.

But, before we pursue this branch of their error, let us look further into the absurd idea, that the sinner must be converted without the agency of the Holy Ghost, in order that he may be sanctified by that agency. The whole scheme is a crude mass of self-contradictions. The heart must be made pure by conversion, in order, forsooth, that this pure Agent may come to dwell in it. But a little before we were taught that conversion was only a change of state, and not of character or quality! Again, conversion and sanctification are generically the same kind of work, related as are germination and growth. Conversion, in the sense of regeneration, introduces the spiritual life, sanctification nourishes it. Now, if a divine agent is needed to nourish and enlarge it, *à fortiori* is he needed to introduce it. (See, here, Campbell's follies.) My instrumentalities, *e. g.*, can do a great deal to nurture a plant which has life; they can do nothing at all to originate that life where it was not. Again, these authors recognize the fact that God "purifies the heart by faith." Now, if faith is a function of spiritual vitality, how comes it in a dead soul without an adequate *external agent*? Again, according to this wonderful invention, the agency of the Holy Ghost, which in conversion is only indirect and instrumental, like that of the preacher, should in sanctification become immediate. But they do not, in fact, believe in *any* immediate agency of the Holy Ghost anywhere; and *the only spiritual influence which their system recognizes is moral suasion*. Common sense will pronounce on the preposterousness of this whole scheme by raising a simple question: If a converted man needs the Holy Ghost *to grow in grace*, how much more must an unconverted man, dead in trespasses and sins, need him *to get into grace*?

3. The next proposition settles the nature and genesis of faith as the simple and natural result of the moral suasion of the gospel. Here, again, their teachings are a jumble of contradictions; but the practical result is Pelagian. Campbell begins by distinguishing between *belief* and *trust*, and teaching very correctly that saving faith includes the latter. But he ends by flouting the distinction between historical and heart-faith, though he himself had illustrated (*Christian System*, pages 52, 53) that difference correctly. Richardson says that faith must embrace Christ for salvation, and that in his threefold offices of Prophet, Priest, and King (page 31). He thus teaches a truth utterly destructive of his own scheme. For, to embrace a Saviour from sin to holiness must imply a true appetency of will for holiness and against sin. But in order for this, the native appetency for sin, which is the regular law of the sinful will, must have been revolutionized. These writers usually claim great credit for teaching that, according to them, "the object of faith is not a doctrine, but a person;" and they falsely charge us with the contrary. But when they come to expound what is involved in this trust on the person of Christ, they necessarily introduce the *doctrines* concerning him, which characterize him as a saving person, just as far as we do, only not correctly.

Mr. Campbell deems *authentic testimony* the sole efficient of faith. Let us remark, in passing, his inconsistency in exalting the value of what he calls "fact" over truth, and direct testimony over doctrinal deduction, with his own Pelagian and rationalistic scheme. If testimony is the sole efficient of faith, by virtue of its rational inducement, as he teaches, then why might not doctrinal deduction also produce it? But it is Mr. Campbell's delight to flout doctrinal truth as worthless in comparison of testified "fact." Now deduction may, when logical, establish as firm an intellectual conviction as testimony can. If Mr. Campbell supposes that testimony produces conviction by a non-logical process, he is ignorant of its nature. Thus, Mohammed testifies, as positively as Jesus, that he will give heaven on certain terms. Why does Mr. Campbell believe Jesus and discredit Mohammed? This question is the touchstone. The answer is, in order to give credit to testimony the *credibility* of the witness has to be weighed. And that is a logical process. The ascertainment of Christ's credibility is a *doctrine*, a *truth* reached by logical process, and

it is *in order* to all influence of the facts testified. Thus, if testimony can generate faith, so can doctrinal dogma; so can logical speculation, if it is correct speculation; for it may *present inducement* as convincingly as testimony. Now, Mr. Campbell urges very correctly, that doctrine does not prove adequate to generate saving faith. This proves that neither testimony nor doctrinal deduction is the efficient of faith; the cognition of them, a rational process in both cases, is only the *condition* by which the Holy Ghost generates faith.

Mr. Campbell's philosophy about faith, then, is the following: He believes that in every case of sense-perception the *object* perceived is the efficient of the affections of soul evoked, instead of the mere occasion. (*Christian System*, page 114.) The same law, he proceeds to teach (p. 115), "holds universally in all the sensitive, intellectual, and moral powers of man." "All our pleasures and pains, all our joys and sorrows, are the effects of the objects of sensation, reflection, faith, etc., apprehended or received, and not of the nature of the exercise of any power or capacity with which we are endowed." This astounding piece of psychology is the corner-stone of his whole theology! He proceeds to illustrate his false principle thus: When the eye looks on a pleasing or repulsive scene; when the ear listens to melody or discord; when the nostrils smell a rose or carrion; when the palate tastes the sweet or bitter; when the fingers touch ice or fire; the pleasure or pain of sense is due exclusively to the nature of the *object*, and not to the manner or nature of the sensational perception, which in each pair of objects was the same. So, says he, when we pass to the inner man, it is not the nature of the recollection, reflection, belief, but the *object* represented, which is the exclusive efficient of mental action. A father hears (credibly) that a lost sheep is found, that a lost son is restored. The assent to the testimony is of the same kind. Why does the latter news produce more emotion? The cause is solely "in the nature of the facts believed." He asserts that the same law is universally true of the will—that the *objects* on which the affections exercise themselves are the sole causes inducing us to action. The consistent conclusion of all is, that objective inducement presented in the gospel is the sole, the sufficient, indeed, the *only possible efficient* of faith and spiritual affections!

Thus Mr. Campbell, after making it the business and malig-

nant pleasure of his life to libel and revile the church as founding its faith on human speculation instead of God's testimony, as he charged, returns and founds his whole system of religion upon a miserable, exploded, and stupid speculation of a purely human and anti-Christian psychology! To this wretched philosophy, falsely so called, and which he does not even presume to sustain by a single proof-text, he must then proceed to wrest and force the sacred Scriptures by such license and dishonest violence of exposition as we have seen.

Every scholar sees here, at a glance, the psychology of the sensualistic schools. The occasional cause is mistaken for the efficient. Object and *effect* so exclusively occupy his attention that the SUBJECT is wholly omitted. It should have given Mr. Campbell some pause, in this absurd analysis, that one result of it is utterly to overthrow, not only that self-determination of will to which he holds, but free-agency itself. The deduction is very short. For, if the objective is the whole efficient of desire and volition, then, supposing the object presented, the volition is mechanically necessitated. Appetency and volition are the physical results of the perception of the object, just as pain is of a blow. Mr. Campbell has shown himself ignorant of the cardinal distinction between subjective *motive* and *inducement*. When Mr. Campbell's instances are inspected, we see that, where contrasted objects are presented to any sense, as the beautiful and ugly, etc., etc., the *objects* are the *occasions* of the pleasure or pain; but a *subjective sensibility* is the true *cause* or efficient. The beautiful landscape pleases the man of taste, it is viewed with indifference by another. Why? As Mr. Campbell asserts, there is no difference in the method or perfectness of the visual perception in the two men. Why do not like causes produce like effects here? The perception *is not the cause* but the *occasion* of the æsthetic pleasure. The true cause is in a subjective sensibility possessed by the man of taste. So, when the father hears of a restored son and a recovered sheep, the *cause* of the greater joy at the former is *parental affection*—the news is the *occasion*. And, in like manner, when the gospel was preached by inspired men, "and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed," while others did not, it was because the former had a subjective appetency, inwrought by the Holy Ghost, which *caused* their wills to embrace Christ. When Mr. Campbell says we

trace the effect to "the manner or nature of the faith," he states the issue falsely. We trace it to the *a priori* subjective character of the heart or moral appetency. And as these we know are by nature for sin and against holiness, it is morally certain that the soul unquickened by the Holy Ghost will not believe with the heart. The well-informed reader will scarcely need a demonstration of the falsehood of this whole philosophy. But, we repeat, such a proof is seen in the fact that the scheme is inconsistent with the maxim that "like causes produce like effects." Were the objective the true *efficient* of the mental state, the same objects should always produce the same states. But note that this is not true, either in the case of senses or æsthetic or moral affections. The same objects educe different effects, or none, from different men, according as their characters vary. This shows that the true efficient is the character, and not the object.

It is obvious that, upon the Campbellite scheme, saving faith can be conceived of as no other than *temporary faith*. Take notice, it arises, say they, in advance of any work of the Holy Spirit. It is the effect purely of gospel inducement, as acting upon the natural heart. No better description of temporary faith could be given. It is equally obvious that no consistent Campbellite is a believer in the doctrine of total depravity or inability of will in the natural man to spiritual good. For surely faith, by which a man "passes from death unto life," is a spiritual exercise and a choice of spiritual good. The argument is conclusive, that if faith is an embracing of Christ for salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel, and if the carnal mind is enmity against God, faith can only be put forth by that heart in which the Holy Spirit has wrought his renewing work. Accordingly, we find Mr. Campbell saying many seemingly scriptural things about the fall and universal sinfulness; but he does not believe that man's will is totally alienated from God. And many of his comrades preach on this point the most unblushing Pelagianism.

Another result of this view of faith is to make man decide his own religious destiny solely by his own self-determination. Sovereign grace is exploded. Man believes solely from the efficiency of gospel inducement, without any work of the Holy Ghost. So the "obedience of faith," which is immersion, is the choice of the natural man. To this remission is pledged, and the Christian state with all its privileges is now fully inaugurated. There is

no election, save the general purpose to bestow reconciliation and grace on the immersed believer.

4. The fourth and last proposition defines Mr. Campbell's idea of the nature of the Holy Spirit's operation in grace. The reader will recall the deceptive and inconsistent statement, that the Holy Ghost is given only *after* conversion. It will appear that Campbellism really holds to a spiritual work as little after as before. The statement sometimes made by its exponents is the semi-Pelagian one. Sometimes they speak in terms which might have been used by Claude Pajon and his school; but in other places they speak out more candidly as simple Pelagians. Thus Mr. Campbell (*Christianity Restored*, pages 350, 351): "As the spirit of man puts forth all its moral power in the words which it fills with its ideas, so the Spirit of God puts forth all its converting and sanctifying power in the words which it fills with its ideas." Again: "When we think of the power of the Spirit of God exerted upon minds or human spirits, it is impossible for us to imagine that that power can consist in anything but words and arguments." There is no uncertainty here. That this is the real view of Campbellism, is shown by its thorough consistency with their doctrine of faith and repentance. It is precisely the scheme of Pelagius and Socinus. In technical language it is the theory of conversion *by moral suasion alone*. Mr. Campbell, in his debate with Dr. Rice, defends it, 1st, By the shallow philosophy already exposed, inferring hence that *objective inducement is the only moral power* which can operate consistently with man's rational constitution. 2d, By the fact that no converting or sanctifying power is ever seen apart from Bible truth. 3d, By the fact that all the exercises and views of converted people reproduce the conceptions of gospel and spiritual things found in the Scriptures, and no others. 4th, That as every case of spiritual life is generically the same, whatever is essential to one case is essential to all. From this very just premise Mr. Campbell attempts to draw the illogical conclusion that, if God regenerates one case, say an infant, without the understanding of the truth, he *must renew all cases without it!* He infers hence that on any other scheme than his of mere moral suasion, all ministrations of the word are wholly useless. 5th, By the fact that God, Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the apostles, always ply men's souls with gospel inducement; and by the numerous passages in which *truth*

is spoken of as the instrument, like this: "Sanctify them through thy truth," etc.

The reader will see at a glance that all this is a very good argument to prove that the truth is the *ordinary instrument*, and ordinarily an essential instrument of conversion; but as an argument to prove *that moral suasion is the only form of spiritual power in the case*, the real issue, it is naught. The refutation of the whole is in one word of the Holy Scriptures (Ps. cxix. 18). To produce actual vision in a blind eye there must be first the curative agency and then the light. So to produce spiritual vision, the soul must be supplied with truth, the intelligible medium; but access must also be made for it to the blinded soul by direct spiritual power.

It may be profitable also to note the points made by Dr. Rice in his reply. He argues first and fundamentally from total depravity, proving the fact irrefragably, and showing that an almighty operation, other than moral suasion, is needed in such a heart to open it to such suasion. He then shows that this direct operation, though mysterious, *is possible*, first, By the fact that God at first *created man upright*; second, That God influences the minds of men in other and secular actions by his secret providence, as in Ex. xxxiv. 24; Prov. xx. 1, etc. Dr. Rice's third argument is that, if conversion is only by moral suasion, then all infants and idiots must be damned. By this point Mr. Campbell felt himself much pressed. He at length resorts to the supposition that, as he gloried in asserting the salvation of all infants dying in infancy, while his theory of moral suasion alone compelled him to admit they left this world unrenewed, they must, therefore, be purified by some immediate operation in the next world. This he calls their "physical regeneration after death"; and he says it is effected by divine power, as the "change" will be wrought on those who are alive at the resurrection. Dr. Rice should have pressed Mr. Campbell here with this obvious surrender of his fundamental ground, that any other moral power than suasion is *impossible*, consistently with the rational constitution of mind. What difference does it make, in theory, whether this almighty change, over and above moral suasion, is in this world or the next? This is enhanced by remarking that as "grace is glory begun, so glory is but grace perfected." The system of grace in the militant and triumphant church differs

only in degree. Our advocate did press him so that he was driven to assume the ground that infant depravity is only corporeal! and is removed by the bodily resurrection!

Dr. Rice argues, in the fourth place, that if regeneration were by moral suasion alone, there would be no such thing in gospel lands as intelligent and wilful rejection of the gospel; but all unbelief would be accounted for by ignorance or misconception.

In the fifth place, he refers to that class of passages which teach a gracious operation *in order to* the saving apprehension of the gospel; such as Jer. xxxii. 39; Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27; Ps. cxix. 18; Luke xxiv. 45; Acts xvi. 14. In the next place, he argues from the fact that repentance and faith are *God's gifts* (1 John v. 1; 1 Cor. iii. 6; Acts v. 31; 2 Tim. ii. 25).

Mr. Rice's seventh point was that, on the theory of moral suasion, it is unreasonable to pray for new birth, either our own or another's. God has no power save that deposited in the gospel; and the only rational thing to do is to ply the soul with its inducements. This point is sustained by two facts: that it actually presents itself in the teachings and corollaries of some of Mr. Campbell's followers; and that many of them do, in fact, pretermitt all such prayers.

Dr. Rice's eighth argument is from the *phenomena* of genuine revivals, where we see the gospel, known before, but inoperative, suddenly assume an unwonted efficiency, as means, to revive Christians and quicken sinners. This new effect implies a new power. He then closes his argument by claiming that at least nine-tenths of the reverent and thoughtful readers of the Bible, in all ages, have believed that it teaches the doctrine of a special divine influence above moral suasion.

V. *The Campbellite doctrine touching the effect of baptism.*

With Campbell's theory of the application of redemption is closely connected his doctrine touching the effect of baptism. None need to be told that, as to the mode of baptism, he is an immersionist of the straitest sect; and as to the subjects, he denies infant baptism with violence. But there is nothing in his treatment of these points not already familiar in our controversy with other immersionists. We therefore simply refer now to the usual discussions, except upon one particular. Mr. Campbell pays an unwitting tribute to the force of our argument for infant membership from the Abrahamic covenant. He does this by his

endeavor to evade it; which is, by teaching that God made two compacts with him—one secular, the other spiritual (*Christian System*, p. 134). Mr. Campbell labors to separate these parts of the Abrahamic covenant. To the one he refers temporal and political blessings, and to the other religious blessings. He then intimates that circumcision was the badge of the secular covenant only. It is easy to retort this piece of dishonesty to the overthrow of his own cause; for if there were two covenants with Abraham, then circumcision was undoubtedly the sign and seal of the spiritual. See Deut. x. 16; xxx. 6; Rom. iv. 11, 12; Gal. iii. 7. And that it was not a sign expressive of or coincident with God's secular favor and the possession of the land of Canaan, see Deut. xxviii. 64; Rom. ix. 6, 7.

As to the design and effect of baptism, the Campbellite theory is substantially the *opus operatum* one. It cannot be said to be "baptismal regeneration," because with them the new birth is not a change of spiritual character, but only of state; a passing from condemnation to pardon. This is *effected*, according to them, in baptism. They say that the immersion of an unbeliever would, indeed, procure no remission, but that sins are *pardoned through faith and baptism*. A favorite formula with them is: "Sins are remitted to believers in the act of baptism." Errett, page 73: "It is the appointed means through which the assurance of pardon is actually bestowed." Campbell, in his debate with Dr. Rice, was allowed to state his proposition, "Baptism is for the remission of sins," ambiguously. He uses the preposition "for" in the sense of "*in order to*." His true doctrine may be defined from his *Christian Baptist*, pages 416, 417: "At the very instant our bodies are put under the water, our former or old sins are all washed away, provided only that we are true believers."

Campbellite writers usually illustrate their doctrine thus: a man may be elected or appointed to an office of authority and trust, but he does not exercise its functions or enjoy its emoluments until the oath of inauguration is taken. Up to that moment official acts by him would be illegal. After that moment they are legal. Again: the sentiments of an immigrant may be thoroughly attracted to the United States, and his residence fixed there for life; but until he takes the oath of naturalization he does not possess any right of citizenship. Two people may

be thoroughly united by affection; but until the marriage ceremony is performed, their cohabitation would be illicit. Thus, says Campbell, this side of baptism, the believer is in one state, that of condemnation; on the other, he is pardoned, adopted and saved. It may be perceived at a glance that these instances present a false analogy. Were they only applied to explain why and how the outward or formal privileges of the visible church connection are suspended on baptism they would be relevant; but when the thing in question is our spiritual state, and that before an omniscient God, where all is of grace, and the gospel term is an inward principle, faith, the case is very different. Such loose analogies are worthless against the express promises of God. It should, however, be said, in justice, that like the Romanists, they make baptism only the formal cause of remission, and teach that the meritorious cause is Christ's sacrifice.

They claim, with much clamor, that the Reformed divines and symbols, and especially the Westminster and the Thirty-Nine Articles, teach their doctrine; and that we have really forsaken our own standards on these points. Their supposed proof is that the Confessions say baptism is not only a sign, but a *seal* of the remission of sins, our engrafting into Christ, etc. It seems hard to make them see that they have leaped from one idea to another wholly different, in thus confounding the attestation by a sacrament, of a *blessing already conferred* on terms entirely non-formal and spiritual, with making the sacrament the essential term for conferring the blessing. To our minds the difference is clearly enough expressed in the words of Paul: circumcision was to Abraham a *seal* of the righteousness of the faith *which he had yet being uncircumcised*. Every one sees that the sphragistic nature of the sacrament is destroyed by assigning it an *opus operatum* power. For visibly to effect a work is one thing, to attest its performance by an invisible agent is a different thing. As fruition excludes hope, so the former supercedes the latter.

The Campbellite writers also speak great things of the superiority of their system, as giving to the convert a palpable and express assurance of his forgiveness, conditioned on a definite act, instead of a mystical state of feeling called "supernatural faith." Thus Errett: "The sects, upon this subject, believe neither the Scriptures nor their own creeds. This seems to be owing chiefly

to the fact that a particular theory of spiritual operations, which has gradually almost monopolized the minds of the Protestant community, makes the assurance of pardon to rest on certain feelings, or upon what are thought to be supernatural visions, or special spiritual communications. The attempt is thus made to *transfer the office of baptism, as the remitting ordinance, to vague emotional or mental impressions*; and to effect this purpose the connection of baptism with remission of sins is totally denied." The reader sees how unscrupulous is this misrepresentation, stigmatizing the *scriptural faith* to which forgiveness is promised by God, the simplest of acts of soul, the most carefully defined in the sacred Scriptures and distinguished in the case of the true believer by definite fruits and the witness of an infallible Spirit, as "vague emotional impressions." But, further, these men admit fully that the immersion of an unbeliever would not effect the remission of his sins. Faith, then, as well as immersion, is the essential term of pardon. And without the faith the immersion would be naught! So that they, as much as we, must "make the assurance of pardon rest on certain feelings." Thus, Simon Magus "believed and was baptized," yet, according to Peter, he was "in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity." To settle that matter, everything turned upon the nature of Simon's pretended faith. So absurd is this pretence in their mouths. We should like to know whether it is not more comfortable to infer our assurance of pardon from a scriptural faith, wrought by the Spirit and answering in nature and fruits to *his* revealed marks, than from the shadowy dividing line between a temporary faith wrought by moral suasion on the natural mind, and the miserable sham called believing with which so many thousands have gone through Campbellite immersion to return immediately like the sow to her mire.

Mr. Campbell argues that his ritual scheme of forgiveness is in strict conformity to the Protestant belief, that no faith justifies save the faith that works. (James ii. 22, etc.) The act of submitting to immersion, says he, is that *test work* in which, when faith culminates, it actually justifies. This act of dipping is that "obedience of faith" (Rom. xvi. 26) made known to all nations by the gospel. Those expositors are most probably correct who make the faith a genitive appositive, so that faith itself is the obedience. But let us adopt the other construction; and the

sacred Scriptures everywhere else will teach us that the obedience which proceeds from faith is that whole career of holy living which flows from a "faith working by love." When Mr. Campbell would substitute for this life-long fruit, in the meaning of such passages as that of James ii., *one easy, cheap, ritual act*, he most wretchedly degrades the plan of salvation and the sanctifying energy of true faith.

His scriptural argument for his water justification consists in part in an attempt to identify immersion and conversion, and the new birth, as different terms for the same thing in the New Testament. This absurd license of interpretation he supposes will enable him to press into service all the texts where conversion and regeneration are connected with remission. Its refutation is easily effected by showing that the ideas of conversion and new birth are as well known in the Old Testament, where, according to Mr. Campbell, there is no Christian baptism, as in the New Testament; that in both they are notoriously spiritual works (Matt. xiii. 15) as opposed to ritual; that Christ rebukes Nicodemus because, being an Old Testament scribe, he was not familiar with the idea of the new birth; but he could not be expected to know anything of water baptism as a gospel sacrament, that in Acts iii. 19, conversion is the sequel and fruit of *μετάνοια* and that according to the Apostle John (1 John v. 1), *all who believe* are already born of God, while Mr. Campbell himself makes believing the necessary prerequisite of baptism; whence it follows that the new birth precedes baptism—is not identical with it.

Mr. Campbell has, of course, his proof-texts. They are such as John iii. 5; Acts ii. 38; xxii. 16; Mark xvi. 16; Gal. iii. 27; 1 Peter iii. 20; Titus iii. 5; Luke iii. 7; Acts x. 14; Eph. v. 25, 26. These are the texts which he regards as strongest. He uses them precisely after the same perverse fashion in which Romanists and ritualists employ them to prove the *opus operatum*. The solution is easy. The sacramental union between the element and the grace naturally leads to the employment of the name of the symbol to describe the grace symbolized. Take, for instance, John iii. 5, 6; the context proves that Christ was not intending *the sacrament of baptism* by the words, "born of water and the Spirit," because that sacrament was not yet appointed, and Nicodemus could not have been rebuked for not understand-

ing it. The force of the words is, "Born of that which the water of purification represents, the Holy Spirit." So, when Peter speaks of "repenting and being baptized in the name, etc., for the remission of sins," he cannot mean to make baptism as important as repentance, for he mentions it no more in any subsequent address. But had it been so essential, he could not have honestly omitted it. Mr. Campbell tacitly assumes that "for" means here "in order to," whereas this preposition of most extensive use (εἰς) may mean "for commemoration of." When Paul says, "We are saved by the washing," or, if you please, "bath," as Mr. Campbell says, λουτρόν, of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, he does not mean that water baptism is that regeneration, but on the contrary, in strict accordance with the sacramental language of the Bible, we are saved by that *spiritual cleansing* which washing with water represents. When the Apostle Peter says "baptism saves us," he immediately guards himself against Mr. Campbell's idea by disclaiming it: "Not the putting off of the filth of the flesh, but the ἐπερώτημα of a good conscience towards God." But it is unnecessary for us to go farther in detail.

The correct statement of the Scripture view of baptism is of itself a reply to much of the above pretended argument. It is a *positive ordinance* enjoined by God for his glory in the church's edification. One of those edifying uses is to be a badge of profession, separating the visible church from the world of the ungodly. Here the illustrations of the marriage ceremony and naturalization oath are germane. To the outward, formal privileges of the visible church baptism does immediately introduce us. Secondly, it is a *didactic ordinance*, teaching several central truths of the gospel by admirably expressive symbol, in the most pungent and impressive manner, as our separation from the world and engagement to be the Lord's, the cleansing of our *guilt* by Christ's blood and of our *corruption* by his Spirit. Thirdly, it is a *sphragistic ordinance*, not only sealing our vow to God, but, if our hearts are faithful, sealing his gracious promises to us; and thus, through the Holy Ghost, greatly strengthening both our devotion and our faith and assurance. In this way baptism is very useful and necessary to the church and edifying to the person. It is a plainly enjoined and important duty. Therefore its wilful neglect must be a sin. This sin, if unrepented, will be,

just like any other wilful sin, a sure index and occasion of the soul's ruin. But we deny that water baptism is the *essential* term of salvation in any such sense as is faith. In the words of Turretin, "*Non privatio, sed contemptus damnat.*"

As the Campbellite doctrine is not identical with the Romish *opus operatum* theory, but has its own phase, we submit an outline of an argument, partly new, in refutation of it.

1. Mr. Campbell is inconsistent in not extending the *opus operatum* dogma to both sacraments. He makes the supper merely a commemoration. But his own principles of exposition, applied to the sixth chapter of John, for instance, would prove sacramental grace far more clearly of the supper than of baptism.

2. That God should have made saving grace *essentially* dependent on a "*positive*" form, or indeed on any act for which the soul is dependent on a fellow-creature, in the case of those who are already spiritually docile, believing and penitent, is incredibly contrary to the tone and spirit of both Testaments. Mr. Campbell endeavors to evade this by saying: "Why are not Pagan souls dependent on either preachers or Bibles for salvation? And in the latter case dependent, in a true sense, on the use of paper or parchment (of rags or skins) and coloring matter? What means more thoroughly external or formal?" The answers are two: 1, These materials are simply *ministerial to a didactic use*. Is Mr. Campbell willing to make baptism such? 2, These souls are contumacious, unbelieving, and corrupt as to the truth; and God's providence merely ordains that their privation of these material means shall be the *occasion* of their condemnation already deserved. The soul who desires to embrace Christ and duty, *never*, under either Testament, depends for redemption essentially upon *any* act where another *creature* must intervene between him and his God. He who cometh unto God through Christ shall in *no wise* be cast out. Again, a place in the favor of God always depends instrumentally on the spiritual state, and on nothing else. See, for example, 1 Sam. xv. 22; Ps. xxiv. 4; Matt. xii. 7; Ps. lxi. 18. This leads—

3. To the irrefragable argument that the Scriptures everywhere say, he that *believes* is justified. See Romans iv. 11; John iii. 16; i. 12; iii. 36; v. 24; Rom. v. 1, *et passim*. Now if remission is given only in baptism, during any interval of time

between the believing and the baptism the believing soul is still in an unjustified state. This is contrary to the sacred Scriptures. Mr. Campbell makes an impotent endeavor to evade by distinguishing between title and possession, between an inheritance in prospect and in actual enjoyment. Thus saith he: The father of the prodigal says to his home-staying son, "Son, all that I have is thine." Yet that son had not a kid to make merry with his friends. Christ during his humiliation could say, "All that the Father hath is mine," yet he was in the other sense so poor that "he had not where to lay his head." Does Mr. Campbell mean to say that true faith, before baptism, only secures a title in prospect, like that of the expectant heir? Why, that the elect sinner has, in God's apprehension, even before he repents! How can this idea square with the declaration, "he that believeth *hath*," "*is passed* from death unto life"? See also Rom. v. 1.

4. Many souls have obtained remission without baptism or any corresponding sacrament. As Abraham; Cornelius, Acts x. 4, 34, 35, 44; xi. 17; the dying thief, etc. Mr. Campbell endeavors vainly to escape the proof that Cornelius was a reconciled sinner before he was baptized, by pointing to ch. xi. 14: "Shall tell thee words whereby thou and all thy house *shall be saved*." It is perfectly evident that the word "saved" here must mean, not the application, but the consummation of redemption, as in Matt. x. 22.

5. The harshness and uncharitableness of this doctrine, if carried out consistently, must condemn it in every fair mind. It would at least throw the destiny of the sincere penitent who died after his regeneration and before baptism into great doubt. But what of the myriads of intelligent, consistent Pædobaptists who live and die without immersion? They present every mark and every fruit of true piety except immersion, and yet are damned? *Incredulus odi*. Mr. Campbell has great difficulty in meeting this charge, and vacillates much. Sometimes he seems to suggest that such unimmersed persons may be accepted on the ground of their misconception of their duty. Sometimes he is more exclusive; but he can never be made exactly to meet the issue.

6. A scriptural argument may be framed from the numerous passages which teach that every believer is born (*γεννηθεῖς*) of God, as 1 John v. 1. But obviously the begotten of God are the children of God. See the clear implication of this in the

same place, verse 2. But the children are *heirs*. How preposterous does it sound to represent the soul which is begotten of God, adopted, and co-heir with Christ, as still under condemnation for his sins? To avoid this, Mr. Campbell weakly attempts to reduce the new birth to a *change of state*, instead of change of moral character, and to identify it with immersion. How unscriptural this is has been already shown. See in addition such passages as 1 Cor. iv. 15; Jas. i. 18.

In conclusion of this point, we may say of this doctrine as of all forms of sacramental grace, it is the prompting of that tendency to formalism and to a sensuous religion which exhibits itself in popery and paganism. To secure a grace pertaining to salvation by human manipulation, instead of embracing it by a sanctifying faith—this suits at once the pride and the obtuseness of the carnal mind. But it is “another gospel.” It is a conception utterly heterogeneous with the nature of the Bible system. It converts the work of God’s Spirit through the truth into a system of religious jugglery.

The other striking peculiarities of Campbellism are the permission of lay-baptism and lay-administration of the supper; the thorough independent church government; and the weekly repetition of the supper. They insist much on these. But they are not the germinant points of the system, and we pass them over.

Our church has committed itself definitely to a policy of non-recognition as to the Campbellite societies. Our grounds may be found stated in the Minutes of the General Assembly, 1871.

THE DOCTRINAL VARIOUS READINGS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT GREEK.¹

THE magnificent work whose name stands last in this list may be said to complete a marked stage in the progress, or at least in the rotation, of the art of biblical criticism. It very properly suggests, not only some inquiry into the value and authority of the Sinai manuscript introduced to the learned world by Dr. Constantine Tischendorf, but a review and comparison of the present and fashionable opinions of biblical critics. We call these the opinions now fashionable; for those who watch the course of this art are aware that there is as truly a fashion in it, infecting its votaries, as in ladies' bonnets, medicines or cravats.

We will premise by stating a few conclusions, in which all schools of learned critics may be said to agree with the enlightened friends of the Bible. First: No one claims for the *Textus Receptus*, or common Greek text of the New Testament, any sacred right, as though it represented the *ipsissima verba*, written by the inspired men in every case. It is admitted on all hands that it is but a reprint, substantially, of Erasmus's Fifth Basle Edition of the New Testament, which that eminent scholar edited from a few manuscripts, for none of which an eminent antiquity was claimed, and belonging, in the main, to the *Korvī 'Exδοσις*, or Constantinopolitan family; and that it is just as it has been transmitted from his day, through the presses of Robert

¹ This article appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1871, reviewing: 1. *Novum Testamentum Græce et Latine*. Carolus Lachmannus. Berlin: 1832, 1842. 2. *Tregelles on the Printed Text of the Greek New Testament*. London: Bagster. 1854. 3. *Novum Testamentum Græce*. Edited by Constantine Tischendorf. Leipsic: 1862. 4. *Authorized English Version of the New Testament, with Introduction and Various Readings from the three most celebrated Manuscripts of the Original Greek Text*. By C. Tischendorf. Tauchnitz Edition. Leipsic: 1869. 5. *Bibliorum Codex Sinait. Petropolitanus, Fac Simile*. By Constantine Tischendorf. (Imperial Edition, Folio.) St. Petersburg. A. D. 1862.

Stephens in Paris and the Elzevirs of Holland. It is therefore not asserted to be above emendation. But, second: This received text contains undoubtedly all the essential facts and doctrines intended to be set down by the inspired writers; for if it were corrected with the severest hand, by the light of the most divergent various readings found in any ancient MS. or version, not a single doctrine of Christianity, nor a single cardinal fact, would be thereby expunged. Third: As more numerous collations of ancient documents are made the number of various readings is, of course, greatly increased; but yet the effect of these comparisons is, on the whole, to confirm the substantial correctness of the received text more and more. This is because these various readings, which are now counted by the hundred thousand, are nearly all exceedingly minute and trivial; and chiefly because, while they diverge, on the one side and the other, from the received text, the divergence is always within these minute bounds; which proves that text to be always within a very slight distance, if at all removed, from the infallible autographs. It is as though an engineer were attempting to fix the exact line of some ancient road. The common tradition points to an existing road as being the same. Some attempts to verify its site, by the *data* given by ancient mathematicians and geographers, show that the ancient track probably varied a foot or two here and there. This discovery greatly excites the engineer's curiosity; he ransacks the ancient writers, and finds a great many other *data*. These, upon the severest application, show a multitude of other points where the modern road probably varied a minute space from the original. But they all concur in greatly increasing the evidence that the ancient track was, with these minute exceptions, just where it now is; and even if all the variations of site were introduced, the road would still lie upon the same bed substantially. The wayfarer may then be fully reassured; and leaving the antiquaries to fatigue themselves with their squabbles, whether at this valley or that rivulet the ancient thoroughfare lay a foot more to the right or a foot to the left, he would joyfully proceed, confident that the existing one was still the "King's ancient highway of holiness," and that it would lead him to the city of the apostles and martyrs. Such is the resultant total of this criticism, with all its variations; and this is gladly admitted by all right-minded critics,

from the pious Bengel to this day. Fourth. The admitted result of more extensive and thorough collations of the received text with ancient documents is to retrieve its credit, even as to the slight degree in which earlier criticism seemed to impugn it. No respectable critic would now hazard his credit by proposing as many emendations as Griesbach; and it is said that Tischendorf, in his latest edition, restores a number of the received readings which he had himself criticized in his earlier ones.

It may also be premised, that since critical investigations have reached the results admitted above, and since the most laborious research seems to give so small a promise of a definite end of debate on the remaining and unessential variations, one is not surprised to find that this branch of study has lost its interest with the more practical and vigorous judgments. Such men feel that they have something better to do with their time and energies. The minds for which criticism retains its fascination are usually of that peculiar and "crotchety" type found among antiquarians. The intelligent reader is, therefore, not surprised to find, along with much labor and learning, a "plentiful lack" of sober and convincing common sense.

In confirmation of this, let us review the different codes of judicial canons which the critics of the text have constructed. We shall find them continually varying, each one obnoxious to grave objections, and the question still unsettled. We find, then, that Bentley, the great English critic, proposed to discard the use of "conjecture," and to reform the text by the supposed agreement of the oldest Greek and the oldest Latin MS. The celebrated Bengel proposed to consider the *recensions* or families of extant MSS., as divided into the Egyptian and the Asiatic; and to give to the former, as represented by the Alexandrine MS., the decided preference. His critical canon for deciding between competing readings was: "*Proclivi scriptioni præstat ardua*"—the difficult reading has the preference over the easy one. The learned Arminian, Wetstein, in his critical edition of the New Testament, discarded all distribution of the ancient MSS. into families or recensions. He differed diametrically from Bentley, in using "conjecture" freely to determine the true reading, and in condemning the oldest Greek *codices*, which showed the nearest resemblance to the oldest MS. of Jerome's Latin version, the ones which both Bentley and Bengel

chiefly valued, as having been interpolated from the Latin, and so of little authority. He determined the weight of competing *codices* as witnesses for or against a given reading chiefly by their number. The majority ruled with him. The celebrated Griesbach, who may be said to have first constructed a critical text of the New Testament, departed again from these doctrines of Wetstein. He distributed the ancient *codices* into three families or recensions, (not absolutely, but generally distinguished by the character of their variations): a western family, originally used by the churches of West Africa, Italy, Spain, and Gaul; an Alexandrine recension, and a Byzantine. The first he considered the oldest; the last the most recent and mixed, and therefore of least authority. This family he found nearest to the received text, and the individual MSS. in it strictly resembling each other. Such was also substantially the view of Michaelis. Griesbach's fundamental canon was, that each of these families or recensions constituted an independent witness for or against a reading. That reading was entitled usually to stand which was supported by two out of the three families. He made use of "conjecture," but did not claim for it the right to introduce a reading, unless it was supported also by some ancient evidence, either of MS. or patristic citation. When it seemed doubtful for which of two readings the ancient witnesses bore strongest testimony, he gave the preference to that which was unusual, over that which was usual; to the shorter over the longer; to the unintelligible one over the clear; and to the harsh over the smooth.

The next critic was Hug, who overthrew Griesbach's system of recensions utterly. He distributes the ancient *codices* into three recensions: that of Origen, in Palestine; of Hesychius, in Alexandria; and of Lucian, in Antioch and Byzantium. The acute and learned Irish divine, Nolan, in his *Inquiry into the Integrity of the Greek Vulgate*, a work which defends the received text with matchless ingenuity and profound learning, also demolished Griesbach's system. Nolan's object is to prove the Byzantine family of *codices*, which approaches most nearly to the commonly received text, the oldest and purest. This recension he considers to be represented in the Moscow MS., whose authority had been so ably advocated by Matthiæ, on grounds similar to Dr. Nolan's. He also shows that Griesbach's preference

for the Alexandrine *codices*, and for Origen their supposed editor, was utterly wrong, there being no evidence that Origen's authority ever affected the text of the *codices* used in Alexandria, and that father being moreover utterly untrustworthy as a witness to the state of the text. Dr. Nolan substantiates his valuation of the three recensions, which he recognizes, chiefly by a comparison with the Latin version. He regards Jerome's version as representative of the *codices* current in Palestine in the fourth century; and the old Italic as representing that text originally current in Asia Minor and Byzantium. To this fact his chief witness is the splendid Brescia MS. of the Latin version, which he believes to be unquestionably the uncorrupted old Italic, and which corresponds remarkably with the Moscow and other Byzantine *codices*.

The system afterwards adopted (1836) in Scholz' New Testament was substantially similar. He found two prevalent recensions or families of manuscripts, the Alexandrine and the Byzantine. The latter contains many MSS., the former few. He gives many strong arguments to show, from the scenes of the apostles' and evangelists' labors, from the ascendancy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and from the early conquest of Palestine and Egypt by the Saracens, that the most numerous and the most correct MSS. would be preserved in the Constantinopolitan churches and monasteries. He also argues from internal marks, that the few *codices* of the Alexandrine family were not copied for the purposes of church use, and did not, at the early date when they were transcribed, represent the *κοινὴ ἔκδοσις*. Dr. Scholtz devoted the best years of his life exclusively to travels, collation of MSS., and similar critical labors, in the course of which he examined and compared six hundred and thirty MSS. The result of this immense labor was to reinstate the credit of the received text in a multitude of places where Griesbach had assailed it, and to show that it presents the most trustworthy text extant.

We now reach what may be called the recent school of biblical critics, represented by Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Alford. Their common traits may be said to be an almost contemptuous dismissal of the received text, as unworthy not only of confidence, but almost of notice; the rejection of the great mass of the *codices* of the *κοινὴ ἔκδοσις* as recent and devoid of

nearly all authority ; and the settlement of the text by the testimony of a very few MSS. for which they claim a superior antiquity, with the support of a few fathers and versions, whom they are pleased to regard as judicious and trustworthy.

Lachmann, whose critical edition of the Greek New Testament was published in Berlin in 1832 and 1850, professes to reject conjecture utterly, as a basis for the introduction of a reading, and boasts that there is not an emendation in his whole edition which rests on that foundation. His system of judicial canons may be said to be summed up in this maxim : that those are the true readings of the inspired writers which are supported by the *testes vetustissimi et longinqui*. That is, if he finds a given reading sustained by very old MSS., versions, and fathers, from very remote quarters of Christendom, this is the reading which was originally written. And there are, in his eyes, very few of either which are safe witnesses. Among the fathers, he relies chiefly upon the quotations of Irenæus, Origen, and Cyprian ; among the versions, upon the pure *codices* (as he supposes them) of Jerome, and among the Greek MSS., upon the Vatican, Alexandrine, *Codex Ephremi*, and a few others. The Latin *Brescia Codex*, which Nolan regarded as so evidently a precious and uncorrupted exemplar of the Old Italic, he deems worthless, as being interpolated from the Greek of the *κοινὴ ἔκδοσις*.

The system of Tischendorf is very simple, consisting in the adoption of what he supposes to be the oldest Greek *codices* as his guides, the Sinaitic, discovered and edited by himself, the Vatican, the Alexandrine ; with the assistance of a few of the more ancient fragments, and of the Latin, Syriac, and Sahidic versions.

Tregelles proposes, as an unfailing means for discriminating the authoritative *codices* from the incorrect, the following, which he vaunts as his canon of "comparative criticism." Select a father of the second or third century who is trustworthy, and who appears to quote *verbatim*. If he quotes such readings, in a number of cases, as are characteristic of a given *codex* or version now existing, we are authorized to conclude that this *codex* or version is, in general, a correct example of the actual Bible which that father used ; that is, of the recognized text of the second or third century. Tregelles especially lauds Lachmann,

because he first introduced the fashion distinctively of ignoring the Greek vulgate or received text as simply naught, and of constructing his supposed original text wholly from other testimonies. This method, substantially adopted by Tischendorf and by Alford, no longer retains the received text as a common basis for emendation, or standard of comparison, or even as a mere cord upon which to string the proposed corrections, but proceeds to construct a text just as though it never existed.

It is this objectionable and mischievous feature of the later criticism which, as we believe, especially demands the notice of biblical scholars at this time. Its natural result will be, that the church of God will finally have no New Testament at all. It should be remembered that the received text is that which is now actually in the hands of the laity, in the popular versions of King James, of Luther, the Douay, the Genevan Diodati's, and those of the other European languages. Does any one suppose that the labors of any learned critic will persuade any of these nations to surrender its version for a new one? It is very clear that, practically, the people must either trust the Bibles they have, or believe in none. *For there is no practicable substitute.* This appears from the fact that no two of the critics are agreed; no one of them is willing to adopt the text as settled by any other; their art has not found, and probably never will find, an authoritative umpire, to end their differences. Tregelles has published a vast list, covering ninety-four octavo pages, of the departures of the four leading editors whom he admires, Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, from the received text. Their number is more than nine thousand. That is, there are so many places in which one or more of these critics differs from the received text. But the same tables evince that *the critics differ among each other in more than nine thousand places!* A notable proof this, that the work of any one of them is still further from being supported by the common consent than the much-abused received text. Hence it appears manifestly, that if the latter is expelled from the use and confidence of the church, the latter will practically be left with no New Testament.

But it may be asked, if the received text was confessedly printed from a few MSS. and versions, of inferior authority and age; if it is confessedly erroneous in some places, and probably so in many; if the absurd ground is relinquished on which its

advocates once presumed to sanctify its very errors: why shall it claim the retention of its place? We reply, *because it is the received text*. Some possible rival text may be better entitled to that place, *but it does not hold it, and cannot win it*. There cannot be in Christendom any common tribunal of criticism by which the most meritorious text can now be installed in that place. Let it be that the received text has usurped the position by accident, or been assigned to it by providence, the all-important fact is, that *it holds it*. It is far better for the interests of truth, that Christendom should recognize, as a commonly received Bible, a less accurate text, than that it should recognize none. Are then the fruits of biblical criticism to remain unemployed, and admitted errors in the received text uncorrected? We reply, not at all. Let all real emendations be made, but in the more modest method of our fathers. The received text should still be retained by all, not as a standard of absolute accuracy, but as a common standard of reference; and the proposed changes of the reading should be appended, and left each to stand upon its own evidences. The received text would then be expounded to the church according to the convictions of the teachers in each instance. Such only would be the result upon the more audacious plan of our recent critics; for of course each teacher will exercise the same liberty and discretion in amending or retrenching their emendations which they have exercised upon the received text. The practical difference, then, which would result from the method which we resist, would be only this, that the church would no longer have a *Bible in common*; and would have nothing whatever to compensate for this immense loss. And inasmuch as the most dissatisfied of these critics confesses that the received text still presents every fact and doctrine of the Christian system uncorrupted, we cannot but regard it as a most unwarrantable exaggeration of their own results, to aim, for the sake of them, at the suppression of our common edition.

We proceed next to substantiate the assertion that the judicial canons by which these critics attempt to discriminate the true readings are not only still unsettled, and in part contradictory, but obnoxious to grave objections. The brief summary which we have given above of the statement of those supposed principles by different critics is sufficient proof of the first part. Let us now bring those canons in which the recent school are most

nearly agreed to the test of reason. In attempting this, we assume that, although altogether inferior to these professional experts in the knowledge of details and antiquarian facts, we are entitled to employ our humble common sense upon those deductions from their details, which they themselves offer to the common sense of Christians. Their labor with musty old parchments, and their familiarity with them, we do not propose to contest. In these particulars we are to them, of course, as children to Anakim. But they propound to us, in their own way, the *data* which they say are collected from these their eminent researches. They invite us to consider the reasonableness of the conclusions they wish to draw therefrom. Then, say we, those conclusions must be considered by us in the light of our own reason. We presume that the antiquaries have no such monopoly of common sense as that which we have conceded them of their critical lore. We shall therefore venture to apply that common sense to their own showing of their *data* and facts, not having before our eyes any terror of the odious charge of intrusion into things too high for us.

Let us, as a preliminary task, test the soundness of that boast which the recent critics usually echo from Lachmann; that they discard *conjecture* as a guide to correct readings, and rely in preference upon the *testimony* of competent ancient witnesses. Do they really discard conjecture? And is it proper to do so? By a conjectural reading they mean one which is supported chiefly by its internal evidences. Now the earlier German critics used inferences from internal evidences with such preposterous license, and with such results, as might well give pause to any cautious or fair mind. But to discard internal evidence from criticism is the other extreme, and it may be equally reckless. Who would dispute that an undeniable anachronism, for instance, in a work to which infallibility was conceded, must be the result of a spurious reading? But the ground of the conclusion is internal evidence; *i. e.*, *conjecture*, a *laying together* of contradictories, demonstrating the inferential, but indisputable, truth, that the pen of the infallible writer did not write that statement, impossible to be true, which we now read in the distant copy of his book. The obvious rule on this point, then, is that internal evidence is to be used, but with caution. Again, Lachmann plumes himself that there is not a single reading in his critical

edition which rests on conjecture; all are supported by the testimony of the *testes vetustissimi et longinqui*. But when we come to his selection of the witnesses, he gives us nothing but "conjecture." No particular reading rests upon conjecture; but the grand foundation of the whole is a bundle of conjectures; that is, upon Lachmann's inferences from internal marks about the writings which he selects as ancient and competent. Why does he choose to believe that among the fathers of the third century, Origen cites (and cites literally) the *codices* of the New Testament of best authority in that age; while Julius Africanus and Dionysius the Great may not be trusted as doing so? Why does he rely on Cyprian rather than Minutius Felix or Arnobius? Why does he conclude that the Vatican, the Alexandrine, the Cambridge, the *Codex Ephremi*, are ancient MSS., while none of the Byzantine are? Why, that the splendid and venerable Latin *codex of Brescia* was interpolated from the (worthless) Byzantine Greek, while the *codex of Vercelli* is more trustworthy? None of these *codices* have a continuous, authentic, known history. He proceeds only upon internal evidence. It is not now to our purpose to inquire whether Lachmann conjectures right or wrong; his ground of selection is but conjecture. This charge is eminently true concerning the age which they are pleased to assign to those Greek MSS. which they recommend to us as most venerable: the Vatican, the Alexandrine, and now the Sinai. It is expressly admitted that neither of these has an extant history. No documentary external evidence exists as to the names of the copyists who transcribed them, the date, or the place of their writing. Nobody knows whence the Vatican MS. came to the pope's library, or how long it has been there. Nobody ventures to affirm whether Cyril Lucaris brought the so-called Alexandrine MS. to London from Alexandria, or from the monasteries of Mt. Athos. Tischendorf himself was unable to trace the presence of his favorite *codex*, in the monastery of St. Catherine on Mt. Horeb, by external witnesses higher than the twelfth century. Their early date is confessedly assigned them by conjecture (*conjectura*: a casting together) of internal marks. It may be rightly assigned, yet by conjecture. Why, then, may not the antiquity of some single readings be correctly assigned by similar evidence?

We shall next attempt to show that several of the critical

canons retained by our recent editors are, in their application, of a conjectural nature, and unsafe conjecture at that. Let the reader take first that rule which is in full force from Bengel to Tischendorf: "*Scriptioni proclivi præstat ardua.*" Is not the "difficulty" or "facility" of the reading an internal mark? But we demur to the justice of the rule as a general one. It is grounded on the supposition that a copyist is far more likely to take the liberty of changing a phrase, in order to make it easier, or more intelligible, or more euphonious, or more credible, than to change it into something more difficult, or harsh, or unpopular. But we reply: Is it at all certain that the majority of copyists were competent to judge what reading would be more grammatical, more easy, more credible? Is it certain that, if they did exercise a license of changing the readings for the purpose of gaining these advantages, their standard of taste and judgment was identical with that of these European gentlemen of the nineteenth century? We have but to remember who and what were the probable copyists of our oldest *codices*; that the most of them were drowsy and ignorant monks, or the merest mechanical drudges; just as in classic MSS. we know the most of this work was done by slaves; that the process of transcription was, while intended to be servilely faithful, most unintelligent and humdrum; that a copyist, who supposed himself more intelligent, and more capable of useful emendation, was very likely to choose precisely that reading as most consonant to his ideas of propriety which seems to our modern notions most a solecism; and we must admit that it is extremely likely, the very readings which our critics prefer, because they think them too difficult to be introduced as emendations, were thus introduced because they were supposed to be easier; and that the very readings which they suppose to be easy, and therefore suspicious, would have struck those copyists, from their point of view, as very great solecisms. For, the least acquaintance with the loose grammar, the superstitious exegesis, the strange prescriptive notions of the Christians of the fourth and fifth centuries, now exploded, will convince a fair mind how much more probable our hypothesis is than the other. Doubtless, where our modern critics find a reading so difficult or ungrammatical that they conclude it never could have gotten into the text had not the original author put it there, the more natural solution is this: if the *codices* show

any ground to suspect a various reading, it was the difficult one which arose from the mere mechanical inattention of the copyist, or from his ignorance of the idiom of his own language, or from the prompting of some queer theory of his day, which is now exploded and forgotten. Surely a mere hypothesis, when so fairly counterpoised by another, cannot be accepted as a general rule of internal evidence.

A second critical canon much employed is this: Where any ground exists for suspecting a various reading in any passage which has a parallel in another gospel, that reading shall be condemned as spurious which would harmonize the two parallel places most; and that reading shall be held the original one which most tends to make them contradict each other. The argument for this astonishing canon is that, since the change was made by somebody, in one way or the other, it is presumable it was made by the over-zeal of the copyists, in order to hide the supposed evidence of contradiction between two inspired men. Again we ask: How much evidence have we that these copyists were either over-zealous or knavish? Do we know that the pair of sleepy monks who were droning over a given place in Mark, knew anything, or remembered anything, or cared anything, at the time, for the parallel place in Matthew? But the chief objection to this canon is that, like some others which evangelical critics have adopted from the mint of infidel rationalism, its sole probability is grounded in the assumption that the evangelists and apostles were not guided by inspiration. Let us adopt the Christian hypothesis, that the scenes of our Saviour's life were enacted, and his words spoken, in a given way, and that the several evangelists were inspired of God to record them infallibly; and the most harmonizing readings will obviously appear to us the most probable readings.

We next consider that method of "comparative criticism" stated on our 355th page, in which Tregelles confides so much. A given MS. is characterized, in the main, by a given school of variations from the received text. We consult an ancient father, who, we have reason to believe, quotes his Greek or Latin Testament literally—say Irenæus. We find that, in perhaps a score of places or more, his quotations from Scripture are *verbatim*, according to the various readings in the old MS. in hand. This authorizes him, Tregelles thinks, to conclude that this MS. cor-

responded *verbatim* throughout with the very Testament which lay on the study-table of old Irenæus, at the beginning of the third century; that we have in it an exact representation of the text which that father used as the authentic one. Now, a moment's reflection will convince the reader that, unless we believe that the existing MSS. at that date were very strictly conformed to some distinct "*recensions*," or families, the inference is worthless. For else, it is not safe to conclude on the old premise of "*ex pede Herculem*;" it is not safe to assume that the occurrence of a few of the same readings in Irenæus's Testament proves that it contained the whole list of the thousands of peculiar readings contained in the old MS. before us. Let us explain by a supposed case: Let it be supposed that, among editions of Shakspeare printed in the nineteenth century, there were clearly observable two *schools* of typographical errors, counting some thousands; that the literary *quidnuncs* had ascertained that this curious fact arose thus, viz., that in the seventeenth century there existed two (and only two current) printed editions of Shakspeare, and these two sets of typographical errors existed in the two old editions, respectively, distinguishing them from each other; and that all the very numerous recent editions, whether printed by a Murray, a Harper, or a Putnam, were but faithful reprints of the one or the other of the two old editions. All that is very intelligible. Now let us suppose further, that in turning over the poet Waller, we found, in some twenty or fifty cases, that his citations from Shakspeare regularly contained the typographical errors—if errors they were—found at the places cited, in the one school of our printed editions. Then we might very safely conclude, that the copy of Shakspeare which Waller used was of *that old edition* of which this school is the progeny. This seems to be precisely Tregelles's inference. And one might possibly go further, and assume that possibly the poet Waller believed the copy of Shakspeare he used the more authentic of the two editions current in his day. But now, to illustrate the fatal vice of Tregelles's argument, let us suppose that he himself denied the whole explanation of the two schools of modern editions; that he disbelieved the whole theory of a family relationship between the two schools, and two current old editions distinguished from each other in the seventeenth century; it is exceedingly plain that he has uprooted the basis of his own

argument. Now this is just what Tregelles and his friends do: they discard the whole theory of distinct ancient "*recensions*," whether distributed into two or three; they recognize no distinguishing character by which the MSS. and versions are classed in families, save the old and the new. The old they believe to be correct, and the new incorrect. If this is true, then obviously their "comparative criticism" is baseless. It may be correctly inferred that the Greek Testament which lay on Irenæus's study-table corresponded in its readings with the various readings of the old MS. we are examining, in twenty or fifty cases; and yet it may be just as likely as not, that these were all the peculiar readings that corresponded, and that this amount of correspondence was accidental.

Let us now look a little more closely at the fundamental maxim of our recent critics—that the oldest are most trustworthy, and the more recent comparatively worthless. In their eyes the testimony of one MS. of the fourth century is worth more than that of a whole family of agreeing MSS. of the ninth century, though counted by the hundred. The reason assigned for this maxim is popular and plausible: that the older must of course be more accurate, because separated by fewest transcriptions from the original autographs of the inspired men. Let us search and see whether this is so clear. *First*, It might very well be that a copy transcribed in the ninth century might be separated by fewer transcriptions from the original inspired autographs than another copy written in the fourth century. How? Thus: that this copyist of the ninth century may have copied direct from an old copy of the second century, separated by only two removes from the autograph left by John at Ephesus; whereas the fourth century copyist may have borrowed for transcription the MS. of a friend written a few months before from a MS. of the latter part of the third century, which, in turn, was copied from a MS. of the middle of that century, which, in turn, was copied from one of the beginning of that century, which again was separated by three or four transcriptions from the old second century MS. so nearly related to John's. Dr. Tischendorf claims that he has effected the exact parallel of what we have supposed. He has published in A. D. 1862 a *fac simile* edition of the Sinai *codex*. Let it be supposed that we have in our library a copy of Robert Stephens's great edition of the (despised)

κοινή ἔκδοσις, of the year 1550 A. D. We, proceeding upon the argument of Tischendorf and the recent critics, that the oldest are nearest the autographs, claim that the folio of Stephens is as much more correct than the Imperial Folio of Tischendorf, as A. D. 1550 is earlier than A. D. 1862. From this Dr. Tischendorf would demur energetically. But on what grounds? He would claim that, although his edition is three hundred years later, it is separated from the apostles by far fewer transcriptions. He would affirm that his St. Petersburg folio is a *fac simile* of the Sinai MS.; that this is of the fourth century; that it is most probably one of the veritable fifty of Eusebius Cæsariensis, transcribed by order of the Emperor Constantine; that the copy which was immediate parent to that was most probably of Origen's editing; and that this was separated by very few transcriptions from the apostles. Whereas he objects, Stephens's folio, though printed in 1550, was copied from the Erasmian and Aldine editions, but a little older than itself; they in turn from recent MSS.; and these separated by many transcriptions from the apostles. Just so, we reply, *the date is worth but little* to determine the number of removes at which a given copy is related to the apostolic autographs.

Second, If the maxim were true that the most ancient *codices* are the most trustworthy, then the most ancient ought to differ least *inter se*. As we approach so nearly to the common fountain-head, the streams ought to approach more and more to unity. Is this so? Now, according to the showing of the critics themselves, the case seems to be thus: that the three oldest *codices*, the Sinaitic, Vatican and Alexandrine, have what we shall find to be a very significant, not to say suspicious, resemblance, in their common omission of *a few* readings, to which a peculiar interest attaches. But in other respects they do not seem to approximate identity. Tischendorf has himself given us a very striking proof of this in his Tauchnitz edition of the authorized English version. He has given us there, at the bottom of the page, a great many various readings, *as between his three favorites*, and not merely as between them on the one side and the received text on the other. It is only necessary to run the eye over these foot-notes to see that, while the variations from the received text are very numerous, the instances in which the Sinaitic, Vatican, and Alexandrine MSS. agree among themselves are com-

paratively rare. The disagreements of the three, among themselves, which are of sufficient magnitude to be represented in the English language, are, upon an approximate estimate, not fewer than five thousand; and this, of course, excludes the minuter variations of spelling and arrangement, which disappear in translation. This is a larger number of various readings than Augustus Hahn has collected, as worthy of notice, from all the critical labors of Griesbach's, Knapp's, Scholz's, and Lachmann's New Testaments. Thus it appears that the plan of our critics, when executed by their own hands, seems to yield very poor results. The three "faithful witnesses" harmonize less with each other than the digests made from the diversified testimony of the despised!

Third, The oldest existing MS. is not claimed to possess an antiquity earlier than the fourth century. The interval between that date and the apostles is abundantly wide to make corruptions of the text in that oldest MS., both by accident and design, both possible and probable; that is to say, no MS. is ancient enough to lead us above the first source of the stream of errors. Now, then, what is the state of the facts? On one side there are a very few MSS. for which very great age is claimed; on the other side (the Byzantine or Constantinopolitan) there is a numerous family of MSS., of which nearly seven hundred have been collated in whole or in part, which have a great uniformity in their readings, but they are admitted to be, mostly, subsequent to the ninth century. The few for which extreme antiquity is claimed do not, in fact, agree closely, but they do agree in a small number of very significant differences, chiefly omissions, by which they are very distinctly characterized as against the Constantinopolitan school of MSS. Now, shall these few, which are claimed to be old, discredit the many more recent? We reply, No. And in addition to the reasons disclosed already we urge this: this Constantinopolitan family must have had a parentage from some MS. older than themselves. Although this their ancient parent is now lost, yet their existence proves that it once existed, and had the features which they now possess in common. So that the actual (former) existence and character of that original is as perfectly demonstrated to the reason as the existence and character of the Sinaitic MS. is to the senses. Now, whence that original? From authentic or from corrupt

sources? It is no reasoning to say, on grounds of conjecture, that it was from a corrupt source; for it is equally possible to conjecture that the Sinai or the Vatican MS. arose out of corrupt sources. Has it not been shown that the fourth century is not early enough to ascend above the sources of possible corruptions? If, then, we and our rivals proceed to reasons, in order to substantiate our conjectures, we urge that one *codex* is much more liable to corruption than a whole family. One dishonest hand is enough to do the former; there must be a concert of many to do the latter. The one was a *codex* made and preserved for private uses, the others were for public church uses. There were therefore a thousand jealous guardians, bishops, clergy, intelligent laymen, to watch against the corruption of the many; but there was only one mind, or at most a few, interested in the purity of the single *codex*.

Fourth, This leads us to consider the critical value of Scripture MSS. made for liturgical purposes, as compared with those made for scholastic private use. The Constantinopolitan family of existing MSS. evidently belong to the former sort, because this appears from their general conformity with existing lectionaries, from their so often containing the calendar of the Greek Church, and from their careful and ornamental execution. But the few old MSS. of the greatest supposed antiquity were not made for liturgical use, but for scholastic and private preservation. Now, our modern critics admit, yea, claim, both these facts, and assert that the liturgical MSS. are least to be relied upon. We ask, why? Is not this conclusion exactly against common sense? Are not our pulpit Bibles now most carefully printed of all? Does not church history teach us that both the pride and the principle of the bishops and other clergy led them to use great care in the accuracy of their church MSS., and especially under the patriarchate of Constantinople? But, say our opponents, the liturgical use of a MS. would compel it to be conformed, at all hazards, to the *κοινή ἔκδοσις*, because the ear of the people accustomed to this would require such agreement. We reply: very well; and was not that very necessity wholly favorable to the perpetuation of accuracy? To deny it, is to assume *that the κοινή ἔκδοσις was at first inaccurate*. Such indeed is the vicious circle in which the argument of these critics moves. The amount of it is: the Constantinopolitan family of existing

MSS. must be very corrupt, because they agree with the *κοινή* *ἐκδόσις*; and the *κοινή* *ἐκδόσις* must be very faulty, because it agrees with them! But now grant—what is not an assumption, but history—that the church teachers were at first very scrupulous, especially in that part of Christendom, to give their churches a correct Bible, and that thus there was at first a received text which was correct; then the necessity of conforming the new liturgical copies to the established habitudes of the people was a safeguard for accuracy, not a source of corruption. In this connection let us notice the reproach, that no old MS. of the Constantinopolitan family survives to warrant the fidelity of its progeny. The probable reason is, that those *codices* were worn out by the popular use for which they were designed; or, being in weekly use in the churches, fell victims to the persecuting fury of Diocletian and his successors more easily than the scholastic copies hidden away in the monasteries and hermitages.

Fifth, Everything in the historical position of those churches, which afterwards formed the patriarchate of Constantinople, marks them as the most likely places in which to look for correct copies of the New Testament. There was the native home of the Greek language, with the truest Grecian culture. To them nearly all the New Testament was at first addressed. There were the churches for whose use Luke, with Paul's guidance, and Mark, with Peter's guidance, and John the beloved apostle, prepared three out of the four Gospels. It was at *Ephesus* that the Apostle John, in his last days, recognized and codified the four Gospels, including Matthew's. There chiefly labored nearly all the apostles who have wielded the pen of inspiration. To those churches, or among them, nearly all the Epistles were written; the Romans, and John 1st, 2d and 3d, *among them*; the Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Philemon, Timothy, and Titus, *to them*. There was the canon closed, by the Apocalypse of John, first published in the home of his old age, Ephesus. In a word, the soil of the Greek Church is the native birthplace of the New Testament canon. Facts are also much obscured by representing Alexandria as the metropolis of Greek learning after the Christian era, and directing us to look thither for the most intelligent and earliest sources of Christian Greek. Alexandria was, in those ages, a large, an assuming, a bustling, a heterogeneous commer-

cial city. But it is very erroneous to represent it as the acknowledged queen of the Greek civilization. Antioch was still its equal. Iconium was for Asia Minor a far more influential centre. Ephesus was still the queen of the *Ægean*. Above all, the old ascendancy of Athens, with her younger rival, Corinth, was still supreme, even down to the days of Constantine; and, beside her acknowledged classic culture, the pretensions of Alexandria were but semi-barbaric. It is not a historical fact that Greek Christianity drew its knowledge prevalently from Alexandria.

The last great persecution seems to have raged equally over the whole eastern empire; and, if we may credit the Christian writers, was everywhere attended with a great destruction of the sacred books. But those writers tell us also of the many pious expedients by which the faithful preserved a part of them. It is reasonable to think that as large a portion of them were saved by the numerous churches of Asia Minor, and Greece, as elsewhere; and that, when the days of peace returned, these were again multiplied, with the pristine care and accuracy, for the supply of the churches. But in the seventh and eighth centuries, a great historic change occurred, which established a grand difference in favor of the Constantinopolitan churches—the Saracen conquests. Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Africa, were then utterly subdued by the Moslems; and in these countries Christianity was everywhere suppressed, and almost exterminated. But, until the middle of the fifteenth century, Constantinople still stood, sorely pressed indeed by the Moslems, but yet independent; a Christian Greek kingdom, retaining the ecclesiastical literature, the language, and the church usages of the third and fourth centuries, with a singular and stereotyped tenacity. Then came the final overthrow and dispersion of 1453. The Greek scholars and ecclesiastics, who then filled Europe with the news of their calamity, became the channels for transmitting to all the west the precious remains of early Christianity; and providence prepared the church with the new art of printing to preserve and diffuse them. It was thus that the Constantinopolitan MSS., the representatives of the *κοινή ἐκδόσις* of former ages, became the parents of our received text.

We have hitherto seemed to admit the full claims of the Sinaitic, Vatican, and Alexandrine MSS. to a great antiquity. But let

us now advert to the grounds on which the experts rest those claims; we shall find them, according to their own showing, far from conclusive. As we remarked, none of these *codices* have an authentic external history; their antiquity is inferred wholly from internal marks. Those marks are so nearly common to them all, that we may, with sufficient correctness, take that statement of them made by Tischendorf for his Sinai MSS. in his *Prolegomena* to the imperial edition, as an example of all.

The monastery of St. Catharine, on Mt. Horeb, is supposed to have been founded by the Emperor Justinian, A. D. 530; and Tischendorf would fain persuade himself that this venerable MS. was a part of the endowment originally bestowed upon it by its royal founder; and that it was one of the fifty MSS. provided by Eusebius of Cæsarea for the Emperor Constantine. There is no external mark of its age save that it was there, and was handled by some of the monks in the twelfth century. Its internal marks of age are the following: It is written, not only in uncial Greek characters, but in that species of uncials found in the Vatican MS., and in some classical MSS. on *papyrus* found in Herculaneum. It has scarcely any marks of punctuation. It has four columns on each page (the largest folios, next to it, having but three,) and Tischendorf thinks, with Hug, that this marks such MSS. as belonging to the age when the old rolled parchments were just going out of fashion; because it is supposed the copyists who were adopting the new fashion would seek to propitiate the reader's eye, by making as many columns as possible present themselves *ad aperturam* on the two faces of the two contiguous leaves. It resembles the oldest biblical MSS. in their antiquated spelling, inflection of words, and order of several books. It has the Ammonian chapters, and the Eusebian canons; yet it is conceded they may have been added by another hand than the copyist's. It contains the Epistle of Barnabas (so-called), and the *Pastor Hermæ*, from which it is inferred that the copyist regarded these two spurious pieces as belonging to the canon of Scripture. Now it is supposed that their claim to that place was exploded before the end of the fourth century, because the Council of Laodicea in A. D. 364, and of Carthage in 397, condemned them as spurious. Yet Eusebius, says Tischendorf, expressly places these pieces, with the "Acts of Paul," among the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*: a sufficiently clear proof,

one would think, that this copy was not one of his fifty. Tischendorf thinks that, inasmuch as the two pieces were not *universally* rejected, the politic Eusebius would be more likely to retain them, than to make the *general* suspicion of them a ground for their exclusion. Another sign of antiquity for the Sinai MS. is, that the numerous marginal corrections, which are supposed to be later than the writing itself, are also in uncials. Last, its omissions (such as those in Mark xvi. 8 to end; Matt. xiii. 35,) are such as to associate it with the Vatican, and the very oldest fragments. Such is the editor's argument.

These marks we cannot but regard as very far short of a demonstration that the MS. was the work of either the fourth or fifth century. We have no disposition to contest its possession of an equal antiquity to that of the Vatican and Alexandrine MSS. But one obvious remark is, that several of these arguments depend wholly upon the assumed antiquity of the latter; whereas the evidences of their age are not different from these. Such arguing amounts to no more than this, that the Sinaitic MS. is as old as the Vatican; and how old is the Vatican? Why, as old as the Sinaitic. *Second*; all the internal marks of great antiquity, as the character in which it is written, the spelling, the inflections, the arrangement, are made invalid by this consideration: that so many reasons existed to prompt the copyist to retain those peculiarities from the older copy before him. A temper of monkish conservatism, superstitious veneration for the forms of the past, the wish to perpetuate a pious fraud, or incompetency to change the antiquated features intelligently, may have caused, and doubtless often did cause, copyist after copyist still to reproduce these peculiarities, even ages after they had become generally antiquated. Let it be remembered, on the last point, that multitudes of *codices* were transcribed in the monasteries by men whose grammatical knowledge was wholly insufficient to construe what they were writing. They employed the hours of a superfluous leisure, which had no value, in imitating mechanically, letter by letter, the copy before them, much as a Chinaman paints the name of his English customer on a sign-board, while he knows not a letter of the English alphabet. It is obvious that such transcribers could not venture to change anything intentionally, however liable to change many things unconsciously; they could not change uncials into cursive letters,

or old inflections into contemporary ones; they must imitate precisely what was before them, or else not copy at all.

Moreover, in the *third* place, it is exceedingly erroneous to suppose that the uncial and the cursive writing succeeded each other at a given date; they were contemporary for centuries. The cursives are known to have been in use as early as Trajan, and the uncials are known to have remained in use until the eighth century. The one set of characters were used for certain species of writing; the other for more serious kinds. A maker of grave-stones in our day carves the inscription on his marble in uncials, and then goes to his ledger and enters his bill in cursives, for the cost of the carving. It would be very unsafe reasoning, which should afterwards conclude that the marble must have been inscribed many ages before the ledger. To the practical mind it will appear very obvious, however provoking to the romantic temper of the antiquary, that the transcription of copies in large uncials may be accounted for by the very prosaic fact, that *spectacles were not yet invented*. The only expedient for assisting the failing eyesight of the aged was to enlarge the size of the letters.

Fourth; the presence of the two apocryphal pieces is very far from a demonstration that the whole writing was older than the councils of Laodicea and Carthage. When the piety of the monkish ages inscribed works of human, but revered, origin on the same parchment with the Bible, this was very far from showing that it assigned it a formal place in the canon. How obvious is this, when we remember that the Anglican Church, in imitation of the patristic ages, is doing the very thing now! She prints and binds up into the same volume the Apocrypha and the Scriptures, while she declares that the former are not canonical. Again, Tischendorf places the Alexandrine MS. only in the fifth century; but it contains the Epistle of Clement. Again, Eusebius places the Acts of Paul, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Pastor of Hermas, not among the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, as Tischendorf supposes, but among the *Νόθα*. (See his *Ecclesiastical History*, B. III., Ch. 25.) Let the reader accept this as one among several proofs that the affectation of superior accuracy of research over those grand and honest old English scholars, whose critical opinions they would supersede, has but little ground. Once more: Athanasius gave (A. D. 315) a list of the New Testament

books esteemed genuine, which agrees exactly with ours in omitting these spurious pieces. And the earlier fathers, up to Irenæus and Tertullian, while not giving, like Eusebius, professed lists of the canon, yet quote just the same books as genuine as now compose our New Testament. We have, then, the lists of Caius the Presbyter, A. D. 200, and of Origen, as preserved in the *Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius*, B. VI., Ch. 25. These also exclude the two pieces from among the genuine. Now then, if Tischendorf's inference were valid, the presence of this spurious Epistle of Barnabas, and of the Pastor of Hermas, in his Sinai MS. must elevate its antiquity, not to the fourth century, but to the second century. The argument is therefore worthless. This feature of his MS., on the contrary, in the eyes of every sober critic, must depreciate its value, and make it probable that it was the work of monkish superstition, rather than of sound biblical scholarship, and the production of a place and an age which give but a feeble guarantee of honesty or accuracy.

This inquiry into the credit of these so-called oldest *codices* is preliminary to another, which is of more practical interest to the Christian. While the various readings are, as we have seen, almost numberless, there are but a few which implicate in any degree any fact, usage or doctrine of our religion. The singular thing is, that the modern critics claim the three *codices* on almost every one of these important variations as against the received text. The following list of them is not presented as complete, but as containing the most notable of these points.

As affecting facts and usages, the Sinai and the Vatican MSS. concur in omitting, in Matt. vi. 13, the closing doxology of our Lord's prayer. In John viii. 1-11, they and the Alexandrine omit the whole narrative of Christ's interview with the woman taken in adultery and her accusers. The first two also omit the whole of Mark xvi., from the ninth verse to the end. Acts viii. 37, in which Philip is represented as propounding to the eunuch faith as the qualification for baptism, is omitted by all three.

As affecting doctrine, the only omissions of practical importance are the following, in which there is also a general agreement between the (supposed) old *codices*. In Acts ix. 5, 6, the received text reads, that Paul, when struck to the earth by the light from heaven, said, "Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to

kick against the pricks. And he, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And the Lord said unto him, Arise," etc. Now the Sinai, Vatican and Alexandrine MSS. all concur in making such omissions as to leave the passage thus: "I am Jesus [of Naz., *Alexandrine*], whom thou persecutest; but arise, and go into," etc.

In Acts xx. 28, the received text makes Paul say to the Ephesine elders: "To feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." The Alexandrine *codex* here makes him say, "To feed the church of the Lord, which he hath purchased with his own blood;" and so read the *Codices Ephræmi and Bezae*.

In 1 Tim. iii. 16, the received text represents Paul as saying: "Great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifest in the flesh," etc. The Vatican here supports the received text; but the Sinai, *Codex Ephræmi*, and probably the Alexandrine, read: "Great is the mystery of godliness, who was manifest in the flesh," etc. It is true that the editors say the reading of the Alexandrine MS. is here uncertain. Certain pen-marks have been either changed *or rewritten* (it cannot be ascertained which) by a later hand, which, if genuine, would make it read, with the received text, θεός, instead of ός.

In 1 John v. 7, the received text represents John as saying: "There are three that bear record in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one. All the old MSS. concur in omitting the heavenly witnesses, so that it shall read, "For there are three that bear record: the Spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three agree in one."

In Jude 4, the received text represents the heresiarchs whom Jude rebukes as "denying the only Master, the God and Lord of us, Jesus Christ." (καὶ τὸν μόνον δεσπότην θεὸν καὶ Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἀρνούμενοι. The authorized English version mistranslates.) The MSS. omit θεόν.

In Rev. i. 11, the received text represents the glorified Messiah as declaring to John in Patmos, "Saying, I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last; and what thou seest write in a book," etc. All the three MSS. under remark concur in omitting the Messiah's eternal titles, so as to read thus: "heard behind me a great voice as of a trumpet, saying, What thou seest write," etc.

If now the reader will glance back upon this latter list of variations, he will find that in every case, the doctrinal effect of the departure from the received text is to obscure or suppress some testimony for the divinity of the Saviour. In the first (Acts ix. 5, 6) the received text teaches us that Saul's resistance to the cause of Jesus was an impracticable resistance to divine monitions. This the so-called older MSS. suppress. In Acts xx. 28, if the church which is bought with blood, is *God's*, and bought with "*his own blood*," then Christ, who confessedly bought it, is very God. This striking proof is adroitly suppressed by the suppression or change of a word. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, the only God ever manifest in the flesh is obviously our Lord Jesus Christ. If, then, the received text stands, he is categorically called God. Here, again, the adroit change of a letter, and a dash of the pen, expunges the testimony, by reading 'Θς for θς; "who" for "God." In 1 John v. 7, 8, the received text presents us two sets, or triads, of witnesses, one in heaven, the other on earth, and asserts the unity of the first triad in one. All this is omitted, and thus all reference to a trinity is obliterated. In Jude, verse 4, a correct rendering of the received text calls our Lord Jesus Christ the only Master and God, thus asserting his proper divinity in exclusive terms. The MSS., by leaving out the word God, greatly weaken, though, even then, they do not destroy this testimony for Christ's divinity. And last, in Rev. i. 11, they all concur in omitting those assertions of divine eternity which the received text ascribes to the Messiah, which in the 8th verse are ascribed to "the Almighty."

Now it should be remarked that, were all these readings of the received text expunged as spurious, many other clear testimonies for Christ's divinity would remain unquestioned by any critical authority, and abundantly sufficient to establish the doctrine on an impregnable basis. But the significant fact to which we wish especially to call attention is this: that all the variations proposed on the faith of these MSS. which have any doctrinal importance, *should attack the one doctrine of the Trinity*; nay, we may say even more specifically, *the one doctrine of Christ's deity*. The various readings taken from the various MSS. and versions are counted by the hundred thousands; but the vast majority of them are utterly insignificant; and among the few which remain, after deducting these, all which bear on doctrine

bear on one doctrine; and that, a doctrine which was keenly debated just before the times when, it is claimed, these three old *codices* were copied. Their admirers claim for them an origin in the fourth or fifth century. The Sabellian and Arian controversies raged in the third and fourth. Is there no coincidence here? Things do not happen again and again regularly without a cause. Why is it that some other doctrines of Christianity do not happen to be assailed by these variations, if indeed their occurrence is fortuitous? The curious coincidence, we repeat, that only one vital doctrine should be touched in any of its supposed testimonies, by all the myriads of variations, almost irresistibly impels the mind to the conclusion, that not the chance errors of transcribers, but some deliberate hand, has been at work in these instances. And when we remember the date of the great Trinitarian contest, and compare it with the supposed date of these exemplars of the sacred text, the ground of suspicion becomes violent. Now, did the party of Athanasius introduce spurious testimonies into the sacred text in support of the *ἁμοούσιον*; or did the party of Arius expunge authentic testimonies from the sacred text in order to obscure that doctrine? The question seems to lie most probably between these limits. It may never admit of solution; but a moment's reflection will convince the reader that the credit and value of these so-called oldest *codices* are complicated with that question. This stands out as one of their most prominent characteristics, viz., that they agree with each other in omitting these striking testimonies to the divinity of Christ; and that they also agree, in the main, in all the other extensive omissions, implicating matters of gospel fact and practice. Now, without deciding whether the Athanasians or the Arians were in fact the corrupters, we must decide that the three ancient *codices* represent the views of persons who regarded the Athanasians as in these passages the corrupters. If this latter charge can be proved, then the credit of the three old *codices* is thereby greatly strengthened; if the opposite charge can be established, that the Arian party sought fraudulently to expunge these valuable testimonies against them, then the credit of the three old *codices*, as against the rival *καὶ ἕξδοσις*, is weakened.

Can any evidence be found in our day substantiating the one charge and refuting the other? It appears to an impartial view that such evidence must be, if it exists at all, of the following

kinds: First, the MSS. and internal evidence for or against the genuineness of the first class of passages omitted, namely, the historical, such as Mark xvi. 9 to end; John viii. 1-11. It is true that the Arian strife is not implicated in these places, but their extent and historical importance is so marked that if their genuineness be demonstrated, then their absence from the three old *codices* characterizes them very strongly as mutilated copies. For it is no slight thing for copies obviously professing so much completeness to omit whole blocks of ten or twelve verses, containing substantive and important incidents in our Saviour's life and teachings. But if the character of mutilated copies is fixed on them, then the reader is prepared, by probable evidence, to suspect them of error in the other, the very marked doctrinal omissions. Second, the evidence in the case must consist of the MSS. and internal evidences against or for the readings which sustain the divinity of Christ. If these readings can be sustained on critical grounds purely, to that extent the three old *codices* are convicted of complicity with Arian mutilations of the genuine text. And, third, the question may be decided in part by external testimony and inference as to the existence and the justice of such charges against the Athanasians of interpolating, or against the Arians of expunging, readings favorable or adverse to their distinctive dogmas. For, in fine, we return to the proposition with which we set out, that the existing variations in these doctrinal readings raise a violent probability of the fact that *somebody's hands* have been at work on the ancient text, with malice prepense, to do the one or the other thing.

Under the first head it is not our purpose to oppress our readers with a long detail of the suffrages of MSS. versions and editors, for or against the first class of passages. We shall satisfy ourselves with presenting the probability which appears from the conclusions of the modern critics, including the "votaries" of the "old codices." All of them, then, are against the genuineness of the doxology in Matt. vi. 13. All of them except Lachmann are in favor of the genuineness of Mark xvi. 9 to end. Even that most unsparing amputator of the received text, Tregelles, dares not insert his knife here. When we come to John viii. 1-11, we find Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles against its genuineness, but all the others admit it, as does Bishop Ellicot, substantially. Against the genuineness of Acts viii. 37 they

all concur. We thus see that these critics are compelled themselves to admit the genuineness of a large part of these omissions against the authority of the old *codices*. Whatever of probability this carries is therefore rather against their credit than in favor of it.

When we come to the second class of evidences, that from the MSS. and internal proofs for or against the doctrinal various readings, we find a very similar showing of the critics, save as to the most explicit one of all. (1 John v. 7.) This all concur in condemning. As to the rest, they differ more or less, while the majority of them admit such a show of ancient and of internal authority for them as would satisfy most minds, even from their point of view, that they have a fair claim to stand as authentic. Dismissing them with this remark, we proceed to consider 1 John v. 7 a little more in detail. This reading Tregelles considers so obviously spurious that he disdains to discuss it. All the critics vote against it. But let us see whether the case is as clear as they would have it. When we raise this inquiry, let it be understood that we do not undertake the hopeless task of satisfying the biblical critics of its certain genuineness. Neither do we absolutely assert its genuineness, but we present the arguments in favor of its claim for the purpose of showing that they do carry a good degree of probability, and that even in this extreme case, the recent critics are not so infallible as they pretend to be. Our object is to keep it an open question, and to preserve that amount of probability which appears fairly to attach to the common reading. The reader will then, by a plain *a fortiori* argument, conclude as to the other doctrinal readings, which these scholars attack with so much less confidence, that the probabilities are altogether in their favor. The often-contested text in 1 John v. 7 also furnishes us a good instance of the value of that internal evidence which the recent critics profess to discard.

The critics all agree in excising from the common reading the words which we include within parenthesis. "Θτι τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες [ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Λόγος, καὶ τὸ ἄγιον Πνεῦμα· καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἓν εἰσι. Καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ,] τὸ Πνεῦμα, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ αἷμα· καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν. The internal evidence against this excision, then, is in the following strong points: *First*, if it be made, the masculine

article, numeral, and participle, *οἱ τρεῖς μαρτυροῦντες*, are made to agree directly with three neuters—an insuperable and very bald grammatical difficulty. But if the disputed words are allowed to stand, they agree directly with two masculines and one neuter noun, *ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Λόγος, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα*; where, according to a well known rule of syntax, the masculines among the group control the gender over a neuter connected with them. Then the occurrence of the masculines *τρεῖς μαρτυροῦντες* in the eighth verse agreeing with the neuters, *Πνεῦμα, ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα*, may be accounted for by the power of attraction, so well known in Greek syntax, and by the fact that the *Πνεῦμα*, the leading noun of this second group, and next to the adjectives, has just had a species of masculineness superinduced upon it by its previous position in the masculine group. *Second*, if the excision is made, the eighth verse coming next to the sixth, gives us a very bald and awkward, and apparently meaningless, repetition of the Spirit's witness twice in immediate succession. *Third*, if the excision is made, then the proposition at the end of the eighth verse, *καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν*, contains an unintelligible reference. The insuperable awkwardness of this chasm in the meaning is obscured in the authorized English version, "and these three agree in one." Let a version be given which shall do fair justice to the force of the definite article here, as established by the Greek idiom and of the whole construction, thus: "and these three agree to that (aforesaid) One," the argument appears. What is that aforesaid unity to which these three agree? If the seventh verse is excised, there is none: the *τὸ ἓν* so clearly designated by the definite article, as an object to which the reader has already been introduced, has no antecedent presence in the passage. Let the seventh verse stand, and all is clear: the three earthly witnesses testify to that aforementioned unity which the Father, Word, and Spirit constitute.

But, *fourth*, the internal evidence from the apostle's scope is, if possible, still more conclusive. He had just asserted (verses 1 to 6) the essential importance of *faith* as the instrumental bond of our spiritual life and the only victory over the world. To exert such energy, faith must have a solid warrant. And the thing of which faith must be assured is the *true sonship* and *proper divinity* of Christ. See emphatically verse 5 with verses 11, 12, 20. The only faith that quickens the soul and overcomes

the world is the belief (verse 5) that Jesus is God's Son, that God has appointed him our Life (compare John's Gospel, v. 21, 26), and that this Life is *true* or *veritable* God. Now, then, the apostle's scope is to answer this question: *On what warrant shall our faith accept these wondrous propositions about Jesus?* The ninth verse gives us the key-note of his answer: *On God's warrant.* This divine warrant (nothing less would answer) comes to us, *first* (verse 6), in the words of the Holy Ghost speaking by his inspired men. (See John's Gospel, xvi. 8, etc.) It comes to us, *second* (verse 7), in the words of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, asserting and confirming by miracles the sonship and unity of Jesus Christ with the Father (as in Matt. iii. 16, 17; John v. 37; Matt. xii. 28; John viii. 18; xv. 26; and such like places). It comes to us, *third* (verse 8), in the work of the Holy Ghost applying the blood and water from Christ's pierced side for our cleansing, in accordance with ancient types and modern sacraments, which concur in the doctrine of Christ's divinity. It comes to us, *fourth* (verse 10), in the spiritual consciousness of the believer himself, certifying to him that he feels within a divine change. How consistent, how accordant with John's modes of teaching, how harmonious is all this, if we accept the seventh verse as genuine? But, if we excise it, the very keystone of the arch of evidence is wanting; the crowning proof that the *warrant of our faith is* DIVINE (verse 9) is struck out.

The probability in favor of the reading which thus arises is confirmed when we remember the circumstances in view of which the apostle John undoubtedly wrote this passage. Authentic tradition teaches us that John spent his latest years at and near Ephesus. Internal marks evince what that tradition testifies, that this epistle was written in those latter years, and for his own spiritual children in those regions. He tells them that the purpose of his writing was to warn them against seducers (ii. 26), whose heresy, long predicted, was now developed, and was characterized by a denial of the proper sonship (ii. 26) and incarnation (iv. 2) of Jesus Christ. Now we know that these heretics were Ebionites, and chiefly Cerinthians and Nicolaitanes. Irenæus, Epiphanius, and other fathers, tell us that they all vitiated the doctrine of the Trinity. Cerinthus taught that Jesus was not miraculously born of a virgin, and that the "Word" Christ was not truly and eternally divine, but a sort of angelic

Aion, associated with the natural man Jesus up to his crucifixion. The sect of Nicolaitanes is most probably identified with the Gnostic Docetæ, who denied that the *Aion* Christ had a real body, ascribing to him only a seeming or phantasmal body and blood. It can scarcely be doubted that these are the errors against which John is here fortifying the faith of his "children." Then, the very point of the seventh verse in the disputed passage was obtruded upon the apostle's attention when he was writing it. Is it not hard to believe that he should, under the circumstances, write anything but what the received text ascribes to him? If we let the seventh verse stand, then the whole passage is framed, with apostolic wisdom, to exclude at once both heresies. In verse seventh he refutes the Cerinthian, declaring the unity of the Father, Word, and Spirit, and with the strictest accuracy, employing the *neuter*, *ἐν εἰσιν*, to fix the very point which Cerinthus denied, the unity of the three persons in one common substance. He then refutes the Nicolaitanes, declaring the proper humanity of Jesus, and the actual shedding and application by the Spirit of that water and blood of whose effusion he was himself eye-witness, and to which he testifies in his gospel so emphatically, in chapter xix. 34, 35. We agree here with Calvin, in regarding "the water and the blood" as not a direct reference to the sacraments of baptism and the supper, but to that blood and water which came from the Redeemer's side, of which our two sacraments are emblems. The shedding of that water and blood, witnessed by the apostle himself, evinced that Jesus was the true antitype to the Hebrew laver and altar, and to all the ritual of both in all ages; that water and blood, applied by the Holy Ghost, cleansing believers from depravity and guilt, mark Christ as the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world," the promised Jehovah-Christ, Immanuel, of both dispensations. Now, when we hear the apostle tell his "children," in the chapter above cited from his own Epistle, that the two heresies against whose seductions he designed by this writing to guard them were these, the denial of Christ's sonship to God and the denial of his incarnation, and when we see him in his closing testimony exclude precisely these two errors, there is a coherency in the whole which presents a very strong internal evidence for the genuineness of the received text. It is, moreover, very interesting to notice the common circumstances connecting this with the two other great

Trinitarian readings which the old MSS. (so-called) concur in excluding, Acts xx. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 16. Paul uttered the discourse of Acts xx. to the elders of this same Ephesian church, in which John almost certainly wrote this epistle. The former there forewarns the elders of the coming Cerinthians and Nicolaitanes under the name of "grievous wolves." Paul wrote the First Epistle to Timothy when he placed him as evangelist in this same Ephesian church, and he advertises him in it of the presence of this "*Gnosis*." We are thus led to see how Paul and John make common cause against these hated errors. We see with what object they shaped their declarations, so as to leave the most distinct testimony on the disputed points. Paul takes occasion to say that the church was ransomed with divine blood, and to tell Timothy that the very God was manifest in the flesh. John testifies that the Father, the Word, and the Spirit are one, and that the humanity was as real as the divinity.

But it is clearly admitted that, for the genuineness of the seventh verse, there is very little authority from Greek MSS. It has, thus far, been found in only two of the many hundreds which have been collated—the Montfort MS. in the University Library of Dublin, which is supposed by some to be of little authority, because suspected of having been conformed to the Latin; and in the *Codex Wizanburgensis*, which Lachmann reckons of the eighth century. But a more faithful examination of the Montfort MS. shows that the suspicion of its being a modern forgery is certainly unfounded; and that, on the contrary, this *codex* so much spoken against has several peculiar marks of antiquity and interest besides this disputed verse. The chief MS. authority which can be cited for it is that of the Latin versions. It is found in all the *codices* of these, with a few exceptions; and not only in those representing the Latin Vulgate, but those which preserve to us the *Vetus Italica*. So, likewise, the patristic authority for this reading is confined to Latin fathers; but among these, it is cited as genuine scripture by several, among whom may be mentioned Tertullian and Cyprian, as both early and well-informed, and the Council of Carthage, and a multitude of others in the later ages. In a word, it seems that this reading, omitted almost unanimously by the Greek MSS., is asserted as genuine scripture with almost equal unanimity by Latin Christendom; and that from the earliest ages. In favor of this testimony of

the West are these considerations: that the *Vetus Itala* was confessedly translated from the Greek Scriptures at a very early age, certainly within a century from the death of the apostles; that in the great persecutions, the Western, and especially the African churches, in which we find the earliest citations of the passage, did not lose their sacred books to so great an extent as the Greek churches; that the ancient Latin churches were comparatively untainted with Arianism, the suspected source of corruptions; and that in the contest with the Arians, the Council of Carthage, as well as many other fathers, appeal with unquestioning confidence to this very verse as a decisive testimony against them.

This, then, seems to be the sum of the matter. As to 1 John v. 7, the Latin Church stands opposed to the Greek. As to the other various readings affecting the doctrine of Christ's divinity, the body of the Greek MSS., representing the *κοινή ἔκδοσις*, stands, in the main, opposed to the three so-called oldest *codices*. These variations are too numerous, and too significant in their effect upon the one doctrine, to be ascribed to chance. We seem, then, to be reduced, by a strong probability, to the adoption of one of these conclusions: either that the received readings are corrupt interpolations of the Trinitarians, or that the omissions of them were dishonest mutilations of the Arians, and other Anti-trinitarians. Which of these conclusions shall we adopt? The answer seems to be in substance this: the date is so remote, and so many of the records of that age have perished, that no decisive settlement of the question is now possible; yet the probabilities strongly tend to fix the blame upon the Anti-trinitarians.

In support of this conclusion, we remark, first, that there are strong probable grounds to conclude, that the text of the Scriptures current in the East received a mischievous modification at the hands of the famous Origen, which has not been usually appreciated. The learned reader needs only to be reminded of his transcendent reputation and influence as a critic and expositor, especially over Pamphilus, Eusebius Pamphili, and the monkish theologians of the fourth and fifth centuries. The chief critical labor of Origen, which is usually mentioned, is his *Hera-pla* of the Old Testament Scriptures. But it is known that he was an indefatigable collector of New Testament MSS., and a voluminous expositor; and that while no *edition* of the New

Testament Scriptures is traced directly to his editorial labors, like the *Hexapla*, the readings which he adopted in his *scholia* and commentaries were, unquestionably, much followed by his admirers in transcribing the New Testament. In a word, Origen was, during the times of the Sabellian and Arian controversies, the *Magnus Apollo* of oriental biblical scholars, and his critical opinions were regarded by them as almost infallible. Now, what manner of man was Origen? He is described by Mosheim (in his *Com. de Rebus Christ*, Vol. II., p. 144) as “a compound of contraries, wise and unwise, acute and stupid, judicious and injudicious; the enemy of superstition, and its patron; a strenuous defender of Christianity, and its corrupter; energetic and irresolute; one to whom the Bible owes much, *and from whom it has suffered much.*” While he gained, amidst the superstitious contemporaries who then gave character to Eastern Christianity, a splendid reputation for sanctity, as well as learning, his character was evidently dishonest and tricky, and his judgment most erratic. The disgraceful story that his condemnation by his bishop, Demetrius, and his flight from Alexandria, were caused by his apostasy to Paganism under the impulse of fear, is not only detailed by Epiphanius, the great enemy of Origenism, but by Cedremus and Suidas. As a controversialist, he was wholly unscrupulous. His reputation as the great introducer of mysticism, allegory, and Neo-Platonism into the Christian church, is too well known to need recital. Those who are best acquainted with the history of Christian opinion know best, that Origen was the great corrupter, and the source, or at least earliest channel, of nearly all the speculative errors which plagued the church in after ages. This general character, coupled with his influence as autocrat among the biblical critics, is enough to excite well-grounded suspicion.

But these suspicions are confirmed when we examine the particular traits of his system. He was strictly a *Rationalist*. No wonder that modern Rationalistic critics should manifest an instinctive sympathy with him, which gives weight to his critical testimony! He disbelieved the full inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures, holding that the inspired men apprehended and stated many things obscurely. His philosophy was that of Ammonius, who asserted a common religion in all the schemes of philosophy, *including the Bible*, which only needed the ex-

cision of the excrescences and misconceptions added by poets and priests, to make their universal harmony appear; and the key-note of all Origen's labors was the effort to reconcile Christianity and this eclectic Pagan philosophy into a substantial unity. He held, as his theory of exposition, that there are three senses of Scripture—the grammatical or literal, the spiritual, and the anagogical; that the first sense does not exist at all in many places, but only the second or third; that the attempt to impose a literal grammatical sense on those places would lead us to absolute falsehood and nonsense; and that the mere words are, accordingly, of no importance. His opinions on the Trinity veered between Sabellianism and Arianism. He expressly denied the consubstantial unity of the Persons and the proper incarnation of the Godhead—the very propositions most clearly asserted in the doctrinal various readings we have under review. His theory was, that the objections of the philosophers, and of the Marcionites and Valentinians, to many supposed facts and dogmas which seem to be contained in the grammatical sense of the Bible, would be unanswerable if that sense is asserted; and that the only solution was to discard that sense, and advance allegorical meanings instead. Nolan charges that his method of citing the Scriptures is inconsistent and vacillating; that he often cites from heretical *codices* and readings; that he often proposes to correct the text of the New Testament by the supposed indications of the Septuagint, and even of heretical comments, upon the most reckless and licentious critical principles. "As he had labored to supersede the authorized version of the Old Testament, he contributed to weaken the authority of the received text of the New. In the course of his commentaries he cited the versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, on the former part of the canon; he appealed to the authority of Valentinus and Heracleon on the latter. While he thus raised the credit of these revisals which had been made by the heretics, he detracted from the authority of that text which had been received by the orthodox. Some difficulties which he found himself unable to solve in the evangelists he undertook to remove, by expressing his doubts of the integrity of the text. In some instances he ventured to impeach the reading of the New Testament on the testimony of the Old, and to convict the copies of one Gospel on the evidence of another." (*Nolan*, pp. 432,

433.) Such are the charges which this learned writer founds on a laborious review of Origen's critical efforts. This acute critic also charges that a number of the most characteristic discrepancies between the Greek Vulgate or Constantinopolitan text, and the texts current from Origen's day in Palestine and Egypt, *are distinctly traceable to a Marcionite or Valentinian source; and that Origen's was demonstrably the mediating hand* for introducing those corruptions into the latter texts. See his work, pp. 470 to 509, where he traces the readings from the Apocryphal Gospels of those Gnostics, through Origen's comments. We especially commend to the admirers of the Oriental and Egyptian *codices* these concluding words of Nolan: "Through various channels those readings might have crept into the edition of Eusebius. The Scripture text of Tatian, which most probably conformed in many respects to the Gospel and Apostolicum of Marcion, the text of Hesychius," (the Alexandrian,) "which was compiled from various apocryphal works, and the commentaries of Origen, which abounded in quotations drawn from heretical revisals of Scripture, opened a prolific source, whence they directly passed into the Palestine edition. The facilities of correcting this text from Origen's writings, and the blind reverence in which that ancient father was held in the school of Cæsarea, seem to have rendered the corruption of this text unavoidable; short annotations, or *scholia*, had been inserted by Origen in the margin of his copies of Scripture; and the number of these had been considerably augmented by Eusebius, most probably by extracts taken from Origen's commentaries. A comparison between the text and comment constantly pointed out variations in the reading; and Origen's authority being definitive on subjects of sacred criticism, the inspired text was amended by the comments. Had we no other proof of this assertion than the feasibility of the matter, and the internal evidence of the Greek MSS., we might thence assume the truth of the fact, without much danger of erring. But this point is placed beyond conjecture by the most unquestionable documents. In some MSS. containing the Palestine text, it is recorded that they were transcribed from copies the originals of which had been 'corrected by Eusebius.' In the celebrated *Codex Marchalianus* the whole process observed in correcting the text is openly avowed. The reviser there candidly states that, 'having procured the explanatory tomes of

Origen, he accurately investigated the sense in which he explained every word, as far as was possible, and *corrected* everything ambiguous according to his notion.' After this explicit acknowledgment, it seems unnecessary further to prolong this discussion."

Thus far *Nolan's Inquiry*. Now it is worthy of notice that these Trinitarian proof-texts, which appear in the Greek and Latin Vulgate, but are wanting in the old *codices* of the Palestine and Egyptian, were aimed by the apostles who wrote them precisely against Ebionite and Gnostic heresies. How natural that when, through the ill-starred manipulation of Origen, the text was infected from those heretical sources, these very readings should disappear? There appears a strong probability, then, that "the learned Origen" is least of all entitled to that authority which the recent critics claim for him as a witness to the state of the genuine readings; but that, if the whole truth could be recovered, he would be found the original corrupter of the text. We would particularly invoke the reader's attention to these admitted facts. This overweening confidence in the literary autocrat of Cæsarea did not much extend to the Latin churches or to Byzantium and Greece. It chiefly affected the East. The Western churches were never infected with the Origenist controversies, which convulsed the churches of the East during the fourth and fifth centuries. Again: the admiration of Origen's learning and opinions was chiefly limited to the monasteries. The fanatical monks generally swore by him almost as their God, because his self-emasculation, asceticism, mysticism, self-righteousness, and superstition, exactly favored monkery. The secular clergy usually condemned his sentiments and influence; and it was by a Byzantine council of such clergy that his name was finally fixed (where it belongs) in the list of *heretics*. Couple now with this the fact asserted by our recent critics in favor of their preferred *codices*, that they were obviously copied for monastic libraries, and not for liturgical use in churches. We conclude that there is so much the more probability they embody the Origenist corruptions. And the judgment which depreciates the liturgical *codices* as compared with the monastic will be reversed: we shall conclude that the church MSS. were originally the truest. Once more. We shall be prepared to believe that the Western early version, where Origen-

ism had then no currency, reflects the original purity of the text, even more truly than the Greek MSS. prevalent after Origen's day in Palestine and Egypt. The testimony of the old Italic in favor of 1 John v. 7 is therefore more weighty than at first appeared.

Let us descend now to the epoch of the Arian heresy, and we shall find in Eusebius of Cæsarea another probable source of mutilation of the original text. His also was a *clarum et venerabile nomen*, with the corrupt and fantastical religionism of the day. He was a blind admirer of Origen, and constantly made tacit pretensions of being, through Pamphilus, the lineal successor to his fame and influence. He was in theology a semi-Arian; in church politics, tricky and time-serving; to the pretentious tyrant, Constantine the Great, a truckling sycophant. Whatever proof exists that Origen and his school deteriorated the correctness of the text, it is to the same extent clear that Eusebius accepted and perpetuated that injury. His employment by the Emperor Constantine to edit fifty complete *codices* of the Scriptures, as detailed in his life of that prince, may be received as being as authentic as any part of the history. Theodoret (*Eccles. Hist.*, Bk. I., Ch. 16) professes to give the very words of this command. The emperor does not assign the destruction of the sacred books in the last persecution, or any resulting scarcity, as the cause of the want, but only the prosperity and rapid advancement of Christianity, requiring more ample appliances. This transaction, therefore, gives no support to the statement which some have insinuated, that the original *ἑξῆς* current in the Greek regions had been obliterated by persecution. And it is certain that the recension which finally prevailed in the patriarchate of Constantinople (the *κοινὴ ἑξῆς*) is very far from being this Eusebian edition. Yet the reputation of the editor and the force of royal favor must have given it some currency and some influence over the received text. Tischendorf, as we have seen, surmises that the Sinaitic *Codex* is one of these veritable Eusebian MSS. presented to the monastery of St. Catharine by Justinian, the successor of Constantine. Now we are not left wholly in the dark as to the character of this edition. The *Eusebian Canons*, as they are called, a species of table by which the parallel passages might be found in the four gospels, have come down to us; and they disclose the fact that this father excluded Mark xvi. 9 to

end, and John vii. 53 to viii. 11, from the text. For the canons contain a complete enumeration of all the chapters and sections, or *στίχοι*, which he recognized, not only arranging those which he considered as parallel against each other, but those places which he considered as unique, but genuine, by themselves. These canons for finding the parallel passages seem to have had a wide currency after Eusebius's day, as they are attached to many Greek MSS., and even to some MSS. of versions. Now, the amount of the evidence from them is the following: If it is proved that the two important passages omitted were genuine parts of the gospels before his day, then it is clear that he endeavored to excise them, and their absence from so many MSS. and versions is very naturally accounted for by his dishonest example. But the evidences of their claim to a place in the Gospels are conclusive, especially the internal. Nor are Eusebius's works lacking in intimations, at least as to the history of the woman taken in adultery, that he was disposed to excise it upon the ground of a misunderstanding of its true scope. So, the supposed contradiction between Mark's account of our Saviour's acts after his resurrection and that of the other evangelists was, as we know, regarded as a great difficulty in the way of its admission. But if there is any case where Bengel's rule, that the harder reading is to be preferred over the easier, is applicable, it is here, where the apparent collision lies so on the surface, that it must almost necessarily have deterred the copyists of that day from interpolating it had it not been already a part of the text. We conclude, then, on the whole, that the connection of Eusebius with the text is suspicious, and that there is a strong probability it suffered again from his hands.

To estimate the probability that the Arian party also injured the integrity of the Trinitarian readings in some places, we must remember their temporary triumph in the East under Constantine's successors; their reckless and unprincipled persecuting spirit; the villainous means to which they are known to have resorted to gain their ends, fraud, lying, subornation (as in the case of the venerable Bishop Athanasius and Eustathius of Antioch), and violence, and the charges of mutilating the sacred books made against them by the orthodox. Athanasius, for instance, in his first Encyclical Letter against the Arians to the bishops of Egypt and Lybia, charges it upon them, as one of

their customary tricks to deceive the unwary, that they advanced deceitful readings of the Scriptures. (Vol. I., p. 287, A.) The fact which Nolan cites is also full of significance, that the Constantinopolitan *ἔκδοσις* is found to contain all the readings which we know from their extant writings the Arians were wont to urge against the proper divinity of Christ. It appears also that there is no evidence the Arians ever had to complain of their orthodox opponents for tampering with the integrity of the text in order to refute them. Here, then, were the facts. The Arians were notoriously unscrupulous. They were openly charged with corrupting the text for polemical purposes. They could not bring any such charge against the orthodox. The *codices* which their orthodox adversaries used honestly retained all the readings which the Arians supposed damaging to orthodoxy. But here is a class of *codices* which present a very singular and suspicious resemblance in omitting certain readings particularly damaging to Arianism. This dogma is, as it happens, the only important one involved in the various readings. The coincidences are too regular to be accounted for by fortuitous influences—somebody has played the knave with the text, either the so-called orthodox by corruptly interpolating, or some Anti-trinitarians by dishonestly mutilating. The alternative is between the two hypotheses. Let the candid reader choose between them in the light of these facts. We think that he will conclude with us that the weight of probability is greatly in favor of this theory, viz., *that the Anti-trinitarians, finding certain codices in which these doctrinal readings had been already lost through the licentious criticism of Origen and his school, industriously diffused them, while they also did what they dared to add to the omissions of similar readings.*

Let us, then, briefly sum up the results attempted in this discussion. If all the debated readings were surrendered by us, no fact or doctrine of Christianity would thereby be invalidated, and least of all would the doctrine of Christ's proper divinity be deprived of adequate scriptural support. Hence the interests of orthodoxy are entirely secure from and above the reach of all movements of modern criticism of the text, whether made in a correct or incorrect method, and all such discussions in future are to the church of subordinate importance. Yet they have their interest, and should receive the intelligent watch of the

teachers of the church. Absolute historical certainty of results is not to be expected, since so many of the documents of the primitive church are gone forever; but probable conclusions are all which are to be expected. But, after all, the weight of that probability brings back the critical conclusions to the theory of Nolan and Scholz, restoring the claims of the *Κοινή Ἐκδοσις*, or received text, to be a faithful one, and invalidating the claims of exclusive accuracy made by our recent critics in favor of the so-called oldest *codices*.

THE REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

ON the 20th of May last, the curiosity of the English-speaking people as to the final result of the revision of the New Testament, raised to a high tension by delay, received its gratification. Thomas Nelson & Sons, on behalf of the English University presses, began at one o'clock A. M. the promised sale. In four days, amidst scenes of unwonted excitement, sale was made of four hundred thousand copies. The ocean telegraph states that one million copies were sold in London in about the same time. This enormous sale, with the universal discussion of the revision in the newspaper press, is referred to as a splendid evidence of the vitality of the Christian religion in our day, and of the power of the Bible. Of course the revision of no other book could excite such attention. But the popular furor is rather an evidence of that Athenian trait, fostered by the prurient civilization of Britain and America, the craving "either to tell or to hear some new thing." It remains to be seen whether, after curiosity is sated, the Scriptures will be more read or more obeyed than before. To make this result permanent, something more is required than a literary enterprise—the power of the Holy Ghost.

Seemliness requires us to take note of it as a literary event. Our purpose is not detailed criticism; of this even village weeklies give specimens. We only aim to signalize some facts concerning the revision for the guidance of intelligent readers.

1. The work originated eleven years ago, in an action of the "Convocation of Canterbury" (the Episcopal Convention of that Province of the Anglican Church.) This raised an Old Testament and a New Testament committee of revision. The latter is the one with which alone we now have to do. It contained twenty-five members, with Ellicott, Bishop of Gloucester, as chairman, of whom nineteen were Episcopal dignitaries and six

¹ This article appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for July, 1881, reviewing the *Revised Version of the New Testament*. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons.

"Dissenters." Afterwards it was judged proper to secure American coöperation. To this end, Dr. Philip Schaff, of the Union (Presbyterian) Seminary in New York city, was invited to London; and, on conference with the British committee, was authorized to select an American committee to examine the work of the British, and report and exchange criticism. Dr. Schaff selected some nineteen or twenty divines in his corner of the country, representing the Congregational, Northern Methodist, Immersionist, Northern Presbyterian, Episcopal, Unitarian, and Quaker sects. These continued the species of coöperation allowed them until the completion of the work.

It is obvious from this statement that, effectively, the revision is not an American, but exclusively a British work. Only a part of the American churches, and a very small section of the country, were represented in the work, even in this nominal manner. *Second*, these local representatives seem to have been selected by Dr. Schaff doubtless on conference with other gentlemen, but by no ecclesiastical authority, and by no standard but that of convenience and his estimate of their scholarship. And *third*, these so-called American revisers were not allowed coördinate authority with the British committee. It appears that they were allowed to suggest criticisms, which the British committee rejected or adopted as to them seemed good, while the American committee had no power to reject the British decisions. Consequently, a large part—perhaps the most, if secrets were divulged—of the suggestions of the Americans appear only in the form of an appendix.

2. A revision naturally falls into two parts: the more correct ascertainment of the text to be translated, and an amendment of the translation itself. The committees have taken in hand the first of these tasks with vigor. They give us a text which boldly departs from the *textus receptus*. The salient trait of their work here is, that, as to nearly all the important and contested "various readings," whose genuineness has been and is subject of debate among competent biblical critics, the committees have arrogated to themselves the prerogative of deciding, and deciding on the side of innovation. Two of these contested passages have, indeed, been allowed to stand: the history of the woman taken in adultery, John viii. 2-11; and the closing words of Mark's Gospel, xvi. 9-20. But of the other readings which the scholar re-

cognizes as classical and undecided topics of debate among critics, the most are decided for the innovators: the omission of the doxology from the Lord's Prayer, Matt. vi. 13; the excision of Philip's answer to the Ethiopian, Acts viii. 37; the suppression of the word "God," Acts xx. 28, where the received text teaches us that the church was purchased with divine blood; the suppression of "God," in 1 Tim. iii. 16, "God manifested in the flesh;" the excision of the three witnesses in heaven, 1 John v. 7; the suppression of the angel's agency at the pool of Bethesda. John v. 4, etc.

This journal, foreseeing the danger of too rash an innovation in our received text, foreshadowed by the spirit of the revisers, endeavored to sound a note of caution in its number for April, 1871, in a discussion of *Tischendorf's Sinai Codex*. It was there shown that the canons of excision, on which the school of critics now in fashion proceed with unquestioning confidence, are neither demonstrated nor safe; that the ages assigned to the leading uncial manuscripts were rather surmises than proofs; that the general maxim, an uncial is more ancient than a cursive, was not certain; that the rule for valuing the internal evidence in favor of or against a reading, "the difficult reading has the preference," is unfounded and deceptive; that the clear internal marks of sectarian tamperings, in the case of the important doctrinal various readings, were not duly pondered. The fears there expressed have been verified. Decisions have been made against the received text, in cases where the critical debate is still undecided; and that, in cases of cardinal importance. Nor are the grounds of these innovations always stated with candor in their justificatory publications. For instance, in 1 Tim. iii. 16, the *θεός* is changed into *ὁς*, thus suppressing the name of God in the text, "Great is the mystery of godliness, *God manifest in the flesh*," etc., and making it "mystery of godliness who was manifest in the flesh," etc. But our revisers, after changing the Greek, do not translate as we have just written, as their own change should have required; they paraphrase, "mystery of godliness: *he who was manifest*," etc. This is but an expedient, unwarranted by their own preferred text, to cover from the readers' eyes the insuperable internal evidence against reading the relative *ὁς* instead of *θεός*; that for the relative there is no antecedent in the passage. So they intrude an antecedent! Yet this does not give

them, still, a tenable sense; for Christ is never called by Paul the mystery, or blessed secret, of godliness. It is the doctrine about Christ which he always so calls. Nor are the defenders of this innovation even candid in their statement as to the testimony of the MSS., when they say, no old uncial has *θεός*. The Alexandrine indisputably has it now. True, the bar in the circle, which differentiates the *theta* from the *omicron*, is said to have the appearance of fresher ink; yet it is confessedly an open question, at least, whether the fresher ink may not be the mere replacement of the original ink of the bar, which was found to have scaled off (a thing which is known to happen to old parchment MSS). This is every way most probable; so that the *prima facie* evidence of the Alexandrine MS. is for *θεός*.

From this specimen the reader may judge on the principle, *ex pede Herculem*, how the text is handled. But there is a graver general objection against the authority arrogated to decide what is the true text, against that hitherto accepted by the church; it is an authority concerning the correctness or incorrectness of whose exercise the Revised Testament provides no data for the reader's judgment. But the biblical critics who guided the revisers to make these innovations in the text are not popes. The rest of us Bible readers have not lost the right of private judgment as to this or any other point. If the Greek Testament, which the church has seen fit to use, is to be changed, we are entitled to have the supposed (critical) grounds for that change spread before us for our judgment. The Revised Testament condescends to give no such grounds. Is it said, such critical matter would be a wholly unsuitable annex to a popular Bible? Just so; and therefore the power arrogated in this matter is wholly unsuitable for the revisers. There is an essential difference between this exercise of power and that of amending a translation; that, in the latter case, the data of comparison and judgment go along with the amendment, at least to every educated man in the church who has in his hand a received Greek text. That text is the umpire, and the reader can compare with it the old translation and the new, and judge for himself which is the more faithful. But upon the plan pursued by these revisers *the church will have no textus receptus* of the Greek; *i. e.*, unless she be willing to accept it on the *ipse dixit* of the revisers. This is in substance the objection made by the most learned and conservative critics of our

Southern Church against the plan of *Lachmann's* text, a plan thoroughly revolutionary in its tendency, however executed in his particular hands, a plan of which these revisers seem especially enamored.

Once more : This over-innovating spirit as to the *textus receptus* is manifested by the unduly depreciating strain in which the revisers now represent its merits. The members of the last Assembly will recall a notable instance of this tone in the remarks made before it in commendation of the revisers' work. We were told that the *textus receptus* was virtually the text settled in Erasmus's latest edition, and that it was now known that he had collated but five or six cursive MSS. of no antiquity and of small authority. Such was the whole showing made for it! And every member of the Assembly can bear witness that the popular impression made and apparently designed was, that our received text had all along been almost worthless as authority, and only right, as it were, by chance! Now here we charge a *suppressio veri*. First, it was not stated that the subsequent editors, as Stephens, who matured the *textus receptus*, had the advantage of collating the great *Complutensian Polyglot*, edited at royal expense, under the auspices of the first scholar of his age, Cardinal Ximenes, from the collation of Spanish and Vatican MSS., and therefore checking or confirming the Erasmian text by independent witnesses from a different part of Christendom. Next, there was a suppression of this all-important fact, that since the development of the vast critical *apparatus* of our century, the *textus receptus*, whether by good fortune or by the critical sagacity of Erasmus or by the superintendence of a good providence, *has been found to stand the ordeal amazingly well*, has been accredited instead of discredited by the critical texts. So slight were the modifications in its readings clearly determined by the vast collations made by the critics of the immediately preceding generation (collations embracing every one of the boasted uncials, except the Sinai MS.), that of all the important various readings only one (1 John v. 7,) has been given up to excision by a unanimous consent of competent critics. Now, the state of facts is this: the question is, of the correctness of the *textus receptus*. The standard of comparison is the result of the most prudent and extensive collations. The evidence of correctness is simply in the agreement of that result with the received text. If there is that

general agreement, as there is, the question of time, whether the text was printed before the result of the collation, does not touch the evidence. Now, our charge is, that this history of the results of the critical work of the age is suppressed in order to disparage the received text. It is well known that after Griesbach, a critic of a revolutionary temper, had issued his text, departing widely from the received one, the steady tendency of later critics, as Hahn, Scholz, etc., guided by wider collations and better critical evidence, has been to return towards the *textus receptus* on many of the readings where Griesbach had departed from it. And now it is credibly stated that Tischendorf's latest edition, as compared with his earliest, exhibits the same tendency. His first impulse, while excited by his discovery of the Sinai MS., was adverse; but the leaning of his riper experience was more favorable. He also found "the old wine was better."

We have left ourselves little time or space for the second branch of the revision—improvements in the translation itself. That a number of the changes are improvements, is undisputed. Under all the heads promised by the revisers, removal of obsolete archaisms, observance of uniformity in rendering the same words and locutions whenever they occur in the same way, conforming Hebrew names to the Old Testament spelling, correcting positive errors, and supplying omissions of King James's Version, and removing ambiguities therein, praiseworthy improvements have been made. Two only will be mentioned: Acts xx. 28, ἐπισκόπους, indisputably identified with πρεσβυτέρους, is translated "bishops," instead of "overseers." In John viii. 34; Luke xvii. 7 (margin); Titus i. 1 (margin), etc., the word "servant," which had become ambiguous, meaning in modern English no more than *employé*, is replaced by "bond-servant." This brings out the true logic of the passages.

But there are other places where greater accuracy or clearness is needed, in which the errors of the old version are perpetuated. Thus: Luke and the apostles always use the two words οἶκος and οἰκία in precise conformity with their classical meanings. Literally and materially, οἶκος is the particular dwelling or apartment occupied by the head of the family and his wife and children; tropically, it is the family proper, the parents and their own offspring. Literally, the οἰκία is the whole curtilage or premises of the proprietor; tropically, it is the whole household, including

slaves and dependents. See this accurate distinction beautifully followed in both senses (Acts xvi. 31-34). But in Acts xvi. 15 (Lydia's case), Acts xvi. 32, this distinction is wholly lost in the new version. In 1 Cor i. 16, and 1 Cor. xvi. 15, the new version exactly reverses the true meaning, making the apostle do precisely what he says he did not do. What Paul says is, that he baptized the *οἶκος*—house—family proper, of Stephanas; and that his *οἶκία* household, slaves and dependents, "addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints."

In Acts xxvi. 28, 29, the old version: "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian," is emasculated by a paraphrase which is not really a translation: "With but little persuasion thou wouldst fain make me a Christian." If this has any meaning, it represents Agrippa as either ironically or resentfully charging on Paul the insolence of desiring and attempting to make him, the king, a follower of the Nazarene, by slight and trivial persuasions. Now, we submit that this is not the idiomatic force of *ἐν ὀλίγῳ*; that there is not in the tense or construction of the verb, *πειθεις*, trace or hint of a conditional proposition, and that the meaning is absolutely out of joint with the following verse.

In Matt. xvi. 26, the famous text on the worth of the soul is spoiled by reading, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own life?" The advocates of this change admit that *ψυχή* often unquestionably means "soul." But they appeal to that canon of interpretation that two meanings must never be ascribed to the same word in one context; and then they appeal to the twenty-fifth verse, where *ψυχή* is (in the old version as well as the new) rendered, necessarily, "life." "Whosoever will save his *life* shall lose it." etc. But we reply: the canon is not of universal force, as witness 1 Cor. iii. 17, where *φθειρει* is rendered both "defile" and "destroy" in the same verse. True, the new version, even here, endeavors to carry out its rule: "If any man *destroy* the temple of God, him shall God destroy;" but it is done by outraging the context and sacrificing the apostle's true meaning. We reply again, that the rendering of *ψυχή* by "life," in Matt. xvi. 25, is not necessary. Calvin renders it by *soul* all through the passage. This is entirely tenable, and indeed gives a finer shade of meaning to our Saviour's words. And last, the rendering of *ψυχή* by "life," in the twenty-sixth verse, does not express

our Saviour's meaning. Since the full worldly prosperity, which is contrasted with redemption, implies continued life, he would not have represented the man who *lost his life* as having "gained the whole world."

But perhaps the most lamentable change is that of 2 Tim. iii. 16. There the old version correctly renders *Πᾶσα γραφή θεόπνευστος, καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν*: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," etc. The enemies of the Bible have long sought to defraud us of this evidence of full inspiration by making it read: "Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable," etc. The poisonous suggestion intended is that, among the parts of the "scripture" some are inspired and some are not. Our Bible contains fallible parts! the very doctrine of the Socinian and Rationalist. This treacherous version the revisers have gratuitously sanctioned! They have done so against the recorded testimony of their chairman, Bishop Ellicott (*Commentary* on 2 Tim.). They have done so against the clear force of the context and the Greek idiom. For there is no doubt, with the careful reader, that the *πᾶσα γραφή* are meant by Paul to be the *ἑρὰ γράμματα* of verse fifteen, which unquestionably mean the whole Old Testament Scriptures. *Second*, Paul leaves us, confessedly, to supply the copula. But it must be supplied between *γραφὴ* and *θεόπνευστος*. "Every scripture is inspired of God," and not between *θεόπνευστος* and *ὠφέλιμος*; for this latter construction would make the first adjective qualify the subject, "every scripture;" and the second adjective would be the predicate of the proposition. Now, it is at least more natural, that the conjunction *καὶ* should connect adjectives in a similar construction. Put the copula, as our old version does, after "scripture," and both the adjectives are predicates, and thus suitably conjoined by the conjunction. Here, again, "the old is better."

In conclusion, the revisers have evidently yielded too much to the desire for change. There is a multitude of needless emendations, of which the least that can be said is, that they are no improvements. The changes have been calculated to average two for each verse of the Gospels and Acts, and three for each verse of the Epistles and Apocalypse. Is this a revision or a new version?

REFUTATION OF PROF. W. ROBERTSON SMITH.¹

FOUR years ago the author, an Assembly's professor in the Free Church Theological College at Aberdeen, startled us by contributing to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* an article on "The Bible," which attacked the validity of the Old Testament canon, as held by the standards of his own church. Discipline was attempted, but legal quibbles delayed it for three years, until, in May, 1880, the charges against him came to be issued by his General Assembly, through reference from his Presbytery and Synod. Instead of trying the charges judicially, the Assembly, in its forbearance, patched up a compromise with him and his numerous supporters, in which it condoned his past offence, continuing him in his professorship over its candidates for the ministry and in its honors and emoluments; and he accepted a public admonition, and gave a pledge not again to disturb the faith and peace of the church by such speculations. It is true that his pledge was given in very diplomatic terms, and was meant in a very "Pickwickian" sense. But it was accepted. The members of the Assembly had, however, hardly reached their homes when another volume of the *Encyclopædia* appeared with a critical article from Prof. Smith worse than the first. It had been in the printer's hands at the very time he was giving his pledge of good behavior and receiving the generous forgiveness of his judges. Yet his conscience permitted his suppressing all allusion to it at that juncture! The best excuse stated was, that he bethought himself that it would then be too late to recall the article without inconvenience to the publisher. Of course this new assault roused the mind of the friends of truth with amazement, grief, and just indignation. The Assembly's com-

¹ This article appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for January, 1882, reviewing *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism.* By W. Robertson Smith, M. A. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1 Vol., 12mo, pp. 300.

mission was called together, the spontaneous attendance of members making it almost as numerous as the body itself, and after another session in the autumn, Prof. Smith was deprived of his right to teach the Assembly's students, on a new charge framed against him. It is not our purpose to discuss or defend the regularity of the Assembly's process against him. It should be noted, however, that it did not attempt to usurp his Presbytery's powers of original jurisdiction, by passing any sentence of suspension from the ministry; it only claimed the power to control his teaching functions in its own theological school, which functions he had derived immediately from the Assembly.

Far more gravity is to be attached to the following which he gained from numerous ministers of the Free Church and more numerous divinity students than to the case itself. These favorers sustained his errors with heat, and during the discussions of the Assembly, by methods which we should regard as flagrant and indecent outrages on parliamentary order. They chose to adopt Mr. Smith's assumption, that the sacred cause of free thought, scholarship, and free conscience was assailed in his person. It is the currency of this unsavory delusion which is most ominous. The distinction between the sacred cause of freedom of mind and the impudent claim to hold a given association's pay and appointment, while attacking the very doctrines that association was formed to uphold, is so broad that only a very deep and inflamed hatred of sound doctrine would seem adequate to blind Presbyterians to so clear a thought. But the charges were hotly hurled at those who were simply unwilling that Mr. Smith should use the Assembly's own place and money to pull down the Assembly's own principles, that they were middle age reactionists, enemies of scholarly progress, repressers of free thought, persecutors. Now, to the honest, plain mind, all this appears as though, when Mr. Jefferson Davis was indicted for treason and Mr. Charles O'Connor had voluntarily assumed the place of his counsel, the latter should have chosen to adopt the newly-found heresy of the victor's sycophants making his client a traitor, in the teeth of the constitutional and historical doctrine which justified him, and which Mr. O'Connor perfectly knew he was engaged to defend, he still holding fast to Mr. Davis's promised fees and the name and place of his counsel. And it is as though, when Mr. Davis and his friends demurred,

the lawyer had charged him as a persecutor and as the enemy of the progress of legal science. Now, in the fictitious case supposed, any mind above idiocy would be competent to answer that, if Mr. O'Connor supposed it due to his liberty of thought and to the advancement of legal science to support the heresy newly invented by the courtiers of the triumphant brute-force, his plain course would be first to surrender his place and his fee as Mr. Davis's defender. Our parable is just. No fair man doubts but that the *Confession of the Free Church*, Chap. I., § 2, means to assert what Mr. Smith distinctly impugned touching the Old Testament canon. It is no new thing, indeed, in church history, to find the advocates of latitudinarian views raising this false issue. None the less is it an ominous symptom that Free Church Presbyterians in such numbers should adopt a strategy so perverse in logic and so marked by moral obliquity.

The author tells us that, after his removal from his chair, "six hundred prominent Free Churchmen" in Edinburgh and Glasgow requested him to defend his views. This he did in the twelve lectures, delivered in both cities, to audiences averaging, he says, eighteen hundred hearers. These lectures, afterwards prepared for printing, with notes, compose the present volume. It is now republished in this country for popular circulation by at least two publishers, and its adroit poisons are dished up for "consumption by the million," in a "Seaside Library" edition, at the price of twenty cents.

The object of the Lectures is to disparage as much as possible the genuineness, antiquity, and authority of extensive parts of our Old Testament. To do this, the loose and rash methods of the most skeptical school of criticism are freely employed. But a worse trait is, that the sounder criticism is usually disregarded and treated as non-existent. In the language of Mr. Smith, to oppose his perverse and groundless methods is to condemn "biblical science" and biblical criticism. Reluctance to follow the rash leadership of his virtually infidel guides is either indolence or ignorance. As a specimen of this arrogance, let the reader take his last paragraph: "*To the indolent theologian*, the necessity of distinguishing . . . is unwelcome." The failure to adopt Mr. Smith's groundless distinctions condemns as "indolent" a Calvin, a Bengel, a Michaelis, a Lowth, a J. A. Alexander. Well! All the mental activity and scholarship are tacitly as-

sumed to be on his side; on the side of those who dissent are only stolid and lazy reliance on prescription, and obstinate prejudice. The reader will find this quiet but intensified insolence pervading the whole. Of course every scholar knows that this saucy strain is not the trait of true learning. Nor is the mode of tactics ingenuous. Unless Mr. Smith is a very shallow young man indeed, he knows that there is more than one school of criticism, and that those schools which disallow his critical conclusions on the most thorough and learned grounds have able and well-informed supporters. He knows that the divines in his own church who condemn him are not opposed to "biblical science" or to the "historical study" of the canon, and do not hold its authority on mere tradition. He knows that they fully hold that man is not bound to accept a book as a rule of faith with the papist's implicit faith; that the valid claims of the canonical books are to be established by an honest critical process; that they employ and value this criticism. Only they will not follow his criticism, because it is uncritical. His trick of attack is no more respectable than that of the quack who declaims against sensible people declining to poison their families with his nostrums, that they oppose the science of medicine. They oppose his empiricism because it is not science.

A second general criticism which we urge is, that Mr. Smith, turning his back on a sounder and more learned school of critics, gives his almost exclusive allegiance to that European school whose foundation maxim is, that the true critic must admit neither the possibility of the supernatural nor of inspiration—taken in the church's sense. The names oftenest in his mouth are of such men as Graf, and Wellhausen, of Germany, and Kuenen, of Holland, these recent and extreme advocates of this infidel theory. But any one can see that if God has indeed given his church a true inspiration and supernatural helps, and has meant his Bible to record such gifts, then the expositor who sets out to explain the Bible from the prime assumption that such gifts cannot possibly exist, must infallibly go amiss. Now if Mr. Smith will announce himself openly an unbeliever, he can consistently adopt the system of these unbelievers. But he tries to use their system while still professing to recognize inspiration and the supernatural. With such a method confusion and error are inevitable.

A third general objection to his work is, that the author utters at least an "uncertain sound" as to the nature of inspiration itself. He says many handsome things about it. But in many places he seems to hold that conception of what inspiration is known in Scotland and America as "the Morell theory," that inspiration is only such views of truth as the soul attains by the exaltation of its religious consciousness, so that the difference between the declarations of an Isaiah and a Whitefield is not generic, but only a difference of degree. It is true that in Lecture X., when speaking of the Hebrew prophets, he defines their inspiration correctly. But he then betrays the sound doctrine by saying that under the "new covenant the prophetic consecration is extended to all Israel, and the function of the teacher ceases, because all Israel shall stand in the circle of Jehovah's intimates." He had just described the prophets, as under the old, constituting that "circle." That is to say, the reason why the church has no prophets or apostles now is that all regenerate people are inspired generically as Isaiah and Paul were. So, in Lecture I., near the end, the same extreme and vicious system of exposition is asserted, which we briefly showed, at the close of Article IV. of our April No., 1881, to be virtually exclusive of real inspiration. This theory claims, not only that the Holy Ghost, in moving holy men of old to speak, employed their human faculties and knowledge as instruments, not only that we should throw all the light archæology can derive from the human use of language in their days on the exegesis of their words, but also that the inspired man's propositions are to be construed in accordance with the uninspired code of opinions which, archæology tells us, he presumably found in, and imbibed from, his contemporaries. Says Mr. Smith: We are "always to keep our eye fixed on his historical position, realizing the fact that he wrote out of the experience of his own life and from the standpoint of his own time."

Now we object, first, that this travesty of the enlightened theory of archæologic exegesis is false to the facts. It is usually the grand characteristic of prophets and apostles that they did not teach divine truth "from the standpoint of their own times," but exactly opposite thereto. Paul was a Pharisee by rearing, and wrote among and for Pharisees. But his whole doctrine of the law and justification is precisely contra-Pharisaic. We ob-

ject, secondly, that this theory might, at any stage in the function, make it impossible for the man to be the channel of divine truth. Only let the "standpoint" of him and his contemporaries be contradictory to that of the Holy Ghost, as all human "standpoints" have usually been, on vital subjects, then on this scheme he *could not* write the mind of the Spirit. It could not be transmitted to his readers through such a *medium* without fatal discoloration. And lastly, a system of doctrines thus transmitted could never enable us to discriminate the fallible human coloring from the infallible divine light—the very result which Mr. Smith's rationalistic friends are seeking.

This book may be justly described as *thoroughly untrustworthy*. The careful reader can hardly trust the author in a single paragraph. Citations are warped, history misrepresented, other theologians' views adroitly travestied, half truths advanced for whole ones. All is dogmatic assertion. In the construing of Scripture statements, the author, as if he were the critical pope, discards expositions which do not suit his purpose, however well supported by critical learning and the greatest names, without giving reasons for his decrees. His readers have not a hint that the soundest biblical learning has rejected his views, and that on conclusive grounds. Everything which does not please him is absolutely uncritical; so much so as, in the majority of cases, to deserve no refutation, nor even mention. Must the well-informed reader explain this as a disingenuous and wilful *suppressio veri*, or as ignorance? It is more charitable to him to surmise that, with all his affectation of mastery of modern critical science, his knowledge is really shallow and one-sided, and that he has fallen under the blinding influence of his leaders. The charitable reader may think this judgment severe. If he afflicts himself, as we have done, with a careful study of his book, he will conclude that the verdict is just, and even forbearing. He will reach the same conclusion if he will ponder our specific criticisms.

The erroneous points made by the book are so multitudinous that, if all were thoroughly handled, a still larger book must be written. Our aim will be to give a general outline of the main *theses* advanced, so as to put our readers in possession of the drift of the work; and to test these *theses* in some of the points supporting them, so as to give fair specimens of the author's method.

The positions taken seem to aim at three leading ends :

1. To disparage the antiquity and accuracy of that established text of the Hebrew Scriptures known as the Masoretic Text, from which all our Bibles are printed.

2. To throw as much uncertainty as possible over the authorship of the Psalms, to assign a recent date to as many of them as possible, and to bring down their compilation below the ages of Old Testament inspiration.

3. To convict the Pentateuch of manifold and extensive interpolations, many centuries after its professed date, and to deny the Mosaic authorship of nearly the whole law.

1. Mr. Smith concedes to the great Reformers a correct conception of the task of biblical criticism, taking good care to travesty their view, in part, as he delineates it; but he thinks that their almost exclusive dependence, unavoidable in their case, on Rabbinical scholars for a Hebrew text, led them to confide entirely too much in the Masoretic recension. He does not believe that the valuable series of critics and editors, beginning with Ezra, called by the Rabbins the "Great Synagogue," ever had a particle of existence as such. Nor does he seem to be certain whether Ezra himself ever did anything important for the correction and preservation of the Hebrew text. Noting the fact that the oldest known MSS. of the Masoretic text date several centuries after the Christian era, he regards the admirable and accurate correspondence of nearly all their readings as ground of suspicion. Dr. Kennicott, for instance, after many collations, found the variations very trifling and few. Mr. Smith wishes to know why they are not as numerous as between Greek MSS. of the New Testament. He concludes from this very sign of accuracy that there has been foul play, that the Masorites, when making their recension and affixing their points (vowel and accent), arbitrarily selected a *codex* from among many varying ones, which suited their own ritualistic views, published that, and burned up all the others! And for this marvellous *hypothesis* he thinks he has historical evidence—that of the Septuagint translation—for it varies very much, in some places, from the Masoretic text. When he examines a number of these variations, he is convinced that there are internal critical marks that the copy followed by the Seventy was the correct one. Their omissions, he thinks, make the narrative much more coherent.

Their transpositions, which are in some places extensive, leave the contents of the prophet in a far more natural order. We cite the instance which Mr. Smith seems to regard as most conclusive, from 1 Samuel xvii. to xviii. 5. The reader is requested to place the passage before him. He will see that the narrative represents David as a favored resident of Saul's court, and his honorary armor-bearer; that still, when the war with Philistia comes on, David is not a soldier; that when he comes to the camp as a shepherd-youth, his elder brother, Eliab, treats him with disdainful petulance, notwithstanding David's favorable standing at court; that when he appears before Saul as Goliath's victor, neither Saul nor Abner recognize his parentage. This story, says Mr. Smith, "presents inextricable difficulties." "Every one has been puzzled by these apparent contradictions." But when we turn to the Septuagint, we find that it omits verses 12 to 31, and verses 55 to xviii. 5. This omission leaves the narrative clear of the difficulties. It is therefore the true original text; and the Hebrew text is largely corrupted. So would Mr. Smith conclude.

Now, we begin our reply by saying, that "every one" has not been puzzled, or "found an inextricable difficulty" in the narrative of the Hebrew text. Not to mention such sound old expositors as Gill, Henry, Scott, who see no contradiction whatever, the following, including learned Germans, concur: Chandler, Wordsworth, Houbigant, Keil, Hävernicks, Saurin, Toy, Broadus. And the great mass of intelligent readers doubtless have concurred with them in thinking that the narrative is perfectly authentic, and all its parts consistent with the facts and with each other, whether they had the exact clue to their explanation or not. *Next*, the reader must be advertised that *other old codices of the Septuagint do not omit the parts* which Mr. Smith dislikes. The Vatican Codex does; which, it seems, he chooses to follow. The Alexandrine Codex corresponds exactly with the Hebrew throughout the passage. The Tischendorf and the other uncial MSS. bear no witness in the case, because they lack the books of Samuel. The Complutensian edition, printed from Spanish MSS., also contains all that the Hebrew contains. So that Mr. Smith has the authority of only one MS. even of the Septuagint for omitting the verses. Is it not a little singular that *he suppresses this material fact*? Nor do all good critics concur with

him in preferring the Vatican MS. as the most accurate. Vossius condemned it as the worst of all; Prideaux, with many others, preferred the Alexandrine MS. *Thirdly*, Mr. Smith, with his preferred "higher" critics, forgets a very obvious reflection, that were there glaring discrepancies, the sacred writer would have been fully as able to see and appreciate them as the rationalists are. Hence, on the theory that the difficulties are there, the most reasonable supposition is that the writer, being strictly honest, felt constrained to tell his story as he has, notwithstanding the foresight of readers' difficulties about it, simply because such were the facts; that the reason why he did not pare and trim his narrative, as one codex of the Septuagint does, was that Saul and Abner really did express, or else feign, an ignorance of David's parentage, whether we can explain why they did so, or cannot. *Fourthly*, Josephus, a Greek-speaking and Septuagint-reading Jew, still gives the narrative as the Hebrew text does. *Fifthly*, The fact that David was not recognized by Saul, either when he presented himself—verses 32 to 39—to ask leave to take up Goliath's challenge (where the narrative does not decide whether he was recognized), or when, verses 58, etc., he returned with the giant's head in his hand, would involve no serious difficulty, when compared with xvi. 19, etc. For either one of several natural and reasonable hypotheses removes the difficulty. It may have been that Saul's ignorance of David was wholly affected; because the king's capricious and insanely jealous temper makes it wholly probable that David's triumph had already roused the envy, of which we read a few hours later; and that it took, at first, the disdainful form of this ironical affectation. "What obscure stripling is this, who presumes thus to outshine us all?" This irony, Abner, courtier-like, would be prone to imitate with a shrug equally disdainful. Or, it is easy to believe that Saul honestly did not recognize David. When he ministered at court, we may be sure that the proud mother had arrayed her darling in his best "Sunday-clothes"; now he appeared travel-soiled and unkempt, in his coarse shepherd's coat. His ministry had been very irregular and short at court; and his enrolment among Saul's numerous honorary or titular armor-bearers implied by no means any intimate or long service; for the relations of his forces to the king were those of a mere militia. It must be remembered that, for all the history teaches us, many months,

or even two or more years, may have elapsed between David's return from court and this war. When, in addition, we remember that, during the time of David's residence with Saul, he was of unsound mind, there appears nothing difficult in the fact that Saul failed to recognize the young volunteer. Another hypothesis is tenable: that David was recognized, but that his parentage was forgotten. What more natural than that Saul, after he saw that he stood pledged to marry his daughter (verse 25) to the young victor, should desire to know all about his lineage? But it must be noticed that Saul's language does not imply forgetfulness or ignorance of David, but only of his parentage: "Whose son is this youth?"

Mr. Smith also deems that Eliab's irritable taunts of David are very inconsistent with his previous court-favor! What is this species of guessing-criticism worth? It may raise a difficulty in any series of facts. What more natural and probable, than that the court-preference for David occasioned this very irritation in the stalwart elder brother, handsome, but vain and selfish? Authentic histories present many surprising features, but this feeling of Eliab is not even surprising.

In fine, one is strongly impelled to ask Mr. Smith why it is that, supposing the narrative of the Hebrew text so difficult of reconciliation, as compared with that of his edition of the Septuagint, he does not here apply the pet canon of the critics, "*Praestat ardua lectio?*" "The more difficult reading is to be preferred." The surmise, that the Seventy, influenced by these imaginary difficulties, tampered with the original in order to smooth the narrative, is precisely such as Mr. Smith's school of critics is wont to apply for rejecting the easier reading, when it suits their purpose. This specimen case has been fully considered, in order that the reader may have a fair sample of the way in which our author endeavors to exalt the Septuagint over its original, by inventing imaginary objections, and advancing groundless assertions.

But now let us address ourselves to the general merits of the assertion, that the Septuagint is to be preferred to the Masoretic text for giving us the original state of the autographs of the prophets. The author confesses, what Keil asserts correctly, that the Protestant critics have usually been against him. And here let the reader's attention be called to that way which Mr. Smith

practices, of intimating that only the recent criticism is "scientific." One would think, from the coolness with which he sets aside the established conclusions of earlier biblical scholars, that somehow, he and his party have found a whole world of new critical *data*, and that they alone know how to use them scientifically. But we beg their pardon. *There are no new archæological data* to be found in this particular field. The rationalistic school have, at this point, no other materials of which to construct a new theory than those possessed by scholars for the last hundred and fifty years. The only difference is, that while the old critics made a sober, honest, logical use of this common stock of *data*, the "destructive" school shuffles them over and rearranges them capriciously, wilfully, illogically, to strain them into correspondence with a foregone, skeptical resolve that the Bible shall speak their philosophy. Let us take, for instance, the learning embodied in the *Prolegomena* of Bishop Walton's great Polyglot, of Prideaux, and of that illustrious school of biblical scholars in England. They surveyed the whole field of testimony as to the Septuagint. They reason from the facts gathered, in the spirit of the soundest criticism. To them, the theory that an original is to yield to a version, in the sense claimed by Mr. Smith, appeared, as it does to us, just as absurd as that the quality of a stream should determine that of its spring.

Our author, as we have seen, thinks the very accuracy with which all known *codices* of the Masoretic text agree is ground of the condemnation of all. He actually complains because they do not vary as much as our New Testament *codices* in Greek. Now, when a number of witnesses, testifying separately, concur with great exactness in the same story, one of two hypotheses is reasonably taken: either, they are truly well-informed and honest witnesses, and their testimony is valuable according to its harmony; or they are dishonest witnesses, whose too close harmony betrays previous collusion. But no fair mind adopts the harsher judgment without some ground of confirmation. Now, we have this undisputed fact: that the Jewish copyists and critics of their text, since the Christian era, have a great reverence for the accuracy of their holy Book; that they have adopted an exact system for insuring accuracy of transcription; and that the faithful use of this system has actually given us, for the last thousand years, a set of *codices* almost without various readings. *Why may not*

the same reverence, and the same method of copying, have produced the same happy result in the previous thousand years? History assures us that the same reverence for Scripture, and the same exact system of transcribing, prevailed before Christ. Surely modern Jews are not more trustworthy than the Jews of the ages of Malachi, Judas Maccabee, and Simon the Just. Oh! it is insinuated, the intense fondness of the scribes for their traditional *Halacha* must have tempted them to take liberties in transcribing, and to foist some of their traditions into the text. But the Rabbins of the post-Masoretic ages have been still fonder of their ritual and tradition, and yet they have not touched a letter of the text they received from the Masorites!

Again; whether the Septuagint *codices*, taken together, present a more accurate view of the autographs of the inspired men than the Masoretic *codices*, the plain reader may judge from these indisputable facts: that the Septuagint was the work of a series of Alexandrine Jews, some more than one hundred years before the others; that the origin of the versions is involved in a fog of ridiculous myths; that the versions of different books are of exceedingly various quality, some, as that of the Pentateuch, the earliest made, being very good, and others wretchedly bad; that the critics have clearly detected purposed corruptions of the text in some places: as Isaiah xix. 18, 19, was evidently twisted to support the enterprise of Onias (one hundred and forty-nine years before Christ) in building his temple at Heliopolis in Egypt, which fixes the late date of the translation of this prophet; that parts of the translations are so bad that such critics as Horne have concluded that the translators were not acquainted with the Hebrew language; and others, as Tyschen, that the *codices* used by the translators must have been the Hebrew Scriptures approximately spelled in Greek letters. The last two conclusions are not mentioned for the purpose of endorsing them, but to show how sorry the credibility of this Septuagint version appears in the eyes of men skilled in critical investigations. It is still more to the purpose to remind the reader that the state of the text of the Septuagint copies is itself too variant and corrupt, granting that the original version may have been perfect, to rely on any edition we now have for correcting the Hebrew text. A glaring example of the uncertainty of the Septuagint text we now have the reader has seen above. Every

student of its history knows that the scrupulous care which the Hebrew scribes employed in their transcriptions was not employed by the copyists of the Greek. Hence, by the end of the second century of our era, the state of the Septuagint text was so intolerably bad that Origen undertook to correct it by collations. His amended text he published in his *Hexapla*. He was a learned but a fanciful and untrustworthy critic. None of his copy has been extant for one thousand two hundred years, except a few fragments copied by others. They tell us that Origen's copy was destroyed; a Pamphylian, a Lucian, and a Hesychian edition were prepared by these three editors, with the aid of Origen's emendations. And our (very clashing) *codices* of the Septuagint may be the descendants of one or another of these recensions, or some of them may be the progeny of the worthless copies which Origen condemned. And this is the standard by which our new school of critics propose to carve and expunge our Hebrew text.

The critical licentiousness of this proposal appears from other facts. The Samaritan sect had their own Pentateuch, written in characters older than the Masoretic. Between this old text and ours there are few various readings, and almost the only important one is the substitution of Gerizim for Ebal in Deut. xxvii. 4; Josh. viii. 30. But the Samaritan Pentateuch dates probably from 2 Kings xvii. 28, and, at latest, from the times of Ezra. This witness to our Hebrew Pentateuch makes it probable that the rest of our Hebrew text is equally ancient and trustworthy. The text followed by the Peschito Syriac version is unquestionably the Masoretic, and not the Septuagint. But the Syriac, if not translated in the first century, as some foremost scholars judge, was unquestionably made early in the second. This was *before the Musorites had done that work of collation which is so suspected by Mr. Smith*. The accuracy of the old Syriac version is impregnable; all who have examined it testify to it. It is also nearly literal, rendering the Hebrew word for word, which the close idiomatic likeness of the language, the West Aramaic, enabled the writers to do, as the heterogeneous idiom of the Greek did not permit. Again, we have every reason to believe that the *Vetus Italica*, the Latin version made before the Masoretic revisal, followed our Hebrew text, and not the Septuagint, as does also Jerome's Latin version, the Vulgate. Once more: the

version of Aquila, also made before the completion of the Masoretic revisal, is almost perfectly literal, and this also follows our Hebrew, as against the Septuagint text. The reader will find a characteristic specimen of the logic of the "higher criticism" in the modes by which Mr. Smith tries to break the fatal force of this witness. First, he assumes, without proof, that the literary demand among learned Jews of the second century for another Greek version than that of the Seventy arose, not out of the great corruptions of their Septuagint copies, its obvious cause, but that it arose out of a purpose to change and shape an Old Testament text to suit the new and growing Rabbinical traditions. Hence, he suggests, Aquila was put forth to publish his pretended literal version. Our answer is, to challenge Mr. Smith to adduce one single *clear instance* in which Aquila has changed a Septuagint translation in the interests of Rabbinism. Apparently mistrusting this plea, he then intimates another, which is, that the resemblance of the names *Onkelos*, *Aquilas*, betrays that this pretended work of Aquila is but a pious fraud, being really a Greek presentation of the Targum of Onkelos so far as the Pentateuch goes. And yet the birth, history, work of Aquila of Pontus are expressly given in our most authentic church history. "The force of nature can no farther go."

Let this trait of the Septuagint be added, which Mr. Smith himself adduces (Lecture V.) for a sinister purpose: that it makes no distinction between the canonical and apocryphal books, mingling them together on its pages. But the Hebrew text always kept this distinction between the divine and the human as clear as a sunbeam. This difference may teach us how low and poor the authority of any Septuagint *codex* ought to be for deciding particular readings, as against our Hebrew text. One of Mr. Smith's particular cases, on which he attempts to ground a preference for the Seventy (1 Sam. xvii.), has been examined, that the reader *ex uno discat omnes*. His other cases, when strictly tested, are equally invalid.

The last point we make for the correctness of the Masoretic copies of the Pentateuch, is peculiarly fatal to Mr. Smith and his critical comrades. He has vaunted the authority of the Septuagint, as containing the most accurate extant representation of the Old Testament text. He wishes us to correct the prophets by it. But now, it turns out that this Septuagint *follows our Hebrew*

text in the Pentateuch, with peculiar, and almost entire, exactness. We pointedly ask, Why this Greek witness, so credible elsewhere, is not equally credible here? Is the "new criticism" wilfully inconsistent with itself? And how came our learned critic to overlook this fact?

And now, after this review of the authentic facts of antiquity, which demonstrate the inferior value of the Septuagint, it may be seen what ground the new critics have for reversing the impregnable verdict of all the great Protestant scholars, from the Reformation to the nineteenth century.

2. The second topic of Mr. Smith's criticism which we mention is the Book of Psalms. In his seventh lecture he crowds together the largest mass possible of assumptions and rash assertions touching the date and authorship of the Psalms, derived from the wilful, frivolous, and reckless speculations of his favorite teachers, the rationalistic (which means infidel) scholars of Germany. There, as is well-known, is a class of scholars who, although holding the seats and drawing the salaries of theological professors, avowedly disbelieve all inspiration and all supernatural agencies; who regard all the Psalms as on the same level with a Vedic hymn or a saga; who discuss them merely as antique literary curiosities; who use them thus only to occupy their literary leisure and whet their inventive ingenuity, ventilating any plausible guess about them which may be made a string to connect specimens of their learning, and probably laughing in their sleeves at the British and Americans who are simple enough to take them seriously; or who only trouble themselves about the Scriptures because *they get their salaries* by lecturing on them, and therefore must say something; where otherwise they would concern themselves with these books no more than with Uncle Remus's fables. Such is the attitude of the guides whom our author selects, while teaching biblical criticism in the orthodox Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland; a church whose very corner-stone is belief in the genuineness and inspiration of these books! Mr. Smith's object is to unsettle our belief in the authorship of as many of the Psalms as possible, to make it appear an immethodical bundle of several earlier Temple-Psalm books, put together by nobody knows whom. Especially does he labor to show that several Psalms must have been written after the days of Malachi, and even as late as the Maccabees; and that, therefore,

the compilation dates long after the ceasing of the Old Testament inspiration. The obvious inference is not stated, but hinted, that the collection is therefore not of authority, and may contain much uninspired matter. First he recommends, and then amends, the fanciful division into *five* collections, for which his pleas are three: that some are Jehovistic and some Elohistie; that in the Hebrew text each book "has a separate heading not translated in our English Bible;" that each book ends with a significant doxology. The first ends with Ps. xli.; the second with Ps. lxxii.; the third with Ps. lxxxix.; the fourth with Ps. cvi.; the fifth with Ps. cl. This imaginary partition Dr. J. A. Alexander, *Commentary on the Psalms*, rightly discards. How flimsy its first ground is may be seen from the fact, which Mr. Smith admits, that both the names Elohim and Jehovah appear in all the five parts, only the one is more frequent than the other in certain parts. Now, who can say what impulse of faith and piety may have moved a psalmist, at any given time, to address his God by the one title or the other? The inference is baseless. Of the second point, it is enough to say, that our closest search of the Hebrew text utterly fails to detect any "separate heading" not translated in our English Bible for the imaginary "five books." As to the grounding of a partition on the recurrence of a doxology at the end of certain Psalms, how worthless this is appears from the fact that distinct doxologies occur in a large number of other Psalms, at their end, and in the body of them, as in Psalm xxviii. 6, and xxxi. 21, and lxvi. 8 and 20, and lxviii. 19, and xcv. 2, etc., and ciii. 1, and cxxiv. 6, and cxxxv. 19, and cxliv. 1, and cxlv. 21; and Psalm cxvii. is nothing but a doxology. Why do not the critics make a "book" end with Psalm cxvii.? Why not with each of these doxologies, or at least with each terminal one? The feebleness of this fancy is also betrayed by this: that Mr. Smith and his guides themselves say that the sequence of the several Psalms in each "book" was not made systematic by the unknown collectors, but is immethodical. Then the Psalms with the terminal doxologies might just as likely have fallen elsewhere; and their place, being accidental, gives no basis for any partition. Epiphanius and Jerome mention that in their days some Jews maintained this fancy about five books. Their object was to make the Psalms resemble the Pentateuch in its

partitions; this craving for arithmetical symmetry is a motive just suitable for a cabalistic rabbi.

Now, of course, every Bible reader knows that all the Psalms were not written by David, nor in David's age; that several, especially of the Asaph-Psalms, were written during the seventy years' captivity, as, for instance, the 137th. But the faith of the church has always embraced these two points: that all were composed by inspired poets; that the authorized compilation was settled by inspired authority, and therefore not later than Malachi. There is no difficulty about the question of authorship; for after Nathan and David, there were twenty-four prophets and prophetesses at least; and every prophet was a poet. As to the compilation, the church doctrine is: that this was attended to continuously by the authorized prophets, as piece after piece was given to the church by the Holy Ghost; and that the whole compilation was verified, and the latest poems added, by Ezra and his inspired successors. So say the authentic uninspired Jewish writers. (2 Macc. ii. 13; Josephus against Apion, I. 8; Philo, II. 475.) So teach the inspired writers of the later ages of the Old Testament. (2 Chron. xxix. 30; Zech. vii. 10; [quoting Ps. xxxvi. 4] 1 Chron. xvi. 7 to end [with Psalms cv., xcvi., cvi.]; Ezra. iii. 10.) But, especially, so teaches Christ in Luke xx. 42, and xxiv. 44, and Peter in Acts i. 20. In the first and last of these places the Lord and his apostle speak expressly of "the Book of Psalms," while quoting it as infallible scripture. There was, then, in the church of that day a book—*one book*—received by all as "*the book*" of lyrical worship. There are also thirty-one quotations from the Psalms in the New Testament, all treating them, either expressly or by clear implication, as God's word. And these quotations are from nearly all parts of the book of Psalms, from the 2nd to the 140th; and eleven of them are from Psalms which have no author named, which shows that the inspired apostles had just the same confidence in these as in the others. When we couple the allusions from Chronicles and Ezra, the testimony of Josephus and Philo, the fact that the Septuagint presented just the one book of one hundred and fifty pieces, that Heb. iv. 7 quotes the same book as *David's* ("saying in David"), yet ascribing it to God; it is impossible to doubt the conclusion that our present Psalter, as one collection, was of

divine authority to the church from the days of Old Testament inspiration.

We may add also, that our Saviour bears his testimony, in Luke xxiv. 44, with equal decisiveness to the whole Old Testament canon. He cites it as an infallible rule of faith under the well-known divisions of the Law, Prophets, and Psalms—the very classification under which Josephus has been cited as including all the books in our Old Testament, and no others; the very classification which we know, from the testimony of the Hebrew and Christian writers nearest our Saviour, was generally adopted by all. Mr. Smith does, indeed (Lecture VI.), with equal weakness and bad faith, attempt to break the force of this fatal testimony, by the sneer that it is but “rationalism” in us to take the terms in our Saviour’s mouth in the historical sense. And in Lecture VI. he attempts to sustain this charge, against the whole current of Christian and Jewish learning of all ages, by intimating that Josephus’ evidence is not near enough in time to our Saviour to define his meaning. Now, Josephus ended his career as a public man A. D. 70, soon after which he wrote his books. Several years before he had been wholly engrossed by the civil and Roman wars. Hence, as it is out of the question to suppose him pursuing any new biblical studies while in the very vortex of these convulsions, we must conclude that his statements touching the Old Testament canon reflect what he was taught in his earlier years. But the words cited from Christ above were uttered A. D. 33 or 34. Hence Josephus was *virtually* his contemporary, as a witness to this point of belief.

Mr. Smith’s method is to support the modern assault upon the genuineness of the Hebrew superscriptions of the Psalms, by impugning as many of those which named David as their author as he can, and to date as many of them as possible after the cessation of inspiration. A few average specimens must suffice to possess the reader with his spirit. Psalms xx. and xxi., ascribed to David, “are not spoken *by* a king, but addressed *to* the king by his people.” Mr. Smith cannot believe “that David wrote for the people the words in which they should express their feelings for his throne,” etc. But was not David a prophet? and is it not *the very business* of a prophet to teach the people the sentiments God wishes them to cherish? It was as the defence of the church that the believers then prized David’s throne. Again,

how does Mr. Smith know but that it was *Messiah's throne* David wished them to value and uphold?

He pronounces, with disdainful levity, that the title of Psalm xxxiv. must be false, because it "speaks of Abimelech as king of Gath in the time of David. In reality, Abimelech was a contemporary of Abraham, and the king in David's time was named Achish." Now, is it possible Mr. Smith does not know that every previous expositor has noted and explained this by the simple remark, that Achish was this ruler's *individual* name, and Abi-melech (my father-king) his *regal* title, as *Pharaoh* was of the Egyptian kings? So not only do all the wise, learned, and sober British expositors say (of whom our author seems to have no opinion at all), but also a plenty of learned Germans, as Gesenius, Lange, *et al.* But he treats this obvious and sufficient solution, supported by so many of the best scholars, as unworthy of mention to his readers or of refutation! His papal word must suffice.

Psalm xxvii., he thinks, cannot have been written by David, because it speaks of inquiring in "his temple" (*viz.*, God's). But in David's time there was "not a temple, but a tent." Will not the reader be shocked with the disingenuousness of this, when he turns to the Hebrew with us and finds that the word for "his temple" is הֵיכָלוֹ? This, Gesenius tells us, means, when spoken in connection with God, simply *his sanctuary*, and is applied to the sanctuary when it was a tent. Again, he argues that the tenth verse, "When my father and mother forsake me, then the Lord will take me up," are quite inappropriate to David. Why? He attempts to invent a reason by prefacing his cavils with the suggestion that the Psalm must have been written after all David's triumphs, because he would only speak of "Zion as God's holy mountain," and of the "house of God at Zion," "after he had brought the ark to Jerusalem." Again will the reader be shocked by the author's disingenuousness when he reads the Psalm and finds that *there is neither word nor allusion in it about Zion*, nor a single trait to prevent our dating the Psalm from the days when David was a young man, deprived for the first time of a father's counsels and a mother's love by Saul's persecutions.

"Psalm lii. is said to refer to Doeg." (See in the title the reference to the slander of that Edomite herdsman of Saul against the

priests who had succoured David at Nob.) "Now David had *nothing to fear* from Doeg." "The *danger was all* for the priests at Nob. How could the Psalmist" . . . "not express in a single word his sympathy with the unhappy priests who perished for the aid they gave him?" Therefore, he concludes, David did not write it. But if the reader will examine 1 Samuel xxii. and xxiii., he will see for himself whether the lies of Doeg portended danger to David. The case meant just this: that Saul, wholly deluded by the vile delator, was now with Doeg pursuing David's life with all the fury which was expressed in his ferocious murders at Nob. And we presume that no one except Prof. Smith ever failed to see in verses 1-5 the most ardent sympathetic indignation for the wrongs done the priests.

Our author does not even believe that David wrote the 51st Psalm, or that it ever had any reference to his sin towards Bathsheba and Uriah. On what argument does he rest? "The prayer (verse 18) that God will 'build the walls of Jerusalem' refer so manifestly to the period of the captivity." He assumes that at this prosperous stage of David's reign, Jerusalem needed no more wall-building. (Borrowed from the ultra-rationalist, De Wette.) How wretched does this trifling appear, when we remember simply that David *was writing poetry*, and hence, uses an appropriate and natural image? The parallelism of the verse is enough to guide every reader: "Do good unto Zion." This shows that the figure of the defending walls up-built expresses the same thought—edification to the church, so exposed to reproach and attack by David's own crimes (see 2 Sam. xii. 14). David, as a military captain, had literally fortified his city with stone walls. But his shocking sins had now laid the church of God open and defenceless against the reproaches of infidels. God alone, by his grace, could repair this ruin. Hence David prays, "Do thou build up what my sin prostrated." This gives a perfectly logical connection with verse 19. For God's acceptance of holocausts does result from such spiritual restoration of professed worshippers; but no success in fortifying a town with literal ramparts has any relevancy whatever to making animal sacrifices more pleasing to a spiritual God.

One more of these far-fetched difficulties must suffice. Mr. Smith does not believe the title of the famous 139th Psalm, when it says, David wrote it, because he thinks he finds four Aramaic

words in it, which proves it must have been written during or after the captivity in Chaldea. Now, there are but three words to debate: as one recurs twice, חַיַּל—*thought*, in verses 2 and 17; רַבַּע—*lying down*, in verse 3; and עֶרֶב—*energy*, in verse 20. He thinks the classic Hebrew must have spelt them with the rougher חַ, instead of ח. But it turns out that the softer forms in each case are derivable from appropriate Ayin-roots; and that the spelling appears with the ח in the earlier books of the Bible. So that the one is as much old classic Hebrew as the other! But how slender a basis would this matter of Aramaisms not be, on which to deny David's authorship, when we remember that Chaldea and Syria with their closely cognate dialects bounded his kingdom on the north and east, and had constant intercourse with it?

When the attack on the genuineness of the titles is made on grounds as flimsy and uncandid as these, the sound biblical scholar can well afford to rest in the old conclusion which accepts them as valid, along with the modern Keil and the great body of the older critics. The titles are now, and so far as we can decide, always were, a part of the Hebrew text. There is no valid canon of textual criticism authorizing their excision that would not equally expunge any verse from the body of the Psalms. Even the Septuagint, Mr. Smith's great authority, recognizes all the titles of David's Psalms, except a very few.

One other point remains to be briefly mentioned affecting the Psalms. This is Mr. Smith's attempt to bring the date of as many Psalms as possible down to a time subsequent to the cessation of Old Testament inspiration. The critic's motive is obvious. Malachi is believed to be the last of the inspired Old Testament prophets. If the Book of Psalms can be proved to contain pieces later than him, the point so dear to the skeptics is made out: that the Scriptures contain spurious materials.

But the grounds presented for this late date of some Psalms are as wretchedly flimsy as the aim is mischievous. One argument is, that the "musical titles are discontinued" (Lect. VII.) in the Psalms of the fourth and fifth "books." The proposed inference is, that the prevalence of the Greek art, after the Macedonian conquests, had caused the ancient Hebrew melodies to be so forgotten by the people that the old musical terms were useless and meaningless. Therefore many of these Psalms, after

Psalm xc., were written after the Macedonian era. But we object, *first*, the distribution of the Psalms into five "books" is imaginary; *secondly*, the musical titles are lacking in Psalms which are unquestionably David's, as in Ps. cviii. and cx. Hence their absence proves nothing as to date; *thirdly*, if Mr. Smith's surmise were worth anything whatever, it would be better satisfied by supposing that it was the Babylonian captivity, and the total interruption of temple-worship for seventy years, which made the old temple-tunes to be forgotten; not pagan Greek art, which never could have influenced Jews abhorring all pagan worship and speaking the Aramaic tongue. Hence, the argument, were it not wholly worthless, would only suggest a possibility that some of these Psalms were written after the captivity began. The other pretended argument is, that the "Pilgrimage-Psalms" ("Songs of Degrees") "are plainly, in part, later than the exile; for they speak of captivity and deliverance." Ps. cxxii. is later than Ezra and Nehemiah, for it speaks of "Jerusalem the rebuilt." Such is Mr. Smith's translation; but it is not that of other Hebraists fully as good as he. Again: Jerusalem might just as well have been spoken of as "rebuilt," after David's storm and sack of Jebus (2 Sam. v. 9), and his restoration and enlargement, as after Nehemiah's work; and the tone of pride and confidence the spectator is made to express in view of the royal city and bulwarks, suits far better to the prosperous city of David than to the poor, half-populated, scrambling town as restored by Nehemiah. As to the allusions to captivity and deliverance in the "Songs of Degrees," these contain nothing more than was applicable to previous disasters before the Babylonish captivity. The proof is, that Hosea vi. 11, and Joel iii. 1, both celebrate a similar joy; and both are indisputably prior to the great carrying away. When these Psalms are examined, they clearly describe national dangers which threatened, but did not destroy, the state and city; as the invasion of Sennacherib. Ps. cxxiv., "The Lord *hath not given us* as a prey to their teeth." Ps. cxxv., "The rod of the wicked *shall not rest upon* the lot of the righteous," etc. These Psalms point much more probably to the times from David to Hezekiah, and to the approaching dangers and deliverances of those reigns. *Lastly*, the utmost that could be inferred, granting the validity of the points made, would be, that sundry of these Psalms were composed by inspired men of

the era of Ezra, Haggai, Zachariah and Malachi. That any of them were written during or after the Maccabean era, there is not a particle of proof. So much for the attack on the divine authority of the Psalms.

3. But Mr. Smith's main and final effort, pursued through five lectures, is to prove the larger parts of the Pentateuch forgeries. The position he has adopted, from his infidel teachers, Graf, Wellhausen, *et al.*, is, that the Levitical details of sacrifice and ritual were never legislated until in or after the days of Ezekiel; that throughout all the ages from his day up to Samuel and the Judges, these laws, now written in the Pentateuch, were never observed, and had never been heard of; that especially was this true of the statute now found in Deut. xii. 11 to 14, enjoining the maintenance of only one altar of sacrifice, at only one place, and prohibiting all others; that the priestly caste at the end of the Babylonian captivity devised this restriction as a means to restrain the disastrous tendency of the people to idolatrous worship; and to give more authority to their device, inserted it in their new recensions of the Pentateuch, and claimed Mosaic authority for it; that Ezekiel's last chapters, xl., etc., gave the key-note for this new legislation, and indeed sufficient divine authority for it; whence he does not regard this ritual, after its late introduction, as lacking in inspired sanction, according to his low conception of inspiration. He thinks he knows just how much Moses actually legislated, viz.: Exod. xxi. to xxiii., inclusive, and Deut. i. to xi. Deut. xii. to xxxvi. forms a later code, ascribed indeed to Moses by the Jews, but in reality first enacted and published by some prophet, or prophets, of the times of Josiah. The largest code is what he calls the Levitical. It embraces Exod. xxiv. to end, and most of the legislative parts of Leviticus and Numbers. This code, with its multiplied and exact details, was utterly unknown until the days of Ezekiel and Ezra, and was introduced by the priests subsequent to the former, and probably upon the hints he gives in his picture of the new sanctuary (chaps. xl.-xlviii).

The pretended evidences for this division are numerous, embracing a multitude of points, all either frivolous or sophistical; of hardy assertions having no other ground than wild dogmatism; of ingenious wrestings of history; of exaggerations of facts; and of misinterpreted texts. The text most relied on is Jer. vii. 22,

23: "For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices. But this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God," etc. On the evidence of these verses Mr. Smith roundly asserts, again and again, that Jeremiah knew nothing of a Levitical code of sacrifices, and that none such existed in his day. Similar passages from Isaiah, Hosea, etc., are quoted, in which God rebukes the Jews for *insincere* offerings followed by impenitence; and all these are wrested to teach that the Levitical offerings had never yet been enjoined. Especially is the argument pressed that the Levitical code could not have had existence during all the ages from Joshua to Zedekiah, because the history in Samuel and Kings does not exhibit Israel as living up to that code. And to exaggerate this argument the history is in many cases falsified to make the contradictions between the code and the conduct more salient. But the chief plea of all is, that whereas the "second or Deuteronomic code," chap. xii. 3-14; expressly enjoined that there must be but one altar for the twelve tribes, to which every bloody sacrifice must be brought, at a single place of divine selection, the historic Israel down to Josiah always had many altars of sacrifice and high places, which even an orthodox Asa or Hezekiah did not abolish, and, worse yet, inspired prophets, as Samuel and Elijah, offered on them. See, *e. g.*, 1 Sam. xvi. 5; ix. 12, etc.; 1 Kings xviii. 32, etc.

It would be unmerciful to the reader, as unnecessary, to detain him for an exposure of the multitude of points sophistically made. A few of them will be mentioned and refuted, in order to sustain our assertion as to the uncandid spirit of the reasoning, and the worthlessness of the conclusion. This reprehensible temper is well instanced in the text cited from Jeremiah. The author, of course, knows perfectly well that the great current of learned expositors explain it as a rhetorical hyperbole. The prophet wishes to emphasize the truth that in Jehovah's eyes sincere heart religion is far more important than ritual; so much more essential that the precepts about the ritual are as nothing compared with the requirement of sincere obedience. He knows that all this class of passages receives the same obvious explanation. But all this he disdains either to mention, or look at, or reply to. For all he tells his readers, they would remain ignorant that anybody

attempted to explain the passages thus. Yet this explanation is clear and satisfactory, and these very prophets themselves shut us up to it by other clear declarations, which Mr. Smith takes especial pains not to mention. Says Lange, on Jer. vii. 22: "But to find in this passage a proof that Jeremiah was ignorant of any legal enactment with respect to sacrifices at the time of the exodus, as Graf does, following Hitzig and others, is a proceeding *for which there is no ground*, either in the historical books or in the writings of the pre-exilic prophets generally." (See Amos iv. 5, compared with Levit. vii. 13; Hos. iv. 10, with Levit. xxvi. 26; Amos v. 25; compare Hosea vi. 6; 1 Sam. xv. 22; Ps. li. 16.) These passages make unquestionable allusions to the Levitical code which Mr. Smith would have non-extant when these prophets wrote. "So also," adds Lange, "in this passage the negation has a rhetorical, not a logical significance." So, in substance, Gill and Calvin. One fact is fatal to Mr. Smith's exposition of Jeremiah. The exodus from Egypt was indisputably attended by the divine appointment of the Pass-over. But the *paschal lamb was a sacrifice*. Mr. Smith's version as to this is puerile and uncandid. It is therefore impossible that Jeremiah could have meant that the exodus was literally unattended by any ordinance of sacrifice. But let the reader consult the following places in the pre-exilic prophets, and especially in Jeremiah himself, and he will feel how amazing is the audacity which can assert (as Lecture X.) that these prophets "say Jehovah has not enjoined sacrifice;" and "it is simple matter of fact that the prophets do not refer to a written Torah as the basis of their teaching," . . . and "absolutely deny the existence of a binding ritual law": Jer. ii. 8; vi. 19, 20; xvii. 26; xviii. 15; xix. 4; xxxiii. 11, 18; Isaiah viii. 20; xxxiv. 16; xliii. 22, 23; lvi. 3, 7; lxvi. 3; Ps. xix. 8; xxvi. 6; xliii. 4; l. 8; li. 19; lxvi. 13; Hosea viii. 12; ix. 4; Ezek. xx. 28; 2 Kings xxii. 8, etc.

The coolness with which the book of Joshua is excluded from witnessing to these facts is as refreshing as our author's hardihood of assertion is astounding. Lecture VIII. says: "I exclude the book of Joshua because it in all its parts hangs closely together with the Pentateuch." The logic of this exclusion is the following: We assume without proof that A is a false witness. Then, since B agrees with him, he must be a false witness. And hence, again, since A agrees with B, he must be a false wit-

ness. A pretty circle, truly! But the real reason why Joshua is not permitted to testify will appear in the following fatal passages: chap. xviii. 1: "And the whole congregation of the children of Israel assembled at Shiloh, and set up the tabernacle of the congregation there;" thus explicitly carrying out the law of Deuteronomy xii., which Mr. Smith says, was never heard of until Josiah's days. Chap. xx. 2: "Appoint out for you cities of refuge, whereof I spake unto you by the hand of Moses." Deut. xix. 3. But this part of Deuteronomy, says Mr. Smith, was never published until Josiah's day! Chap. xxi. 2, the Levites at Shiloh say: "The Lord commanded by the hand of Moses" (see Num. xxxv. 2) "to give us cities to dwell in, with the suburbs," etc. But the most significant place of all is the twenty-second chapter. The two-and-a-half tribes, whose cantons were east of Jordan, in returning to their homes after the war of conquest, build an altar at the river. They meant it not for an altar of sacrifice, but of witness, designed merely to attest their and their children's rights in the national altar at Shiloh. But the remaining Hebrews, supposing that these are preparing to break the law of Deuteronomy xii. against a plurality of altars of sacrifice, are so determined to enforce that Mosaic statute that they prepare for war against their own brethren. Yet Mr. Smith says no such statute existed until Josiah! See verses 10, 16, 22-29. The high priest decides, verses 32, 33, that such an altar of witness is no breach of that statute. Now, the genuineness of this book is indisputable for every sound critic. Not only does every *codex* and every version, including Mr. Smith's special favorite, the Septuagint, sustain its integrity, but the internal evidences of it are peculiarly clear. The lines of the cantons, and the references to topography alone, when tested by the subsequent Hebrew history and by modern explorations, prove the perfect accuracy of Joshua.

So, in the book of Judges, while we have frequent relapses from the laws, and while we see the roots of all the subsequent abuses planted, yet the worship at Shiloh goes on with an approximate regularity in the better days, which constitutes a constant reference to the existence of the whole Levitical law.

Before proceeding to the remaining arguments let us notice, as specimens of the bad faith with which the criticism is conducted, some of the attempts to exaggerate differences, and to

make imaginary ones between the historical Hebrew usage and the Levitical law. Mr. Smith says (Lecture VIII.) that the statute about the daily sacrifice found, for one place, in Numbers xxviii. 3-5, is of later date than the return from Babylon. His proof is, that whereas that statute required two lambs, one for the evening as well as one for the morning, the usage was only to present a "meat-offering" in the evening, without any living victim, because in several places, as 1 Kings xviii. 36, it is called the קֹרְבָן. But this noun, while we admit that it came frequently to mean the unbloody "meat-offering," is also the generic name for any offering, as its root signifies. It may mean a living offering. Thus say the best lexicons. Buxtorf defines it as meaning generically a sacrifice, specifically an oblation. Gesenius says it means, 1, A gift (its etymologic primary sense); 2, Tribute; 3, An offering to God, a sacrifice, spoken especially of one unbloody. Fürst renders it, *Donum, munus, sacrificium, προσφορά φυσία*. In Gen. iv. 4, it is used especially for a bloody offering: The Lord had respect unto Abel and his קֹרְבָנוֹ. Thus the argument is exploded.

Mr. Smith says (Lecture VIII.), that the Levitical ritual always represents itself as "the necessary forms *in which alone* the inner side of religion, love to God and man, can find acceptable expression." Again: "Accordingly, sacrifice, atonement, and forgiveness of sin, are absolutely dependent on the hierarchy and its service." "Its aim is to *provide everything* that man requires to live acceptably with God," etc. The argument he suggests is: that as we see in the history of the Hebrews a good deal of religion which was not hierarchical, this proves the Levitical code was invented after the exile. But his assertion is simply false. Israel had its moral, sabbatical, domestic, and social worship, inherited from of old, which quietly held its way alongside of the sacrificial worship of the tabernacle. This was so exactly provided for at the one chosen place as the standing type of Christ's expiation. That the moral worship should go on in every town and family, as it always had done, is taken for granted as a matter of course. The main object of the Levitical code is to provide for the typical observances, which were largely new. Hence, had the Levitical books said not one word about the general moral worship, Mr. Smith's assertions would remain groundless. But those books expressly contradict him. In Deut. vi. 7, etc.,

the daily duty of religious instruction in the family is enjoined. The Hebrew's religion was connected with every event of his daily life (verses 9 and 13). So in chap. xi. 18, 19. No priest intervenes here. Israel is repeatedly urged to love and serve his God in the heart, and not in the form only, and to regulate his daily life by this principle of piety. (Lev. xix. 18; Deut. xiii. 4; xxx. 16.) Solomon, in the very act of reëstablishing this ritual in his temple, in his dedicatory prayer again and again refutes Mr. Smith's assertion, by expressly praying that God would open communion between himself and his believing people, not only through the priest and at the altar, but without any priest and away from the altar, in their homes, in foreign lands, in captivity, in drought, in pestilence and in the sick-room, in the battlefield, on the journey. Even the foreigner turning to God is to enjoy like communion. This daily access to God from every heart and from every place is grounded on God's omnipresence, which no temple can limit. See 1 Kings viii. 27-52. The Psalms, which describe the very same state of religion depicted in the Levitical code, represent the godly man as meditating in God's law day and night; as praying to God when far away from priest and temple; as performing his individual devotions thrice or seven times daily. Psalm i. 2; iv. 4; v. 3; xxxiv. 1; liv. 1; lvi. 1; lvii. 1; lv. 17; cxix. 164. See also Zech. xii. 12. Thus do the Scriptures themselves utterly deny that view of the Levitical religion which is reasserted through pages of this Lecture VIII. with a wearisome monotony of false assertion.

In the same Lecture it is roundly asserted that the Levitical code, Lev. xvii., makes it "a perpetual statute that no animal can be slain for food unless it be presented as a peace-offering before the central sanctuary and its blood sprinkled on the altar." Again, he makes Hosea teach that "all animal food not presented at the altar is unclean." His object, of course, is to argue hence that, in so large a country as Palestine, containing so many people, many altars must have been made essential by this law; and that hence the restriction to one altar could not have been enacted or known. The least examination of Lev. xvii. 3-6, shows that to call this a "perpetual statute" is false. It had only a temporary force so long as the people were gathered conveniently around the tabernacle in one encampment. The thing which was made a perpetual statute was, that when flesh was

eaten the blood must not be eaten with it, but must be poured out and covered with dust. Even while the encampment continued, the Hebrews were allowed to dispose thus of the blood of the clean beast taken in hunting (vs. 13) without bringing it to the altar. And in Deut. xii. 15, 16, in immediate connection with the absolute restriction of *all sacrifice* to one altar, express permission is given to butcher any clean animal for food anywhere at any man's home, provided only the blood is not eaten. This shows that the restriction of Lev. xvii. was meant to be temporary, and was now removed, in view of the approaching separation of the people to their homes in Palestine.

It is argued that in the days of Eli and Samuel the supposed law for keeping the ark in a holy *tabernacle* was not observed, (and therefore had not been yet heard of,) because (1 Sam. iii. 15) the sanctuary at Shiloh *had doors to it*, and therefore must have been a timber or stone house, and not a tent. This beautiful point is unluckily ruined by observing that the word *דלתות* suggests by its very etymology a curtain-door, for it means, says Gesenius, something "hanging and swinging," and that in David's time (2 Sam. vii. 2) the ark of God still "dwelt within curtains."

Mr. Smith argues that the Levitical code was not observed by good Eli, and therefore had never been heard of as yet, because he let the child Samuel, who was not of the Aaronic family, sleep in the holy of holies, a place which the high priest himself only entered once a year, according to that code, and then "not without blood." The shocking dishonesty of this statement is exposed when we note that all the passage says is, that Samuel lay down to sleep in the *ה'יכל*. This word, says Gesenius, "*never stands for the holy of holies.*"

Mr. Smith says that both David and Solomon "officiated in person" before the altar, the latter frequently. Hence he would infer that the Levitical code restricting this privilege exclusively to the sons of Aaron had never yet been legislated. But his only proof that David and Solomon ever intruded into the priest's office is the places where it is said that they "offered" so many or such sacrifices. The same sort of argument would prove that David built with his own hands all his palace and bulwarks at Jerusalem, and that the temple was all erected by Solomon's personal labor. Who does not see that, as they builded by the

hands of the professional mechanics, so they sacrificed through the agency of the appointed priests? Let the reader compare 2 Chron. xxvi. 16-18.

He asserts that the Jewish kings habitually carried their pagan body-guards with them into the sanctuary, which shows that the Levitical code forbidding all but Hebrews to enter even its court had not yet been enacted. He finds these pagan retainers in the Cherethites and Pelethites of David, and the "guards," **כָּרִי** of Jehoiada's day, who guarded the child-king, Jehoash, in the temple. These, he is certain, were Cretans, Philistines, and Carians! Now, in the first place, if the orthodox kings had any such retainers of pagan blood, we may be very sure they had become Jews by proselytism and circumcision, as the history shows so many of David's had, before they ever entered the sanctuary. But, in the second place, Mr. Smith ought to know that the best Hebraists regard the terms, not as names of nationality at all, but as names of calling. The Cherethites were armed guards and executioners, so called from **כָּרַת**—to cut. The Pelethites were couriers, from a root signifying to run swiftly. The **כָּרִי** of Jehoiada were executioners, "cutters," and were unquestionably the armed Levites mentioned in 2 Chron. xxiii. 2, 7. How preposterous the dream that Jehoiada, hitherto a purely religious officer, holding his place by sufferance under the pagan Athaliah, in the little dwarfed inland kingdom of Judea, either could or would get pagan Cretans and Carians into his temple guard! Such dreams are the chief staples of our critic's arguments. But the reader will cry, *Ohe! jam satis*; the recital of these points has become wearisome. Let these, then, and their exposure suffice as specimens of the multitude of such quibbles, industriously heaped together to travesty the actual state of the Hebrew religion under the orthodox judges and kings.

But while we object to these unjust exaggerations of the departures of Israel from the Levitical code, we expressly admit that there were, during a large part of his chequered history, wide departures. Rarely, after Joshua, did even the best judges and kings return exactly to the perfect pattern of the law. Let us see now how far we should, in candor, carry this admission. *First*, The history of the "altar of Ed," under Joshua's rule, while it perfectly demonstrates the existence and currency at that day of the very law of a single altar of sacrifice, which Mr. Smith

so strives to date after the exile, also proves that memorial structures simply, in the form of altar or pillar, for the exclusive purpose of witness, were not against that statute. The prohibitions of them were designed to prevent their building under circumstances which tended to corrupt worship and idolatry. *Secondly*, It is expressly admitted that other *altars for sacrifice* were from time to time erected and used by inspired prophets, besides the one at the sanctuary. Samuel sacrificed once and again at Ramah, and at Bethlehem once. David, while the sanctuary and altar were still at Gibeon, sacrificed on the threshing-floor of Ornan once, and statedly on an altar before the temporary tent on Mt. Zion, where he had ensconced the recovered ark. Elijah built an altar and sacrificed on Mt. Carmel, in 1 Kings xviii., and there can be no question of God's allowance of this act at least, for he sanctioned it by miracle. On this class of facts Mr. Smith glories over us exceedingly. He would conclude from them that the statute of the single altar could not have been in existence in all these ages, because here it is not a fickle backsliding populace that breaks it, but apparently inspired men directed by God.

The obvious reply is, that Mr. Smith wholly misconceives the statute. It must be construed in the spirit of its design. This design was to secure accuracy of typical teaching and purity of worship, by keeping the sacrificial ritual under the immediate eye and control of the responsible officers. The only ground for not having a plurality of altars of sacrifice was that it would open the door for religious schism, for departures from the authorized ritual, and for will-worship, and thus ultimately for idolatry. Where the church was sufficiently guarded against such abuse by the presence of an infallible, because inspired, officer, these grounds ceased to exist. Hence, it is obvious that the force of the statutes was to inhibit the erection and use of a second altar *by mere human authority*. God never designed to intimate that he, by this command, inhibited himself from giving his people several altars. *He* might and would do it on suitable occasion; *they* must never presume to do so. When Joshua and Phinehas supposed the eastern tribes had raised an altar for sacrifice on their own motion, they correctly adjudged it a breach of the well known statute. On learning that it was only a memorial monument, these orthodox rulers approved it as entirely

consistent with the law. When Micah (Judges xvii. 18) set up a local worship, and the corrupted Danites removed it to Laish, and all by mere human authority; when Jeroboam set up altars of separation at Bethel and Dan for a mere political motive, these were breaches of the statute, and they were clearly denounced as such by the inspired teachers. So was the erection of every "high place," if made by human authority. But when Samuel, David, or Elijah, acting by inspired warrant, reared an altar for sacrifice, the explanation is, that they were as truly prophets as Moses. Their act was as much God's act as the passing of Moses' statute was. How thoroughly thoughtless is this criticism which mistakes a rule God *imposed on his creatures* as though he had thereby forever tied his own hands! It is to be noted also, that at each season when this additional altar of sacrifice was authorized by God, there was a special reason for its utility, and even necessity. In all Samuel's day the arrangements at Shiloh were disorganized by the loss of the ark and its stay at Kirjath-jearim. Many districts were also in Philistine hands, and many Israelites could not safely make journeys to Shiloh across those districts occupied by the enemy. When David made the additional altar, the ark was still out of place, Shiloh was in ruins, the tabernacle and brazen altar were at Gibeon; and the project to which David was, by divine direction, bending his energies, was the transfer of all to Jerusalem, and their rearrangement there under strict Levitical law, which Solomon completed. David's day was one of transition. Once more: when Elijah built his altar on Carmel for a special purpose, Jerusalem was practically inaccessible to most of Ahab's subjects. Hence, rather than let pious people worship at the unlawful altars of Jeroboam, God authorized Elijah, and perhaps several other inspired men, to rear an altar for temporary use, under safe, orthodox, and inspired regulations, at another point than Jerusalem.

But again, we admit that during most of the ages between Joshua and Ezra there was a large difference between the Levitical code and the usages actually prevailing in Israel. Mr. Smith urges that the difference is so wide as to imply that the stricter points of that code must have been all unknown during all these ages, and must have been introduced into the Pentateuch after the captivity. This inference we deny. Our grounds of denial

are the following: *First*, The history itself recognizes this departure from the code in all its breadth and excess. The inspired writers of Israel also predict it and its calamitous consequences. (See Deut. xxviii.) Joshua, even in the act of calling Israel to strict observance of the code, tells them that he knows they will violate it. (Chap. xxiv. 19.) In chapter xxiv. 31, the era of observance is expressly limited to the life of Joshua and his contemporaries. (See also Judges ii. 7, 10.) So, chapter ii. 11-19 gives us, as a prevalent picture of the state of Israel from age to age, this alternation: a wide apostasy from the Mosaic code, uniformly followed by the threatened calamities, and the pity of God excited by their sufferings, raising up some reformer; then a deliverance through the efforts of this reformer, with a partial, but only a partial (chap. v. 17), return to conformity, and another speedy relapse into almost total departure, with another catastrophe. Such is the actual picture of the sinful cycle around which Israel moved during the whole prophetic era. Whereas Mr. Smith thinks it incredible that the actual historical departures from a known Levitical code could have been so wide, the history itself tells us that the departure was just such, always partial at the best epochs, usually great and lamentable. And such is the account of the history given by the prophets near or at its close, that Israel *had been* capable of disregarding *all the points* of the code given them at the beginning. (See Ps. xiv. 3; 2 Chron. xxxvi. 16; Jer. v. 5; Ezek. xx. 13; Amos ii. 4; Nehemiah ix. 29; 2 Kings xvii. 8, 16.) "And they *left ALL the commandments* of the Lord their God," etc.

Secondly, It is not at all incredible that a church should possess a revealed code from its foundation and yet live in habitual violation of its plainest rules, because we see precisely the same thing before our eyes in the case of the papacy. This body has had both Old and New Testaments from the beginning, and yet has been for hundreds of years living in most flagrant violation of their plainest precepts. The papist's professed rule of faith, the Bible, expressly forbids the worship of any but God; Rome worships God, men, women, angels, bones, pictures, statues, and a piece of bread. The Bible forbids persecution; Rome persecuted every dissentient, no matter how holy. The Bible knows no priest but Christ in the new dispensation; Rome is full of human priests. The Bible says none can forgive sin but God

only; the Romish priest undertakes every week to forgive sins. The Bible says marriage is honorable in all; Rome forbids her priests to marry. With this picture before our eyes, it is but silly to say that it is incredible the Hebrew church could have departed so widely from a known Levitical code. And especially is the parallel instructive, because in both cases the departures have been occasioned by the intrusion of the same human theories into the church, that of "tradition" and that of ritual righteousness. It was these errors, working, of course, upon and with human depravity, which made Israel's revolt against a revealed code he professed to hold, a possible thing. It is the same in Rome. Hence, were all Mr. Smith's claims of fact granted, his laborious conclusion from the discrepancies of the code and the practice would be worthless. It is contradicted by what we see every day.

Thirdly, While Mr. Smith supposes that this Levitical code was first introduced after the captivity by Ezekiel and the prophets succeeding him, the fact is, that these prophets themselves refer to the code in many particulars as already binding. Jeremiah, a little before the captivity (chap. xxxiv. 8), while citing the law of release for Hebrew servants, first given in Ex. xxi. 2, also makes an unmistakable reference to Lev. xxv. 10, 39-46, borrowing its very words. In Nehemiah v. 1-12, there is an unquestionable reference to the release of debtors and lands, enacted in Lev. xxv. 9-13. But, according to Mr. Smith, this part of the Pentateuch was not written until after the captivity! Both 2 Kings xv. 5, and 2 Chron. xxvi. 20, 21, in relating Uzziah's leprosy, make obvious reference to the law of leprosy in Lev. xiii. 46 and in Num. v. 2. But these books, Mr. Smith says, are, except their thread of history, not a part of Moses' Pentateuch. The same history (chap. v. 18) makes equally obvious reference to the law forbidding any but a son of Aaron to offer incense, contained in Ex. xxx. 7, 8, and Num. xvi. 40, and xviii. 7. But these also, Mr. Smith thinks, did not belong to the law at that date. Nehemiah ix. 14 speaks of detailed "precepts, statutes, and laws," given from God by the hand of Moses, in terms plainly allusive to the Levitical particulars. Joshua, as the very first thing he did on his return from the captivity, resumed the offering of the "daily burnt-offerings by number, and the new moon continual burnt-offering, and of all the set feasts,

according to the custom." These details are all contained in the Levitical code, and that code is here obviously referred to as having ordained them long before, not as now first invented.

The very places in the historical books which teach Mr. Smith that the law of a single place of sacrifice was so habitually broken, also imply that it was in existence and known. For example, 1 Kings xii. 29 to end, tells us how Jeroboam extended this unlawful usage; but it also plainly implies that the law of a single altar, and the law against worshipping Jehovah through images, and the law confining priestly functions to the sons of Aaron, and the law fixing the annual atonement on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, were all enacted, and known before Jeroboam. So of Rehoboam's sins (1 Kings xiv. 23). So, in recording that Asa (1 Kings xv. 14), Jehoash (2 Kings xii. 3), Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 3, 4), while in the main reformers, left the altars still in use, the historian clearly intimates that in doing so they came short of the existing law. They did right: "but not as David their father did." With Hezekiah it was otherwise (2 Kings xviii. 3, 4). Mr. Smith does not dispute but that good Josiah made an end of all "high places." Well, the narrative of his reform not only plainly implies that the recovered "book of the law," which guided him in doing so, was the Pentateuch itself; but every word and act of Josiah shows that he considered the abuses he removed as every one violations of old law, which Israel was bound to know. He apprehended great wrath for its neglect. Did he suppose that God would punish Judah so fearfully *for not keeping a law before it was enacted?* Mr. Smith's hypothesis as to Ezra's first introduction of the Levitical code is most unlucky. In his history (chapter ii. 63, and iii. 1 to 6), we find Joshua and Zerubbabel enforcing all the distinctive ritual of that code. Does the reader note how long this was before the appearance of Ezra as a teacher in Judea? According to Prie-daux's chronology, which scholars now follow usually, about ninety years!

But especially is Ezekiel's testimony unfortunate for Mr. Smith. His theory is that the ritualistic descriptions of Ezek. xl. to end gave the first impulse to the introduction of this Levitical code. But the prophecies of Ezekiel teem with references or allusions to that very code as preëxistent and old. The emblematic temple which he describes in his last chapters certainly was not a

model for the second temple or its ritual. It had the Shekinah, which the second temple never claimed. The land-allotments to the priests do not correspond to actual usage. There was nothing to correspond to the river of life, which Ezekiel describes as flowing from his east gate. In his vision the "whole limit" of the top of the mountain is "most holy." In the second temple the court of the Gentiles was admitted within that circuit. Worse yet, this very vision refers unmistakably to the "law" and a "covenant," as preëxisting, which Mr. Smith would have first to be suggested by it. We read in chapter xliii. 8, "shall no more defile" the house. This implies that they had defiled it before, which they could not have done had there been no ceremonial law. So chapter xliv. 7 speaks of a ceremonial covenant as already broken, but to be now renewed.

The most marvellous thing about Mr. Smith's critical conclusion is, that this foisting in of the Levitical code into the Pentateuch, nearly a thousand years after it claimed to be written, does not seem to him at all to impair its divine authority. He thinks that such a pious fraud is, for all practical purposes, just as good scripture as though it had been all written by inspired Moses. "That the law was a divine institution, that it formed an actual part in the gracious scheme of guidance which preserved the religion of Jehovah as a living power in Israel until shadow became substance in the manifestation of Christ, is no theory, but an historical fact, which no criticism as to the origin of the books of Moses can in the least degree invalidate." "If it could be proved that Moses wrote the law, what would that add to the proof that its origin is from God?" (Lecture XI.) The answer patent to the plain mind is, this is what would be added: a source for the Levitical code in Moses' inspiration, instead of in a literary forgery perpetrated a thousand years after Moses by unknown authors. One fact Mr. Smith either conceals or else in one place feebly evades, that as the Levitical code now stands in the parts of the Pentateuch which Mr. Smith dates after the captivity, *the text claims Moses' authorship for it all.* All through the suspected passages, from Exod. xxiv. to the end of Numbers, and from Deut. xii. onward, the matter is continually ascribed to Moses at the introduction of each new section or topic. "And he said unto Moses." "And Moses wrote all the words of the Lord." "And the Lord spake unto Moses,

saying, And thou shalt make," etc. These introductions, and such like ones, containing a distinct assertion of Moses' authorship or utterance of the code, recur not less than *one hundred and thirty-five times*, interspersed all through the matter which he says Moses did not write! Mr. Smith suspects many parts of the Pentateuch, because Moses speaks of himself in them in the third person. Well, in Deut. xii., etc., and a number of subsequent chapters, Moses speaks continually in the first person. But this does not please him any better; he rejects these chapters also!

Now the "higher criticism" may be able to believe that men who forged the name of one who had been dead a thousand years, one hundred and thirty-five times in seventy-six chapters, and then usurped his personality all through some twenty more chapters, were not only honest and truthful, but inspired of God. But Mr. Smith may be assured that all men of common sense will obstinately demur. To teach them that these chapters were written after the captivity is to convince them that they are spurious. There will be no help for it. And they will also conclude that this profession of respect for such impudent forgeries as of divine authority still, is a very thin mask. Such criticism cannot save itself from infidelity.

Our last objection is against the manner in which the book discounts the testimony of our Saviour and his apostles to the validity of the Old Testament canon, and of the passages impugned. The critic claims to be a thoroughly reverent Christian; but he virtually arrays himself against Christ's veracity, and he leaves his readers in ignorance of this irreverent and fatal feature of his reasonings. Let the reader, then, notice the following, in which the New Testament not only refers to this Levitical code as appointed of God, but *names Moses* as the inspired legislator of it. In Matt. viii. 4, Christ says to the healed leper, "Offer the gift that *Moses* commanded." This is in Levit. xiv. 3, etc., a part of the Pentateuch which Mr. Smith refers to Ezra's day or later! In Matt. xix. 7, "Why did *MOSES* then command to give a writing of divorcement?" This law is in Deut. xxiv. 1, one of the passages Mr. Smith says was never known until Josiah's day. So in Mark x. 3, "What did *MOSES* command you?" (on this same subject). In Matt. xxiii. 2, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in *MOSES'* seat. *All therefore* whatsoever they bid you, that observe and do."

This plainly implies that all the observances for which they quoted Scripture were quoted from Moses. In Mark xii. 19, "*Moses wrote*" (the law of Levirate marriage). This is in Deut xxv. 5 again. So says Luke xx. 28. Luke xvi. 29, "They have *Moses* and the prophets," etc. In John i. 17, "The law was given by *Moses*." In John iii. 14, "*Moses* lifted up the serpent in the wilderness." (Num. xxi. 9.) In John vii. 14, "Did not *Moses* give you the law?" Now, according to Mr. Smith's own theory, the "law" which the scribes of that day ascribed to Moses certainly included the whole Levitical code. In Acts iii. 22, "*Moses* truly said unto the fathers, a prophet like unto me," etc. This is said in Deut. xviii. 15. So in Acts vii. 37, and Rom. x. 5, "*Moses* describeth the righteousness of the law." (See Levit. viii. 5.) In 2 Cor. iii. 15, "When *Moses* is read," meaning unquestionably when the Pentateuch, as we now have it, is read. In Heb. ix. 19, "When *Moses* had spoken *every* precept." This was in Exod. xxiv. 5, at the earliest, if not in Levit. xiv. Mr. Smith thinks Moses spoke very few Levitical precepts. Now, in view of these inspired assertions, can it be that all these men, when they called the Levitical law "*Moses'* law," only meant that it was a law which for four hundred years had gone by Moses' name, though really invented a thousand years after him? Again, Paul says expressly (Gal. iii. 17) that "the law," meaning unquestionably this Levitical code, was added "four hundred and thirty years after" Abraham. Mr. Smith thinks the larger part was added fourteen hundred years after Abraham. And Luke ii. 23, 24, refers to the law of the first-born male and the mother's cleansing as the "law of the Lord," but a part of it is found in Exod. xxxiv. 19, and Num. iii. 13.

The intelligent reader of the Epistle to the Hebrews will especially remember how fatal its testimony is as to Mr. Smith's theory. The inspired author is beyond doubt (see chapter ix. 1-7) describing a tabernacle made at the time of the covenant of the Exodus. In this he places (chapters viii. and ix.) nearly every feature of what Mr. Smith calls the Ezdrine ritual. And then he ascribes the whole to Moses (chapter ix. 19-22) with an unmistakable reference to Exod. xxiv. 5. If the Epistle to the Hebrews is inspired, Mr. Smith must be wrong.

No better place than this offers to direct the reader's attention also to the theological tendencies of his criticism. He says that

before the exile the prophets enjoined on Israel *no sacrificial ritual*; that their teachings constantly depreciate the value of such a ritual, and point the people, as Micah vi. 8, to acts of justice and mercy, as what God requires of believers. But he admits that, after the exile, a sacrificial ritual was enjoined by divine authority. But the old dispensation was typical of the new, and foreshadowed the way of salvation. God, therefore, has taught *two opposite ways of salvation*. First, for a thousand years the Socinian theology, which discards the necessity of expiation; and then, from Ezra's day to ours, the Calvinistic theology. Is the Christian reader ready for this conclusion?

Another class of attestations is found in the mode of the citation of the Old Testament as "the Scriptures," ἡ γραφή, or αἱ γραφαί, the "oracles of God," the "sacred Scriptures," "the law and the prophets," and in one case (Luke xxiv. 44) "the law of Moses, the prophets and the psalms." Now the force of this attestation is contained in these facts: *First*, These "Scriptures" are usually quoted by Christ and his apostles as authentic and infallible, as a standard of unquestionable appeal, as given from the Spirit of God. *Secondly*, The text and canon referred to were certainly those we now have, as is proved by particular citations from nearly every book, and by the testimony of the Septuagint, from which the quotations are usually made, not to say by the Hebrew *codices* extant, and represented in our copies. Hence, *thirdly*, the words "scripture" and "law, prophets, psalms," were certainly used by our Saviour and his apostles as distinctive of that canon of the inspired Old Testament which we now have. This conclusion is resisted, indeed, and the attempt is made to persuade us that our Saviour did not mean to state the threefold division of the Old Testament in the sense of the customary Jewish division, and that the word γραφαί may mean, not only the inspired, but any other religious writings of the ante-Christian times current among the Jews, as for instance, the *apocrypha*. We have seen the disingenuous attempt to rob us of Josephus' witness, and that of the Targum of Onkelos as to what a Jew of the Christian era meant by "law of Moses." That attempt is futile. It is unquestionable that in Christ's day the terms *law, prophets, psalms*, had a perfectly definite meaning as the three grand divisions of our present Hebrew canon. Hence, it is the plainest rule of hermeneutics that he shall be held to

use the terms in their recognized sense, inasmuch as he gives us no *caveat* against it. Josephus, in his testimony, shows clearly that a broad separating line existed in every Hebrew mind between the books of the canon, and all others, however pious and popular.

That neither Christ nor the Jews of his day ever confounded these inspired books with any *midrash* or *halacha* appears again thus: in every place where authority is claimed for a rabbinical law, its inferiority to the inspired law is admitted on both sides. See, for instance, Matt. xv. 2, 9. The scribes do not dare to call their rule of handwashing more than a "tradition of the elders," even when they claim obedience to it. Christ contrasts it with *God's δόγματα*, as a "commandment of men." So Mark vii. 3, 8, 9.

Lastly, The words "scripture," "scriptures," and "sacred writings," are together used fifty-two times in the New Testament, and in every case the context makes it plain that the meaning attached is that which we give them—inspired writings. "The scripture cannot be broken." "The scripture must be fulfilled." "No scripture is of private interpretation, but holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." "All scripture is given by inspiration of God." "What saith the scripture?" (evidently appealing to it as an infallible arbiter). Such is the tone of this New Testament usage. Since the intensest Rabbinist did not dare to claim that his "tradition" was "scripture," and since Christ so clearly distinguishes them, it is beyond debate that the words designated only the inspired canon. But since the very parts of Leviticus and Numbers which Mr. Smith suspects are quoted as "law of the Lord," as "scripture," as "God's teaching by Moses," his suspicions are contradicted by Christ and his apostles.

In concluding this review, we can add very little as a summing up. We can safely appeal to the attentive reader to decide whether our exceptions to Mr. Smith's conclusions are not decisive. We can equally leave it to him to decide, after the exposure of his uncandid methods, whether our disapprobation of his work, though plainly expressed, is not just and deserved. Our word of condemnation was not too hard, and the safety of the church and the truth requires from faithful defenders no less. Finally, while we do not presume to question the personal sin-

cerity of Mr. Smith's protestations of his own confidence in the substance of the Bible as containing a divine religion, we warn him that few who adopt his principles of criticism will think that they can consistently stop where he stops. The Germans whom he follows do not think so. Their first principle is, that the supernatural is incredible. The very aim of their policy in adopting a method so rash is, to be able thereby to eliminate this supernatural out of the Scriptures. And such will be the tendency wherever such methods are used. The result towards which they incline is virtual infidelity.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ON THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.¹

IN the great Protestant Universities of Germany are to be found wonderful advantages for learned research, a mighty spirit of research, and many and great merits. The Germans, compared with the Hollanders, the British, and even the French, are a poor nation, and both munificent salaries and large incomes are rare among them ; so that the endowments and emoluments of their professorships are munificent when viewed in relation to the habits of the people, although very moderate when measured by a British standard. The organization of their universities is wise and liberal, the professorships amazingly numerous, and the division of labor accordingly minute. This partition of branches of instruction, with the cheapness of living and of books, and the scale of the libraries, enables scholars to pursue the different departments of literature to their extreme ramifications with a nicety unknown in any other country. Hence, in German universities are found men devoting their whole lives to examining and teaching departments which, in other countries, are either not touched or treated as a brief appendage to some other branch. Studious effort is, moreover, honored, and literary success valued by the whole people and the governments. The appointing power is, no doubt, usually employed with great impartiality and wisdom to elevate men of real diligence and learning to distinguished chairs.

The genius of the German Protestant people also contributes in a splendid way to the fruitfulness of this vast literary husbandry. Intensely devoted to freedom of speculative thought, thorough, laborious, patient in temperament, they are perhaps the more independent and adventurous in literary inquiry because they have been allowed so little liberty of political action. This part of Germany is still the *Protestant* nation, proud of the

¹ From *The Southern Presbyterian Review* of April, 1881.

right of free inquiry, and zealous to exercise it everywhere they are allowed. In no country of Christendom is the higher education so prominent and so honored, and nowhere is the *trade of scholarship* so completely organized or so persistently plied.

Hence it would be both incorrect and ungrateful to deny the indebtedness of the civilized world to German scholarship. In no department of human learning have the Germans been laggards; in some they have laid scholars under peculiar obligations. In philology, the editing of the classics and the patristic writings, the illustration of the Scripture text, the compilation of accurate lexicons and critical grammars of all the tongues which are taught in civilized countries, they have long taken the lead. And they are now coming to the forefront in the more realistic sciences of law, medicine, chemistry, which men used to consider as the prerogative of the more practical Briton and Gaul.

But in no department have the Germans attracted so much attention as in theology. Men speak of "German theology," sometimes with fear, sometimes with admiration, but often as though it were something single and unique, and separated from all other schools of theology by uniform traits. Whereas there are as many German theologies, at least, as there are British or American, differing as widely from each other in merit and in opinions. There is, indeed, so much of a pretext for speaking of "German theology" as a single system by itself, that the most of the writers of that nation, of all the various schools, have a few common traits. One of these is the use of a peculiar philosophic nomenclature, made prevalent among them by the long ascendancy of one or another phase of idealism. Another may be said to be a certain boldness of criticism in dealing with inspired declarations, which, to the orthodox apprehension of the reformed, savors of a degree of license. But German theology is yet as many-sided as that of Britain or America, and there are as wide differences between the good and the bad. Of some of their expositors and dogmatic theologians it is hard to utter praise too high.

But in settling the weight to be attached by English-speaking Christians to the theological emissions of the German press there are some very plain facts which must be considered.

1. In German Protestantism, Lutheranism is now virtually

dominant. One sufficient cause of this result is the ascendancy of Prussia and her persistent policy of unifying her state church. The University of Marburg, a small one, is now the only distinctively Reformed or Presbyterian institution left in Germany. It is not asserted that all Reformed divines are excluded from all the rest. But the general rule is, that the Lutherans are preferred, and are in the ascendant. Now, as students well know, Lutheran theology is no longer that of Martin Luther, as to the distinctive points of Calvinism. On these doctrines the most evangelical and orthodox teaching one hears in Germany is as hostile and as condemnatory as that we are wont to hear at home from Wesleyans and Arminians. But this fact is almost trivial when compared with another, viz., that the present Lutheranism, when not rationalistic, is sacramentarian. The most devout, the staunchest assertors of inspiration, like Luthardt of Leipzig, teach a phase of baptismal regeneration, and the real, corporeal presence in the supper. The fruits of this teaching there, as everywhere else, are evil.

2. The Protestant churches of Germany are state establishments, and such are their universities, with their theological departments. The theory of this relation to the state is rigorously Erastian. It is well known in history that at the Reformation the German princes usurped the power of dictating to their subjects a religion, with a tyranny at least equal to that of the popes. The motto of treaties and laws was: "*Cujus regio, ejus religio.*" The ruler of the land ruled the religion of the land. The people of an unfortunate state had to change their faith and worship backwards and forwards, from the Reformed to the Lutheran, and from either to the popish, as the sword, or the interests, or the lusts of the prince dictated. Nor is the church in Germany less helpless under an imperious Erastianism to-day. Of spiritual church government there is simply none. The church courts are either absolute ciphers, or they are but names for what are, really, *bureaux* of state administration, as little reflecting a spiritual power as a bureau of police or street-paving. The prostration of church power under the secular received notable illustration as late as 1875-'76, when the foul state of the marriage and divorce laws of Prussia (which Bunsen has cited as the one of two grand blots on the Protestant world,¹) provoked a protest

¹ *Hippolytus*, Vol. II.

from the Lutheran pastors. The answer was an imperious edict from Bismarck, suppressing their protest, commanding them to solemnize the adulterous unions, and ordering them to expurgate the church liturgy so as utterly to suppress its implied disapprobation of the antichristian law and usage.¹ In England, where a nominally Protestant but Erastian church is established by law, the healthy vitality of the national conscience is expressed in Dissent. The Dissenting churches embody nearly or quite half the population, and give a place of refuge to honest and manly Christians. In Germany, Dissent is so insignificant as to be practically *nihil*. The pressure exists in full force; there is not enough vitality to evoke this form of remonstrance.

Hence, with this state subjugation of the church, and doctrine of baptismal regeneration, every German Protestant child is baptized in infancy, and is confirmed at the approach of puberty, before it is betrothed or conscripted. All are full members of the church; all have been to their first communion; there is no church discipline in the hand of any spiritual court to deprive any of membership, however he may become infidel, atheist, adulterer, or drunkard. Every member of the church is, so far as ecclesiastical title goes, eligible to a theological professorship. The appointing power to theological chairs is virtually the state. There is no need whatever that a man be ordained to the ministry, that he have a saving, personal knowledge of the gospel, or make any profession of it. Rather is it necessary that he attain the proper academic degree, defend his *Thesis theologica* in a Latin disputation, get himself much talked of as a diligent linguist and student, and an adventurous, slashing critic; and that he be acceptable to the government. The class of theological students, from whom the appointments to theological professorships most naturally are taken, does not pretend to be in any way more spiritually-minded than the body of University students. To require a credible profession of regeneration and spiritual life, as a prerequisite for joining a theological school—or for receiving ordination and a parish, even—would excite in Germany nothing but astonishment: it would be hard to tell whether the feeling of absurdity, or of resentment, would most predominate in the German mind at this demand.

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, Oct., 1880, p. 270.

It is not meant that none of this class of students are devout, praying men: there are doubtless cases of true piety. But no such profession or quality is ever demanded. Certainly there exists, between the mass of the students of divinity and the others, no marked distinction of manners, morals, church attendance, or habits of devotion. Church historians know that the theory of Spener and Francke was denounced by the general mind of Lutheran Germany, and dubbed by the nick-name of "Pietism." But that theory was, in the main, embraced by evangelical Christians in America as almost a self-evident truth. It is, at least, an accepted axiom, that the pastor, and especially the teacher of pastors, must be a man who has spiritual experience of the truth.

Hence, the American evangelical Christian must be reminded of the large abatement to be made in estimating the weight to be attached to much of the German theology. To tell our people that an author is *a theological professor*, is virtually to say that he is not only a living, experimental Christian, but that he is supposed to be an eminent one. His opinions are the object almost of religious reverence. At least, he has credit for the most thorough earnestness and sincerity in his teachings. It is supposed, as of course, that his declarations are made with all the solemn intent proper to one who believes himself dealing with the interests of immortal souls. It is hard for our people practically to feel that a man so trusted in the holiest things may be dealing with the sacred text in precisely the same spirit as that in which he would criticize a Saga, or an Anacreontic ode. To appreciate the matter aright, they should represent to themselves a Bancroft or an Emerson, with aims perhaps very genteel and scholarly, but wholly non-religious and unspiritual, criticizing the authorship of *Ossian* or of *Junius' Letters*.

Now, the Apostle Paul has passed his verdict on such men. "Christ crucified . . . to the Greeks foolishness." "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things." They "have the understanding darkened by reason of the hardening of their heart." "But the anointing which ye (believers)

have received of him abideth in you," says the Apostle John, "and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." "He that believeth hath the witness in himself." Unless we are prepared to contradict God's Holy Spirit, we must ascribe to the unregenerate critics, however learned, this consequence, that their carnal state must cause them to dislike and misconceive true godliness and salvation by grace. Such a judgment they will, of course, disclaim and resent; they will flout the pretensions of spiritual discernment, which the children of grace derive with sanctification from the Holy Ghost, as Boëotian, or as fanatical, or as a cheap and vulgar mode of asserting one's intellectual and literary aristocracy, without paying for it the price of that diligent learning which they arrogate. If Paul and John speak truth, it is, of course, unavoidable that these men should answer the charge thus. The same "blindness of heart" which makes them unconscious of the spiritual beauty of the gospel will, of course, make them unconscious of their prejudice. They are perfectly sincere in thinking themselves dispassionate. They are in a state analogous to that of the freezing man, who, *because he is so chilled* as no longer to feel the cold, does not feel that he is frost-bitten. It is thus with the man who is so utterly possessed by a blinding prejudice against his neighbor, that it is, for the time, simply impossible for him to take an equitable view of that neighbor's acts. This is the very time he protests that he is entirely dispassionate, and is calmly condemning his neighbor from the simple force of truth and justice! It is obvious that if the apostles' verdict be true, these worldly men will be unconscious of its truth; and they cannot but resent the charge as unhandsome. But none the less, the Christian who does not wish to fly in the face of inspiration must make the charge. He makes it, not because he is glad to insult anybody, especially any learned men, but because he dares not insult God by contradicting him. We will, while making it in this case, give these scholars all the credit we can for every excellence they can claim, courteous manners, correct morals, (shaming, of course, all mere pretenders to spirituality,) diligence, minute learning, and even a commendable intellectual honesty wherever the spiritual truth, which is the object of their unconscious prejudice, does not present itself.

When it comes to the handling of the themes of redemption, there must be, then, a certain incompetency, in spite of their learning; and if the apostles have not slandered the "natural man," we must hold ourselves prepared to discount a large part of their conclusions.

3. The spiritual atmosphere which these scholars inhabit, moreover, must be judged by us extremely unfavorable to evangelical investigation, or several of our most firmly established convictions must be discarded by us. We have held it beyond a doubt, that the influence of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration must be deadening and unwholesome. But the Lutheran divines now usually hold this with a tenacity proportioned to their professed orthodoxy. We have been taught to regard the sanctification of the Lord's day as ordained by a *jus divinum*, and to believe that God has thus enjoined it, because its right observance is essential to the healthy culture of the soul. Well, Lutheranism believes that all sacred days of divine authority are as utterly abrogated as the new-moon sacrifices; that "to sabbatize is to Judaize;" and Lutheranism very diligently "shows its faith by its works." Take this sample from Luther's *Table Talk*: "If anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day's sake, if anywhere anyone sets up its observance on a Jewish foundation, then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast on it, to do anything that shall remove this encroachment on Christian liberty." When their holiest man can so insolently reject God's ordinance, the common sense of the reader will suggest how much improvement is like to be made of the Lord's day by average Lutherans.

The evangelical Christian accordingly recognizes the spiritual atmosphere of these great centres of learning as *fearfully cold*. One index of this is, that American students of divinity around them, although sufficiently masters of the language to attend German lectures, feel themselves instinctively drawn to set up separate preaching. Devotional meetings are rare. Sunday is, to most, merely a holiday. The average university student is heard to boast, not seldom, that he has not entered a church for a year, and hopes not to do so until his marriage, when he will have to enter it once more. But he is none the less a baptized and confirmed member of the Lutheran Church. The state of church attendance tells the whole story as to the spiritual atmos-

phere. Berlin now has more than one million one hundred thousand people. It has about thirty-two Protestant places of worship, of which many are very small, and scarcely any have a full attendance. Göttingen is a little city of twenty thousand. Its university has about seventy professors and one thousand students. In the whole town and university are four places of Protestant worship, two of which are small. The "University Church" has *one sermon a fortnight* during the sessions. On a good day one may see there from fifteen to twenty-five young men, who may pass for students (or may be, in part, genteel merchants' clerks). The theological department counts from eighty to a hundred students! Where are these on Sunday morning? "In the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg an inquiry was made in 1854 into the condition of the Lutheran Church, and it was found that no service had been held in the head churches for two hundred and twenty-eight times, because there had been no congregations."¹ No one has drawn this picture in darker colors than the evangelical divine, Christlieb, of Bonn. He says: "There are large parishes in Berlin and Hamburg where, according to recent statistics, only from one to two per cent. of the population are regular church-goers. Elsewhere it is somewhat better. But speaking of Germany in general, we may say that in the larger towns the proportion seldom exceeds nine or ten per cent., and in the majority of cases it is far lower."² In fact, the general aspect of Protestant Germany, on the Lord's day, is prevalently that of a civilized pagan country like China. The bulk of the population does not enter God's house, but does go to places of amusement. The only marked religious activity in the larger part of Germany (there are happy *oases* of spiritual fruitfulness, like Elberfeld), is among the papists. Their churches are thronged; and during the hours of mass the worshippers remind one of a busy swarm of bees about their hive. The contrast is, to the Protestant, most mortifying.

The inferences which the practical mind must draw from this picture are two: the spiritual atmosphere is not one in which we should expect evangelical views to flourish, and the fruits of German theological criticism in its own country are not such as to encourage its dominancy here. While German scholarship has been busy with its labors, it has suffered almost a whole

¹ *Edinb. Review*, Oct., 1880, p. 274.

² *Mod. Doubt. and Chr. Belief*, p. 27.

nation to lapse into a semi-heathenish condition. It has had popery within the reach of its arm ever since the end of the "thirty years' war" (*Peace of Westphalia*, 1648), and has won nothing against it. Tried by its works, German divinity is found wanting.

4. The writings of the rationalistic schools betray this spiritual blight in a defect which the living believer must ever regard as a cardinal one. This is the failure to appreciate and to weigh at all that class of internal evidences for the gospel and for the doctrines of grace which is presented in the correspondence between them and the experiences and convictions of the gracious soul. This is, indeed, the vital, the invaluable evidence. The class of criticisms alluded to know nothing of it. They dissect the evangelists, epistles and prophets, just as they do Homer or the Vedas. They have never felt that declaration of our Saviour: "The words which I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." The response which is made by the profoundest intuitions of the human heart and conscience, quickened by the Spirit, to these lively oracles, immediately avouching them as the words of the Creator of the human soul, is unnoticed by these critics. They propose to settle the authenticity or falsehood of the records by antiquarian processes only, similar to those by which Niebuhr proposed to test the legends of early Rome, or Wolf the genuineness of the Homeric epics.

5. The sober and practical mind finds the best argument of the real value of this species of discussion in its history. Let us glance over a small part of it. The time was when Rosenmüller and Kuinöl were ranked as marvels of critical acumen and learning. Now, the mention of their special conclusions excites a smile, and their works are obsolete. In the latter part of the last century, Semler led off in what was then the new school of rationalism, explaining away everything in the sacred records which transcended human conception. To-day, while there are plenty in Germany who hold to his skeptical results, none follow or believe in his criticism. He was first *professor of theology* in, and at last head of, the divinity school of Halle. Eichhorn was a famous professor of Oriental languages and literature at Göttingen up to 1827. He also is a disbeliever in all the supernatural, and explains all the miracles of the Bible as natural events. The book of Isaiah he regarded as entirely unauthen-

tic—the product of a plurality of writers put together at random. De Wette was theological professor in the University of Basle. He is usually regarded as the founder of the historico-critical school in Germany, which was, though less extreme than the Tübingen school, tinctured largely with rationalism. He does not believe that the Chronicles are scripture, or that the apostle Paul wrote Ephesians or First Timothy. The latter he rejects because it has un-Pauline phrases, and because it portrays a too advanced state of the gnostic heresy for Paul's day, and a church government too mature. In these points he has been utterly refuted by Bunsen's *Hippolytus*.

Paulus, professor of theology at Heidelberg, 1811, was a thorough rationalist, who “sat down to examine the Bible with the profound conviction that everything in it represented as supernatural was only natural or fabulous, and that *true criticism* consisted in endeavoring to prove this.”

Baur (Ferd. Chr.) was professor of Protestant theology at Tübingen from 1826 to 1860. He is usually regarded as the founder of the “Tübingen school,” which arrogates to itself the name of “*the critical*.” He has been both represented and contradicted by his pupils and successors, Volkmar, Keim, Hilgenfeld, *et al.* Its principles may be said to be two: that nothing supernatural can ever have really occurred, and that the Christianity of the first age was from the first divided by two hostile and contradictory schools, the *Petrine* and the *Pauline*. For this notable hypothesis the only tangible pretext is the narrative of Gal. ii. 11–16. The advocates of the two doctrines had, he thinks, each their gospels, compiled to suit their views, and the later gospels, especially John's, were forged to smooth over this fatal breach and hush up the squabble, long after the deaths of the men whose names they bear. Hence, the source of the materials used for these pious frauds must be guessed. The guess of Baur and Volkmar is, that at first there was a brief writing of somebody, possibly the evangelist Matthew, strictly Petrine, or Judaizing, in tenor. Somebody on the Pauline or Liberal side got up a life of Christ in Luke's name. Of this the Luke now in our Bibles is a later rehash and expansion. Then, somebody, to make weight against this fuller Luke, about A. D. 134, wrote the book which now passes by the name of Matthew. And after this somebody forged the gospel of Mark, as it now stands, in

order to smooth over this ugly Petrine and Pauline difference, and give homogeneity to the Christian scheme. Then, finally, about 170 A. D., still another forger wrote a gospel, with the object of completing this amalgamation, and affixed the apostle John's name to it. But Baur's pupil, Hilgenfeld, supposes Matthew was completed first, then Mark, and then Luke. Köstlin thinks there was first a Mark, then Matthew, then another Mark, then Luke. Ewald, once at Tübingen, but later at Göttingen, teaches that there was (1), a gospel of Philip; (2), some *Logia* or speeches of Jesus of unknown authorship; (3), a short biography ascribed to Mark; (4), an anonymous gospel; (5), the Matthew now in our Bibles; (6, 7, 8), three short writings of unknown authors, detailing incidents of Christ's early years, of which there are no extant remains or proof, but of which Ewald speaks as confidently as though he had them in his hand.

But an anonymous critic of this Tübingen school cuts the matter short. The "Anonymous Saxon" concludes that the fourth gospel was the work of John, but that it is wholly unreliable and false. His theory is, compared with the learned Ewald's, refreshing for its simplicity. It is that John did his own lying.

Would the reader see a specimen of the "criticism" on which the date of John's gospel is settled by this school? Hilgenfeld argues that John omits the circumstance that Simon the Cyrenian was impressed to bear the cross for the fainting Saviour. The synoptic gospels narrate it. But Basilides (second century) made a pretext of that narrative to support his gnostic crotchet, that the person crucified was an ordinary Jew, and not the Messiah. Therefore John's gospel was written after Basilides! If this is argument, one might as easily prove that the Declaration of Independence was written after the fourteenth amendment.

But the admirable harmony of this criticism displays itself in the date the school assign for the forgery of John. Baur is certain it could not have been earlier than A. D. 160. Bunsen fatally refuted him in his *Hippolytus*. Zeller places it at 150. Hilgenfeld 130 to 140. Keim in A. D. 130. More recent examinations by Luthardt, of Leipzig, of the orthodox school, refute the whole of them, and demonstrate the genuineness of the gospel as the work of the apostle John in the first century. Bunsen even carries it up to as early a date as A. D. 60-65.

Schenkel, in his sketch of the life of Jesus, undertakes to construct a biography of the Saviour, wholly omitting the supernatural powers, by the violent supposition that the gospels were later works, embodying a number of superstitious legends of the early Christians. But David Friedrich Strauss crowned this work by his *Life of Jesus*, fashioned on the mythical hypothesis. This learned professor of divinity studied for a time at Tübingen. He was elected divinity professor at Zurich, Switzerland, but by a popular *émeute* was prevented from taking his chair, though he continued for the rest of his life to draw a part of his salary. He married an actress, from whom he was afterwards divorced. The use he made of the leisure, subsidized by this Christian annuity, was to publish a second *Life of Jesus* more anti-Christian than the first; and at last to carry his anti-supernatural position to its consistent extent—*atheism*. His last work adopts the evolutionism of Huxley and Hæckel, denies the existence of the soul and God, and makes man a helpless subject of mechanical fate. The English reader may see a full, moderate, and intelligent account of these speculations in Lectures VI., VII., and VIII. of Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*.

Now, the purpose of this bird's-eye-view is not to attempt a refutation in this place of any of these conclusions. The reader is only requested to note the following facts: Each of these mutually destructive speculations has been advanced by theologians. Each has had in Germany a large following, and has claimed to be the final result of sound investigation. Each has been superseded in its turn, and while a virtually infidel result is still reached, the old methods are discarded for some newer hypothesis. None of them has been able to do what the old orthodox doctrine of inspiration has always done, retain the hearty and permanent confidence of a mass of Christians great in numbers, respectable in learning, and venerable for character.

Another trait of this part of the German theology is its submission to the sway of successive schools of philosophy. One century has witnessed the triumph of Kant's, of Schelling's, of Fichte's, of Hegel's system, and the death of all of them. To-day one must look out of Germany for learned Hegelians, the last of the schools mentioned, and the unorthodox philosophy of Germany to-day sways towards the opposite extreme from idealism, that of materialism. But it has been the weakness of the

popular German theologians to mould their creeds into the forms of these unsubstantial and fleeting philosophies. A Feuerbach, following Hegel, as he supposes, reduces God to the mere objectified reflex of his own consciousness. A pious and eloquent Schleiermacher imbues his whole system with idealistic pantheism.

The unhealthiness of the theological atmosphere is revealed also in a way still more painful and significant by the foibles of the so-called orthodox. What name is more venerated by Americans than that of the sainted Tholuck, the beloved theologian of Halle? But even he charges the apostle Paul with making "a false construction." He seems to confess that, on Rom. ix. 17, he intimated that the apostle had misrepresented Exod. ix. 16 (Septuagint), "because he believed he could in that way better refute the Calvinistic view. (*Haldane on Romans*, pp. 741, 742, Edition of 1870.) Tholuck's semi-Pelagianism, and his utter unconsciousness of man's natural state of ungodliness and enmity to God, seemed to have perverted his view of the Epistle to the Romans. Again, the pious Neander seems to give the weight of his assent to that deficient theory of inspiration which makes it only an elevation of the prophet's own rational consciousness. A Bunsen (*Hippolytus*, Vol. I., p. 10,) declares with passion that the cloven tongues of fire at Pentecost were only lightning flashes from a thunder cloud, and flouts the idea that the twelve really spoke in unknown tongues. Meyer, the so-called conservative, the vaunted bulwark on the orthodox side, began his career an Arian. He seems to have gotten no further than Homoiousianism, admitting that Christ has a nature like his Father's. But he admits that his divinity would be proved by 1 Tim. iii. 16, *were the epistle only genuine*. He teaches that man has two souls, the *ψυχή* and the *πνεῦμα*. He holds the gnostic doctrine, that sin resides in the "corporeo-psychical" part of man's constitution, and that the *πνεῦμα* is only trammelled by it like an unwilling but chained captive. His theology is distinctly semi-Pelagian. He declares that Paul borrowed the allegory of Hagar from the Rabbins, and holds that he was sincere, but erroneous, in thus arguing. "If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

6. Why is it that men of undoubted learning and diligence thus pursue speculations so convicted, by the result, of evanes-

cence and futility? The more profound solution has doubtless been given in our picture of the State Church and its results. Another solution is to be sought in the defects of the German system of university education. These are so great that, after conceding all the praise these universities deserve, we cannot but ascribe the main credit of German scholarship to the *Gymnasia*. In the universities there is no regimen exacting diligence in study. There is no roll-call, and a student need not even present his body with any punctuality in any lecture-room. But if his body is there, absolutely no means are used to secure the exertion of his mind. The university professor never asks questions, never holds any recitation. With the most of his students he most probably never speaks one word on the subject he teaches, and many remain utterly ignorant whether the man before him is an idiot or is mentally rejecting every item of instruction he offers him. Unless the student is a candidate for a degree, he is not even examined at the end of the session or the course. The excuse for this fatal neglect is, that the student has had enough of this species of drill in the *gymnasium*, so that now it is sufficient for him to have the lecturer's example and guidance in the work of study. But this plea is wholly inadequate. The mere lecturer maintains only a one-sided relation to his pupils' minds. If they listen, they may learn his mind; but he never learns theirs. Every mind has its own idiosyncrasy, out of which arise its own peculiar weaknesses, wants, and misapprehensions. The experience of the writer as a teacher of bachelors of arts, in studies properly post-graduate and of a university grade, who may be presumed to bring to their work at least as much mental discipline as the lads from a German *gymnasium*, confirms this view. This experience proves that lectures without recitations would leave his students only half taught. All but a few would carry away the queerest possible half-views and misconceptions of the doctrines enounced to them. The recitation, the personal dealing, the detection of the individual's peculiarity, the testing and correcting of his apprehension of the ideas delivered to him, are worth more than the lecture. Consequently, the one-sided instruction must result in a one-sided culture. Is not this the solution of that feature of the German mind that, while the memory is stored with such a

multitude of facts, the logical power remains so inaccurate, and the mind is so often the victim of its own hobbies?

There is another feature which presents an instance of the law that human imperfection permits no good to exist without its evil, even as there can be no tree without its shadow. The great division of labor in the German universities has been spoken of, with its grand advantage of enabling scholars to pursue the *minutiae* of scholarship at their leisure. But hence result the known evils of *specialism*. Judicious medical men have recognized it. The specialist, who devotes all his mind to the study and medical treatment of a particular set of nerves, acquires, of course, an amount of knowledge and dexterity about them beyond the attainment of the finest general practitioner. But unless this specialist is a very wise and self-restrained man he gains this at the expense of one-sidedness of mind; he becomes overweening in his thinking; he makes his set of nerves his pet crotchet; he exaggerates their influence, until his judgment in pathology becomes weak and even absurd. Doubtless there is too much specialism in German erudition, and hence, while the pursuit of particular branches is thorough beyond that of any other scholars, the views of truth are not well coördinated, and the scientific judgment is infirm.

There is reason also to believe that the overweening applause so long given to German scholarship has borne its natural fruit, undue inflation of the applauded. It is not asserted that there are no men in their learned circles who pursue a cosmopolitan learning, but certainly the general result is that their scholars consider Germany sufficient unto herself. Their boast is, that Germany is "the schoolmistress of the world." They feel that they can give to all, but have need to borrow of none. The best recent efforts of learning and study in other countries remain usually unnoticed by them, and discounted from their appreciation. A German theologian, for instance, when told that the American students are waiting with eagerness for the final work of Dr. Philip Dorner, complacently accepts it as perfectly natural and proper, as much so as that one should "go to Newcastle for coals." But when one mentions the final work of the American Dorner, Dr. Charles Hodge, the exceedingly learned man, who has read the Vedas, and is deep in the latest Sanscrit and the most recondite German discussions of Egyptology, knows

nothing of Hodge. He feels that for him to read any other than German scholarship would be more like "carrying coals to Newcastle." An exception to this contemptuous discounting of all the rest of the world exists in favor of a few British and American authors. These are men who studied in Germany, who have continued their correspondence with the German scholars, and who make a boast of retaining in those foreign lands the German methods. A few such scholars, Professor Max Müller, Professor Robertson Smith, for instance, receive some recognition, because in smiling on them Germany is still, in a sense, exalting herself.

If the late Dr. J. Addison Alexander may be believed, there was still another exception to be noted in his day. In the last conversation the writer had with him (June, 1856,) the character of the English scholarship of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was mentioned, as at once thoroughly modest and honest. The works of Prideaux were mentioned as fine specimens of historical research, exhaustive in their learning, and yet plain, perspicuous, and modest in their method. Dr. Alexander replied about in these words: "I am extremely glad to hear you say so, because such is just my estimate of those scholars. And I will tell you what you, who are so much younger than I am, and who have not been in Germany as I have been, are not in a position to know so well as I do. That is, that these Germans, with all their affectation of ignoring British learning, sometimes make a quiet use, nevertheless, of these old scholars, as convenient quarries to dig ready material out of, which they use without acknowledging. You have mentioned Prideaux. Now, it is singular that there is a late German work, very pretentious, on a part of the ancient church history, which has almost made its fortune out of plagiarisms from Prideaux." This is given on the authority of Dr. Alexander solely.

7. But the worst literary influence remains to be explained. As the German university is actually administered by its teachers, its "final clause" is not to communicate knowledge to pupils, but to manufacture professors. The professor does not lecture so much for the purpose of teaching the ascertained and recognized body of his science—the student is presumed to have gotten that already, in the *Gymnasium*, or by his own reading—the prelection is rather designed to set him a pattern of the me-

thods of new research in the outworks of the science. The aspirant is perpetually taught that to get into the line of promotion he must "do new work," which means that he must make some addition, not known before, to the science which he has adopted as his specialty. The test of ability is not the man's capacity to acquire an intelligent, perspicuous knowledge of the science, however thorough and extensive. Nor is it to be able to make useful applications of the principles of the science, already established, for the benefit of mankind. Nor is it to be able to teach the whole known science effectively to other minds. All this is not enough. The aspirant must "do new work." He must also evince independent powers of research or invention by extending his science in some quarter not explored before, however minute, or merely curious and trivial. Hence, "Do new work" is a sort of *shibboleth* with them. The "dissertation," which introduces the candidate to the privilege of an examination for an honorary degree, must profess to "do new work." When the young aspirant has become a "*privat docent*," his main hopes of promotion and a salary repose on his getting the name of having "done new work." When he becomes at last a "professor extraordinary," his prospect of elevation to the rank of a full professor depends still on his "doing new work." One peculiarity of the German university is, that this "*professor ausserordentlich*," or assistant professor, is not really the assistant of his senior, but his rival. He may have a miserable pittance of salary, but he has the privilege of lecturing on any part of the course he pleases; on the very same parts his senior is lecturing on, at the same time; and instead of following, he may move abreast of, or in advance of him. It is supposed that this license stimulates both senior and assistant, and keeps them both diligent and pushing. It certainly stimulates the assistant; for he is grasping up after his "bread and butter." Hence, it is not unknown that the superior shall lecture to six or seven students, and his assistant to forty or sixty. And the case is probably found to be this: that the old superior professor is still delivering the same course which, twenty years before, made him *Magnus Apollo* in the university, and delivering it with all the increased efficiency derived from experience in teaching and successive reexplorations of his ground, while his assistant is "doing new work." The senior *has done* his "new work" a few years ago. Probably it

was really important work, constituting really grand extensions in the domains of his science; possibly it was work so valuable that it really left little except the gleanings of trifles in that sphere of science for those who come after him; but, alas for this senior! it is no longer "new work" to-day. And so his students pronounce that he is no longer "fresh." They forsake him for his young aspiring assistant who is "doing new work;" the new work, namely, of whittling and polishing some little angle of the science which his senior has left "in the rough," and which is never going to be anything more than a curious trivialty after it is polished. And the enthusiastic young gentlemen fancy that they are mastering the body of the science, because they are assisting so zealously in this polishing of the useless angle, when, in fact, what they need is to be studying the old work, which is not fresh, so as to ground themselves in the rudiments of their science.

The consequences of this system are in part admirable. It begets in a numerous body of young aspirants a restless, if an innovating, activity in research. A multitude of minds are pushing the outer boundaries of knowledge in every direction. In the physical sciences, which partake of the almost boundless variety of their subject-nature, and in antiquarian researches, where the documents are so numerous, this plan may work well. The young man who would teach mineralogy, or chemistry, or botany, or electricity, cannot indeed hope to add a whole province to the domain of his science, like a Davy, a Franklin, or a Linnæus. But he may hope to construct some acid or neutral salt never combined before, and give it a learned name; or to detect, analyze, and classify a few weeds or mosses which the books had not before recorded. Nor should these minute industries in the scientific field be wholly despised; for it may be, that in some future induction, which really leads to important truth, the little facts may bear a useful part. No one can predict.

But obviously, the results of this system are far from healthy in the spheres of philosophy and especially revealed theology. The facts and *data* with which the philosopher can properly deal are limited; they can properly include only those contents of consciousness which are common to sane men. That is all. Hence, when this imperious injunction is still imported into phil-

osophy, that the aspirant in this branch of study must "do new work," or else remain an underling, with no professorship, no honor, no fame, and very little "bread and butter," he is placed under violently unhealthy influences. What can he do? He can only innovate; he can only attack existing doctrines; and if it happens that the existing doctrines are already settled aright, he must unsettle them to get them wrong. Let us suppose, for example, that the venerable Dr. Archibald Alexander, while teaching in Princeton that beautiful course of elementary ethics, which is left to us in his little volume of *Moral Science*, was condemned, according to the German system, to have under him this "professor *ausserordentlich*," with the privilege, not of assisting, but of rivalling his senior, with a starveling salary of \$250 per annum, and a nice young lady in some New Jersey church, betrothed to him some five or seven years ago, with no chance of marriage under present circumstances. This young gentleman is told that his getting a full post and salary in some younger western seminary, (as the Allegheny or Chicago,) depends on his "doing new work" in his department. It will not be enough for him, adopting the system of his venerable senior, to add some more resources of diligence in illustrating it and successful perspicuity in teaching it. This is not really "doing new work." It does not evince original, creative, philosophic talent. Let us suppose again, that the ethical philosophy of Dr. Alexander *is the true one*. We now have precisely the German conditions. Unless the assistant professor is almost miraculously a saint, of course he gets a "bee in his bonnet." He can only rise by differing substantively from his senior's philosophy. But that is the right philosophy. Then he must rise by inventing a false one, and by exerting his learning and ingenuity to make the false one look like the truth.

But it is when this law is virtually applied to the student of theology that it works the most deadly mischief. Here, as we believe, is a divine science. Its whole *data* are given to us in revelation, and are therefore limited and definite in number, and immutable, because infallible in character. There can be but one right system. All others, so far as they vary from this, are wrong. There is, indeed, much scope for exegetical diligence. But this continued exegetical labor can never introduce substantial modification into a single essential member or relation of the

system; it can only add the lesser, and as the industry proceeds, increasingly minute, confirmations to the main results accepted from the first by true believers. Here is a vital distinction which is more and more overlooked in days of pretended "progress." And the proof of its justice is this: that the revealed code, containing all these *data* of the science of redemption, was avowedly and expressly given by God to the common people, with the pledge that it was sufficient to give them the infallible knowledge of salvation; and the qualifications required for its right apprehension were not any antiquarian learnings and sciences of criticism to be acquired in the future development of civilization, but an obedient heart and spiritual discernment given in answer to believing prayer. (John vii. 17; xvi. 13 and 23; James i. 5; 1st Epistle of John ii. 27, etc., etc.) In short, that revealed theology *cannot be a progressive science*, is proved by this short argument. It was equally given by its Author to save sinners of the first century of the Christian era, and of the last. He declares that it saves by its truth, and by the reception of its truth alone. If, then, the system by which we are to be saved in the last age is the result of a progression in science, it could not have been a system to save the sinners of the first age.

Hence, when the injunction to "do new work" is thrust upon the theologian, it is almost a direct incentive to heretical innovation. The *animus* which this trait of the German erudition has imported into theological study, is poisonous to orthodoxy. It begets an endless and ever restless spirit of innovation. To the current inquiring mind, the doctrines which are accepted and established are presumptively obnoxious because they are accepted. The Protestant principle is that nothing is to command our faith merely because supported by human prescription. Educated Germany is prone to push the truth to this extreme: that because a proposition happens to be supported by the prescription of the day, therefore it is not to be believed.

When the influence of this usage is properly appreciated, the American Christian becomes aware that he has been under a species of hallucination in attaching any serious significance to this species of critical and theological speculations. Devout and evangelical men among us are, of course, "in dead earnest" in handling the topics of redemption. They believe that it is by

these topics immortal souls are to live or perish forever. Through these topics the holiest attributes of God, and the most sacred compassions of the incarnate Saviour, receive their manifestation. We remember that there is an ever-present responsibility resting on all who touch them, for the manner in which they handle them. Hence, it is hard for us to apprehend the footing which doctrines, and facts concerning the sacred writings, hold in these minds as merely interesting antiquarian subjects for an intellectual sword play. The Rationalists are, of course, not oblivious of the ephemeral life of the previous speculations of their comrades. They know that the usual term of their life is not more than a generation; and as all the previous ones have had their day and died, there is a tacit understanding that the ones they are studying will have the same fate. To the resident in Germany there is, as men say, a "feeling in the air," that no one regards these critical theories as final. This admission betrays itself in a hundred hints. One inquires, for instance, whether a given great man is a leading power in his department of literature. The answer is: "Oh, not now: he has been before the German public too long. Blank is now the coming man" (mentioning a younger celebrity). Does one ask why, if the writings of the first were true and just, they should not continue to lead the mind of the country, inasmuch as truth is never old? The answer is a shrug, and the remark, "Why, his last great work has been out twenty years!" The new contribution is recognized with favor, not as destined to establish final conclusions, but as furnishing a new scholarly theme, as creditable to German erudition, and as placing a literary comrade in the way of promotion.

In a word, much of this writing is the literary "student's duel." The young German of fashion is the model of military courtesy, and member of a fashionable university *corps*. He fights two or three duels per session with gentlemen of other *corps*, with whom he has not the shadow of a quarrel, and with whom he will be thoroughly warm and cordial at the next "kneiper." He seeks to slash him with his sword, and shed his blood—in a mild way. Now should this antagonist take his discomfiture *au grand sérieux*, and pursue his quarrel, after the fashion of the British or American duelist, with real deadly intent, the men of fashion would view this as clear proof of lack

of breeding, almost of lack of civilization. So when German *literati* learn that we take their attacks on the Scriptures and the doctrines of grace in this solemn way, they are affected with a somewhat similar sentiment. It is a combination of amusement and disgust; our making a life-and-death affair of them is an index of "deficient culture," indeed of a state of very imperfect civilization. It proves that we have not experienced the liberalizing influences of letters which educate a man out of intolerance. Had we the full German culture, we should be too courteous and tolerant to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints;" we should not allow a consideration so prosaic as that "there is only one name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved" to obstruct the freedom of learned inquiry.

8. Our indictment against the spirit of this theology, then, is, that it tends to unsettle everything, and settle nothing. It has mistaken license of mind for liberty of mind. It claims the privilege of pursuing the Protestant freedom, "to prove all things and hold fast that which is good;" but it perverts that right to a questioning of good things which results in the holding fast to nothing. It is said that the truly philosophic method is to question every position in our beliefs, and that this is a duty which one man cannot do for another more than he can eat and breathe for him, so that even the most fundamental and settled dictates of belief shall be held subject to debate by each new comer. It is sneeringly asked, Would you have the pastors of the church especially hold their creeds on ignorant prescription? Shall they preach dogmas as Bible truths only because a Synod, confessedly not inspired, said three hundred years ago, that the Bible taught them?

We reply, of course not. But let it be supposed that possibly that Synod was right; that the canonical Scriptures are God's Word; and that the creed formulated by the Synod from them is the meaning of God in them. If, on the one hand, the "say so" of this naughty thing, a Synod, does not prove this true, neither does it prove it untrue. Suppose, now, for argument's sake, the Synod true. How then will this universal right and duty of free inquiry combine with that fact in the results? This question reveals at a touch the shallow and impertinent sophism. Does this right of free inquiry take the form of a right to reject

the truth, and that on the ground that some good man, before us, in the legitimate exercise of this same right, ascertained that truth for us? Hardly! In the case supposed, then, the individual right of free inquiry resolves itself simply into this: the right (and duty) of embracing heartily and intelligently the truths given to us. That is all. The sophistical assumption in this innovating criticism is, that this individual right can only be fully exercised by differing from all previous uninspired results. But this would be true only on the supposition that all previous results must be erroneous, because uninspired. If this were true, then all the exertions of these last (uninspired) critics are thereby shown to be thoroughly impertinent. How baseless the theory is appears from a simple *dilemma*. Either this method of criticism and free speculation is not a method for the ascertainment of truth, or it is. If it is not, it is worthless, and the sooner we have done with it the better. If it is, then it leads to the permanent establishment of truths. Therefore the Protestants who come after these critics can no longer exercise their freedom of inquiry without claiming a license to *criticize and reject truth!* Any other science of ascertained truth may offer us good and sufficient instances. The teacher of geometry does not inhibit free thought. He does not teach the conclusions of his science by dictation, but he knows that the right exercise of free thought by his pupils will inevitably lead to their readoption of the same old theorems taught ever since Euclid. How is this? Because they are clearly true. Ah! but this is an exact science; a science of absolute truth, says one. Let another instance be taken, then. The German antiquary teaches his pupils that Dionysius, Paul's convert in Athens, *did not write the Celestie Hierarchia*. He by no means teaches this by mere dictation. He invites his pupils to the fullest freedom of inquiry. But he expects them inevitably to readopt his conclusion.

But it is pleaded that the human mind is an imperfect instrument of cognition, and this imperfection cleaves, in some degree, to its most fundamental exercises. Hence, it is argued, the only way to secure accurate knowledge is to hold all conclusions, even the foundation ones of the science studied, subject to reëxamination and possible modification by every student. This conception implies, that the only way to build the temple of truth securely is for each builder to relay for himself all the stones,

including the foundation stones. Another proposition is far more certain: that if everybody is to be continually moving the bottom stones, no temple of truth can be built at all for anybody. Each builder should, indeed, acquaint himself intelligently with those foundation stones, as with all above them in the wall, but not for the purpose of moving them. He acquaints himself with them for the purpose of approving their position, and satisfying himself they are in the right place. This overweening critical spirit overlooks an all-important truth, that the attainments of sound, healthy research are cumulative. The results of the mental labor of previous generations should count for something. Some things should get settled by the progress of knowledge. Truths ascertained in one way reflect their light of evidence on other truths; so that these latter become perfectly clear in their certainty, and are most thoroughly settled for the most enlightened and just-minded men. There is no theory which is really more dishonoring to the rights of the human intellect than this innovating criticism, for its tendency is to mark all the efforts of men continually with practical futility. It seems to say, that man's intelligence is never to attain conclusive results. If this were indeed so, we see not how such a faculty is worthy of rights to any prerogative or any freedom.

When we see the rationalistic theology and criticism, then, perpetually announcing new results, we ask: Have any new and important *data* been discovered, such as justify the laying anew of the foundations? Have any more primitive documents been discovered? What are they? The Moabite stone, the Rosetta stone, with the readings of Egyptian monuments deduced therefrom. The cuneiform remains in Mesopotamia. The Sinai MS. of the Scriptures, found by Tischendorf, the lost work of Hippolytus of Portus (if we may trust Bunsen). But every one of these is favorable, and only favorable, to the old conclusions as to the canon and text of Scripture, so far as they touch the subject at all. Have any new lights of importance been thrown upon dates or the genuineness of patristic writings since the era of Cave, Bentley, and the other great critics who settled the estimation of this literature? Have any testimonies as to the canon been unearthed more authoritative than those of Caius and Eusebius? None. *The materials* remain substantially as they were, when the renewed and exhaustive research of a Hug,

an Alexander, and a Sampson, made a final settlement for fair minds of the canon. But the new criticism goes on, shuffling its pack of cards over and over, without any ground, making its new deals of pretended conclusions, which have nearly as much fortuity, and as little authority, as the deals of the fortune-teller's cards.

But it is claimed that, though the materials remain substantially the same, the advance of philology has given a new *apparatus* of exposition, and the methods of the new criticism place the *data* in new lights.

No one can be readier than the writer to recognize every collateral ray of light thrown on exegesis by philology with gratitude. But the recent beams are, compared with the great flood thrown by the Reformed exegetes of the previous ages, slender side lights, and they are in the main confirmatory of the old orthodox methods and conclusions. To say that modern philology has furnished any grounds for revolutionizing exegesis, is simply a boastful misrepresentation. Let Winer be taken as the most illustrious example. His rationalism was probably so entire as to create for him the conditions of a complete grammatical equity and impartiality, by means of his very indifference to the doctrines extracted from the text. It made no difference to his prejudices or feelings whether the Scriptures were so interpreted as to teach Calvinism or Semi-Pelagianism, since to him they were no inspired authority for anything. Hence, he could investigate their grammatical laws with the same equanimity as those of Tyrtaeus or Pindar. What has been the result? That the principles of his grammatical constructions give the same conclusions in exegesis usually reached in Calvin's. In the minuter details and accomplishments of exegesis, he completes Calvin's exegetical results, in a few cases he differs from him, usually not for the better.

As for the methods of the new internal criticism, we meet the claim by a direct denial of their correctness. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Their most pungent condemnation is from their clashing results in the hands of their own advocates. On such critical premises an ingenious man might prove almost anything about any authentic writing. A much more plausible argument could be made to prove that the history of the first Napoleon is mythical (as Archbishop Whately showed), than

that the gospels of Jesus are mythical. One maxim of the common-sense of mankind contains a refutation of the most of these criticisms: "Truth is often stranger than fiction."

Only one of these so-called critical principles, one now exceedingly fashionable, will be mentioned in conclusion.

Protestant expositors have always admitted the utility of learning all that is possible of the personality of the human penman of the inspired document, of his times, education, opinions, modes of thought, idiosyncrasy of language, and nationality. Why? Because it is possible that any of these, when authentically known, may throw a side light, usually a dim one, on the interpretation of his words. But now, this obvious old admission is travestied and reappears in this form: that the human author's ascertained doctrinal "standpoint" is to dictate our construction of his inspired writing. And this, sometimes, when the doctrinal standpoint is the one he held before his conversion to the gospel! Clearly, this principle begs the whole question of that writer's inspiration. On the orthodox theory of inspiration, that the Holy Spirit, using the man as his *amanuensis*, did not suppress the human element of thought and style, but directed it infallibly to the giving of the form of expression designed by God for the composition, the penman's personal traits would naturally appear in the verbal *medium* of the divine thought. But, even then, they would not be allowed to vitiate the perfect truth of that thought. But to say that the propositions themselves were the results of the human writer's education and opinions, is simply to say that he had no inspiration. If the sacred writers claimed inspiration, and sufficiently attested the truth of the claim, then this theory of exposition is naught.

VINDICATORY JUSTICE ESSENTIAL TO GOD.¹

"Who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; but glory, honor, and peace to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile: for there is no respect of persons with God."—ROMANS ii. 6-11.

IN the first revelation which God ever made to man, that of Paradise, justice was declared as clearly as grace. Was the garden adorned for man's occupancy by the lavish hand of divine benevolence, and was eternal and assured blessedness offered him on the easy terms of refraining from the fruit of one tree? Yet justice added the threat: "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." As soon as innocent man fell, and it became necessary to reveal a religion for sinners, the foremost point of this creed was the necessity that sin must be punished for the satisfaction of the divine perfections. The chief aim of God, in every institution of Old Testament religion, was obviously to make this prime truth stand out to the apprehension of sinners. What was the prominent addition made to the worship of Paradise? Bloody sacrifice, and that undoubtedly ordained by God, since Abel's faith in offering it must have had such a warrant. And this remained the grand characteristic of the religion for sinners until the Lamb of God came, who taketh away the sin of the world. Wherever the patriarchs approached the throne of grace, there the altar must be reared: before the gates of the lost Eden; on the steaming soil of the earth, just yielded up by the avenging waters; on the plains of Mamre; at Horeb, and through all the centuries of the sanctuary, the orisons of faith and penitence must be accompanied with the streaming blood of a victim and the avenging fire of the altar. They could only rise to heaven when attended by the smoke of sacrifice. God was thus teaching all ages this founda-

¹ This article appeared in the *Southern Pulpit*, April, 1881.

tion truth of the theology of redemption, that "without the shedding of blood there is no remission." The guilt of sin must be avenged by the just penalty, for the satisfaction of God's perfections, before the sinner can be forgiven.

But this principle, which God so obviously places in the forefront of his gospel, is one to which the carnal mind is most obtuse. This strange and obstinate forgetfulness is manifested at once by the crude notions of the people, and the speculations of the scholar. Investigate the alarmed conscience, not yet taught of the Spirit, and you will usually find an utter unconsciousness of the necessity for satisfaction for guilt, and of the true object of Christ's sacrificial sufferings. Ask the distressed sinner how he hopes to be forgiven. He will tell you, "For the sake of my repentance;" or "of my prayers;" or "of my new obedience;" or "of my penances." Anything rather than the one Bible answer, "For the merit of the penal sufferings and death of my divine substitute." And when you have swept away those refuges of lies, and even left the cowering soul desperate of all other resort, you may hold up this, the only source of pardon, to his despairing eyes, and he will turn away unsatisfied and stolid. The cross is "unto him foolishness," unless he who commanded the light to shine out of darkness shine into his mind to teach him its glory.

So the speculations of carnal science betray a similar incompetency of the fallen mind of sinners for this fundamental truth. Let philosophy, falsely so called, set itself to devise a theory accounting for the infliction of punishment on sin, or for the necessity of Christ's sacrifice, and you shall hear any inconsequent scheme whatsoever, rather than the true one. One dreamer will tell us that punishment is not the decree of God's special providence at all, but the regular and unavoidable effect of the system of nature, as though that system were aught else than the expression of God's almighty will. Another will teach that God's vindicatory justice is nothing but "benevolence guided by wisdom;" that love is the only essential attribute of God's moral nature; that the true end of punishment is the reformation of the offender, or, at most, the politic and benevolent expedient to deter men, free agents, from sin, and thus save them from its unavoidable miseries. When they come to explain the sacrifice of Calvary, they are, accordingly, ready to give any other than the true account of it. "It was designed to attest the divine

benevolence offered us in the promises." "It was to instruct us by a splendid example of disinterestedness." "It was to melt our hearts by the spectacle of dying love." "It was to exhibit a dramatic spectacle of the evil of sin." Truly, saith the sacred Scriptures, it was incidentally all this; but because it was chiefly and primarily intended to satisfy God's holy perfections by paying the penalty of sin.

In order, then, to lay a foundation for your understanding of this way of salvation, I ask you to consider the scriptural account of God's punitive justice. I have chosen, for this purpose, one of the fullest and most solemn declarations of the whole Bible: "But, after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; but glory, honor, and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile: for there is no respect of persons with God." The passage is too clear to require critical exposition. It declares that God, at the revelation of his righteous judgment, will render to every man according to his deeds. This is the inspired definition of distributive justice. That justice has two correlative branches, the one as inevitable as the other; the one requires the reward of eternal life for righteousness; the other requires the penalty of eternal anguish for evil doing. In the impartial distribution of these sanctions no boast of name, or race, or profession, or privilege, will avail anything; the guilty Jew will meet the same doom with the equally guilty Gentile; and the righteous Gentile will reap the same reward with the righteous Jew; "for there is no respect of persons with God." It is the divine equity and impartiality which cause these awards. Here we have, then, the simple account of God's distributive justice, in his own words. He rewards and punishes, not mainly to reform the offender for his good, nor mainly out of a benevolent expediency, but mainly because his rectitude requires it. Sin is punished because of its desert of punishment in the estimate of the divine equity. God's

fundamental motive to punish is the honor of his own principles, as a holy sovereign and impartial ruler. I have thus repeated the proposition of the text in several equivalent forms, that no one may mistake its intent. All that I assert is summed up in this: that God's punishments are primarily designed to satisfy his own rectitude by giving sin its desert.

In exposing the erroneous theories, which will be my first attempt, I would admonish you against the delusion, which has deceived many minds, from likening God's penalties to those of secular government. Thus, the jurist *Grotius*, seeing that the penal legislation of the commonwealth is, properly, designed in large degree as an expedient to repress crime, imputed no higher purpose to God's justice. He forgot that God has reserved to himself the supreme function of vengeance (Rom. xii. 19), and assigned to the magistrate the lower and temporary purposes of law. He forgot, also, that if the penalties of the magistrate ever lose sight of their true ground, in the evil desert of the crimes punished, they at once sink from the rank of a benevolent and righteous expediency to the grade of odious iniquities. I pray you, beware of this mistake.

But to proceed: It may be quickly decided whether God's penalties on sin can be explained as means designed for the benefit of the sinner. Many of his most notable punishments summarily destroyed the culprits; the flood; the doom of Sodom; the extermination of the Amorites, when their "iniquities were full"; the final and endless punishments of hell. At the simple mention of these instances this part of the false theory dissolves like a thin cloud.

But it may be argued, the amendment of these sinners had become hopeless and their continued existence incompatible with the welfare of the more numerous and more righteous fellow-creatures. Let love, say they, be God's sole and consummate moral attribute. Let all virtue be defined as benevolence. Then the moral ground for inflicting the misery of penalties on sinners will be found solely in this fact, that such sufferings are the necessary expedients of wise benevolence to curb the evils of sin within the narrowest possible limits. God punishes the incorrigible sinner only because by this means he secures "the greater good of the greater number." "His seeming vengeance is but love." Thus, these theorists, placing a fragment of the truth in

place of the whole truth, turn upon us and arrogantly contrast what they claim to be the mildness and sweetness of their creed, with the vengeful severity of ours. Our God, say they, is the God of love. Yours is the brutal theology of ancient barbarians, who sanctified their malicious revenge under the name of vindicatory justice, and represented to themselves a God, like themselves, pleased with the fumes of his enemies' blood. It is "the theology of the shambles." Our God has no emotion towards any of his creatures but benevolence; he desires no retribution of the sinner for "its own sake!"

Let us see how this will stand the test of reason and sacred Scriptures. Does God love a good man any more than he loves a wicked one? You are compelled to say yes. Then, for what does God love the good man most? For his righteousness. Then God loves righteousness? Yes. If he did not he would be himself unrighteous. But righteousness and sin are the opposite poles of character; to love the one is to hate the other, just as necessarily as the attraction of the North Pole for one end of the magnet implies its repulsion of the other end.

This pretended resolution of punitive justice into benevolent expediency is, in its result, impious towards God, and practically identical with the ethics of supreme selfishness. The sacred Scriptures teach that "man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." The humanitarian scheme proposes as our most virtuous end, not God's glory (this would be, say they, to make God the infinite egotist), but advantage to man. To man in general, not self. This, they claim, is true disinterestedness. But by what logic can it be denied that whatever is made our highest ultimate end is practically made our God? It is nothing to the purpose that names and titles are decently exchanged, and man is still called the creature, and Jehovah the God. Virtually, the aggregate of humanity is made our true divinity by being made our moral end, and Jehovah is only retained, if retained at all, as a sort of omnipotent expediency and servitor of this creature-God. Further: this result is also involved, that inasmuch as the benevolent man is himself a part of this aggregate humanity, which is his moral end, he is a part of his own God. He himself is, in part at least, his own supreme end! Here begins to crop out the tendency of this scheme of pretended benevolence towards supreme selfishness.

The completion of the process is easy and short. If the advantage of aggregate humanity is my proper moral end, and I am one of the integers thereof, "by nature equal to any other," what so reasonable as that I should recognize the humanity embodied in myself as my own nearest and most attainable end? Does not nature herself seem to sanction this conclusion by the instinct of self-love? Man's powers are very narrow; hence, were he to direct the efforts of his benevolence equally to the whole aggregate, they would be wholly nugatory. He can only serve the mass by serving a few individuals in it. Nature has given me more direct means to benefit my own destiny than any other man's. Hence, obviously, the best mode for me to seek the advantage of aggregate humanity is to make my own advantage my supreme end! Such is the abominable conclusion of the process; and the process is, from these principles, perfectly valid.

In proof of this, let me cite to you a few words from the "system" of Dr. Samuel Hopkins. This divine had embraced with enthusiasm the speculation which resolves all morality into disinterested benevolence. In unfolding it, he carries the principle out to its selfish result with an unconscious simplicity and candor, which strangely illustrate the force of the logic; it led him, against his will, and without his seeing it, to the opposite point from that he intended to reach. Hear him:

"And as every person is nearest to himself, and is most in his own view; has opportunity to be better acquainted with his own circumstances, and to know his own wants, his mercies and enjoyments, etc., and has a more particular care of his own interest than of that of others, and is under greater advantage to promote his own happiness than others, his disinterested, universal benevolence will attend more to his own interest, and he will have more and stronger exercises of it, respecting his own circumstances and happiness, than those of others, all other things being equal; not because it is his own interest, but for the reason just given." That is to say, he may practice supreme selfishness, provided he is not selfish in doing so. Thus, this boasted scheme of disinterestedness resolves itself into a most odious one of selfish expediency.

This conclusion suggests the following refutation: If punishment of sin is only a benevolent expedient to reform the trans-

gressor and repress crime, then the expedient which is most effectual is most just. Let us suppose any case in which the criminal, and others who are disposed to imitate him, would be more deterred by the punishment of an innocent victim than by the chastisement of the offender himself, then it would be more just to take vengeance of the innocent in that case than of the guilty. Nor is it at all impossible that such instances may arise. Here is an outlaw, hardened and desperate in crime, callous to shame, and weary even of his life, whom you propose to curb by penal inflictions. But what cares he for your threats? His name has been too long synonymous with infamy to be blackened any farther by your sentence. Your jail is rather a refuge, with all its hardships, when compared with the miseries of his vagrant life. That life has no value in his eyes. He defies your threats, and mocks your fiercest severities. Your penal expediency has lost its whole power with him. But now steps forward one of your police-agents and informs you that there is one green spot in that seared and arid heart; that this desperado has a child whom he loves, an only child, a tender daughter, whose purity has strangely exempted her from the contamination of her father's character. Punish her with stripes; let him look on and see her tender flesh torn with the scourge, and hear her screams; and this rugged heart will relent, which else would look the cruellest death in the face and refuse to quail. The success of the result justifies its righteousness, does it not? "Punitive justice is but a benevolent and necessary expediency to repress crime." That is the doctrine! In this case, the scourging of tender innocence is most expedient—yea, the only expedient—and therefore the most righteous. Can any human heart consent to this? No! You repel the monstrous iniquity with just abhorrence. Then you must reject the plausible, but hateful error, from which it flows as a necessary consequence.

But there is another difference between human authority and divine, which has been overlooked by this false theory. "Expedients" are the resort only of the weak. Omnipotence has no need of expedients, for it can march straight to its desired ends, and command success in their attainment by whatever road it prefers. All Christians hold that God is omniscient in knowledge and omnipotent in power; that his understanding is infinite, and his power competent to every effect. Now, if bene-

volence is his exclusive moral attribute, constituting his whole moral nature, God must be infinitely benevolent. His omnipotence makes it as easy for him to prevent transgression by some other system, not involving penal sufferings, as by this expedient. Hence, his infinite benevolence must prompt him to prefer that other system, for thereby there would be a clear gain of the aggregate of happiness to creatures. And if benevolence constitutes God's whole moral nature, then that aggregate happiness, the largest possible, must be his chief end as to them. Why did he not convert Judas, instead of punishing him? "Had he not the residue of the Spirit?" Here is a father, whose heart is nothing but kindness, as this theory represents. Many of his children are scourged by virulent ulcers; and the pitying father amputates their limbs or burns out the sores with canteries, lest they should terminate in the worse evil of death, and infect also the other children. But suppose it should appear that this father is able to cure these ulcers radically by a healing word, without more than a momentary pang. Then, if kindness is the only consideration, why did it not decide this father to adopt the latter means for arresting the misery among his children? Why all this gratuitous resort to the knife and cautery? Truly, it would rather seem as though this parent, instead of having a nature made up exclusively of kindness, must be possessed by an unmitigated malignity, which took pleasure in inflicting agony for its own sake.

But especially is it impossible on this theory of expediency to account for everlasting punishments under the government of an almighty God. Here the plea that the penal pain is for the good of the sufferer, is utterly inapplicable, for he is to sin and suffer for ever, without amendment or advantage. Nor will the other plea avail, that penalties are for the prevention of crime in others, for the Scriptures represent the awful infliction as continuing on and on through everlasting ages, after all the penitent shall have been perfected, and all the perfect securely enclosed in the protecting walls of heaven. Why has God adopted this system of just rewards and punishments, resulting, as he must have foreseen, in this measureless aggregate of woe, when his wisdom and power might have provided some other plan which did not include this terrible incident? To this utilitarian philosophy there is no answer. He who holds it consistently should either go

consistently to universalism, and assert that there is no hell, or he must deny the omnipotence of God and contradict the sacred Scriptures, and insult its author by saying that he punishes a Judas because he is unable to convert him.

The scheme, my brethren, will not do. "God is love," and "God is also a consuming fire." He is infinitely benevolent in all ways consistent with his honor, and also infinitely just. Sin is punished by him, not mainly out of a benevolent expediency, but because its ill desert requires punishment; because the honor of God's impartial justice, as the infinite sovereign for whose glory all creatures exist, and as the Chief Magistrate of his vast republic, necessitates his dealing with every moral act as it deserves. (Text.)

The affirmative argument of this truth will, briefly, compose the second part of this discourse.

My first appeal is to your own consciences. Every man who believes in a God recognizes the justice of God, and that imprinted on the conscience of the creature, as the same in principles or rudimental nature. For two reasons we must believe this, because our souls were created in the spiritual image of God (of which conscience is the chief lineament which is not obliterated), and because government and governed must avouch and live by the same code of justice, in order that the government may be honored. Let any man, then, dispassionately examine his own conscience, and ask himself why he approves of the punishment of sin. The simple answer of the mind is, because sin deserves to be punished. The discrimination which the reason of man intuitively makes between the right and the wrong act, and the righteous and the wicked agent, awakens necessarily the feeling of approbation and disapprobation. We judge and feel that the righteous agent deserves well; the wicked agent deserves ill. Desert or ill-desert is inseparable from moral agency. Is not this so? But desert of what? When you said the one deserved well and the other ill you had already answered the question. The right agent deserves reward and the wicked deserves penalty, and the one title is the counterpart of the other. The connection between transgression and punishment, by its ill-desert, is immediate, and morally necessary.

Let me remind you, in a few familiar instances, of the fact that

this is the intuition by which your own mind unavoidably judges in every moral problem.

Why is there so much sorrow and pain in this world of our heavenly Father? Every thoughtful mind which cherishes any reverence for him answers: Because this world is so full of sin. It is the creature's sin which accounts for and justifies all this suffering under the providence of an Almighty Being. But this solution is made by assuming the ill-desert of sin making the guilty creature worthy of the suffering.

Again, why does every unpardoned soul, Christian or heathen, regard it as so "fearful a thing to fall into the hand of the living God?" Why is death formidable? Why does its approach usually awaken so powerfully the conscience of ill-desert? When the solemnity of that hour has swept away the disturbing illusions of sense and worldliness, every rational soul returns from its chase of vanities to the thought of its sins and their dread punishment, as naturally as the needle reverts to the pole. Why is this association so inevitable? It is because reason then speaks the fundamental truth that sin intrinsically deserves, and must receive its due penalty.

Let me take an instance from the more familiar transactions of human justice. Whenever a secular crime has been committed, flagrant enough to arrest your attention, you feel a certain desire that just punishment shall follow. And when, as too often happens through the arts of unscrupulous counsel, or the incompetency of juries, the criminal escapes his just deserts, you feel as though you had been wronged. You feel that you have a right to complain, and with a certain indignation you cry that "the gallows has been cheated." Let us suppose now that the discharged criminal turned upon you and asked, "Why this grief in you at my good fortune? Why this heat and sense of wrong? Were you thirsting to gratify your malignity with my blood? Would the sight of my death-agony and of the anguish of my bereaved and dishonored family have been so sweet to you that you coveted to gloat upon it, and begrudge this disappointment of your barbarity?" You, my hearer, would have indignantly repelled such an interpretation of your feelings as an outrage against the truth and yourself. You would have warmly replied: "No, my sentiments were not those of cruelty, but of justice. The sufferings which you deserved would have been,

in themselves, no joy to me, but a pain. I complain only that justice is robbed of her dues, and every righteous man is wronged along with her. My heat is not that of cruelty, but of generous justice." Thus your reason would teach you to distinguish in your own case between malice and justice, and you would instinctively feel that while the sentiment of cruelty and revenge is criminal and odious, that of justice is praiseworthy. Here, again, you find your reason proceeding without hesitation upon the intuitive judgment that punishment is what sin intrinsically deserves.

I remarked that when justice is robbed of her dues by the escape of the guilty, every righteous man properly feels that he has been wronged along with her. But let us suppose the case of one who felt himself honestly entitled to reward by his righteous conduct, and who was deprived of his just recompense. He would feel yet more strongly that he was the victim of inexcusable wrong. Now let us suppose that it were pointed out to him how some benevolent expediency required the Ruler to deprive him of the recompense which he had earned, in order to bestow it on one who had earned nothing. Let us suppose a glowing picture of the beneficent results, the politic advantages of that disposition of affairs, to be placed before him, in order to reconcile him to his loss. He is reminded that distributive justice is but "benevolence guided by wisdom," and as, in this case, the benevolence had directed his well-earned recompense away from him to his fellow, he must acquiesce in the justice of the award. Would he be thus reconciled? Nay, verily. His reason and heart would both rise up in irreconcilable resistance against such a conclusion. They would declare that his duly-earned reward was his by a bond too sacred to be ruptured by any plea of expediency or advantage. And never until reason was dethroned would that man cease to believe that he was the victim of an unmixed iniquity. We may not "do evil that good may come." "The damnation of those who teach thus is just." But now you are to be reminded that right and wrong are the two opposite poles of this one moral magnet, the conscience; that the same intuitive principle of reason which attracts us to the right, repels us from the wrong; that the title of the transgressor to his penalty is the same title with that of the righteous man to his reward. Such is the doctrine of our text:

“Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile ; but glory, honor, and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile ; for there is no respect of persons with God.” (Rom. ii. 9-11.) “He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord.” (Prov. xvii. 15.)

Thus it appears from this new point of view that God can no more fail to punish sin justly than to reward holiness faithfully. The divine impartiality, then, must prompt God with an everlasting certainty to render to every one according to his works.

There is one more thought which deserves to be added to this demonstration. The divine Judge has made incomplete and unequal inflictions upon men for their sins in this world. He has made a beginning of this retributive work. Then he must complete it. He has chastised some of the less guilty more heavily than he has smitten some of the more guilty. It behooves him then—with awful reverence we say it—to go on until he has made his judicial work equal. Inferior rulers may defend the equity of their intentions amidst the imperfections and inequalities of their administration, by pleading the limitation of their powers. They may claim that they have done the best their circumstances and their nature permitted. But God’s infinite perfections estop him from the use of this plea, as they remove both the occasion and the desire to use it. “With him all things are possible.” Infinite wisdom and power, and absolute sovereignty, leave no obstacles between his will and its effectuation. Therefore the actual results of his administration will be a reflection perfectly exact of the preference of the divine mind. If there were imperfections in the result, it could only be because there was injustice in the almighty will. A perfect God must exhibit at last a perfect government. The final adjustment may be long suspended at the prompting of the divine compassion and wisdom, but when God finally declares his judicial work complete, its equity will be in all its multitudinous particulars as absolute as the perfection of the Judge. (Text, verse 11.)

The conclusion, then, is that under God’s government the punishment of every sin is inevitable. “Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty ; visiting the iniquity of the

fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation." (Ex. xxxiv. 7.) "That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. xviii. 25.) "Therefore the ungodly shall not stand in the judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous." (Ps. i. 5.) "The foolish shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all workers of iniquity." (Ps. v. 5.) "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." (Rom. vi. 23.)

The conclusion, then, is that under God's government the punishment of every sin is inevitable. Is then the punishment of every sin inevitable? "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." (Rom. iii. 24-26.) Here, then, is the fundamental design of Christ's obedience and sacrifice, to make satisfaction to the justice of God, so that he may be just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly which believeth in Jesus. It is this for which chiefly Christ suffered, that the sin might be righteously punished (in our substitute) and the sinner forgiven. Do men tell us that Christ's sacrifice was designed to be an example to us; that it was made to be an attestation of the divine pity; that it is God's expedient to draw us to him by the constraining love of the cross? All this is true. But if any of these objects is advanced as the prime design, the incidental is thrust into the place of the essential. All these statements are subordinatedly true, but they are true because, and only because, Christ's sacrifice has satisfied the divine perfection outraged by our sins, and thus enabled our God to instruct and melt and allure us by the example of Calvary without dishonoring his eternal justice.

So, men tell us, that executed penalty is God's expedient to repress the mischiefs of transgression, and that he is, therefore, benevolent even in punishing. This also is true as a subordinate truth. God's rectoral justice and the interests of his holy crea-

tures who, under a covenant of works or of grace, have confidently entrusted themselves to his guardianship, are secondary motives for the regular administrations of these sanctions of his beneficent law. But God gives this expression of his benevolence even in his justice, only because his justice punishes for the intrinsic deserts of sin. To act on any other foundation would leave neither justice nor benevolence. "Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne: mercy and truth shall go before thy face." (Ps. lxxxix. 14.)

Let me beseech every soul, then, who is conscious of sin, to pay this tribute to the rights and honor of the divine justice, namely, to accept Christ's vicarious, penal satisfaction as the necessary provision for the remission of the guilt which he confesses. To go to God for pardon with any other plea, to urge before him the atoning merit of your repentance, or reform, or alms, or works, to appeal to an indiscriminate pity without this propitiatory satisfaction for your guilt in the fore-front of your petition is but an insult to God. It is as though the confessing and convicted felon should impudently require the judge to forswear himself and drag his judicial ermine in the mire of iniquity, in order to procure for him, him deserving only of execration and doom, the impunity which his ruthless self-love craved. It is worse, as much worse as the honor, the holiness, the majesty of God are above all human dignities.

On like grounds, I assert that such a salvation as is imagined by this humanitarian theology would be as corrupting to men as dishonoring to God. It is easy to retort on the advocates of that scheme, with crushing effect, the charges which they fling upon the moral effects of our gospel. They flout the idea of an intrinsic obligation to penalty in every sin. They say the pretended justice which demands it is but barbarian revenge cloaked under the veil of equity, and the creed which symbolized this necessity of just retribution by the perpetual stream of sacrificial blood, was but "a theology of the shambles." They declare substitution and imputation immoral. But I forewarn you, when you hear one of these advocates of "advanced thought" babbling this shallow creed, if he be not only babbling in the idleness of his conceit, you had best regard him as a man not to be trusted. He is shamelessly confessing his insensibility to moral obligation. The obligation of ill-desert to penalty is as

original as the right of well-desert to its reward. He who boasts his indifference to the one will not be slow to betray his indifference to the other. He who is ready so flippantly to strip his God of his judicial rights will not stickle to plunder a fellowman of his rights. In this theory of sin, punishment and atonement, he has adopted the creed of expediency, as distinguished from that of just principle. Will he not act on a similar one in his own affairs? Worse than all, he has fashioned to himself a God of expediency. Nothing on earth can be so corrupting to the soul as to have an imperfect or corrupt model exalted upon its throne as the object of its adoration, the standard of its imitation, the regulator of its principles and conduct. It is of the inventors of idols that the Psalmist says (cxv. 8), "They that make them are like unto them; so is every one that trusteth in them." As the arrow is ever prone to sink somewhat beneath the mark, so will human imitation degrade itself always below the level of the God whom it has proposed to itself; men will ever allow themselves more license than they impute to their divinities.

Nor can any preceptive stringency in the law of God repair this corrupting effect. God has, indeed, spoken plainly enough to us as to the code of ethics on which he requires us to act. He tells us that we are in no case to sacrifice principle to policy or simple justice to kindness. "Neither shalt thou countenance a poor man in his cause." (Ex. xxiii. 3.) "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord." (Prov. xvii. 15.)

If life itself comes into competition with truth or right, life must be sacrificed rather than they. Such is the high and holy standard he has enjoined upon us. But this God has also told us that our holiness is to consist in the imitation of him. Can he, then, adopt a standard of expediency for himself which he has so sternly prohibited to us? But if he could, what effect could his prohibition have on us, save to make us mean and truckling eye-servants? A father prohibits his sons, under the severest penalty, from ever postponing principle to policy, even under the enticement of the greatest advantage. But the sons see their father do the very thing as often as plausible occasion arises. Such a family government as this may make them skulking hypocrites; it can never make them honest men. I repeat, then, that this "school of advanced thought," which is as old,

stale, and trite as Pelagianism, is only an advancement backwards, towards unprincipled morals, and is, therefore, dishonorable to God. Let this, then, be the conclusion of the matter : that God stakes his own glory, which is the supreme ultimate end of all his action, upon rendering to every work according to its desert. Guilt, once incurred, is irremissible before him. God's attributes of impartial justice, of truth, of holiness ; yea, of benevolence also, O sinner ! with every right and interest of his vast commonwealth of holy creatures, rise up in adamantine array to forbid your escape from guilt until it is removed by the penal satisfaction of the cross. (Isaiah liii. 5.) But if you will honor God by pleading this satisfaction, then "He will turn again ; he will have compassion upon you ; he will subdue your iniquities ; he will cast all your sins into the depths of the sea." (Micah vii. 19.)

THE BELIEVER BORN OF ALMIGHTY GRACE.¹

"And what is the exceeding greatness of his power to usward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places."—EPHESIANS i. 19, 20.

THE saving belief of the gospel, my brethren, is the first and most uniform action of the new-born soul. Hence, when the Apostle Paul here speaks of himself and brethren as "us who believe," he refers directly to their new-birth or regeneration. "God's power to usward who believe" means his "power by which we are made believers," or in other words, are born again. And this is the power whose greatness he so exalts. Other wondrous displays of divine might were made in connection with the mission of Christ and his apostles; but of these Paul is not speaking here. Let him explain his own meaning. Two verses below he resumes the comparison of the text and says (ii. 1), "You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins." And in the fifth and sixth verses still more clearly, "Even when we were dead in sins he hath quickened us together with Christ, and hath raised us up together, and made us to sit

¹ A sermon preached at Frederick's Hall, Va., in Hood's (4th) Texas Brigade, June 22, 1862, and published in tract form at the request of Gen. "Stonewall" Jackson.

General Thomas J. Jackson, during his forced march from the Valley of Virginia to the Chickahominy, halted his command, for the Sabbath, along the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, from Gordonsville to Frederick's Hall, in the county of Louisa. He himself spent the sacred day at the latter place, in the hospitable home of N. Harris, Esq. I ascertained that the brigade of Hood, near us, had at that time no chaplain present, and offered to conduct public worship for them. This offer was courteously accepted by their General, and the afternoon of the bright Sabbath was chosen as the time, and a dilapidated country church, near the encampment, as the place.

These troops, having been attached to the command of General Jackson a few days before, were strangers to his person, and naturally anxious to see the far-famed soldier. This desire, with better motives on the part of some, brought the whole brigade to the appointed place. The little wooden church was packed, the

together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." The thing which is compared to Christ's resurrection in the text is then beyond doubt the renewal of the souls of sinners.

This passage, therefore, exhausts the strongest expressions of human language, to assert the divinity and omnipotence of the power by which the sinful soul is changed. It is God's work, not man's. "They are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i. 13.) It is effected by "the greatness of his power." Nay, more, it is "the

open grounds beside it crowded, and the fences and the very trees loaded with human bodies. To provide for the multitude without, General Hood proposed that the speaker should be placed, not in the pulpit, but in a side door, where a table was arranged for him. A long bench next this door was intended for General Jackson. As party after party entered the house, and finding no vacant seats elsewhere, were about to occupy this bench, General Hood arose again and again, and remarked: "That seat is reserved for General Jackson and his staff." This repeated caution seemed at length to beget in all minds the vision of a brilliant cavalcade, dashing up with the far-famed Stonewall Jackson at its head, and displaying any amount of military pomp and finery. After a few moments a "buggy" was seen creeping along, containing the General in a sunburned uniform, and a person in black. The two dismounted, and proceeded with their own hands to detach the horse, and tie him to a "swinging limb." After this, the General slipped quietly into the house and took his seat. Noticing, as he approached, one or two companies of Texans marching up in regular ranks, though unarmed, he said: "See there, that is what I like." After the close of the service, he saluted the officers near him, returned to the vehicle, reattached the horse with no other assistance than that of his clerical companion, and returned to his quarters. The great multitudes around him behaved throughout with the strictest decorum; and not a man betrayed the slightest manifestation of unseemly curiosity.

As we were returning, General Jackson said to me: "Your subject this evening was of great importance, and some of your views new to me. I wish all my men could read your sermon. I should be glad if you would reduce it to writing, when other duties permit—I know you cannot have time for this now, but hereafter, when operations in the field are less urgent—and let me have it. I will print it myself and supply my command." To this request I could only promise compliance.

The pressure of duties in the field, then protracted sickness, then the death of my revered commander, with a train of subsequent disasters, have long delayed my fulfilment of the pledge. It is, in my eyes, only the more sacred, that he is no longer upon earth to remind me of it. Having at length found another medium (through the Publishing Committee of our church, which prints it simply for the sake of the great truths of redemption it contains), I now present the sermon to the survivors of those for whom General Jackson designed it. I beg them to receive it as his message; his adopted testimony to the necessity and nature of the new birth. It comes to them as a voice from beyond the grave, as well as an affecting mark of the zeal and love of the departed Christian soldier towards their souls.

R. L. DABNEY.

Union Theological Seminary, December 20, 1868.

exceeding greatness of his power." And, as though to exalt the work to the utmost, it is likened to the most illustrious miracles which demonstrated the gospel, the resurrection and ascension of the Lord Jesus Christ. It is "according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places."

We are all in substance agreed, that a miracle was such a manifest suspension of the laws of nature as only God can work. Miracles were usually rare in their times; for had they become customary, their end would have been disappointed. Blessed be God, this divine work, the new birth, is frequent and customary wherever his gospel is faithfully taught. It is not palpable to the senses save by its effects. But neither could you have seen the subtle essence of Lazarus' soul reënter his corpse had you been present at that tomb of Bethany; you would only have known its return by its effects, when you saw the dead man come forth. Let us consider, and we shall see that the change of a godless, self-willed, worldly soul into a sincere, believing, joyful Christian, is as truly above the laws of his natural heart as the living again of a corpse is above the powers of matter. This text teaches us, then,

That the saving change of the soul is God's own almighty work, and is, in that sense, supernatural.

What is this change? Some, from shallow observation, answer: It is only the sinner's *change of purpose* concerning his duty to God. But the Scriptures answer, that it is a *change of the dispositions of heart*, which prompt and regulate man's purposes concerning this duty. Note, I pray you, my words, and apprehend the difference, for it is that between light and darkness. And this I promise to show before I am done, if you will give me your attention. That new birth, I repeat, which is necessary to salvation, is some deeper thing than the mere making of a new resolution by the sinner. It is the fundamental revolution of the very dispositions of soul, out of which his purposes were all prompted. Hence, it is not the work merely of reasonings and inducements presented to the mind, but of God's almighty power, through his Holy Ghost, quickening the soul to feel those reasonings and inducements.

Having explained my meaning, I present some probable proof

of it from this fact: that human efforts have by themselves done so little to remedy the moral evils which curse the hearts of mankind. In the world of matter, men's exploits have been marvellous, especially when they have combined their industry. They have bridged mighty floods, traversed the pathless oceans, pierced the entrails of the earth for her treasures, bent the winds and even the lightnings to serve them, and modified the face of continents. But how fleeting and scanty are man's moral exploits, where God, in the gospel of his Son, has not wrought through him? Where are his drunkards reformed? Where his vices abolished? Where his races civilized and redeemed, without Christianity?

Every instance of the permanent change of a hardened sinner to godliness bears, to the experienced eye, the appearance of a power above man's, because we see so few men make otherwise a radical change of habits and principles after these are fully formed. The wise observer of the world will tell you that few men, except under this peculiar power of Christianity, change their course after they pass the age of thirty years. Those who are then indolent do not become systematically industrious. Those who are then intemperate rarely become sober. The radically dishonest never become trustworthy. It is also happily true, that good principles and habits then well established usually prove permanent to the end of life. But, as it is easier for feeble man to degenerate than to improve, the few instances in which this rule does not hold are cases of changes from the better to the worse. When, therefore, I see, under the gospel, a permanent change of a hardened sinner for the better, my experience inclines me to believe that he has felt some power above that of mere nature.

But third: when we consider what the change in the new birth is, and what the heart to be changed is, we plainly see that the work is above nature. The soul of man has its natural laws as truly as the world of matter. In both worlds we learn these laws by the uniformity of our experience. Because all men have ever seen water run down hill, therefore we say that this is the law of its gravitation. And, therefore, when the waters of Jordan stood on a heap while the ark of God and Israel passed through its channel, men knew it was a miracle. The sun and the moon have always proceeded regularly from their rising to

their setting. Hence, when their motion ceased at the word of Joshua, it was plainly a miracle.

Now universal observation proves that *ungodliness* is the natural law of man's soul, as the holy Scriptures declare. Let me explain. By this bad word, *ungodliness*, I do not mean some series of sins peculiarly degrading in man's eyes, or some peculiar degree of enormous criminality. I mean that natural alienation from God, that obstinate reluctance to submit your wills to his righteous will, that native preference for the good things of this world over God and his service and favor, which you all feel in your breasts, and which, in the best of you, show themselves in the fixed purpose to break, for the present, some commands of your Maker, and to neglect at least some known duties. There may be much difference in the sinfulness of different men here. Some of you have no leaning to certain sins, which others pursue with greediness; social principles may make you despise them. But I know that I may make *this* charge against the most decent impenitent man here: you prefer the world to God; he "is not in all your thoughts;" you are alienated from him; you are determined not at this time to surrender your will entirely to his holy will; and you are resolved, with full purpose of heart, not to do at this time the whole of what you know to be your duty to your God. I have read you aright, have I not?

Well, this heart is, in different degrees and phases, universal among natural men, in all races and ages, under all religions and forms of civilization, whatever religious instincts men may have, and to whatever pious observances they may be driven by remorse, or self-righteousness, or spiritual pride. We perceive that this disposition of soul begins to reveal itself in all children as early as any intelligent moral purpose is disclosed. We observe that while it is sometimes concealed, or turned into new directions by the force of circumstances, it is always latent, and is a universal and controlling principle of conduct towards God. We find that it holds its evil sway in spite of all light and rational conviction in men's own minds, and of inducements drawn from conscience and heaven and hell, which ought to be omnipotent. Such is every man's inward history, until *grace* reverses his career.

Now I claim that these facts of experience authorize me in regarding this ungodly disposition in man as natural and funda-

mental. How do we learn more certainly that any other native trait or affection belongs to the constitution of his soul? It is plain that, since Adam's fall, ungodliness is as radically a native disposition of man's soul as the desire of happiness or the fear of pain. (John iii. 6.)

But here I remind you, that no man ever reverses or totally eradicates or revolutionizes any material or fundamental disposition of soul by his own purpose or choice; nor can any mere inducement persuade him to do so. Look and see. These principles may be bent, they may be concealed, they may be turned into new channels by self-interest, or by education, or by restraint. The same selfishness which in the season of heady youth prompted to prodigality, may in thrifty age inspire avarice, but it is never eradicated by natural means. Again I say, look and see. Hunger is a natural appetite. Should a physician tell you that he had a patient with a morbid appetite, but that by his eloquent pictures of the dangers of relapse and death from the imprudent indulgence in food, he had actually caused the man no longer to be hungry, you would tell him, "Sir, you deceived yourself; you have only persuaded him to curb his hunger; he feels it just as before." Suppose this physician told you that he had plied his patient's mind with such arguments for the utility of a certain nauseous drug that it had actually become sweet to his palate? Your good sense would answer, "No, sir; it is in itself bitter to him as before; you have only induced him by the fear of death—a more bitter thing—to swallow it in spite of its odiousness."

Try my assertion again by some of the instinctive propensities of the mind, instead of these animal appetites, and you will find it equally true. The distinction of *meum* and *tuum* is universal in human minds, and the love of one's own possessions is instinctive in men's hearts. Can you then argue or persuade a man into a genuine and absolute indifference to his own? This was one of the things which monasticism professed to do: monks were required to take the three vows of "obedience, chastity and poverty." Many devout and superstitious persons upon entering monasteries reduced themselves to absolute and perpetual poverty, by giving their goods to the church or the poor, and foreswore forever the pursuits by which money is acquired. But was the natural love of possession really eradicated? The noto-

rious answer was, No. Every one of these monks was as ready as any other man to contest the possession of his own cell, his own pallet, his own gown and cowl, his own meagre food. And for the commonwealth of their monastery and order they uniformly contended with a cunning and greediness which surpassed all others, until they engrossed to themselves half the wealth of Europe.

The love of applause is native to man. Can reasoning or persuasion truly extinguish it? These may correct, direct, or conceal this passion; they can do no more. The hermit professed to have extinguished it. He hid himself in deserts and mountains from the society of men, and pretended that he was dead to their praise and their attractions, dead to all but heaven. But he who sought out this hermit and conversed with him soon detected in him an arrogance and spiritual pride above those of all others; and the chief reason why he was content to dwell in savage solitudes was that the voice of fancy brought to his soul across the wastes which sundered him from the haunts of men, their applause for his sanctity, in strains sweeter to his pride than the blare of bugles and the shouts of the multitude.

I return, then, to my point. There is, there can be, no case in which mere inducements work in man a permanent purpose contrary to the natural dispositions of his soul. But ungodliness is a native, a universal, a radical propensity. Hence, when we see such a revolution in this as the gospel requires in the new birth, we must believe that it is above nature. This great change not only reforms particular vices; it revolutionizes their original source, ungodliness. It not only causes the renewed sinner to submit to obedience, as the bitter, yet necessary medicine of an endangered soul; it makes him prefer it for itself as his daily bread. It not only refrains from sin, which is still craved, as the dyspeptic refuses to himself the dainties for which he longs, lest his indulgence should be punished with the agonies of sickness; it hates sin for its own sake. The holy and thorough submission to God's will, which the convert before dreaded and resisted, he now loves and approves. Nothing less than this is a saving change; for God's command is, "My son, give me thine heart." He requireth truth in the inward parts, and in the hidden parts he shall make us to know wisdom. Saith the Saviour, "Either make the tree good and its fruits good, or else the tree

evil and its fruits evil." Such is the change which makes the real Christian. It is a spiritual resurrection; it is the working of that "mighty power of God which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead."

Indeed, a little plain reflection, of which any thinking man should be capable, will convince you that this conclusion of our experience could not be otherwise. It is unreasonable to expect any inducements you can offer from without to make a thorough change of the natural propensities of the heart of your hearer; and this because the natural propensities are the causes which decide already whether any objects you may propose to his mind and heart shall be to him inducements or repulsions. Is it reasonable to expect nature to work against or above nature? Surely not. Can a thing by its power determine or change that prior force which gives or deprives it of all the power that is in it? Can the effect change its own cause? Can the quality of the child determine what shall be the nature of the father who begat him? Just so reasonable is it for you to hope that gospel truth and inducements will suffice by their natural influence to change the moral nature of a sinner radically, when that evil nature determines already that the gospel is to his heart no natural inducement at all, but, on the contrary, intrinsically hateful. You see an engaging child playing in some place of danger; you wish to draw it away; and you crave to caress it and please yourself with its beauty and grace. Would you call to it, "Come hither, pretty child, and I will give you *aloes* and *quinine* to eat?" Will such an inducement fetch it to you? I trow not. Suppose, then, you exhibit the lure in more force; increase its quantity: intensify its odor and bitterness; cause the child to smell of it near at hand, and receive a more correct perception of its nature. Try whether by this means you can attract it to your arms. Do you not know that the more you press the bitter drug the more the child will recoil? And your good sense gives the explanation. You know that the child has beforehand a natural palate, whose laws determine that these drugs are intrinsically unpleasant and can only repel instead of attracting. If you had presented sweetmeats and ripe fruits, you might have succeeded in attracting. You see clearly enough here that it is preposterous to expect that the offer of bitter things will attract the palate to a change, because the nature of the palate has determined in advance that

they shall be only nauseous and repulsive to it. If there is any superior medical agent which will revolutionize the very law of this child's palate, so that the bitter shall now be sweet, and the sweet bitter, then you may present your drugs where that agent works, and they will attract. So holiness and submission of the inward heart to the sovereign will of God are now bitter to the taste of the sinner's soul; the more they are displayed the more will he recoil from salvation, until the same Divine Physician who healed the stroke of death in Jesus' body heals the perversity of his heart by his sovereign touch.

I argue, fourth, that the new birth is the exceeding greatness of God's power, because of the different effects which accompany the preaching of the gospel to different men, and to the same men at different times. Were the power only the natural influence of the truth, these diverse effects could not be explained consistently with the maxim that like causes produce like effects. The same gospel inducements are offered to a congregation of sinners, and "some believe the things which are spoken and some believe not." It is not always the most docile, amiable or serious mind that yields; such unbelievers often remain callous to its appeals, while some ignorant, stubborn and hardened sinner is subdued. How is this? If the whole influence were in the truth preached, should not the effects show some regular relation to the cause? Should not the truth prevail where the natural obstacles are least, if it prevailed at all? Why do we see cases in which it fails before the weaker and triumphs over the stronger resistance? It is because, in one case, "the exceeding greatness of God's power" is behind that truth, and in the other case, is absent.

But if you deny the sovereign agency of the Holy Ghost in the new birth, you have a more impracticable case to explain. It is the case of him who had resisted this gospel for twenty, thirty, or fifty years, and has yet been subdued by it at last. If the truth had natural power within itself to persuade this soul, why did it not effect it at first? If it lacked that power, how does it come to effect the work at last, after so many failures? This mystery is enhanced for you by two great facts: the one is, that the futile presentation of this gospel-truth for so many years must, in accordance with the well known law of habit, have blunted the sensibilities of the soul, and rendered the story of redemption

trite and stale. If you know anything of human nature, you cannot but admit this result. Repetition must make any neglected story dull. That which at first somewhat excited the attention and sensibilities, urged so often in vain, must become as

"Irkesome as a twice told tale,
Vexing the dull ear of a drowsy man."

Familiarity and inattention must blunt the feelings toward such a story. The man who first approaches Niagara has his whole ear filled with that mighty, sullen roar of the waters, which shakes the very ground beneath his feet. The dwellers at the spot are so habituated to it by use that they forget to hear it at all! The ingenuous boy almost shudders at the first sight of blood, though it be only that of the bird he has brought down in his sport. See that person, when hardened by frequent scenes of carnage and death into the rugged soldier, insensible to the fall of his comrade by his side, and planting his foot with a jest upon human corpses, as he mounts to the "imminent, deadly breach."

The other fact which you must take into the account is, that while this sinner is growing more callous to sacred truth by its neglect, every active principle of ungodliness within him must be growing by its indulgence. Is any one ignorant of this law, that a propensity indulged is thereby strengthened? Need I bring instances to prove or illustrate it? How else does any man grow from bad to worse; how does the temperate drinker grow into a drunkard, the card-player into a gambler, save by the force of this law? It must be then that, while the sinner is neglecting the gospel, at the bidding of ungodliness, the love of the world, avarice, sensual lusts, self-will, pride, ambition, false shame, with every evil outward habit, are growing into giant strength.

This, then, is the case which you have to solve. Here is an influence, the natural force of sacred truth, which was fully plied to overcome the unbelief of the young heart, with every advantage of fresh interest. The tenderness of maternal love, the gentle and venerable authority of a father amidst the sweet sanctities of home, plied when the soul was still unformed, and in the plastic gristle of its childhood. But even in this tender heart the inborn power of ungodliness was too strong, the application utterly failed. But now, after this truth has been exhausted of its power by twenty, thirty, or it may be, fifty years

of useless presentation; and after this native ungodliness, too strong in its infancy, has been hardened by as many years of sin into the rugged bone of manhood, lo! the powerless truth suddenly becomes powerful! The stubborn sinner listens, feels and submits. Natural agencies cannot account for this. The finger of God is there. Let me suppose a parallel case. Years ago, suppose, when the trees which embower this forest sanctuary were lithe saplings, and I in the vigor of my first prime, you saw me lay hold of one of them with my hands, and attempt to tear it from its seat. But, though a sapling, it was too strong for me. Now years have rolled around, that tree has grown to a giant of the forest, and I return, no longer in the pride of youth, but a worn and tottering old man; and you, the same spectators, are here again. You see me go to that very tree, and attempt to wrench it from its place. You laugh scornfully; you say, "Does the old fool think he can pull up that sturdy oak? He was unable to do it before, when it was a sapling, and he was strong." Yes, but suppose the tree came up in his feeble hand? You would not laugh then. You would stand awe-struck, and say, "Something greater than nature is here."

And so say I, when I see the sturdy old sinner, hardened by half a century of sins and struggles against the truth, bow before that same old gospel story, which he had so often spurned. When I see the soul which was by nature dead in trespasses and sins, and which has been stiffening and growing more chill, under all the appliances of human instruction and persuasion, at the last, when the zeal and hope and strength of man are almost spent, suddenly quickened under our hands, I know that it is "the exceeding greatness of God's power (not ours) according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead."

Does any one attempt to escape this conclusion by saying that the new efficacy of the truth may have been derived from the superior force or eloquence of the orator who preached it on this occasion, or from the advantage of some such circumstance? I have two answers. One is, that there are no circumstances so auspicious, and no eloquence so persuasive as those which this soul has already resisted as an impenitent child. What eloquence is equal to that of the Christian mother, as she draws her beloved son to her knee, and tells him the history of Jesus'

love in accents tremulous with unutterable tenderness? Would that I could imitate it, while I beseech you to seek the new heart! The other answer is, that the plain facts and persuasives of the gospel are, in themselves, too infinite to receive any appreciable weight from the trivial incidents of a perspicuous statement and an eloquent tongue. In the simple story of the cross, with divine love there dying a shameful and bitter death for its guilty enemies, in the offer of a heaven of everlasting and unspeakable bliss, and the threat of an eternal and remediless hell, even if they be but intelligibly lisped in the feeble voice of a child, there should be a weight so immense that beside it all the enlargements of human rhetoric would be as naught. Ah, my brethren, man's skill of speech cannot weigh where Christ and eternity prove too light. It is as though that mighty mountain, whose ridges we scaled a few days ago, had been put in the balance against the mightier strength of your ungodliness, but could not counterpoise it. And then I come, and with my puny hand cast one little stone at the mountain's base, and say, "There, I have added to its weight; it will no longer prove too light." Such folly is it to expect that man can convert. Where the story of the cross has been resisted, naught can do it "save the exceeding greatness of his power."

Once more I argue, in the fifth place, from the uniform representations of the Scriptures. The picture which they give of man's spiritual state by nature proves the text. Your souls, before the new birth, are blind, "having the understanding darkened, because of the blindness of your heart" (Eph. iv. 18). They are "enmity to God" (Rom. viii. 7). They are "stony" (Ezek. xxxvi. 26). They are "dead in trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. 1). Do you object that these are tropes? Yes; but I suppose that the Spirit of all truth does not select tropes such that the figurative resemblance to the truths contained under them would be false. Now, then, can the blind eyes so admit the light as to open themselves thereby? Does obstinate enmity beget love out of itself? Does the stone imbue itself with softness? Does the dead corpse prepare its own resurrection?

Again: the images by which the Scriptures describe the great change are obviously chosen so as to teach that it is directly of God. It is a "new birth" of the Holy Ghost (John iii. 5). It is an "opening of blind eyes" (Psa. cxix. 18). It is a "new crea-

tion unto good works" (Eph. ii. 10). It is a "quickening of the dead" (Eph. ii. 5). Again I ask, Does the infant generate itself? Does the wood shape itself for the artisan into the form of utility he desires? Does the corpse raise itself to life? Then must the infant work before it existed; the wood exercise intelligence and will, and the dead body perform the prime action of life before it is alive!

And to this agree the express testimonies of the Word in other forms: "I have planted, Apollos watered; *but God gave the increase*" (1 Cor. iii. 6). They "that believe on his name are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John i. 13).

Every genuine conversion, then, reveals the quickening power of God's almighty Spirit; it is a supernatural work. But if it is according to the working of God's mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead, then it is as valid a proof that "the kingdom of God is come unto you" as though you witnessed a sensible miracle; it carries the same high responsibility to believe and love and obey the word of that kingdom.

But I pass by this corollary, to urge upon you, in conclusion, this one solemn thought: "Except ye be born again, ye cannot see the kingdom of God." You will never work this new birth of yourselves; you are absolutely dependent on the sovereign in-working of that God against whom you sin hourly. Unless he condescends to stoop and touch your stubborn heart, it will remain ungodly, just as surely as the corpse remains dead. All the zeal of religious teachers, all your own self-righteous resolutions and vows, will be assuredly vain. But your whole life, your every act now tends to alienate that almighty hand, on whose touch your salvation depends. How complete is this dependence! How mad your rebellion! Will you not now cease fighting against your only deliverer, and begin to cry, "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me?" (Psa. li. 10.)

I know the cavil with which impenitence excuses itself, and I know its emptiness. Will you object that my exhortation is contradictory to my doctrine? Will you tell me that if you are dependent on sovereign grace, and will never change your own hearts, then the only consistent effect of the teaching must be to

make you to fold your hands, and await in absolute apathy the almighty touch?

"Fold your hands," I reply, while you passively await God's help? Nay, your hand is stretched out every moment in active resistance to God's will and grace. Talk not to me of passivity, when the very nature of your soul is active, and that activity is ceaselessly directed by a rebellious will against God and duty. I would that you could become passive from sinning. Nor is it true that the Bible doctrine herein chills or represses your exertions after redemption; for, in truth, you do not believe in your real dependence. Would God that you did; would that you knew it as well as I do, for then we should see you, instead of coldly cavilling against facts and duty and grace, crying mightily unto God for his aid. It is not according to reason or nature that your clear knowledge of your coming ruin, and of your absolute dependence on help from above for deliverance, should paralyze effort or produce apathy. Here is a man whose house is hopelessly involved in flames. He is within, in an upper chamber, busily collecting his treasures, and he supposes that he has the means of escape wholly at his own command, to resort to them whenever he deemed it imprudent to venture farther. This notion, as you well know, will tempt him to postpone his escape, to venture near the utmost moment, to listen to the attractions of his wealth which he would fain rescue.

And this is just your delusion now. But meantime the man casually looks at the stairway without, by which he expected to escape, and finds to his surprise that it is wrapped in flames. He sees that he has no means of egress at his own command; unless assistance comes from without he is lost. Now, what does nature or reason prompt this man to do? That moment there is an end of his rash delays. No longer does he tamper with the rescue; his dearest treasures drop from his hands, and he runs to a window and shouts, "Help, help, or I am gone!"

So do you cry to God. It is the very thing, the only thing, which a helpless sinner, who is guilty for his very helplessness, should do. "Save, Lord, or I perish!"

THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH:

ITS NATURE, DESIGN AND PROPER OBSERVANCE.

IT must be confessed that the Christian world now presents an anomalous condition touching the Sabbath. Strict Protestants usually profess in theory the views once peculiar to Presbyterians, and admit that the proper observance of the Sabbath is a bulwark of practical Christianity. But their practice does not always correspond with their theory. In actual life there is, among good people, a great uncertainty, with a corresponding confusion of usages, from great laxity up to the sacred strictness of our pious forefathers. It is greatly to be feared that those in the church who tolerate this laxity are increasing in numbers and influence. The civil law, which guarantees the Sabbath rest to all as a secular benefit and right, is enforced with more and more difficulty, especially in populous places; and this law is disregarded with increasing boldness by powerful corporations and by those who offer amusements and sensual enjoyments to the public. Hence the wisest friends of truth and good have taken the alarm. The aim of this treatise is to give some humble help in this good cause by proving the divine and perpetual authority of God's holy day.

It will appear singular to the thoughtful observer that the consciences of devout and sincere persons leave them room for such license in their Sabbath observance, while in all other things they show themselves honest Christians, sincerely governed by their convictions of truth and duty. The explanation is, that men's convictions touching the claims of the Sabbath are not clear. And this confusion of opinions is to be traced to a fact of which many, perhaps, who experience its injurious effects are not aware: that the Protestant communions founded after the great Reformation were widely and avowedly divided in their opinions on this duty. In our mixed population in America the descen-

dants of these different communions live dispersed among each other, and oftentimes are found in the same churches. They have lost sight of the opposing doctrines, the one asserting that the Lord's day is still God's Sabbath, and the other denying it—doctrines once honestly held by their respective forefathers. But the usages, strict or loose, which consistently flowed from these convictions, scriptural or erroneous, cleave to the descendants. These lax customs, by example, influence multitudes of other Christians. Thus, many persons weakly lapse into breaches of the Sabbath law for which they have not even the partial excuse of an erroneous opinion honestly adopted; and they violate their own professed doctrine, feebly and unintelligently held, with a looseness of conscience greater than that of the European Protestants whom we condemn for avowedly neglecting the Sabbath. Hence, a brief historical statement will be instructive, and will prepare the way for our appeal to God's word. It will not be necessary for the purpose in view to encumber this statement with names and authorities, or to detail the names of the churches and men who held the one or the other side.

It may be said, in general terms, that since the days of primitive Christianity there has existed a difference of opinion in the Christian world as to the authority upon which the Lord's day should be observed. The Reformation did not extinguish, but rather defined and fixed, that difference. The wrong side, as we conceive it, was held not only by papists, but by some of the great Reformers, and error was by them planted in some of the Protestant churches. According to that opinion, the sanctification of one day from every seven was a ceremonial, typical and Levitical custom, and it was therefore abrogated when a better dispensation came, along with other shadows of spiritual blessings. These persons admit that the Lord's day deserves observance as a Christian festival, because it is a weekly memorial of the blessed resurrection, and because the example of the church and the enactments of her synods support it, but not because it is now a commandment of God. Weekly rest from worldly labors is a social and civil blessing, they say, very properly secured by the laws of the commonwealth, and so long as these laws are in force every good citizen must of course comply with them. Public and associated worship of God is also a scriptural duty of Christians. But, in order that they may join in these acts of worship, they

must agree upon some stated day and place; and what day so suitable as this first day of the week, which is already made a day of leisure from secular cares by the law of the commonwealth, crowned with pious associations and commemorative of the grand event of the gospel history, Christ's rising from the dead? But this, they say, is all. To sanctify the whole day as a religious rest under the supposed authority of a divine command is Judaizing; it is burdening our necks with the bondage of a merely positive and typical ceremony which belonged to a darker dispensation.

The second opinion is that embodied in the Westminster Confession; and to the honor of the Presbyterian branches of the Protestant body it may be asserted that these have been, since the Reformation, the most intelligent and decided supporters of it. These Christians believe that the sanctification of some stated portion of time, such as God may select, to his worship, is a duty of a perpetual obligation for all ages, dispensations and nations, as truly as the other unchangeable duties of morals and religion; and that the Sabbath command has been to this extent always a "moral" one, as distinguished from a "positive," ceremonial" one. They believe that God selected one-seventh as his proper portion of time at the creation, at Sinai, and again at the incoming of the last dispensation. But when the ceremonial law was for a particular, temporary purpose added to the original, patriarchal dispensation, the seventh day became also for a time a Levitical holy day and a type. This temporary feature has of course passed away with the Jewish institutions. Upon the resurrection of Christ the original Sabbath obligation was by God fixed upon the first day of the week, because this day completed a second work even more glorious and beneficent than the world's creation, by the rising of Christ from the tomb. Hence, from that date to the end of the world the Lord's day is, by

¹ Most of God's commands are simply expressions of the essential and unchangeable rightness of the things commanded, as when we are enjoined to speak truth and love God. These precepts divines call "moral" or "permanent moral." The things are commanded because they are right in themselves. But some things God commands or forbids for wise reasons which, without his precept, would not be of themselves right or wrong. Such was the prohibition to the Jews to eat swine's flesh. These precepts the divines term "positive." The things are right or wrong only so long as, and only because, God enjoins and prohibits them. Many ceremonial commands, rules about ceremonies, are of this kind.

divine and apostolic authority, substantially what the Sabbath day was originally to God's people. It is literally the "Christian Sabbath," and is to be observed with the same sanctity as it was by the patriarchs.

The great synod which most truly in modern ages propounded this doctrine of the Lord's day was the Westminster Assembly. Its Confession of Faith is now the standard of the Scotch, the Irish and the American Presbyterian Churches, as well as of some independent bodies. It puts the truth so luminously that its words, though familiar to many readers, are repeated here as the best statement of what is to be proved in the subsequent discussion;¹

"As it is of the law of nature, that, in general, a due proportion of time be set apart for the worship of God, so in his word, by a positive, moral and perpetual commandment, binding all men in all ages he hath particularly appointed one day in seven for a Sabbath, to be kept holy unto him: which, from the beginning of the world to the resurrection of Christ, was the last day of the week, and from the resurrection of Christ was changed into the first day of the week, which in Scripture is called the Lord's day, and is to be continued to the end of the world as the Christian Sabbath.

"This Sabbath is then kept holy unto the Lord when men, after a due preparing of their hearts and ordering of their common affairs beforehand, do not only observe an holy rest all the day from their own works, words and thoughts about their worldly employments and recreations, but also are taken up the whole time in the public and private exercises of his worship and in the duties of necessity and mercy."

The attempt will now be made to give a brief and plain statement of the grounds upon which this position rests. And,

I. The Sabbath law is contained in the Decalogue. None will dispute this proposition: That if this is "a positive moral and perpetual commandment, binding all men in all ages," the change from the Jewish to the Christian dispensation has not removed its divine authority over us. Not being "positive and ceremonial," like the Jewish rules of meats, new moons and sacrifices, it has not passed away along with the other Jewish shadows. Let us, then, test the truth of the former position, that

¹ Westminster Confession of Faith, XXI., Secs. 7, 8.

the Sabbath command in the Decalogue was "moral and perpetual."

The argument will pursue this plain and fair course: If this command was not for the first time introduced by the Levitical economy, but was in full force before, and if it was binding not on Jews only, but on all men, then the abrogation of that dispensation cannot have abrogated it, because it did not institute it.

We are but using logic parallel to that which the apostle Paul employs in a similar case. He is proving that the gospel promise made to the Hebrews in Abraham could not have been retracted when the law was published on Sinai. His argument is (Gal. iii. 17): "The covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul." So reason we: if the Sabbath was instituted long before, it did not come with Judaism, and does not go with it. It is instructive to note that those Christian Fathers who gave countenance to the idea that the divine injunction of the Sabbath was abrogated also leaned to the opinion that the Sabbath was of Mosaic origin. This indirectly confirms the soundness of our inference, while it betrays their slender acquaintance with the Old Testament Scriptures. The anti-Sabbath opinion in the Christian church had its origin in error and ignorance among the early, uninspired teachers.

It may be argued that the Sabbath is of moral and perpetual authority from these facts: There is a reason in the nature of things, making such an institution essential to man's religious welfare and duty; and this necessity is substantially the same in all ages and nations. That it is man's duty to worship God none with whom we now deal will dispute. Nor will it be denied that this worship should be in part social, because man is a being of social affections and subject to social obligations, and because one of the great ends of worship is the display of the divine glory before our fellow-creatures. Social worship cannot be conducted without the appointment of a stated day; and who can authoritatively appoint that day except the God who is the object of the worship? For the cultivation of our individual devotion and piety a periodical season is absolutely necessary to creatures of habit and finite capacities like us. What is not regularly done will soon be omitted, for we are dependent on habit; and of this, periodical recurrence is the very foundation. We are by nature

carnal and sensuous beings; we are prone to walk by sense instead of faith. The things which are seen, but temporal, are ever obscuring the things which are unseen, but eternal. If such creatures were left to themselves to appropriate to spiritual interests only such irregular seasons as they should select of their own motion, it is very plain that the final issue would be the total neglect and omission of the interests of eternity. This conclusion is fully confirmed by experience, for among nominal Christians, where the Sabbath is entirely neglected, the result is always a practical godlessness among the people; and it is believed that even among Mohammedans and pagans the employment of some stated holy days has been found essential to the existence of those religions. The tribes which have no holy day, the obligation of whose observance is believed by them to be from their gods, are those which, like the Bushmen of South Africa and the Australian blacks, are almost as devoid of religious ideas and as degraded as the apes of their native wilds. It seems absolutely necessary that man's unstable religious sentiments be fixed for him by having them attached by divine authority to a sacred day and an appointed worship.

But it is a well-known maxim in morals, that when a certain work is obligatory, the necessary means for its performance are equally obligatory. The question whether the Sabbath command is moral or positive seems, therefore, to admit of a very simple solution. Whether one day in six or one in eight might not have seemed to the divine wisdom admissible for its purpose, or which day of the seven, the first or the last, should be consecrated to it, or what ought to be the particular forms of its worship,—these things, we admit, are of merely positive institution, and may be changed by the divine Legislator. But that man shall have his stated period of worship enjoined upon him is as truly a dictate of the natural conscience and as immediate a result of our relation to God as that man shall worship his God at all. And no reason can be shown why this obligation was more or less stringent upon Israelites of the Mosaic period than on men before or since them.

Having found the observance of some stated and recurring season essential to that worship of God which is naturally and perpetually incumbent on us, we ask, by whom shall the season be selected or enforced?—by man or by God! If the great duty

of worship is essentially and morally binding, this necessary provision for compliance is also essentially and morally binding. Whose is the reasonable and natural authority for providing and enforcing it?—the creature's or the Lord's? To ask this question is to answer it. Obviously, this provision ought to be fixed by the Lord, to whom the worship is due. It is his right to settle it. He alone has the authority to enforce it. The purposes of social and concerted worship require *uniformity* in the season. Now, the Jew says that each seventh day, the Christian says that each first day, is the proper season. If this is left to mere human authority, the Christian has no more right to dictate his preference to the Jew than the Jew to force his on the Christian. No uniformity can be had. Clearly, the selecting and enforcing of the proper day does not belong to Jew or Christian, but to the divine Lord.

We argue further, that the enactment of the Sabbath law does not date from Moses, but was coeval with the human race. It is one of the first two institutions of Paradise. The sanctification of the day took place from the very end of the week of creation. For whose observance was the day, then, consecrated or set apart, if not for man's? Not for God's observance, because the glorious paradox is forever true of him that his blessed quiet is as everlasting as his ceaseless activity. Not for the angels', surely. But for Adam's. Doubtless, Eden witnessed the sacred rest of him and his consort from

“the toil
Of their sweet gardening labor, which sufficed
To recommend cool zephyr, and made ease
More easy, wholesome thirst and appetite
More grateful.”

And from that time downward we have indications, brief indeed, but as numerous as we can expect in the compendious record of Genesis, and sufficient to show us that the Sabbath continued to be an institution of the patriarchal religion. A slight probable evidence of this may be seen in the fact that *seven* has ever been a sacred and symbolical number among ancient patriarchs, Israelites and pagans. In Genesis we read of the “seven clean beasts,” the “seven well-favored” and “seven lean kine,” the “seven ears of corn, rank and good.” Now, there is no natural sign in the heavens or earth to suggest the number, for no heav-

only body or natural element revolves in precisely seven months, days or hours, nor do any of man's external members number seven. Whence, then, the peculiar idea attached so early to the number, if not from the institution of the week for our first parents?

But to proceed to more solid facts. The "end of days" or "return of days" (Gen. iv. 3), rendered in our version "process of time," at which Cain and Abel offered their sacrifices, was most likely the end of the week, the Sabbath day. In Gen. vii. 10 we find God himself observing the weekly interval in the preparations for the flood. We find another clear hint of the observance of this weekly division of time by Noah and his family in their floating prison. In Gen. viii. 10-12 the patriarch twice waited a period of seven days to send out his dove. From Gen. xxix. 27 we learn that it was customary among the patriarchs of Mesopotamia in the days of Laban to continue a wedding-festival a week; and the very term of service rendered by Jacob for his two wives shows the use made of the number seven as the customary duration of a contract for domestic service. Gen. l. 10 shows us that at the time of Jacob's death a week was also the length of the most honorable funeral exercises. In Exod. xii. 3-20 we find the first institution of the passover, when as yet there were no Levitical institutions. This feast was also appointed to last a week. In Exod. xvi. 22-30, where we read the first account of the manna, we find the Sabbath observance already in full force; and no candid mind will say that this is the history of its first enactment. It is spoken of as a rest with which the people ought to have been familiar. But the people had not yet come to Sinai, and none of its institutions had been given. Here, then, we have the Sabbath rest enforced on Israel before the ceremonial law was set up, and two weekly variations wrought in the standing miracle of the manna in order to facilitate its observance.

This fact is so fatal to the doctrine that the Sabbath was only a Levitical ordinance that opponents have attempted to deny the force of it. They say that Moses now, for the first time, anticipating the law of Sinai by a few days, gave the Hebrews the Sabbath on the occasion of the manna's beginning to fall. They would have us believe that the people had never heard of the Sabbath before. This construction they force on the twenty-

third verse: "And he said unto them, This is that which the Lord hath said: To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord," etc. But we answer: Moses does not say or imply that this was *the first time* the Lord said the seventh day was holy. On the contrary, the drift of the whole narrative shows that the Lord was now, by Moses, referring the people to their former knowledge of the sanctity of the Sabbath as an explanation of their finding no manna on that day. ¶ No fair reader can compare the words with Gen. ii. 3 without seeing this. But especially does the twenty-second verse of chap. xvi. prove our view and refute the other. The people had, on the sixth day, already begun to make preparations for the rest of the seventh by gathering two portions of manna, before Moses or the elders had said one word to them about it! Their doing so was what prompted the elders to make the inquiry of Moses. Thus it appears beyond question that the Hebrews did know of God's command to hallow the Sabbath, and were in the general (not universal) habit of honoring it, before ever the manna had fallen or Moses had said a word about the duty.

But let us proceed to Sinai. When the Sabbath command is there repeated it is stated in terms which clearly imply that it was known before and that its obligation was only reaffirmed. The fourth command begins: "*Remember* the Sabbath day to keep it holy." It is not accurate to call on people to remember what they had never heard before. None of the other commands begin thus. But others, if not all of them, were old commands, known to God's people before. Yet the fourth alone begins with the call to remember. This makes the language more expressive, and it indicates plainly this thought: that in the fourth commandment God considered himself as only requiring the same duty taught to Adam.

It is argued further, that the very fact that this precept has its place in the awful "ten words" is itself evidence enough that it is no mere positive and ceremonial command, but one moral and perpetual.

Confessedly, there is nothing else ceremonial here. An eminent distinction was given to these ten commands by the mode in which God delivered them. They were given first of all the laws enacted at Horeb. They were spoken in the hearing of all the people by God's own voice of thunder, which formed its

tremendous sounds into syllables so loud that the whole multitude around the base of the mount heard them break articulate from the cloud upon its peak. "These words the LORD spake unto all your assembly in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud and of the thick darkness, with a great voice; *and he added no more*" (Deut. v. 22). No other words shared the same distinction. Then they were engraved, by God's own agency, on two stone tables, whose durability was to represent the perpetual obligation of all that was written upon them. How can it be believed that one ceremonial precept was thrust in here where all else is of obligation as old and as universal and as lasting as the race? There is no ceremonial rule on the two tables. This conclusion is confirmed by another fact: the two tables were made "tables of the testimony," and for holding them the sacred ark was made, called the "ark of the testimony," covered with the mercy-seat and crowned by the Shekinah, the bright symbol of God's presence. This fact showed that this law written on the stones was the permanent bond of God's covenant with his church—the very law which the great, divine High Priest came to honor, and whose breaches are covered only by the blood of Calvary.

We find, again, that the ground assigned in the commandment is the same as in Genesis, and is in no sense Jewish or local or temporary. God's work of creation in six days and his rest upon the seventh have just as much relation to one tribe of Adam's descendants as to another. To appreciate the force of this we must notice, on the other hand, that when ceremonial commands are given which are peculiar to the Jews, such as the passover, a Jewish event is assigned as its ground, as the deliverance from Egypt.

The early traditions of the pagans are, of course, of no divine authority to us, yet they give an interesting support to the lesson taught us in Genesis and Exodus, showing that even these idolaters once knew that the Sabbath was a primeval institution ordained for all nations. No one will imagine that Homer and Hesiod, for instance, borrowed from the Old Testament sabbatical allusions which would have been unintelligible to their pagan readers. These poets evidently refer to the popular traditions which these Greek descendants of Japheth carried to the "Isles of Chittim." A few of the early allusions to a Sabbath will be borrowed from the writings of Clement of Alexandria, a learned

Christian of the second century, inasmuch as he has made them ready to our hands. He remarks: "That the seventh day is sacred, not the Hebrews only, but the Gentiles also acknowledge, according to which the whole universe of living and vegetable things revolve. Hesiod, for instance (*Dierum*, 6), says of it, 'The first and the fourth and the seventh also is a sacred day.' And again he exclaims: 'The seventh day once more, the splendid dawn of the sun.' And Homer sings, 'The seventh then arrived, the sacred day.' Again, 'The seventh was sacred.' Once more, 'The seventh dawn was at hand, and with this all this series is completed.'" Clement also quotes the poet Callimachus as saying, "It was now the sabbath day, and with this all was accomplished." "The seventh day is among the fortunate; yea, the seventh is the parent day." "The seventh day is the first, and the seventh is the complement." "This day the elegies of Solon also proclaim as more sacred, in a wonderful mode." Thus far Clement *Præparatio Evang.*

The ancient Jewish historian, Josephus, in his last book against Apion, affirms "that there could be found no city, either of the Grecians or barbarians, who owned not a seventh day's rest from labor." The learned Jew, Philo, called it the "festival of all nations."

The most emphatic uninspired testimony is also the most valuable because of its antiquity. The late Mr. George Smith, famous for his Assyrian researches, says: "In the year 1869, I discovered, among other things, a curious religious calendar of the Assyrians, in which every month is divided into four weeks, and the seventh days, or 'sabbaths,' are marked out as days on which no work should be undertaken" (*Assyrian Discoveries*, p. 12). H. Fox Talbot, in his translation of these creation-tablets, renders two lines thus:

"On the seventh day he appointed a holy day,
And to cease from all business he commanded."

He also says: "This fifth tablet is very important, because it affirms clearly, in my opinion, that the origin of the Sabbath was coeval with the creation." So the Rev. A. H. Sayce (*Trans. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, Vol. v., pp. 427, 428). Mr. Sayce has translated the rules for each day of the month. Those for the seventh day (which is called "sabbath" and "day of completion") forbid the

prince on that day to eat cooked fruits and birds, to change his garments, to legislate or appoint office-holders, to take medicine; and requires him to make his sacrifice to God on that day.

There is another convincing proof that the Sabbath never was a merely Levitical institution, which is found in the fact that in the very law of the Decalogue God commands its observance equally by Jews and Gentiles: "In it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, *nor thy stranger that is within thy gates.*" This stranger was the foreigner residing in the land of Israel. To see the convincing force of this fact the reader must contrast the jealous care with which the "stranger," the pagan foreigner sojourning in Jewry, was excluded from all share in the Levitical worship. No foreigner could partake of the passover; it was sacrilege. It was at the peril of his life that he presumed to enter the inner courtyard of the temple, where the bloody sacrifice was offered. Now, when this foreigner is required to keep the Sabbath along with the families of Israel, does not this prove that rest to be no ceremonial, no type like the passover and the altar, but a universal moral institution designed for all nations and times?

Once more. That the Sabbath of the Decalogue was not a ceremonial command is proved by the fact that its violation was made a capital offence. (See Exod. xxxi. 14.) No ceremonial command was thus enforced. Even circumcision, fundamental as it was to the whole economy, was not thus fenced up. Its neglect, of course, excluded a man from the church, but it incurred no capital penalty.

Care has been taken to establish this assertion on an immovable basis, because the inference from it is so direct. If the Sabbath command was in full force before Moses, the passing away of Moses' law did not revoke it. If it always was binding, on grounds as general as the human race, over all tribes of mankind, the dissolution of God's special covenant with the family of Jacob did not repeal it. If the nature of the Sabbath is moral and practical, then the substitution of the substance for the types did not supplant it. The ceremonial laws were temporary, because the need for them was temporary. They were removed because the church no longer required them. But the practical need of a Sabbath is the same in all ages. When we are made to see

that the sanctification of this day is the bulwark of practical religion in the world; that it goes hand-in-hand everywhere with piety and the true knowledge of God; that where there is no Sabbath there is at last no Christianity, it becomes incredible to us that God would make the institution temporary. The necessity for a Sabbath has not ceased; therefore the command has not been revoked It is a perpetual moral command, and moral commands are as incapable of repeal as the nature of God, on which they are founded, is of change. Hence we conclude that the command, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy," stands just as binding upon us now as any other of the ten. The New Testament writers and our Lord Jesus always speak of the other nine commands, and comment upon them, as permanent and unalterable: "It is easier for heaven and earth to pass than one tittle of the law to fail." The Sabbath command stands as one among the precepts of this permanent law, resting on grounds equally moral and universal.

But it is objected that the seventh-day Sabbath is declared to have been to the Hebrews a peculiar institution, and even a sign or type, having the ground of its injunctions in their own special history and enjoined only as a badge of their own special theocratic covenant with God. Thus, in Deut. v. 15 the deliverance from Egypt is mentioned as the ground of the command: "And remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence, through a mighty hand and by a stretched-out arm; therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the Sabbath day." It is sought to push this text to mean that to the rest of God's people, who did not share the exodus from Egypt, there is no ground for observing any Sabbath.

That this is utterly foreign from Moses' intent appears thus: The exodus from Egypt is the express preface to the first command (and so to the whole Decalogue), both here in Deut. v. 6 and in Exod. xx. 2. This notable argument would prove, then, were it worth anything, that because we did not share the exodus from Egypt we are not bound by the great command, against idolatry, nor indeed by any of the Decalogue! It is worthless.

Again: In Exod. xx. 11 a worldwide and permanent ground for the Sabbath command is assigned: "For in six days the Lord

made heaven and earth," etc, while nothing is said about the exodus. The explanation is clear. The Hebrews had all the reasons to keep the Sabbath which the whole human race has—God's sanctifying it at the creation of the race and commanding it to all the race. But they had this additional reason: that God had now blessed them above all other tribes. Hence they were bound by gratitude also to keep the Sabbath.

Again: It is objected that God made the Sabbath 'a sign' between him and the Hebrews (Exod. xxxi. 13-17; Ezek. xx. 12, 20). The attempt is made to infer hence that the Sabbath was a mere type to the Hebrews, and thus has passed away like all the other types, since the antitype, Christ, came. Again I reply: If its being "a sign" between God and Israel proves it a type, then the same argument proves that the great first law of love itself was a type, and has been abrogated; for in Deut. vi. 6, Israel is commanded to make this "a sign." Such is the absurdity of this argument. Moreover: the Decalogue itself is called again and again the "testimony," and the very chest in which the two tablets of stone, written with the commandments, were kept, is called "the ark of the testimony" (Exod. xxv. 16, 21; xxxi. 18; xxxii. 15; xxxiv. 29; Ps. lxxviii. 5). If the reader would see how near this word "testimony" is to the other word "sign," let him read Josh. xxii. 26-34. (The word is the same in the main.) Let him compare also Ruth iv. 7, where the shoe "was a testimony in Israel." The idea of the "sign" between God and Israel, and of the witness between them, is there nearly the same. Hence I argue again: if the Sabbath being "a sign" proves it a mere type, the Ten Commandments being a "testimony" or "witness" proves them a mere type.

To understand this "sign" we must remember that all the world except the Hebrews had gone off into idolatry, neglecting all God's laws and also the proper observance of his Sabbath. The covenant which Israel made with him was, to be separate from all the pagans and to obey his law, so neglected by them. Now, the public observance of the Sabbath gave the most obvious, general, visible sign to the world and the church of this covenant, and of the difference between God's people and pagans. Hence it was eminently suitable as a sign of that covenant. The human race is still divided between the world and the church; and holy Sabbath observance ought to be precisely such a "sign" of the

church's relation to her God now. This simple view relieves the whole question. The general apostasy of the nations made this duty of visible Sabbath-keeping, which God enjoins on all men of all ages, a badge and mark of those who still fear him.

It should be noted also that the phrase "sabbaths," as used in the Pentateuch, means the other Jewish festivals as well as the seventh day. Thus in Lev. xxv. 2, 4, "sabbath" means the sabbatical year. In Lev. xix. 3, 30 it probably includes all the annual festivals of religion. In Lev. xvi. 31 it means the great day of atonement, which, coming on the tenth day of the seventh month each year, might be any other day as well as the seventh. In Lev. xxiii. 24 it means the day of the new moon, which might be on any day of the week.

Finally, the subsequent parts of the Old Testament teach us that Sabbath observance was, to the believing Hebrew, a spiritual and not a ceremonial duty. The ninety-second Psalm is entitled, by inspiration, "A psalm or song for the Sabbath day." Every sentiment there is evangelical, and the believer's chief joy in the day is in the foretaste it gives of the everlasting rest.

In Isa. lvi. 4-8 we have the following words: "For thus saith the Lord unto the eunuchs that keep my sabbaths and choose the things that please me, and take hold of my covenant; even unto them will I give in mine house, and within my walls, a place and a name better than of sons and of daughters: I will give them an everlasting name that shall not be cut off. Also the sons of the stranger that join themselves to the Lord, to serve him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants, every one that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, and taketh hold of my covenant; even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer: their burnt-offerings and sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar: for mine house shall be called a house of prayer for all people. The Lord God which gathereth the outcasts of Israel saith: Yet will I gather others to him, beside those that are gathered unto him."

Let it be noted that here Sabbath observance receives a blessing for Gentiles as well as Jews, and that this blessing is associated with that full ingathering of Gentile believers which was predicted to attend the Messianic dispensation, when Zion should be a house of prayer for all nations. How could words more strongly indicate that the Sabbath belongs to both dispensations?

But the language of Isa. lviii. 13, 14 is still stronger: "If thou turn away thy foot from the sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words; then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."

Let the reader observe here that the main scope of this fifty-eighth chapter of Isaiah is to dissuade the Jews from a ceremonial righteousness by showing its worthlessness when unaccompanied by spiritual holiness. They are ardently urged to offer God, instead of ritual service, the duties of inward righteousness, and especially of charity. To these the blessing is promised. Now, it is in this connection that the prophet also urges a spiritual Sabbath observance, and to it he repeats the same promises. He also connects this right kind of Sabbath observance immediately with the glorious Messianic triumphs of Zion, which, as we know from all the subsequent history, occur only under the new dispensation. Nowhere does Isaiah better deserve than here the title of "the evangelical prophet." It is simply impossible for the candid reader to take in the anti-ceremonial aim of the whole passage, and to believe that Isaiah here thought of Sabbath observance as only a typical duty.

II. But it is said that the New Testament does repeal the obligation of the Sabbath, and that in the face of this new teaching of Christ and his apostles the plainest seeming inferences must give way. Let us, then, consider these passages carefully and candidly. Let us weigh them honestly, listen fairly to all that the learned enemies of the Sabbath have to argue from them, and grapple manfully with their real teachings. We will refer the reader to every verse in the New Testament which has been supposed to bear on the question.

The first we notice are those contained, with some slight variations, in the parallel places of Matt. xii. 1-8; Mark ii. 23-28; Luke vi. 1-5. Matthew's narrative is, on the whole, the fullest:

"At that time Jesus went on the sabbath day through the corn [wheat or barley]; and his disciples were an hungered, and began to pluck the ears of corn, and to eat. But when the

Pharisees saw it, they said unto him, Behold, thy disciples do that which is not lawful to do on the sabbath day. But he said unto them, Have ye not read what David did, when he was an hungered, and they that were with him; how he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shew-bread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests? Or have ye not read in the law, how that on the sabbath days the priests in the temple profane the sabbath, and are blameless? But I say unto you that in this place is One greater than the temple. But if ye had known what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the guiltless. For the Son of man is Lord even of the sabbath day."

Now, it is claimed that these words of our Saviour modify, and, to a certain extent, repeal the Sabbath law with a view to the new dispensation. The attempt is made to sustain this by pointing to the fact that Jesus here illustrates his point by referring to two other merely ceremonial or positive instances, by which they think he intimates that the Sabbath was as much a positive ceremony as the shew-bread, and thus as reasonably liable to repeal.

The reader, upon supplying from the second and third evangelists what is omitted in the first, will find that our Lord advances five distinct ideas.

His hungry disciples, passing along the footpath through the fields of ripe grain, had availed themselves of the permission of Deut. xxiii. 25, to pluck, rub out and eat some grains of wheat or barley as a slight refreshment. The Pharisees, eager to find fault, cavilled that Christ had thus permitted his followers to break the Sabbath law by preparing food in sacred time, making this ado about the plucking, rubbing and winnowing of a few heads of grain with their hands as they walked. In defence of them and himself our Saviour says, in the first place, that their hunger was a necessity which justified their departure from the letter of the law in this case, as did David's necessity when, fleeing for his life, he innocently used the shew-bread to appease his hunger. Second, that the example of the priests, who performed necessary manual labor about the temple, such as skinning and dressing the sacrifices, cleaning the altar and such like, on the Sabbath, and were blameless, justified what his disciples

had done. Third, that God prefers compliance with the spirit of his law, calling for humanity, love and mercy, to mere observance of its outer form. For, fourth, God's design in instituting the Sabbath had been a humane one, seeing he designed it not, as the Pharisees regarded their observances, as a galling asceticism, burdensome to the worshipper, and ministering only to his self-righteousness, but as a means of promoting the true welfare of his servants. And lastly, that he himself, as the Messiah, was the supreme and present authority in maintaining the Sabbath law, as well as all others of his laws; so that it was enough that he acquitted his disciples of sin; and this pretended zeal for God in the presence of the Supreme Lawgiver, God incarnate, was officious and impertinent. Had his disciples really committed an infraction of his Sabbath law, he could have seen to his own rights and honor without the Pharisees' deceitful help. The consistency of this simple view with itself, and the perfectness of its logic in rebuking the cavillers, are a sufficient proof of its faithfulness to the Saviour's meaning.

Now, the modern opponents of our doctrine would have us believe that our Saviour here exerts his Messianic authority to introduce, for the first time, the freer and more lenient law of the Sabbath for the new dispensation, and to repeal the Mosaic. It will appear that this is a sheer blunder, a bald misconception of the whole case, and the short and simple proof is, that *the Sabbath, as it ought to be observed by Jews under the Mosaic laws*, is what our Saviour is here expounding. The new dispensation had not yet come, and was not to begin until Pentecost. After all this discussion Jesus Christ scrupulously observed every point of the Mosaic law up to his death. He was engaged in the celebration of a Mosaic ordinance, the passover, at the very hour his murderers were arranging for his destruction; it was the last free act of his life. The whole Scriptures concur in teaching us that the change of dispensation resulted only from his death and resurrection. Until those acts were completed the types were unfulfilled, and the grounds of the old dispensation all remained. At the time of this discussion Christ was living as a member of the Jewish church, for our sakes "fulfilling all its righteousness." If, then, anything were here relaxed, it would be the Mosaic Sabbath, as Jews should keep it, which is the subject of alteration. But there is no repeal of anything: only an explanation.

To represent the passage as a change of an Old Testament law for Old Testament members would not help the cause of our opponents a particle; and, moreover, it is a thing which could not happen, as the Old Testament laws were all perfectly permanent until the time came for the change of dispensation.

The careful reader will see that our Saviour does not plead for any relaxation of the Sabbath law in favor of his disciples; he only asks a correct exposition. The whole drift of his argument is to prove that when it is correctly understood how God intended Jews to keep his Sabbath law, it will appear that his disciples have not, by this act, broken it at all. They need no lowering of its claims in order to escape condemnation.

Bearing this important fact in mind, let us proceed to the second erroneous inference. This is, that our Saviour, by illustrating the Sabbath law from two ceremonial instances, intimates that the Sabbath also was but a Jewish ceremony. But when one observes how the Jewish Scriptures commingle what we call "moral" and "positive" precepts, and how uniformly the Hebrew mind seems to ignore the distinction, this inference will be seen to be utterly worthless. The Jew, in his practical views of duty, never paused to separate the two classes of precepts. Thus, Moses in Exodus connects solemn prohibitions against idolatry with injunctions not to hew the stones for an altar, against eating flesh torn of beasts in the field and bearing false witness. Ezekiel (ch. xviii.) conjoins eating upon the mountains and taking interest upon a loan with idolatry and oppression, in his charges against the Jews of his day. Yea, we see the apostles themselves (Acts xv.), warning the Gentile believers in the same breath against fornication and eating a strangled fowl. We do not argue from these facts against the existence of our distinction of "moral" from "positive"; we only show how utterly unwarrantable it is to argue that both of two precepts must be positive only because the sacred writers connect the one with another which is such.

It is inferred again, from Christ's third remark, that the Sabbath command must be ceremonial, because he teaches that the obligation for its observance should give place to that of mercy. This, they suppose, must be on the principle that positive or ceremonial commands give place to those which are moral and perpetual. One reply is, that so do moral duties of a lower

grade give place to those of a higher in some cases. Thus there is a natural, moral and perpetual obligation to worship God, yet any and every form of God's worship would be righteously suspended for a time to save a man perishing in the water. This duty of humanity would take precedence of the other duty of religious worship for the time, because of its greater urgency; an hour later God might still be worshipped acceptably, but the man would be drowned. Prov. xxi. 3 expresses precisely this truth in these words: "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice." Both in this place and in our Saviour's citation from the prophet Samuel, whose words he quotes, "sacrifice" stands for religious worship in general. This, surely, is not a duty merely ceremonial and positive, yet it is righteously postponed to mercy. Then, our Saviour's postponing a given point of Sabbath observance to mercy does not prove that this is merely ceremonial and positive.

A second answer is, that circumstances may greatly modify the details of duties of the most permanent character. Does any one dispute that the obligation to honor one's parents is a moral and permanent one of very high order? If parents are aged and dependent, this honor doubtless includes maintenance. Thus it might be a most urgent and binding duty of a son in England to furnish his aged parents with fuel, while no such obligation would rest on the son of such parents in India, because in that warm climate nobody needs or uses fires in the sitting-rooms. How simple is this! Then it is equally plain that no one is entitled to infer that the Sabbath command is only ceremonial because circumstances alter the times and details of observance.

But the force of the inference is entirely destroyed by the fact that it was not a failure of Sabbath observance which Christ was excusing. He declares that there had been no delinquency. The accused disciples were "guiltless." He explains their act as an incidental labor of necessity, strictly consistent with proper Sabbath observance. There was no overriding of one obligation by another more imperious to be explained.

The perverted gloss of the fourth point, "The Sabbath was made for man," is almost too shallow to need exposure. These writers seem to think that our Saviour meant that God did not design to cramp any man by the Sabbath law, but to allow it to

yield in every way to the creature's convenience and gratification. But what Christ here says is that the design of the Sabbath is a humane one; that is, man's true welfare. Then it must be settled what that true welfare is, and how it may be best promoted, before we may conclude that God allows us to do what we please with his holy day. If it turns out that man's true welfare imperatively demands a Sabbath day, fenced with divine authority and faithfully observed, then the humanity of God's motive in appointing it will argue anything else than this license inferred from it. It may be added that a moment's thought of the Pharisees' religious system will show us what ideas our Saviour was exploding by the statement that "the Sabbath was made for man." The religion of that austere and proud sect was intensely self-righteous and formal, and, to a certain degree, ascetic. It was a religion, not of love and holiness, but of fear and slavish forms. Their idea of a religious observance was not that of a blessed means of grace, but of an ascetic burden, by bearing which a man might imagine he was making merit, and that a merit proportioned to the irksomeness and difficulty of the form he forced himself to go through with. Now, such people as these would very naturally think that the more burdensome they made their Sabbaths to themselves by heaping on particulars of man's invention the more merit they would get. Hence they blamed the disciples for their little act of labor. Our Saviour evidently designs by these words to teach them that they wholly misunderstood the purpose of the Mosaic Sabbath. God did not require the Hebrews, nor any one else, to keep it as a means of ascetic self-punishment, like the papist's hair shirt, but he required them to keep it intelligently and from the heart, as an appointed and blessed means of grace. The pangs of hunger may be a very fit self-punishment if the purpose is that of the self-righteous monk, to make a fancied merit by torturing himself for nothing. But as there is no true religion in bodily hunger, and as it ordinarily interferes with Bible study and devotion, of course God's idea in giving the Hebrews a Sabbath to sanctify implied that a proper part of that sanctification was for them to eat when they really needed to eat.

But we turn our Saviour's declaration, that "the Sabbath was made *for man*," directly against its adversaries. The word "man" is used in its generic sense—the race. Here, then, we

are divinely taught that the Sabbath was made not for the Jews, but for the race, which is precisely our doctrine.

The concluding words of our Saviour in Matthew have suggested an argument which is a little more plausible. We even find one of the great Reformers paraphrasing those words thus: "The Son of man, agreeably to his authority, is able to relax the Sabbath day just as the other legal ceremonies." And again: "Here he saith that power is given to him to release his people from the necessity of observing the Sabbath." The inference he would draw is, that then the Sabbath must be a ceremonial institution, for we have ourselves argued that moral and permanent laws are founded on the unchangeable nature of God, and will never be changed, because he cannot change. But we deny the exposition. It gives an utterly mistaken and perverted view of our Saviour's real meaning. Our Saviour's own words are: "*For the Son of Man is Lord even of the Sabbath.*" Now, the conjunction "*for*" was undoubtedly our Lord's own word, and he makes it emphatic. But these expositors strangely and criminally neglect its force altogether. We see how an erroneous notion of the meaning blinded them. All careful students of the Bible know that this conjunction "*for*" is usually placed by a sacred writer to introduce the words which state the ground or reason of that which he had just asserted: "Watch, therefore, *for* ye know neither the day nor the hour when the Son of man cometh." The fact that we do not know the day is given as the *reason why* we are told to watch. It is always safest criticism to give its usual force if the sense of the passage will bear it. Let us do so here. Then the meaning is, that the Messiah's being Lord of the Sabbath day is the *reason why* these disciples are innocent.

The Saviour's reasoning is in substance this: "These men, blamed by you Pharisees, are innocent. I saw them pluck and eat the grain. It is enough that I do not forbid them; for I am the Lord of this Sabbath day. This law is my law. I was the person who published it from the top of Mount Sinai, as the divine Angel of the covenant. It is my authority which sustains it. Hence, if I am satisfied with this act of these men, that is proof enough of their innocence."

Such reasoning is clear; and it is conclusive and unanswerable, as the arguments of the Saviour always are when properly understood. Does not this show that we explain him aright?

But if the reader will attend we will show that the sense placed on our Saviour's words by these expositors cannot be right. *They make him contradict himself.* He says, first, that the disciples were innocent, that they needed no excuse; and then they make him say that "he will excuse them by altering the law, in their favor, as he has a right to do so." The one ground contradicts the other. This explanation would represent the Saviour as stultifying himself by his own words, as we sometimes hear foolish and false children and servants do, when, being charged with an offence, they first deny it and then make an excuse for it. Were such an explanation wilfully urged for Christ's words, it would be profane.

Another proof that they do not represent Christ's words aright is in the fact that Christ did not at that time use his Messianic authority to repeal any Mosaic institution whatever. *The repeal never began until after his resurrection.* It is well known that, on the contrary, he taught his followers to give an exemplary compliance with the Levitical laws in every respect until he had "caused the sacrifice and oblation to cease" by "bringing in everlasting righteousness."

Every gloss which has any bearing against the morality and perpetuity of the Sabbath command has been thus removed from these passages in the Gospels. The statement of our Saviour's argument, which we gave at the beginning of the explanation, is seen to be consistent and scriptural. This is one of the best tests of its truth. But the reader is entreated to remember that, let the explanation of our Saviour's reasons be what it may, we are bound to hold that it was the true nature of the Mosaic Sabbath which he was unfolding. *It was the Sabbath as binding on Jews under the old dispensation* which he was explaining. So that, let them prove what they may, they have proved nothing whatever as to the manner in which Christians under the new dispensation are required to keep the Sabbath, whether more strictly or more loosely. If they succeed by their erroneous criticism in persuading themselves that Christ here relaxed the Sabbath law, the only consequence is the unfortunate one of making Christ appear to contradict his own inspired prophets.

This may be a convenient place to notice a supposed difficulty attending our argument. It is said, "If you deny that Christ gives any relaxation of the stringency of the Levitical Sabbath

as of a ceremonial yoke, then in consistency you must exact of Christians now as punctilious an observance in every respect as was required of the Jews. You must allow people to make no fire in their dwellings on the Sabbath. You will seek to re-enact the terrible law of Num. xvi., which punished a wretch with death for gathering a few sticks on the Sabbath day."

This is only skilful sophistry. No one has asserted that all the details of the Sabbath law in all the books of Moses are of perpetual authority. It has not been denied that at the epoch of Sinai the Sabbath, a holy day for all mankind already, became in addition a sign and a day of typical worship to the "peculiar people." The two instances mentioned are the only plausible ones which can be advanced against us; and it must be noticed that they are not taken from the Decalogue, *but from subsequent revelations which contain many ceremonials and peculiar political rules suited to Hebrews only.* No one argues, for instance, as to the second commandment, which all admit to be of perpetual and moral authority, that it perpetuates all the rites of the altar for ever. The Westminster Catechism declares that the purpose of the second commandment is to require the "keeping pure and entire all such religious worship and ordinances as God hath appointed in his word." After the twentieth chapter of Exodus there follow in the same book many ordinances enjoining bloody sacrifices, incense and shew-bread. No one has been so heedless as to think these ritual details were intended by God to be explicative of the perpetual obligation of "keeping pure and entire" his appointed divine worship. Why should they commit the similar folly in the fourth commandment? We repeat: the moral and perpetual obligation is what was spoken by the Messiah's own voice from the top of Sinai in the "ten words," and what was carved by his own fingers on the imperishable stone. What follows in the Levitical books may be only explicative of ritual details appropriate to the Jews, like the incense and shew-bread. Whether a given detail is such, or is explicative of the permanent part of the obligation, this must be found out, not by rashly "jumping to a conclusion," but by the careful and faithful comparison of scripture with scripture.

Now, in the Sabbath command that which is of perpetual moral obligation is what is founded on the rights of God and the nature of man; and this is the true sanctification to his public and private

worship of such stated times as he claims. This he tells us is one day out of seven. Other details that follow may or may not be ritual.

There are several scriptural facts which give us a safe guidance as to these details.

First. The Sabbath became to the Jew at the Mosaic epoch not only what it had always been to all men, a sacred day of worship, but a sign and a day of sacrifices. It ranked with his new-moon days. This must attach to its observance, for a Jew, features of exactness and mechanical regularity above what its moral observance required.

Second. The government was a theocracy; no line whatever separated the secular and sacred statutes. The God who was the religious object of the Hebrews' worship was also the political king of the commonwealth. He was setting up a very strict ritual for the purpose of making a rigid separation between the Hebrews and the pagans around them. Hence, wilful breaches of ordinances bore the character of treason against the divine King of the nation, and might be naturally and properly punished as capital crimes. Idolatry and persuading another to idolatry were capital crimes in the theocracy, and properly so. But it would not be proper for the State of California to punish the Chinese there with death for their idolatry, because that State is not a theocracy, and church and state are properly separate. So the State of Virginia ought not to punish Sabbath-breaking in its worst form with death. Of course, it will not punish capitally the gathering of sticks to make a fire on the Sabbath. The Christian church has no power of corporal punishment for any crime.

Third. Hebrew houses had no hearths or chimneys except for cooking, because in that mild climate the people made no use of fire in their sitting-rooms. Hence the injunction to make no fire in their dwellings on the Sabbath day amounted precisely to an injunction not to cook food on that day. There is a wide and necessary difference in the species of food on which civilized man subsists in our latitude and the national food of ancient Israel. This, with the necessary use of fuel in winter among us, may make some slight difference of detail in the application of the Jewish rule against cooking food on the Sabbath, especially for the sick and infirm. But as to the spirit of the prohibition,

it ought undoubtedly to be held among us, as among the Jews, that with these exceptions no culinary labors should have place on the Sabbath. To allow ourselves further license in this is to palter with the essential substance of the perpetual command, the sanctification of one whole day out of seven from all secular labors, except those of necessity and mercy, to God's religious service. These culinary labors, as pursued in so many families in America, and Britain even, are a robbery of servants, depriving them of their Sabbath, and a transgression of God's will, for the mere indulgence of luxury in eating. This sin doubtless cries to God fearfully, even from these Protestant lands.

The only other places in the New Testament which can be used against our theory of Sabbath obligation are from the Epistles. They also form a group, and may be viewed together.

Rom. xiv. 5, 6 : "One man esteemeth one day above another : another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord ; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard it. He that eateth, eateth to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks ; and he that eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth God thanks." Gal. iv. 9-11 : "But now, after that ye have known God, or rather are known of God, how turn ye again to the weak and beggarly elements, whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage ? Ye observe days, and months, and times, and years. I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed on you labor in vain." Col. ii. 16, 17 : "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath days : which are a shadow of things to come ; but the body is of Christ."

Those who oppose the divine obligation of the Christian Sabbath make the following use of these passages. They say that they find in them the same two arguments seen in the passages from the evangelists : first, that the apostle calls the Sabbath a shadow or type, and we know that the types are abolished ; second, that the apostle here discusses Sabbath observance on the same footing with the distinctions of clean and unclean meats, which shows that he thought of the Sabbath only as a positive and ceremonial command. They also claim that the apostle here, by his inspired authority, abolishes all distinctions of days whatsoever from that time onward, and absolutely makes all

days alike for Christians. Their account of this amazing revolution is the following: The old dispensation, they say, was dark, unspiritual, slavish, adapted to the church in its infancy, and hence burdened with many grievous rites which were in themselves of no real spiritual use to souls; but they served to keep the stupid and childish minds of the Old Testament worshippers reminded of the curse of a broken law under which they lay and anxious for the gospel deliverance. When that deliverance came, say they, all these burdensome shadows were lifted off; they had fulfilled their purpose; and among them was removed all obligation to keep any one day as more sacred than another day. This, say they, follows from the truth that gospel love and gratitude in a pardoned and sanctified believer's heart consecrates every day. He "does all for the glory of God." His ploughing and building and buying and selling are all done in a devout spirit; they are all a worship of God. Every day is to him virtually a Sabbath day, and thus there is no room for a distinction of days under the new dispensation. Hence they charge that he who transfers the divine obligation of the seventh day to the first, and regards the Lord's day as a divine, Christian Sabbath, is but Judaizing. He is still in bondage; he has not come out into the liberty and love of the gospel, and he does not even understand it.

But we ask them whether the apostle in these very passages (Rom. xiv. 5, 6,) does not allow the keeping of days, and admit that he that does it "keepeth them to the Lord"? And do not these very divines hold that the church does right to make the Lord's day a day of leisure and of public worship? And do they not also keep Easter and Whitsuntide, two days of mere human appointment? They have an answer ready. They say, Yes; the leisure is a benefit and respite to domestic servants and work animals. Some day must be agreed on by human ecclesiastical authority for concerted public worship. And, chiefly, the apostle sets them the example of allowing a distinction of days to weaker Christians who have not attained to that higher experience which can make every day a Sabbath, which is the proper standard of the new dispensation. The apostle remarks that while some Christians—those, namely, of higher attainments—"regard every day alike," others—the weaker and foolisher—"esteem one day above another." The wiser must make

allowances for the weaker, and permit, or even encourage, them to employ these Jewish crutches for their weakness until they can get upon better grounds of religious experience.

Such is the view of the three passages taken by this class of writers.

The first remark we make upon it is that, whether we can advance a better one or not, theirs cannot stand. For, first, it undertakes expressly to repeal one command and expunge it from the Decalogue. It arrays Paul against Christ. Christ put that command in the "ten words" which contained nothing but the perpetual moral law; he carved them in stone, a symbol of their perpetuity; they came from the immediate mouth of God, who "spake no more," spake no mere ceremonial matter in this way; he imposed this command on foreigners, who were neither required nor permitted to observe the ceremonial commands while Gentiles. But this scheme represents Paul as putting the Sabbath command among mere ceremonials. Now, it is not to be believed that two inspired by the same God contradicted each other, or that a part of that law has been abolished of which our Saviour declared, "Heaven and earth shall pass before one jot or tittle of it shall fail."

Second. The reason assigned by these writers for thinking the Sabbath of divine appointment unsuitable for the gospel dispensation is foolish. God thought that a Sabbath day suited our holy first parents in Paradise. Is the Christian experience of any poor, fallen sinner who has become a gospel believer higher and purer than that of Adam while he was "in the image and likeness of God"? Do any of these more thoroughly consecrate their common labor, and make every working day a Sabbath day, more than Adam did? Yet God thought Adam needed a literal Sabbath, one day in seven. Or we might show the foolishness of this view by comparing ourselves with Old Testament saints. Was the Psalmist, who wrote the one hundred and sixteenth Psalm; was holy Isaiah, such a stranger to grace, to gratitude, to gospel self-dedication, that he did not know how to consecrate his whole life to his Saviour? Surely no sinner saved by grace under the gospel ever had a soul more baptized with these blessed affections than David and Isaiah. In fact, when a believer now desires to pour out his love and gratitude to his God, he usually borrows the hymns of Old Testament

devotion in which to do it. Yet nobody disputes that God required David and Isaiah to keep a Sabbath day.

The truth is, that this feeble notion had its origin among a school of half-reformed divines who were heretical as to the gospel character of the old dispensation, and who even held that believers under it had no certain gospel light or hope, and that the dispensation was not a spiritual one at all. We cannot thus contradict both Testaments; and to us, therefore, this dream that a regular holy day is unsuited to the more spiritual and thankful experience of the new dispensation can only be absurd.

Third. A just view of human nature and of religious experience proves that believers of all ages do need a regular Sabbath day; that it is useful, yea, necessary, for them, and a blessing to their souls. Man is a creature of habit; he is a finite creature; he cannot do two things at the same time. His soul needs just such an ordinance.

The reader must note that the Bible speaks of the Sabbath not as a ritual burden, laid on the neck of the church because it was in its minority, but *as a privilege and a blessing*. We are "to call the sabbath a delight, holy to the Lord, and honorable" (Isa. lviii. 13); "*Blessed* is the man . . . that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it" (Isa. lvi. 2); "The sabbath was made for man" (Mark ii. 27); "The Lord *blessed* the Sabbath day, and hallowed it" (Exod. xx. 11). The argument is this: Since the Sabbath is a needed blessing, if God has abrogated the Jewish Sabbath and given to us no Christian Sabbath in place of it, the new dispensation is less blessed than the old. But who can admit this? Did kings and prophets desire to see the less blessed day rather than their own? The new dispensation is always represented in the Bible as more blessed than the old, more crowned with privilege and better furnished with means of grace.

Fourth. This view represents the apostle, an inspired man, as setting up a standard of Christian experience which was found in practice unsuited to human nature. That Christians did observe sacred days in the apostle's time these writers admit, and also that the usage was approved. But they say it was not founded on any divine authority; the apostle had just repealed all that. Then on whose authority? That of the uninspired church. Their view, then, is that the apostle, sweeping away

all Sabbaths and Lord's days, invites Christians to ascend to his lofty and devoted experience, which had no use for a set Sabbath because all his days were consecrated. But as it was found that this did not suit the actual Christian state of most Christians, human authority was allowed, and even encouraged, to appoint Sundays, Easters and Whitsuntides for them. The objections are: first, that this countenances "will-worship," or the intrusion of man's inventions into God's service; second, it is an implied insult to Paul's inspiration, assuming that he made a practical blunder, which the church synods, wiser than his inspiration, had to mend by a human expedient; and third, we have here a practical confession that, after all, the average New Testament Christian does need a stated holy day, and therefore the ground of the Sabbath command is perpetual and moral.

For these reasons it is impossible for us to agree that the apostle Paul meant what these men say. What then, did he mean in the three passages? A few historical facts will plainly tell us; and *these facts are not disputed* by those who differ from us.

After the new dispensation was set up, the Christians converted from among the Jews had generally combined the worship of Judaism with that of Christianity. They observed the Lord's day, baptism and the Lord's supper, but they also continued to keep the seventh day, circumcision and the passover. Nor was this wrong *for them* during the transition state. Acts (ch. xxi.) tells us that the apostle Paul did so himself. But at first it was proposed by them to enforce this double system on all Gentile Christians as a permanent one. Of this plan we have the full history in Acts xv., where it was rebuked by the apostles and elders at Jerusalem. A certain part of the Jewish Christians, out of which ultimately grew the Ebionite sect, continued, however, to observe the forms of both dispensations, and restless spirits among the churches planted by Paul, which contained both Jewish and Gentile members, continued to make trouble on this point. Some of them conjoined with this Ebionite view the graver heresy of justification by the merit of ritual and ascetic observances, as we see in the Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians. Thus at that day this spectacle was exhibited: In the mixed Christian churches some brethren went to the synagogue on Saturday and to the church on Sunday, keeping both days holy. Other brethren—Gentiles—paid no respect to Saturday,

and kept only Sunday. Others again—Jews—felt bound to keep not only Saturday and Sunday, but all the Jewish sacred times—the new moons, the paschal, pentecostal and atonement feasts and the sabbatical years. Here was ground of difference and of mutual accusations. This was the mischief to which the apostle had to bring a remedy. We may add that the question about clean and unclean meats was mingled with that about Jewish days. Was it right now for any Jewish Christians to do as the Gentile Christians did—use bacon, lard, and the butcher's meat of animals which had been killed at pagan altars?

Now, let us see the divine truth and wisdom with which the apostle settles the disputes. One thing which he enjoins (at the end of Rom. xiv.) is, that whether any man's light is wholly correct or not, he must act conscientiously. He must not do the things which honestly seemed to him wrong, for if he did there was sin, the sin of outraging his own conscience, even though his scruple turned out to be a mistake. Then, first of all, let everybody act conscientiously. He tells them, secondly (Rom. xiv. 3, 4), not to be censorious, but to respect each other's conscientious convictions, even when they seemed groundless. For there is no positive sin in itself in letting alone bacon, for instance, or stopping work on Saturday; and if a brother's mind is under error as to the duty of doing so, he deserves our respect at least for conscientiously denying himself in these things. But, third, when the apostle saw some professed Christians teaching that a man should make self-righteous merit by continuing to burden himself with the Jewish new-moons, sabbaths, fasts, annual passover feasts and sabbatical years, after the obligation of them in fact was repealed he confessed that this alarmed him (Gal. iv. 11), and made him feel as though all his trouble in preaching salvation by free grace to them was to go for nothing. For this idea of making merit by observing self-imposed ceremonies and troublesome rites was entirely a different matter from those other conscientious mistakes, and it involved the very poison of will-worship and self-righteousness. Hence (Col. ii. 16 to end) he expressly and solemnly condemns it all. This never had been the gospel, either under the Old Testament or the New. To appoint the means of grace for his people, this was God's part. As long as any ordinance was commanded by him, our part was to make use of it, humbly and

faithfully, *as a means of grace*, in order to strengthen the faith and repentance which bring us to the Saviour. But the moment any man undertook to build up his self-righteousness on will-worship he was under a soul-destroying error, which must not be tolerated one moment. Hence the apostle commands that these Jewish holy days, feasts and fasts, are not to be enforced on anybody; and he explains that they were no longer binding, because that new dispensation of which they were shadows or types had now come with its own divinely-appointed ordinances, and taken the place of others. He did not design to be understood as speaking at all of the Lord's day, which is one of these New Testament ordinances. He means only the Jewish holy days. Does not the consistency of this view with itself and the Scriptures show that it is the true one?

But some one may rejoin that he was speaking of the Lord's day also, because he says (Col. ii. 16), "Let no man, therefore, judge you in respect of a holy day, or of the new-moon, *or of the sabbath days*." This objector is under a delusion. The word "Sabbath" is never applied by a New Testament writer or by one of the writers of the primitive church to the Lord's day or Christian Sabbath—never once. This all learned critics admit. All those early writers carefully reserve the word "Sabbath," which is a Hebrew word, to denote the holy days of the Old Testament; and when they would speak of the holy day of the New Testament they call it "first day of the week" or "Lord's day" or "Sunday." The Westminster Assembly did indeed say of the Lord's day, "which is the Christian Sabbath." This was intended to teach an important truth which had been denied by the objectors, that the Lord's day is to us by divine appointment what the Sabbath was to the Jews as to its main substance.

The word "Sabbath" was of wide significance among the Jews. It meant not only the hallowed seventh day, but also the "week" or space of seven days. The Pharisee says: "I fast twice in the week" (Luke xviii. 12). In the Greek it is "twice in the sabbath." The word was also a common name for all the Jewish festivals, including even the whole sabbatical year, with new-moons, passovers, and such like holy days. "I gave them my sabbaths [my religious festivals] to be a sign between them and me" (Ezek. xx. 12). "The land shall enjoy her sabbaths" (Lev. xxiii. 24; xxvi. 34; compare 2 Chron. xxxvi.

21). Hence the apostle's mention of "sabbath days" does not certainly prove that he alluded to the seventh day particularly; he may have used the word as a common name for Jewish holy days. Be this as it may, we know that he did not intend the Lord's day, because the early writers never apply that name to it.

This Christian holy day is not in question, then, in these texts, for about the observance of this we believe there was no dispute or diversity in the churches. To the sanctification of that day Jewish and Gentile Christians alike consented. When Paul teaches that the observing or not observing of a day is, like the matter of meats, non-essential, the natural and fair construction is that he means those days which were in debate, and no others. When he implies that some innocently "regarded every day alike," we should understand every one of those days about which there was no diversity, not the Christian's Lord's day, about which there was no dispute. The passage in Colossians is upon the same subject with those in Romans and Galatians. Hence it is fair to regard the one as an explanation of the others. Thus the use of the phrase "sabbath days" in the first is an advantage to our cause, for it explains the "every day alike" of Romans as really meaning "every sabbatical day;" that is to say, every Jewish holy day, such being the precise meaning of "Sabbath" in Paul's mouth.

One more objection to our view remains, which we wish to meet fairly. It is this: Grant that by the phrase "sabbath days" in Colossians the apostle did not mean to include the Lord's day. He says of all the Jewish *sabbata*, including the seventh days, "which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ." It thus appears that the Sabbath day of the fourth commandment was a type, the substance of which was to be found in Christ, even as the passover was a type of him. Why, then, should not the Sabbath pass away with the passover and the other types? There is no positive New Testament law re-enacting it. Thus our opponents.

The answer is: The Jewish Sabbath was a sign, and also something else. Its witnessing use has passed away for Jews, so far as it was to them a sign of their exodus, their peculiar theocratic covenant and their title to the land of Canaan. But its other uses, as a means of grace and sign of heaven, remain for them and for

all. Moreover, the Christian Sabbath, which is the Lord's day, remains just as much a "sign" of our Christian separation from the world and engagement to be the Lord's as the seventh day ever was to the Jew. And our faithfulness in sanctifying the Lord's day ought to be as plain a mark distinguishing us from unbelievers as that which distinguished the Hebrews from the Amorites. That it always was more than a mark we proved in the first division of this discussion. It is as old as the race; it was given to all the race. The ground of the institution is as universal as the race, the completion of creation. It is dictated by a universal necessity of man's nature, which has not at all changed in passing from one dispensation to another. It was in full force before the typical ceremonies of Moses. It was enjoined on Gentiles, who had no business with those ceremonies. It had its permanent, moral and spiritual use before Moses came. God then placed an additional significance on it for a particular purpose. When the typical dispensation passed away, then this temporary use of the Sabbath fell off, and the original institution remains. God's day is now to us just what it was to Adam, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham. How reasonable this is may be shown from the very comparison which the objector makes, that of the passover. The passover was a type, but it was something else—a commemoration of redemption. It foreshadowed "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," but it commemorated the redemption of the people from death in Egypt. Now, let us see what happened. The Lamb of God came, and was actually sacrificed on Calvary, "by one offering taking away sin." *Was the passover revoked?* Not at all. Its typical part was revoked; the lamb was no more killed and roasted. But its commemorative part remains to this day. The bread and wine are still consecrated by divine appointment for a sacrament, and the Lord's supper remains as *the Christian passover*. This is just what the apostle teaches in 1 Cor. v. 7, 8.

When Israel came to Sinai, God did select this Sabbath day, which had existed before as a commemoration of creation and a moral and spiritual ordinance for all people, to serve the additional purpose of a "sign" between him and Israel. It was a pledge and emblem of their covenant as his people (Deut. v. 13; Exod. xxxi. 13; Ezek. xx. 12). It was for a time possibly an emblem of their peaceful home in Canaan (Heb. iv. 4-11). It

is for us, as for them, an emblem of our gracious rest in heaven (Heb. iv. 9). Thus, the observance of the Sabbath was, like that of the new moon, marked by two additional sacrifices. These temporary uses passed away, of course, with the coming of the new dispensation. But the moral and perpetual uses of the ordinance having been already transferred by Christ to the Lord's day, the seventh day remained at the time of Paul's writing as a mere shadow to the New Testament saint as a new moon. In this aspect the apostle might well argue that the stickling for it betrayed Judaizing. Moreover, when the apostle says (Col. ii. 17) that the new moons and Sabbath days are a "shadow of things to come," his real meaning is, the sacrifices celebrated on those days were the shadow. Literally, the days themselves were not shadows, but only the typical services appointed on them.

III. We shall now attempt to show the ground on which the Sabbath "from the resurrection of Christ was changed into the first day of the week, which in Scripture is called the Lord's day, and is to be continued to the end of the world as the Christian Sabbath." This proof is chiefly historical, and divides itself into two branches, the inspired and the uninspired. The first proceeds upon two plain principles. One is, that example may be as valid and instructive a guide to duty as precept. Or, to state it in another form, the precedent set by Christ and his apostles may be as binding as their command. The other is, that whatever necessarily follows from Scripture "by good and necessary consequence" is as really authorized by it as "what is expressly set down."

Our first argument shows that every probability is in favor of the Sunday's being now God's day, in advance of particular testimony. We prove under the first main head that a Sabbath institution is universal and perpetual—that the command to keep it holy belongs to that law from which one jot or one tittle cannot pass till heaven and earth pass. But the apostle Paul (in Col. ii. 16, 17) clearly tells us that the seventh day is no longer the Sabbath. It has been changed. To what other day has it been changed? The law is not totally repealed; it cannot be. What day has taken the place of the seventh? None is so likely to be the substitute as the Lord's day; this must be the day.

The main direct argument is found in the fact that Christ and

his apostles did, from the very day of the resurrection, hallow the first day of the week as a religious day. To see the full force of this fact we must view it in the light of the first argument. We remember that the disciples, like all men of all ages, are bound by the Decalogue to keep holy God's Sabbath. We see them remit the observance of the seventh day as no longer binding, and we see them observing the first. Must we not conclude that these inspired men regarded the authority of God as now attaching to this Lord's day?

We shall find, then, that the disciples commenced the observance of the first day on the very day of Christ's resurrection, and thenceforward continued it. John xx. 19 tells us that the "same day, being the first day of the week," the disciples were assembled at evening with closed doors, and Christ came and stood in the midst. Can we doubt that they met for worship? In the twenty-sixth verse we learn, "And after eight days again the disciples were within, and Thomas with them" (who had been absent before). "Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you." None will doubt that this was also a meeting for worship, and the language implies that it was their second meeting. Now, it is admitted by all that the Jews, in counting time, always included in their count the days with which the period began and ended. The best known instances of this rule is seen in the rising of Christ. He was to be "three days in the heart of the earth," but the three days were made out only by counting the day of his death and the day of his rising, although the latter event happened early in the morning of that day. By this mode of counting, the eighth day, or full week from the disciples' first meeting, brings us again to the first day of the week. Thus we learn that twice at least between the resurrection and Pentecost the first day was kept as the Lord's day.

But the decisive instance is that of Pentecost itself. The reader will see, by consulting Lev. xxiii. 15, 16, or Deut. xv. 9, that this day was fixed in the following manner: On the morrow after that Sabbath—seventh day—which was included within the passover week, a sheaf of the earliest ripe corn was cut, brought fresh into the sanctuary, and presented as a thank-offering unto God. Thus the day of this ceremony must always be the first day of the week, corresponding to our Lord's day. From this

day they were to count seven weeks complete, and the fiftieth day was to be Pentecost day, or the beginning of their "feast of ingathering." Remembering, now, that the Israelites always included in their reckoning the day from which and the day to which they counted, we see that the fiftieth day brings us again to the first day of the week. We are told expressly that Christ rose on the first day of the week.

We thus learn the important fact that the day selected by God for setting up the gospel dispensation and for the great pentecostal outpouring was the Lord's day—a significant and splendid testimony to the sacred honor it was intended to have in the Christian ages.

This epoch was indeed the creation of a new world in the spiritual sense. The work was equal in glory and everlasting moment to that first creation which caused "the morning stars to sing together and all the sons of God to shout for joy." Well might God substitute the first day for the seventh when the first day had now become the sign of two separate events, the rising of Christ and the founding of the new dispensation, either of which is as momentous and blessed to us as the world's foundation.

But we read in Acts i. 14, and ii. 1, that this seventh Lord's day was also employed by the apostles and disciples as a day for religious worship; and it was while they were thus engaged that they received the divine sanction in their blessed baptism of fire and of the Holy Ghost. Then the first public proclamation of the gospel under the new dispensation began, and the model was set up for the consecration of the new Christian Sabbath—not by the burning of additional lambs—by public preaching, the two sacraments of baptism and the supper, and the oblation of their worldly substance to God. At this all-important stage every step, every act, of the divine providence recorded by inspiration in the Acts was formative and fundamental. Hence we must believe that this event was meant by God as a forcible precedent, establishing the Lord's day as our Christian Sabbath.

Let the reader carefully weigh this question: Have we any other kind of warrant for the framework of the church? All Christians, for instance, believe that the deacon's office in the church is of perpetual divine appointment. Even Rome has it, though perverted. What is the basis of that belief? The pre-

cedent set in the sixth chapter of Acts. The apostles there say, It is not good "for us to leave the word of God and serve tables," etc. They do not say even as much about the universal perpetuity of this office as Paul says to Titus (ch. i. 15) about the elder's office: "Ordain elders in every city." But all sensible men see that the principle stated and the example set are enough, and that the Holy Spirit obviously taught the inspired historians to relate this formative act of the new dispensation as a model for all churches. The warrant for making the Lord's day the Sabbath is of the same kind.

It is most evident, from the New Testament history, that the apostles and the churches they planted uniformly hallowed the Lord's day. The instances are not numerous, but they are distinct.

The next clear instance is in Acts xx. 7. The apostle Paul was now returning from his famous mission to Macedonia and Achaia in full prospect of captivity at Jerusalem. He stops at the favorite little church of Troas, on the Asiatic coast, a little south of the Hellespont, to spend a week with his converts there. "And upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them, ready to depart on the morrow; and continued his speech until midnight." Here we have a double evidence of our point. First, Paul preached to the disciples on this day, while he had been, as the sixth verse shows, a whole week at Troas, including the Jewish Sabbath. Why did he wait a whole week? Why did not the meeting, with the sermon and sacrament, take place on the Jewish Sabbath? We learn from verse sixteen that Paul had very little time to spare, because he had to make the whole journey from Philippi to Jerusalem, with all his wayside visits, within the six weeks between the end of the paschal and beginning of the pentecostal feast. He was obviously waiting for the church's sacred day in order to join them in their public worship, just as a missionary would wait now under similar circumstances. But, second. The words, "When the disciples came together to break bread," show that the first day of the week was the one on which they met to celebrate the Lord's supper. So it appears that this church at Troas, planted and trained by Paul, kept the first day of the week for public worship and the sacrament, and the inspired man puts himself to some inconvenience

to comply with their usage. It has indeed been objected that he selected this day, not because it was the Lord's day, but because he could not wait any longer. This is exploded by the fact that he had already waited six days, including the Jewish Sabbath ; he was evidently waiting for this day because it was the Lord's day.

The next clear instance is in 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2: "Now, concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come." We here learn two things: that the weekly oblation of almsgiving was fixed for the Lord's day, and that this rule was enacted not only for the church at Corinth, but for all the churches of Galatia. It seems a very clear inference that the apostle afterward made the rule uniform in other churches as he organized them. Again, we find the objectors arguing that, admitting what we claim, we have not proved that there was any regular public worship on the Lord's day, because it is said, "Lay by you in store;" that is, at home. But the answers are two: The words, "Lay by him," etc., are, literally, "place to himself," or "segregate"—"treasuring according as the Lord hath prospered him." It is a misunderstanding of the apostle's meaning to take the word "treasuring" as putting a piece of money on Sunday morning in a separate box or purse at home. Most frequently, as we know from history, it was not money, but bread, meat, fruit, clothing, a part of anything with which providence had blessed them; and the *undoubted usage* in the earliest age after the apostles was to carry this oblation with them to church every Lord's day morning and give it to the deacons, who put it into a common stock for charitable uses. The words "treasuring it" refer, says Calvin, to a wholly different idea—to that which our Saviour expresses (Matt. vi. 20): "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven;" to that idea which the charitable Christian expressed on his tombstone: "What I kept, I lost; what I gave away, I have." It is the Lord's treasury which the apostle here has in view—the Lord's "store." So that the natural meaning of the precept is fairly presented in this paraphrase: "Let every one every Sunday morning set apart, according as the Lord hath prospered him, what he intends to carry to church with him to

put into the Lord's store." But, second. Even if we contradict the unanimous voice of history, testifying that the weekly oblation took place at the church-meeting and went at once into the deacon's hands, the truth remains that this oblation was an act of worship. (See Phil. iv. 18; 2 Cor. ix. 12, 13.) This weekly oblation was, then, a weekly act of worship, and it was appointed by inspired authority to be done on the Lord's day. That makes this day a sacred day of worship; we care not whether this oblation was public or private, so far as the argument is concerned.¹

The other instance of apostolic consecration of the first day is perhaps the most instructive of all. In Rev. i. 10, John, when about to describe how he came to have this revelation, says, "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day." The venerable apostle was "in the isle that is called Patmos for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus." We know from history exactly what this means. The pagan magistrates had banished him to this rocky, desolate islet in the Ægean Sea as a punishment for preaching the gospel and testifying that Jesus is our risen Saviour. He was there alone, separated from all his brethren. But he "was in the Spirit on the Lord's day." What does this

¹ The next place to be cited is Heb. iv. 9. This verse (with its context, which must be carefully read) teaches that, as there remains to believers under the Christian dispensation a hope of an eternal rest, so there remains to us an earthly Sabbath to foreshadow it. The points to be noticed in the explanation of the chapter are: That God has an eternal spiritual rest; that he invited Old Testament believers to share it; that it is something higher than Israel's home in Canaan, because after Joshua had fully installed Israel in that rest, God's rest is still held up as something future. The seventh day (verse 4) was the memorial of God's rest, and was thus connected with it. It was under the old dispensation, as under the new, a spiritual *faith* which introduced into God's rest, and it was unbelief which excluded from it. But as God's rest was something higher than a home in Canaan, and was still offered in the ninety-fifth Psalm long after Joshua settled Israel in that rest, it follows (verse 9) that there still remains a sabbatism, or Sabbath-keeping, for God's people under the new dispensation; and hence (verse 11) we ought to seek to enter into that spiritual rest of God, which is by faith. Now, let it be noted that the word for God's "rest" throughout the passage is a different one from "Sabbath." But the apostle's inference is that because God still offers us his "rest" under the new dispensation, *there remaineth to us a Sabbath-keeping under this dispensation*. What does this mean? Is the sabbatism identically our "rest" in faith? But the seventh day was not identically that rest; it was the memorial and emblem of it. So now sabbatism is the memorial and emblem of the rest. Because the rest is ours, therefore the Sabbath-keeping is still ours; heaven and its earthly type belong equally to both dispensations.

mean? It means that he was doing what godly people now call "keeping Sunday." He was engaging in spiritual exercises. He was holding communion with the Holy Spirit. Here, then, is our first point: that although in solitude, cut off alike from Christian meetings and ordinary week-day occupations, by his banishment, the inspired apostle was "keeping Sunday." It is the strongest possible example. Our second point is, that God blessed him in his Sabbath-keeping with the greatest spiritual blessing which perhaps he had enjoyed since he sat at the feet of Jesus. His Saviour came down from glory to "keep Sunday" with him. Our third and strongest point is, that the inspired man here calls the day "the Lord's day." There is no doubt but that the "Lord" named is the glorified Redeemer, whom he declares in his epistle to be "the true God and eternal life." There is but one consistent and scriptural sense to place on this name of the day. It is the day that belongs especially to the Lord. But as all our days belong in one sense to him, the only meaning is that the first day of the week is now set apart and hallowed to Christ. In Isa. lviii. 13 the Sabbath is called by God "my holy day;" in lvi. 4, "my Sabbath." That was God's day; it belonged to God. This is Christ's day, and in the same sense belongs to Christ. It is consecrated to his worship as was the Sabbath; it is virtually "the Christian Sabbath."

We now add the uninspired testimony of the early historians and Fathers, showing that from the apostles' days Christians understood this matter as we do, and consecrated the first day of the week.

But let us explain in what sense we use this human testimony. In our view, all the uninspired church testimony in the world, however venerable, would never make it our religious duty to keep Sunday as a Sabbath without God's own commandment. We use these "Fathers" simply as historical witnesses. Their evidence derives its sole value from its relevancy to this point, *whether the apostles, who were inspired, left the command and precedent in the churches of observing the Lord's day as the Sabbath of the fourth commandment.* If they said, "We Fathers command you to observe Sunday," we should reject the authority as nothing worth. But when, as honest and well-informed witnesses, they testify that the apostles taught the

churches to observe Sunday, we regard their testimony as of some value.

Our first witness, then, is a learned pagan, Pliny the Younger, a high magistrate under the Emperor Trajan. He says, in a letter written a little after the death of the apostle John, that the Christians were accustomed to meet for worship on a "stated day." This was the Lord's day, as we see from other witnesses.

Ignatius, the celebrated martyr-bishop of Antioch, says, in his Epistle to the Magnesians, written not more than twenty years after the death of John, that "this is the Lord's day, the day consecrated to the resurrection, the chief and queen of all the days."

Justin Martyr, who died about A. D. 160, says that the Christians "neither celebrated the Jewish festivals, nor observed their Sabbaths, nor practiced circumcision" (*Dialogue with Trypho*). In another place he says that they were "all accustomed to meet on the day which is denominated Sunday, for reading the Scriptures, prayer, exhortation and communion. The assemblies met on Sunday, because this is the first day on which God, having changed the darkness and the elements, created the world, and because Jesus our Lord on this day arose from the dead," etc.

Tertullian, at the close of the second century, says: We Christians "celebrate Sunday as a joyful day. On the Lord's day we think it wrong to fast or to kneel in prayer." It was a common opinion of the earlier Christians that all public prayers on the Lord's day should be uttered standing, because kneeling is a more sorrowful attitude and inconsistent with the joy and blessedness of Christ's day.

Clement of Alexandria, a very learned Christian contemporary with Tertullian, says: "A true Christian, according to the commands of the gospel, observes the Lord's day by casting out all bad thoughts and cherishing all goodness, honoring the resurrection of the Lord, which took place on that day."

Perhaps the most valuable, because the most important and explicit, as well as the most learned, witness, is Eusebius of Cæsarea, who was in his prime about A. D. 325. In a commentary on the ninety-second Psalm, which, the reader will remember, is entitled, "A psalm or song for the Sabbath day," he says: "The Word" (Christ) "by the new covenant translated and transferred the feast of the Sabbath to the morning light, and gave us the symbol of the true rest, the saving Lord's day, the

first of light, in which the Saviour gained the victory over death. On this day, which is the first of the Light and the true Sun, we assemble after the interval of six days, and celebrate holy and spiritual Sabbath; even all nations redeemed by him throughout the world assemble, and do those things according to the spiritual law which were decreed for the priests to do on the Sabbath. All things which it was duty to do on the Sabbath, these we have transferred to the Lord's day, as more appropriately belonging unto it, because it has the precedence, and is first in rank, and more honorable than the Jewish Sabbath. It hath been enjoined on us that we should meet together on this day, and it is evidence that we should do these things announced in this psalm."

These citations from the pastors of the early church might be continued to great length. Not only individuals, but church councils, added their sanctions to the sacred observance of the Lord's day. Thus the Council of Laodicea (A. D. 363) commanded Christians to rest on the Lord's day from all secular labors except those imposed by necessity. Many other councils during the fourth century ordain that public worship and the sacraments shall be observed on the same day. It may be asked, If this sanctification of the Lord's day was of divine appointment through the apostles, why do we not hear of earlier councils enacting its observance nearer the days of the apostles? The answer is very simple: During the ages of persecution, which only ceased with the accession of Constantine, councils could meet rarely and with great peril, and the persecutors busily destroyed their records.

Those who are familiar with the controversy about the Lord's day are aware that quite a number of writers, especially those of prelatical views, are in the habit of roundly asserting that the "fathers" held the fourth commandment to be abrogated; that they grounded their observance of the Lord's day, not on God's authority, but on comity, convenience, and church authority, like the other feasts, and that no "father" bases the observance of the Lord's day on the fourth commandment expressly. They are very fond of quoting the great Augustine, for instance, as teaching that the fourth commandment alone among the ten was "partly figurative," and so abolished with the other types. The arrogance and dogmatism with which these assertions are made by

prelatic adversaries of God's law are offensive to every fair and reverent mind. Those who are best acquainted with these fathers will be least disposed to attach importance to their assertions, whether concurrent with or against God's truth. Had these prelatists, for instance, the honesty to *quote all* that their favorite Augustine says in that same exposition of the Decalogue, the sensible reader would feel the contempt for his opinions on this subject which they deserve. We should see this great father expounding each of the ten commandments as typified in the "ten plagues of the Egyptians," and gravely running a fanciful analogy between a given precept and a given plague! The fact is, that even the more learned fathers (Augustine had little Greek and no Hebrew learning) were prevented by certain valid causes from taking a point of view whence they could properly appreciate the relations of the old dispensation and the new. The reasons were these: A good knowledge of Hebrew was rare. Judaism was only known to the Christians of those ages in its worst phase of Phariseeism, because all truly believing Jews, of the type of Simeon, Anna, Matthew, etc., had gladly acceded to Christianity and been absorbed into the Christian church. Hence it was a natural mistake to confound the true Old Testament religion to a certain extent with the apostate Judaism they witnessed around them in these professed advocates of the Old Testament, and to misconceive the divinely-established worship of the old dispensation according to the spurious forms to which it was now perverted after its fulfilment in the new dispensation. It was easy for Christians, witnessing the typical worship only in these spurious anachronisms, to overlook the fact that there had been a time when it had been of divine appointment, spiritual and evangelical. Again, the Christians knew of Jews only as the murderers of the Lord, as stubborn and embittered opponents of his gospel, whether as revealed in their own Old Testament or in the New, as systematic slanderers of the church and as instigators of pagan persecutions. This odious attitude of all the professed advocates of the Old Testament could not but prejudice the Christians' apprehension of their scriptures. To these causes must be added also the perverse, metaphorical and mystical plan of interpreting Scripture, and especially Old Testament Scripture, which the fathers so soon imbibed, and which they saw carried to such extremes by the rabbinical scholars.

When we consider these causes, we cease to wonder that the early Christian writers misconceived the proper relations of the Old Testament to the New, or that they uttered on this subject many ambiguities and errors.

If, now, a father is found saying that the apostles "abolished the Sabbath," he is to be understood, *not as meaning that the apostles abrogated the fourth commandment*—a statement which can be found in no respectable Christian writer—but he is thinking only of the rabbinical seventh day, with its senseless and unscriptural superstitions. This is the simple key to all these patristic citations.

Some of the prelatie enemies of our Christian Sabbath lay much stress on the assertion that none of the fathers expressly trace the Christian observance of the Lord's day to the fourth commandment. What if they do not? This is, after all, only negative testimony, which proves nothing positive. We point, on the opposite hand, to the fact that none of the fathers deny the continued authority of the fourth commandment in its essential substance. We hear the wisest of them asserting that the sanctification of one-seventh part of our time in the observance of the first day is of divine authority through the apostles. We hear Eusebius, the most learned of them all, say that *Christ, by the new covenant, translated and transferred the feast of the Sabbath to the first day, or Lord's day, and that all the Christians in the world accordingly have transferred the Sabbath duties to that day*. Is not this virtually saying the essential thing, that the sanctification of the Lord's day is the Christian's compliance with the fourth commandment?

A comprehensive view of these testimonies sufficiently shows what was the opinion and what the usage of the early Christians. As the Dark Ages approached, sound knowledge of the Hebrew literature became very rare; few could read the Old Testament in the original language, and the embittered and sinful prejudices of the Christians against the Jews had their influence in making the former indifferent to the Hebrew Scriptures. Hence, great ignorance of the old dispensation and of its relations to the new sprang up. It was natural that the grounds of Sabbath observance should then be misunderstood. Superstition was then rapidly increasing, and saints' days and holy days of human invention first rivaled and then surpassed God's own day in the veneration of

the people. When the great Reformation came, many of the Reformers remained under the error which confounded the Lord's day with the church's superstitious holy days, and when they threw off the trammels of superstition, unfortunately they cast away the divine obligation of the Sabbath with them.

When we see some of the Protestant churches and divines of Europe deliberately defending worldly amusements (after public worship) on the Lord's day, we should not do injustice to the piety and conscientiousness which many of them show in other things, nor should we condemn errors which they justify to themselves by arguments which they sincerely, though erroneously, believe, as severely as the profane abuse of the Sabbath committed by some in our country against their own clear convictions. Yet the deplorable fact remains, that these unscriptural views about the divine authority of the Sabbath have been the bane of Protestantism. They cause and perpetuate much of the irreligion and skepticism which deform Protestant Europe in many of its parts. It is historically true that the vitality and holiness of the church are usually in proportion to its reverence for the Sabbath. The Sabbath-keeping churches and generations have been the holy and zealous ones.

This recurring fact may remind us of another argument: that the necessity of a Sabbath day is written in man's very nature. The same God who laid the foundation for its observance in his unchangeable law for all nations and dispensations has also laid the foundation for it in the faculties of man's body and mind, and even in the nature of the brutes which work for man. This truth has received remarkable confirmation in this age, not only from Christian teachers, but from physicians, statesmen, historians and business-men. Experience has taught us that neither man's body nor his soul, nor the beast which is his servant, was made by the Creator to work seven days in the week. The attempt to do so brings upon the body lassitude, nervous excitability, disease, premature old age, and often sudden death, and on the mind morbid excitement, impatience, rashness, blindness of judgment, and not seldom lunacy. The very beast of burden can do more labor without injury in six days than by working all the seven. An army can be carried further upon a long march in six days than in seven. It is well known that the merchant who spends his Sabbaths in his counting-house or in worldly

excitement is liable to become a bankrupt, because the privation of that recurring sacred calm which God enjoins in his word and in nature leaves his mind and heart unhinged. The professional man who devotes his Sabbaths to his study ends not seldom in lunacy or in suicide.

Again: As a social and moral institution the weekly Sabbath is precious. It is a quiet domestic reunion for the bustling sons of toil. It brings around a period of neatness and decency, when the soil of weekly labor is laid aside and men meet each other amid the proprieties of the sanctuary and the sacred repose of home to renew their social affections. It enforces a vacation in those earthly and turbulent affections which would otherwise become morbid and excessive.

But, above all, the Sabbath is essential for man's spiritual welfare. God found it necessary in Paradise for his innocent creatures, necessary for holy patriarchs and prophets, and necessary for Christians. A creature subject to the law of habit, finite in his faculties, compelled by the conditions of his existence to divide his cares between earth and heaven, cannot accomplish his destiny without an authoritative distribution of his time between two worlds. When we remember that men are now carnal and by nature ungodly, ever prone to avert their eyes from heaven to earth; when we see so much of mundane affection, so much of the eager craving and bustle of worldliness, enticing to an infringement of the claims of heaven, we see the absolute necessity of such a division. But, obviously, if such a sacred season is necessary, then it must be marked off by divine authority, and not by a sort of convention on man's part. Do we not see that even the divine sanction is insufficient among many who profess to admit it? If the Sabbath be grounded only in human agreement, the license which men will allow themselves in infringing its claims will at last effectually abrogate the whole. Such is the lamentable result to which a Sunday of man's appointment has actually come in more than one land, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. The most striking confirmation of the whole argument may be seen at this time in a part of Protestant Germany, where, after God's Sabbath was repudiated, the Sunday of man's device has slipped away also, leaving the populace alike without a weekly rest and without Christianity. Ex-

perience proves that to neglect the Sabbath day is virtually to neglect religion.

We have thus found the Sabbath law written by the same divine Hand on man's nature and on the pages of the Bible.

The chief attention in this discussion has been given to this point: That the duty of keeping holy the Lord's day is of perpetual and moral obligation on all men. It is by no means to be understood that this duty is hard to be seen by the plain Christian because many objections have been solved and many explanations made by us in reaching this conclusion. It is not any lack of clearness in the duty which has made us deem this long discussion useful, but it is the pertinacity with which error has sought to obscure God's truth. We have weighed the objections patiently, candidly, thoroughly, not because they really deserved weighing, but only because a sad experience shows their power of deceiving. We wished to clear away the last shadow of doubt from God's command. Yet the fair and obedient mind may reach the knowledge of it, if the caviller will only leave him unbiased, by a very short and simple process. There stands the command, "Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy," in the Decalogue. That law was never meant for change. Then the substance of it must bind me in this last dispensation just as it has bound all men from Adam. The matter is just as plain as "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."

It was worth the time and toil for us to reach this settled conviction of a continuing divine obligation for the Sabbath. Its proper observance can never be secured in any other way. It is a "thus saith the Lord," and this alone, which binds the conscience and spurs the heart of every true Christian. Let the intimate conviction of this divine warrant for the holy day be established in the minds of Christian people against all the doubts and quibbles which have infested parts of Christendom since the Dark Ages, and all men that really fear God will begin to sanctify his day. Hence we close this essay with the feeling that if this conviction is established, little more remains to be done except to invoke the aid of divine grace for assistance in executing our convictions of duty.

The proof which is here presented of the nature of the Sabbath is the best answer to the question, How ought it to be kept?

Let conscience and heart respond to God's requirement that his day be hallowed by us, and the details will be easily arranged.

But the answer to this question of details given in the Westminster Confession is so precise and so scriptural that it will not be amiss to repeat it: we must "not only observe an holy rest all the day from our own works, words and thoughts about our own worldly employments and recreations, but also take up the whole time in the public and private exercises of his worship and in the duties of necessity and mercy."

A day consists of twenty-four hours, and when God commands us to sanctify one day to him, as we devote the other six to "all our own work," the honest conscience will find no difficulty in concluding that holy time should not be abridged by unnecessary sleep or by needless recreations any more than any other day. Let true faith possess the soul with a scriptural sense of the arduous task to be finished in the believer's own life in fitting it for the everlasting Sabbath, and of the multitudinous claims of misery and ignorance surrounding him among his perishing fellow-men, and the holy occupations of the Sabbath day will appear so urgent and so numerous that there will be no room in it for either worldliness or indolence. Let us hear the law and the testimony, which we have shown to be unrepealed:

Deut. v. 12-14: "Keep the sabbath day to sanctify it, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee. Six days thou shalt labor and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates."

Ex. xxxiv. 21: "Six days thou shalt work, but on the seventh day thou shalt rest: in earing-time and in harvest thou shalt rest."

Ps. xlii. 4: "I had gone with the multitude; I went with them to the house of God, with the voice of joy and praise, with a multitude that kept holy day."

Neh. xiii. 15: "In those days saw I in Judah some treading wine-presses on the sabbath, and bringing in sheaves, and lading asses; as also wine, grapes, and figs, and all manner of burdens, which they brought into Jerusalem on the sabbath day; and I testified against them in the day wherein they sold victuals."

Mark ii. 27: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath."

Matt. xxiv. 20: "But pray ye that your flight be not . . . on the sabbath day."

Luke xiii. 15, 16 (to show that "works of necessity and mercy," however forbidden by rabbinical superstition, were always consistent with the fourth commandment under both dispensations): "Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and lead him away to watering? And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the sabbath day?"

Rev. i. 10: "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day."

Isa. lviii. 13, 14: "If thou turn away thy foot from the sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words: then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."

IV. The increasing disregard of the Lord's day in the United States demands a renewed application of the authority of the civil law to support right customs. The American commonwealths usually have Sabbath laws. These do not, indeed, compel the citizens, under any civil pains or penalties, to attend the churches or the sacraments; nor do these laws attempt to prescribe a spiritual use of the day. The latter is the function of the church alone. But the state closes all her own halls of legislation and justice, and gives an entire rest to her own servants, on the Christian Sabbath. She also enjoins upon all citizens a cessation of all forms of secular employments on that day, except such as are unavoidable, so as to secure for all a weekly rest and the opportunity to keep religion's holy day to God if they desire it. In how many ways even this slender respect of civil society to God's day is now impaired the reader knows but too well. Especially is the law of rest trodden upon by those great carrying corporations which seem to feel themselves already too great for the law.

To add to this disorder, large numbers of our citizens, com-

posed of a few professed atheists and infidels and a multitude of immigrants from states abroad, where the Sabbath has been long dishonored, now formally attack the right of the state to enact any Sabbath rest or to enforce it by civil pains. Their argument is plausible. It proceeds from the thorough separation and independence of church and state established by the American constitutions. These documents say that men of all religions and of no religion shall be equal before the law; that all shall enjoy liberty of thought; that no man shall lose any privilege which the other citizens possess by reason of his opinions or usages about religion; that it shall be unlawful for the state to make any religious establishment of any religion. From this position the enemies of the Sabbath proceed thus: "The Christian Sabbath is no more than an ecclesiastical and religious institution. The Jewish Sabbath, in its day, was only a temporary and typical one. The churches may require an observance of a Sabbath from such persons as choose to join them. But the state has no more right to pass any law about its observance than about enforcing attendance on any other Christian rite or sacrament. Hence, when a citizen who does not believe in religion or its holy days is estopped from his lawful labor or pleasure on such days, it is an infringement of his guaranteed freedom of opinion. The loss of the day's profit is of the nature of a fine levied against him for his opinions, and is therefore unconstitutional."

Several replies to this argument are commonly heard from the pious. One reply has been that, according to the American laws, the majority are entitled to rule; and, since the major part of Americans are Protestant Christians, they are entitled to enforce Sabbath laws. But this argument is ruined by two rejoinders. One is that, while the majority has a right to rule, it is only in accordance with, and within the limits of, the constitution. The other is that, should the majority in America ever become infidel, then, by the same argument, they would have as good a right to pass laws prohibiting a Sabbath.

Again, it is argued that our Sabbath laws lay no other restriction on the infidel than on the Christian, and that therefore they are just and equal. The Christian citizens do not require of the non-Christian any other Sabbath observance than what they exact of themselves, so that there is no unfairness. That this is also invalid may be shown thus: Let us suppose Papists in the

majority here, and forbidding Protestants to labor on their numerous saints' days, whose observance we regard as wholly superstitious. They could say that their requirement was fair, because they observed it themselves. But we should regard it as oppressive, because we should find ourselves prohibited by others' superstitions from acts to which we had a moral right. Just so argue the infidel immigrants against our Sabbath laws.

Again, we hear the argument put thus: Although church and state are separate here, yet the American is a *Christian people*. The country was settled by Christians. The great mass are professed Christians. Hence the immigrant who finds himself a dissentient must submit to this Christian feature of the society whose hospitality he enjoys. If he does not like this usage of ours, he is free to go away. But, unfortunately, the state, which enforces these Sunday laws, and which invites these dissentients to become citizens among us, has made an express constitutional covenant with them, that they shall incur at the hands of the state no restriction or limit of privilege whatever on any religious ground. Now, if any man has a natural, secular right to live without a Sabbath, this objection is formidable.

Once more, it is urged that Christians, conscientiously believing it their own duty to observe the Sabbath, have a civic right, on the lowest grounds, to observe the day, and to be protected from molestation by the amusements and employments of those who care nothing for it. The infidel replies that it is as much the Christians business to take his psalm-singing out of the way of the worldling's Sunday theatre or brass-band. He says that, in a non-Christian state, such as the American, the one stands on as lawful a footing as the other.

But a more tenable plea for the Sabbath laws of the state is found in the facts noticed above, that man's natural constitution requires a weekly rest. Hence, even regarding the state as non-Christian, and as possessed of no functions except protecting temporal and earthly interests, we may claim for it a right to legislate a rest for man and beast on the grounds of health and temporal welfare. This is a sound argument, but it only rests our Sabbath laws on a hygienic ground. It is as when a state enacts that children and minor servants shall not be kept at work in shops and factories more than a healthy number of hours.

But the real ground of the state Sabbath laws was touched when we raised the question in a previous paragraph, whether any reasonable creature, a subject of civil society, has a natural right to live without the Sabbath? We answer: He has not. Whether he chooses to profess the Christian religion or not (a point on which the state has no right to dictate), he is bound simply as a rational creature of God by the Sabbath law of the human race. The positions by which this argument is constructed are these:

1. While the plan of redemption is not essential to ground the validity of a state authority, the doctrine of natural theism is necessary. On the atheistic theory no reasonable or obligatory basis can be found for civic duties and allegiance; no solid answer can be given to the question, "Why am I bound to obey the civil magistrate?" nor can any basis of morality safely be laid down. If atheism were true, men would be only ingenious animals; convenience might prompt them to feed in herds, but they would no more be suitable subjects for civil society than other brutes. Civil society is, while a temporal, essentially a moral institution. Morality can be established only on theism.

2. The Sabbath, as first given to the human race, was an ordinance of natural theism. It was given to man before he was a sinner, or needed a Saviour. It was equally enjoined on all races, and at first observed by all. Here the reader need only be referred to the argument of our first section. The Sabbath, as an institution given to men for all ages and dispensations, even including that of Paradise, was and is God's means for maintaining in the human family his knowledge and fear as our Maker, Ruler and future Judge. But on that fear all moral institutions repose—the family and the state, as truly as the church. Therefore, men are naturally bound to keep the Sabbath simply as men, and not only as Christians.

3. After man fell, and came to need redemption, the Sabbath was also continued by God as a means of grace and a gospel institute. But this did not repeal or exclude its original use. The professed Christian has two reasons for observing the Sabbath; every human being has one.

4. The civil legislator makes use of the books of Genesis and Exodus in supporting the propriety of his state laws for the Sabbath, not as a code of redemption, but as an authentic history of man's origin and early code of natural theism. As such, it is

supported by all authentic tradition and history, by the teachings of experience and the approval of all wise and virtuous legislators who have known their contents. There is the same species of reason why this sacred history should guide the legislation of all states, as for the British Parliament's guiding itself by *Magna Charta*.

This argument, it will be noticed, gives no pretext for any intermingling of the state with the Christian church or any denomination in it. The church is the spiritual organism of redemption. The state is the secular, but moral and righteous, organism for safety, justice and welfare in this life. The state is not necessarily Christian. But it is necessarily theistic, because on the atheistic theory its basis, its rights and its healthy existence are lost. Hence, while the church has its use of the Sabbath as the institute of redemption and means of grace, the state has its use of it as the institute of righteousness and the natural knowledge and fear of God. The church accordingly enjoins and seeks to enforce, by her spiritual means, on her members the right spiritual improvement of the day. The state, by its secular power, enjoins and enforces the outward rest of the day, so that the people may, if they will, use it to learn of God and of his righteous law, to cultivate morals and decency, to rest their faculties of body and mind, and to enjoy the ennobling and wholesome moral influences of the family and fireside.

On this theory no man's franchises as a citizen are abridged on account of his failure to adopt a Christian profession of any name whatsoever. But on this theory we candidly avow the state does discountenance atheism as her necessary and radical antagonist. Should either church or state therefore persecute an avowed atheist? By no means. Both should treat him with pity and with all the forbearance compatible with the duty of self-preservation. But the state has the same right to restrain him from destroying society by his atheism which a householder has to prevent a lunatic son from burning down the children's dwelling-house. To this catastrophe the systematic neglect of the Sabbath naturally tends, because it tends to the forgetfulness of God, the ruler of mankind; and that such is its tendency experience is the best proof. The only atheistic communities which have ever had a permanent existence in the world have been mere hordes of savages, like the Australians and Hotten-

tots. All the civilized pagan nations of ancient and modern times had at least polytheism as the basis of their morals and government, and when religious faith was overflowed by skepticism in Athens and Rome, those republics fell. Twice France has seen attempts to found a civil government on atheistic principles. The results were the two Reigns of Terror. Russia now has an atheistic sect seeking to establish a new commonwealth, and its favorite measure is *assassination*.

The sum, then, is: Theism is essential to the state; the Sabbath is essential to maintain theism. Therefore it is that the state can do no less than maintain an outward Sabbath rest.

AN EXPOSITION OF 1 CORINTHIANS III. 10-15.

"According to the grace of God which is given unto me, as a wise master builder, I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon. For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ. Now, if any man build upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man's work shall be made manifest: for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire; and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire."

THERE are few passages of Scripture concerning which more numerous and more contradictory explanations have been given than this. The most noteworthy of these schemes of exposition may be classed under three, from which they differ only in some minor details. The first of these is the scheme of the common current of the Popish writers, and of many of the Patristic interpreters. It makes the foundation to be the orthodox doctrines of the gospel, as Rome understands them; the various builders to be Christians; the gold, silver, precious stones, to be good works superadded to faith by Christians; the wood, hay, and stubble, venial sins committed by Christians; and the day and fire which shall burn up the latter, the season and the punishments of purgatory. The Christian who has added such venial sins to an orthodox faith is accordingly represented by the 15th verse, as getting to heaven indeed, but with loss, and by passing through the purgatorial fires. The obvious drift of this whole explanation is, therefore, to make the passage teach that there is a purgatory.

This interpretation is too bald and crude to satisfy even learned Papists. Cardinal Bellarmine, for instance, who is perhaps the ablest and most learned of their polemics, himself refutes it, in order to establish one more plausible. The arguments are obvious, such as, that the several builders are all obviously ministers, as is implied by the whole current of the chapter, and not professed Christians in general. The cardinal then presents the following scheme, countenanced by some of the early fathers,

which leads by a more circuitous way, to the same doctrinal result as the first. The foundation which Paul says he laid is the orthodox gospel; the several builders are legitimately ordained church-teachers; the gold, silver, precious stones, which they superadd to the foundation, are the correct and accurate details of Popish doctrine; the wood, hay, stubble, are inaccurate and incorrect details of doctrine, not indeed positively heretical (for they would have sent the teacher straight to hell), but ill-judged and partially perverted; the day and the fire are the season and punishments of purgatory, in which such teachers shall be chastised. But such teachers, if genuine Catholics at bottom, shall reach heaven at last, after passing through purgatory. The inference then is, that if this passage teaches a purgatory for imprudent or imperfect ministers, it may be assumed, by good logical consequence, to await all other classes of Christians, except the beatified who die in actual perfection.

The third scheme is that followed by the current of respectable Protestant commentators; for example, by Calvin, the continuators of Matthew Henry, and Scott. They give the same interpretation with Bellarmine to the foundation, the various builders, and the contrasted sets of materials in the superstructure, only they suppose the foundation to be, the doctrine of the cross understood as Protestants hold it. They then suppose the day to be the day of judgment, when the preaching of God's ministers shall be strictly tested, and the fire to be the penetrating and holy judgment of God concerning his creatures; or, as Calvin interprets, with nearly the same virtual result, the fire represents the Holy Ghost, as in Acts ii. 3, by whom the hearts and teachings of ministers will be searched. This terrible and holy ordeal of the divine inquest will utterly explode all erroneous superstitions, and self-righteous doctrines which have been attached to the pure doctrines of the cross. But if the minister has truly embraced and preached Jesus Christ, he shall be saved in spite of his unfortunate errors in smaller points of doctrine. Yet he will lose much of the glory and blessedness graciously bestowed by God on wise, orthodox, and faithful ministers, and will gain the gate of heaven as it were with difficulty, and only by running as it were through a fiery ordeal, to reach it.

This explanation avoids the unscriptural and superstitious consequences of the two others; and leads to no practical

error. Yet we are persuaded that it still comes short of the meaning of Paul, and misses therefore his true intent, and the rich instructions contained in it. We will first state the view which seems the true one, and then give the grounds of dissent from all the three schemes recited, following the order of the passage of Scripture itself, instead of attempting to refute each scheme separately. Brevity and clearness will thus be promoted.

We hold, then, that as Paul names himself “wise *master*-builder,” he means by the other various builders ministers of rank inferior to the apostolic, coming after him. The foundation which he laid is that blessed cluster of fundamental doctrines which set forth Christ crucified as our salvation. The building reared on this foundation by various hands is the church of Jesus Christ, taken generally; and the gold, silver, precious stones, are genuine and regenerate persons introduced into the church by the labors of wise and faithful ministers, while the wood, hay, stubble, represent spurious converts, and unconverted professors of religion, introduced into the church by less judicious laborers. When the day of judgment comes, this church universal, thus variously built, shall be tested by the holy, searching and penetrating inquest of God the judge, even as a material building would be by having the torch applied to it. In such a building, the living rock on which it is founded, and the imperishable stone and precious metals, would remain after the conflagration; but the perishable materials would be utterly consumed. So, nominal Christians, spurious converts, whose faith is a dead faith, however connected with a genuine and orthodox church of Christ, will be cast into hell, and forever consumed by God’s wrath; while true Christians will remain uninjured. And in the judgment day, those ministers who by their soundness, prudence and fidelity have added genuine converts to Christ’s church, will receive a reward from the free undeserved grace of their Lord. These ransomed souls having stood the test of the judgment day, will shine as stars in their crowns. But this gracious reward will be lost by those injudicious and rash ministers who had introduced unsound professors into the church. If the ministers are themselves built on the Rock Christ Jesus, they will indeed be saved; but they will see the unregenerate members whom they have brought into God’s house sink to hell

under his strict judgment, and will wear in heaven a crown stripped of its jewels.

Although this scheme is found in none of the commentaries which the writer has consulted, no originality is claimed for it. It was first orally suggested to him in its leading feature by the late Dr. F. S. Sampson.

An unprejudiced consideration will show the congruity of this explanation in all its parts, and with the rest of the scripture; and in this there is no little evidence of its correctness. That the various builders represent ministers in the church is evident, and indeed, is disputed by none of the modern interpreters. That the structure is the church and the contrasted sets of materials are genuine and spurious church members, we may solidly establish by several proofs. *1st.* The passage itself expressly asserts that the foundation laid is Jesus Christ. But the usual tenor of scripture figure, in both the Old and New Testaments, represents the church of Christ as the structure built on that foundation, and individual Christians as the constituent parts of the structure. Let the reader only refer to the well known passages in Isaiah xxviii. 16; Matt. xvi. 18; Eph. ii. 20-22; 1 Peter ii. 4, 5. In all these passages, the building resting on this foundation is the church, and Christians are the stones united to that sure basis. Why suppose that the apostle departs from this uniform mode of using the figure here? But *2nd.* The context of our passage settles the meaning. The subject is introduced by that unseemly strife in the Corinthian church in which the disciples ranked themselves in parties, according to the minister by whom they had been gathered in. The apostle's object is to rebuke this division, by showing that the foundation is one; that the only Efficient in making a true Christian is God; that the only function of any minister is to be an instrument in building up this one structure, not two rival buildings, and that all should tremble with holy fear, because a man might be connected with the true, orthodox church of Christ, and might even be introduced into it by a minister who was a sincere Christian, and yet be damned. In introducing this train of thought, Paul employs two similes, that of the husbandman and that of the builder. But the latter suits his purpose best in some respects, and he expands it. In verse 9th he says to the members of the church: "Ye are God's

husbandry: *ye* are God's building." And in verse 16th he repeats: "Know *ye* not that *ye* are the temple of God?" We may justly claim, therefore, that the apostle himself decides for the sense we have given. The different constituents built upon the true foundation are the different classes of church members, regenerate and unregenerate. *3rd.* It seems far less natural to speak of erroneous or human doctrines connected with the gospel, as consumed by the fire of God's heart-searching justice, than of unsound persons. The former metaphor is unusual and unnatural; the latter is customary and easy.

In the next place, we concur with the Protestant interpreters in understanding by "*the day*" which shall declare every man's work, the day of final judgment. It is spoken of emphatically as *the day*, as though it were well known. What day so emphatic and marked in the mind of a Bible Christian as "the day of judgment?" The very phrase is repeated almost perpetually. "God hath appointed *a day* in which he will judge the world." (Acts xvii. 31.) "He who hath begun a good work in you will perform it until *the day* of Jesus Christ." (Phil. i. 6.) There is a striking and curious confirmation of this meaning only eleven verses from the passage on which we are remarking. In 1 Cor. iv. 3 Paul says: "With me it is a very small thing to be judged of you, or of man's judgment." So reads the English version, but in the original it stands literally "to be judged of you *or of man's day*." The translators seem justly to have considered that the meaning of a *day of judgment* was so plain in the word "*day*" that it was proper to institute "judgment" for "*day*," in order to make sense to the English reader. Now, if the day which shall declare each minister's work, so as by fire, is the day of judgment, there is no countenance here for the doctrine of purgatory, for the plain reason that, according to all Papists, purgatory is finished completely before the day of judgment comes. The same conclusion follows also from the 15th verse, where the unsound work is destined to "be burned." The word rendered "burned" means "burned down," "burned to a thorough destruction." But the pretended fires of purgatory are represented by Papists as only perfecting him who is subjected to them.

The next point to be proved is the meaning we have assigned to "the fire" which is to try every man's work in that day. Cal-

vin understands by it the Holy Ghost, who was symbolized by tongues of fire sitting on each disciple at the day of Pentecost. Other sound expounders understand by it the strictness of the divine holiness and justice, by which ministers and their followers will be judged. We would think either sense admissible, and practically they come to the same thing; for if we suppose the Holy Ghost here alluded to, it is only as a spirit of truth and judgment. But the second sense is somewhat more accordant with scripture usage. In Hebrews xii. 29 the fact that "our God is a consuming fire" is assigned as the reason why we should serve him with reverence and godly fear. In Mal. iii. 2, Jesus Christ is described as like a refiner's fire and fuller's soap; and it is said that he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver to purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness. In both these cases the fire represents the character of the divine attributes with which we have to deal. That the fire in our passage cannot mean what the Papists suppose, the actual fire and torments of a purgatory, is plain from the fact that it is throughout only figurative. The minister who, though united to Christ, has built up his church with bad materials, "shall be saved, yet *so as* by fire." The particles we have italicized clearly suggest a simile. If the saving of the workman by fire is figurative, it is reasonable to suppose the testing of his work by fire is figurative also. This, a correct exposition, removes every shadow of meaning favorable to a purgatory. The strict and terrible ordeal through which the foolish workman will get to heaven, and in which his foolish work will utterly perish, is the ordeal of the judgment day.

This striking passage, thus restored to its true meaning, presents many valuable, practical inferences. One of these is that Christ's church is composed in this world of mixed characters; some are regenerate and some are unregenerate; and this is true even of churches founded on Jesus Christ by apostles and built up by pious ministers who reach heaven. Thus that view of the church is confirmed which Christ gives in the parable of the tares and wheat (Matt. xiii. 36) and of the net and fishes (Matt. xiii. 47), and that unscriptural doctrine is again overthrown, by which the attempt is made to exclude our children from the church. Another practical lesson terribly enforced by this passage is that addressed to ministers at the end of the

10th verse, "Let every man take heed how he buildeth there-upon."

The apostle enforces a solemn caution to take heed what kind of accessions are gathered into the church. And this caution is addressed, not to heterodox, but to orthodox ministers., who truly hold Christ the head and preach fundamental truths. A moment's consideration will show that it is one of vast importance to American Christians, not only because of the consequences of the evil to ministers and people, but because of the prevalence of unsound profession among us.

One form in which ministers, substantially sound, perpetrate this mischief is the lack of diligence, firmness, and fidelity in purging the roll of the church by admonition and discipline. If any member of the spiritual building evinces an unsound and perishable nature, he should be removed from the structure of the church itself before the fiery day of inquest destroys him and mars his pastor's reward. The unconverted man is better anywhere than in the full communion of the church.

Another way in which unsound accessions are often made is by the application of lax or erroneous tests to the religious experience of new converts. The minister preaches Christ indeed, he points out the right way of salvation, but, from indolence, ill-judged softness of temper, or ambition to count large numbers of converts, he admits many to his communion without taking time and pains to apply discriminating tests of a true conversion. In the light of this third chapter of First Corinthians, how vain and foolish does this ambition to report numbers appear. It is not the wood, hay, stubble that will truly add to the altitude of the structure and the reward of the workman, but only the gold, silver, and costly stones. The more of the former he heaps up, the larger ruin is he preparing for his own hopes. There is, therefore, scarcely a more solemn duty that a minister has to perform than that of trying and training young Christians before he admits them to a profession.

But there is still a third form of the error, which is most mischievous and extensive among us, and which we would, therefore, unfold with greater particularity. It is the habit of endeavoring to promote religious feeling by other means than the application of enlightening and saving truth to the soul, while that truth is also presented with a good degree of fidelity.

With those who do not truly preach Christ we have nothing to do just now; for they cannot even claim to be building their spurious and perishable trash on the apostolic foundation. But there is a set of expedients, used frequently in connection with good preaching, by Presbyterians sometimes and more by others, which are familiarly known by the name of "new measures." Some of these expedients are capable of a partial apology, as when they profess to enlist the intercessions of God's people for an anxious soul, but they are more often calculated to mislead, by confounding natural religious feelings with the supernatural and sanctifying; and thus they often result in the heaping up of much wood, hay, and stubble in the church. Let us then examine the dangers of these methods, by looking into the facts of human nature as influenced by religious excitements.

The first fact to which we would call attention is, that all excitements about religion are not therefore good, or pious, or sanctifying. It may be supposed that a thing so obvious would need no remark; but it is amazing how blindly multitudes of Christians credit any strong emotion about religion as being, of course, wholesome and beneficial emotion. That the man feels acutely, that he has been profoundly disturbed, and has attained to more comfortable emotions, seems to be all these good people demand, in order to think well of him; and any excitement *about* religion is hailed as a precious religious revival. It is forgotten that grace is supernatural, while a multitude of religious emotions are very natural. The word *religion* has been so long used as the same with *Christianity*, that men have lost sight of the fact that there is a multitude of religions, some bad, yea vile, and only one good; that all mankind, down to the basest pagan tribes, have their religious systems and religious fears, anxieties, joys and triumphs. Emotion merely religious may be compatible with the most depraved and atrocious state of character, and with creeds utterly false. To think of future welfare, to be goaded by a guilty conscience, to be full of feeling and passion about eternal realities, may be just as congruous with paganism as with Christianity. And Turkish Dervishes, Hindoo-Faquirs, or Indian Medicine-men, have their *religious revivals*, just as truly as our ill-judging churches. That is, they have their seasons of prevalent and contagious religious emotions, agitating at once large masses of men. Now, since these things are so,

would it not be reasonable to suppose that poor human nature may frequently be subject to these spreading impulses of merely natural, unsanctifying feelings about religion in our Christian lands as well as in heathendom, and that there is probably a great deal of feeling here also about the soul which yet does no good to the soul? Indeed, these contagious accesses of feeling are so natural to the human race, that they may occur about many other subjects besides religion. We have seen our political revivals, fostered by inflammatory speeches, songs, badges, processions, which were as truly *revivals* as, and perhaps little less worthless than, many religious excitements. It is not enough then to produce feeling about the soul; we must aim to produce right feeling. And this is only produced by revealed truth intelligibly presented to the understanding, and applied by a supernatural agent. All else, no matter how genuinely warm or intense, is only that sorrow of the world that worketh death, and needeth to be repented of. The whole labor of the wise minister, therefore, will be to replace this natural religious feeling by the supernatural.

Let us next advert to the principle of sympathy in the human soul. We so habitually limit the operations of this, in our thoughts, to the sorrowful emotions, that we almost forget its universality. The Creator has formed man with this law of feeling, that the mere witnessing of any human emotion colors the soul of the spectator with a similar emotion, in a less degree. In the object of the sympathy, the emotion was propagated according to the laws of the understanding, which presents to the heart some view of facts rationally adapted to be the motive or occasion of the feeling. But in the subject of the sympathetic feeling, there is no acting of the understanding, no view presented by it to the heart, unless we call the mere perception of emotion in the other person a view of the understanding. The sympathetic emotion is wholly unintelligent, is superinduced by the mere sight of the feeling in another, and usually vanishes when that is removed. In proof, we point to the facts that we are saddened when we see a person weep, although we do not know the cause of his grief, and if we see persons angry or fighting, we partake of their excitement, though we know and care nothing of them or their quarrel. In a word, our sympathetic feeling is provoked, not by the rational cause of the feel-

ing we behold, but by the mere beholding of the feeling. Again, it should be remarked that sympathy is involuntary and immediate. The senseless passions of mobs, where men are suddenly led to clamor or fight with vehemence for objects of which they are utterly ignorant and careless, are familiar and trite illustrations of this power.

It will now be at once seen that we have here an engine which may be used to a slight extent as occasion of genuine, gracious emotions; but which admits of indefinite and tremendous abuse for the excitement of spurious, senseless, religious feeling. It is usually called into use by rash ministers in two ways, of which one is the rhetorical painting of startling or moving pictures in their discourses, and the other is the parade or display of the religious passion in those who are already inflamed with it. These ill-starred artists have learned by experience that the machinery of the sympathetic passions is one on which they may count with perfect regularity. No human feeling can be exhibited to human beings without awakening the corresponding feeling to some degree. In some persons the susceptibility is slight, in some it is strong: but the more widely the sympathetic flame is spread the more power does it have to propagate itself, and the more certainly, promptly, and fiercely. Nothing more is needed than to display the desired passion, either by the dramatic rhetoric of the preacher, or by the collecting and exhibition in public of persons already infected; the result naturally follows. Feelings of supposed religious anxiety, conviction, penitence, gratitude, spiritual joy, spread from heart to heart, assuming the garb of true spiritual emotions. But from the very nature of sympathy, they are unintelligent; that is to say, they are produced by mere contagion from the feeling of others, without any view presented by the understanding of the truths by which true, gracious emotion should be produced, and therefore it is a sheer impossibility that they can be sanctifying; because the Holy Spirit, the sole agent of sanctification, only works on reasonable souls by the instrumentality of *truths intelligently comprehended*. The understanding is the only channel through which the sanctifying means can reach the heart. The subject of this sympathy does not truly feel for his own sins; he only feels for another who is feeling for his sins. He

is not properly anxious for his own soul; he is only anxious about the anxiety of another for his soul.

We are now perhaps prepared to give an answer to the question, how far sympathy may be legitimately employed as a lever for moving the careless about the things of God. This law of sympathy, yea, of the religious sympathies, was given to our souls by our Maker; was it for nothing? Has it, unlike all his other works, no legitimate use? Again: the true orator, when he arouses feeling by the exhibition of his own feeling, undoubtedly appeals to the law of sympathy. Is all this improper? We answer, no: there is a legitimate use which may be made of this law. We often find our fellow-men because of their inattention insensible to the clear truths presented to the understanding, which are the Spirit's sole instruments for salvation. It is then desirable to superinduce feeling in connection with these truths, even if it be at first unintelligent feeling, and such as is not sanctifying, in order that saving truth may catch the attention, may be truly heard, remembered, and by God's further blessing felt. We would then allow to these sympathetic impressions their proper place as means, but as means of secondary grade and importance. They are, indeed, only means to other means; they are but an expedient for securing attention to that more direct means, the truth, by which alone saving impressions can be made. If therefore the preacher aims to excite the sympathetic religious emotions by that scriptural and rational warmth of feeling with which he is expounding scripture truth to the understanding, with that feeling which such truths should reasonably stimulate in a gracious and enlightened heart, he does well: he is guilty of no abuse. For, while he aims to produce the sympathetic emotion which, if it remained mere sympathy, would be unintelligent and worthless for ulterior good, he also presents Bible truths to the understanding, gaining for them the warmth and quickened attention of the temporary feeling; so that by their truths the hearer's soul may now, perchance, be profited. But if he merely seeks to excite and harrow the sympathies by touching or dramatic incident, or by fiery displays of passion, which contain no perspicuous explication of Bible truths, he is abusing his power. He is exciting by mere contagious influence a senseless and worthless agitation, which can do no good, being accompanied with no light for the

understanding, and which is likely to do irreparable evil, by being mistaken for true religious feeling. Again, the exhibition of genuine religious emotion, which is the just fruit of right views of truth held by the understanding, may have a valuable sympathetic effect on others; as when that exhibition is properly made in the daily duties of a holy life, in the approaches to the throne of grace, in the tender expostulations of the Christian with his impenitent neighbor. The sympathetic softening may make way for the teachings of instructive example or discourse to the mind before inattentive. But when emotions are paraded in publicity and inflamed by the artifices of the ecclesiastical "manual exercise," in order to propagate a passion beyond that begotten by the truth itself, the result is unmingled mischief. The misguided subject is taught to regard this unintelligent passion as the end, instead of a very secondary means, and to rest in it as constituting gracious affections. It is as though the sick man, benumbed with the approaching chill of death, should mistake the warmth of the appliances used from without for the glow of that animal heat, the inward and living result of vitality, which the former could only serve to stimulate. To apply our comparison to the soul, where the true principle of vitality exists, which the Spirit of God bestows and which he only bestows by the means of THE TRUTH intelligently apprehended in the understanding, the artificial caloric applied from without may do some good, by stimulating the internal spiritual heat which is the effect of genuine spiritual life and which therefore must ever originate from within. But all the warming of a dead corpse with external applications of heat which human art can imagine will never make it a living man. It may hasten putrefaction! Just as soon as the applications are suspended, it will be a cold marble corpse again. And how ruinous would be that error which should mistake the fleeting touch of warmth given from without for the true animal heat?

The nature of sympathetic excitements has now been somewhat explained. It has been shown that the mere witnessing of emotion superinduces some degree of the same emotion in the soul of the spectator, and that this excitement is not produced by any rational view of a cause of emotion seen, or at least supposed to be seen, in the understanding, as is always the case with independent emotions; but that it is immediate

and unintelligent. But now, the first great fact which we mentioned must be recalled. It was that some sort of religious—not Christian or sanctifying—feeling is native to man; and that high degrees of such feeling are compatible with the deepest depravity and often co-exist with it. What are we to expect, then, but that this blind, sympathetic excitement will, in accordance with the great law of association, excite these religious feelings in their direct forms also? Thus the state of the agitated soul, instead of presenting that single and simple emotion we have thus far described, becomes very mixed and complex. The unreasoning impulse of sympathy mingles with the rational but unsanctified emotions produced by the convictions of the sinner's awakened understanding, and perhaps with those also awakened under the teachings of the Holy Ghost. The three-fold elements would require nice and careful discrimination to distinguish between them, but the storm of excitement leaves the subject of them no disposition to watch or investigate. Let us here remember also, another fearful fact, that Satan is often at hand, striving to mislead and pervert those movements for good which he cannot wholly prevent, by his false and destructive suggestions. For example: we will make the more favorable supposition, that the emotion exhibited by the indiscreet minister, or the persons whom he parades, for the purpose of starting the agitation, is genuine, spiritual emotion. The only direct effect it has on the spectators, in virtue of the law of sympathy, is to awaken the contagion of an unintelligent excitement. But this sympathetic wave immediately starts the emotions of natural religious feeling, consisting of the sinful sorrow of a guilty conscience, selfish anxiety and slavish fear, with perhaps superstition. The two elements mingle, and how natural is it that the ignorant soul, especially if misled by the father of lies, should suppose them as pure and spiritual as those feelings in the Christians before him, from whom he has caught the infection? "The heart is deceitful above all things." There is here deep feeling *about* God and religion; it is mistaken for godly feeling.

But now, to the storm there will succeed calm, just as surely as day follows after night, summer after winter, and the ebb tide after the flood. The human soul never endures a high tension of emotion for a long time at once. If there is no other cause to relax it, the result will be produced by the very violence of

feeling: the passion wears itself out. The natural fancy is possessed with lively pictures of the loveliness of Christ, and the imagination embraces him in a sense, but not the heart; for there is no scriptural view of the evil of sin, or desirableness of his redemption, which is a redemption unto holiness. It may be a slavish fear compels to a sort of surrender of some sin, which the frightened transgressor concludes he is willing to desert rather than endure hell fire. Now, suppose some indiscreet friend, or the sinner's own anxious self-love, or Satan, who knows so well how to quote scripture, should whisper the suggestion: "Is not this calm, this surrender, the peace of believing?" There is every prospect that the delusion will be embraced. And when once harbored, the spurious joy which it suggests of course tends to propagate and increase itself for a time.

The consequent peace is deep and sweet just according as the previous pain was pungent. It is mistaken for spiritual joy. Self-love of course prompts a spurious gratitude and praise for it; and causes the heart to love the scenes, the means and the companions of its delicious intoxication. And now we have "the stony ground hearers" reproduced. (Matt. xiii. 20-21.) The dead heart, having no true vitality to generate spiritual emotion from within, sinks into a chill and dreary vacuity when alone; and thus it is all the more prone, for a while, to crave a return to the place and the scenes where the exhilarating appliances were enjoyed. It loves that exciting companionship which alone can save it from the unwelcome conviction that it is as wicked as ever, and thus the graces of brotherly love and delight in ordinances are simulated for a season by its spurious affections. He is befooled into the church. And now many things confirm his mistake. Do feelings decline? He says: "Christians should not live on frames." Does sin triumph again over him? He remembers that even a Paul had a "law in his members, warring against the law of his mind." Habits formed during the fever-fit of his religion, together with pride of consistency, cause him still to persevere in some duties; and other unsanctified principles propagate other observances. Quite a warm zeal may be begotten by party feeling, the social principle, self-love, desire of applause, meddlesomeness, emulation, or the love of power. Let self-love or pride of intellect hallow to itself some creed or system, by enshrining it on the

polluted altar of its self-worship, and forthwith it is loved and asserted. To hear it ably expounded or defended gives vivid pleasure; to hear it assailed arouses indignation. Thus the sinner is deluded into the belief that he loves God's truth. And almost all the marks of Christian character may be thus counterfeited.

But the whole is not yet stated. In many accessions made to the churches means of excitement are applied still more deadly in their results. We speak now of what are called the anxious seat and the altar; the directing of all persons who can use certain language, supposed to be decisive of a change of heart, to rise or kneel in their places in the public congregation; and the various other arts for tricking persons into a hurried committal of themselves. If these arts have any object, the whole and obvious design must be to excite certain natural emotions, with the hope of stimulating by their means warmer religious feeling. But, as we have seen, the great evil is the mixture of the natural with the supernatural; and the main desire of the wise minister is, to separate and suppress the former, in order that the latter may be clearly evinced unto the saving of the soul. We will not dwell now so much upon the fact that persons of a true sense of propriety, modesty and humility, will usually be the last to make these unseemly exposures of themselves; and so the very persons who would most profit by the attentions and instructions of the ministers—if those instructions were worth anything—are overlooked, and fail of them entirely. But what are the unsanctified emotions which these usages excite?

1. In the first place, they arouse the blind sympathies in a powerful and dangerous degree. Then a flustered and abashed modesty produces tremendous agitation in all young persons and females. The social and domestic affections are also employed, by using parents as decoys for children, or children for parents, sisters for sisters; and even lovers for lovers, so unscrupulous is the spirit of management often displayed. Again, when the exposure has once been made, and the notoriety acquired, the unfortunate victim feels that he is "in for it;" and every principle of pride pushes him on to act out his part, and force, by every expedient, the continuance of his artificial feeling. So, if advantage is taken of the turmoil and whirlwind of

passion which often attends such scenes, to exact an unthinking avowal of conversion in public, either in act or word, a terrible motive is created, out of the pride of consistency, to persevere in that profession, and to shun the self-examination which might reveal the mortifying delusion, until the soul is undone. Men nearly ignorant of the fearful machinery of the human emotions, and unconscious of the significancy and influence which even slight acts possess with the soul in times of intense excitement, tamper with these springs of eternal weal or woe with a heedless and rash hand. It would be less insane for the surgeon's apprentice to toy with the naked jugular vein, with the point of his master's keen bistoury! What an argument is there here against entrusting the work of the ministry to any but a "scribe instructed unto the kingdom of God!" (Matthew xiii. 52.)

2. Let us now inquire, what is the testimony of that sure guide, experience, concerning the fruits? It is notorious that, even where the preaching is orthodox, discriminating, and faithful, the accessions made to the church by this class of means are often found to be "wood, hay, stubble." Some congregations of Christians report almost annual and splendid accessions, which, if half genuine, should in a few years have raised them to the highest spiritual power and prosperity; yet, after a long series of such revivals, the churches are found small, languishing, and unsound as ever. The thing is so well known that in many regions the public coolly expects about forty-five out of fifty, or even a higher ratio, to apostatize ultimately. And this, alas, is not the language of exaggeration! The sinful world, too, instead of awe and reverence—which the world always feels in the presence of God's Spirit, even when it fights with the heavenly visitor,—looks on with disrespectful levity, and makes such revivals its jests. A multitude of these unsubstantial accessions fall away so speedily that there is scarcely time to count them as communicants; but of those who continue church members, is there not reason to fear that numbers had better be open apostates? Even the judgment of charity decides that our churches have many dead members. These are the result of this building with wood, hay, and stubble, by hasty or unskilful workmen.

We have seen how natural and common are the elements of a religious excitement; that it is so entirely possible for them to

act utterly without anything good or holy, that they are found frequently among pagans and heretics, and that similar excitements may even arise where religion is not in question at all. We have seen the modes in which the natural and sinful exercises may easily counterfeit the genuine and supernatural. We have seen the evidence of a sure *experience*, which shows that the mistake does occur in multitudes of cases. The apostle tells us what are its fatal consequences. The wood, hay, stubble, shall be utterly burned; the miserable victims of all this handicraft of self-deception shall lose their souls; and the ministers who work the machinery, if they escape hell themselves, will escape it "so as by fire," and will lose the reward of their labors. And now, does it not seem amazing that even uneducated men, who have some good sense and scriptural knowledge, should, in view of these truths, perpetrate the acts which are often done amidst religious excitements; that ministers of the gospel, for instance, should triumphantly proclaim a given young person regenerate in the face of the crowd, because forsooth he has extracted from the confused, the almost frantic mind, some random expression of faith or love towards Christ? Or that they should persistently inflame all the spurious emotions we have described, and then, on the ground that they are felt, recognize whole crowds of persons ignorant and credulous, as true converts to Christ, without either allowing the time or taking the pains to discriminate between the work of the Holy Spirit and the work of their own arts, which is so exceedingly apt to ape and simulate God's work? We would distinctly admit that many truly good men are concerned in this error, because of an honest, but misguided zeal to save souls; but yet a portentous amount of guilt is contracted and of everlasting mischief done in this way. That the error of management be explored and thoroughly exposed is one of the most urgent religious wants of our age.

I object to this well known system farther :

3. Such measures are hazardous for the awakened, not only because (see above) they produce a mischievous turmoil of the natural sympathies, or worse, where the utmost perspicacity, solemnity, and sincerity are desirable; but

(a.) They raise a false issue for the sinner's conscience. The real issue is as stated in John vi. 29, or Acts xvii. 30, or ii. 38. The

false is, Will you come to the anxious seat? or some similar observance. Thus follows unavoidable confusion of conscience. If the person awakened has dignity and good sense, he will probably refuse to come, and then the *drift* of the system is to tell him that *therein* he has rebelled against God and grieved the Holy Ghost; hence, groundless distraction. If he is more gullible, and *goes*, it is implied that he has performed a saving act, or at least one that has *gratia congruens*. It is *in vain they disclaim*; for the common sense reasons, "Why so much urgency, if the means is not truly effective of something?" The altar, or anxious bench, is called the "foot of the cross," "blessed place," etc. Those who come are *gloried over*. Hence—

(b.) The victim is placed in a false position, where his soul is subjected to most vicious considerations. It is claimed, these measures "bring the sinner to a decision, and make him commit himself." Yes, unfortunately; but only mischievously. "*C'est le premier pas qui conte?*" True, of *sinful* courses, the completion of which is in the sinner's own depraved power and will; not otherwise. Is this decision a *determination to come to Christ?* Then the man is a believer. Why not instruct him as such? He has gotten past the need for "measures." Is it a determination to do *something else?* Then it is mischievous, for until he comes to Christ he does *nothing*.

But he has "committed himself." Yes, unfortunately. **Not** to his God, to enlightened, honest, deliberate conscience, but to false pride, to a human public, to false shame. If he does not go on, he is—not unjustly—left full of indignation and spite for the mortifying attitude; he feels he has been entrapped. If he cowers before the false shame, then a fearful temptation is created to "get up" a spurious conversion with counterfeit graces. Look at *results!*

The system is very like the Romish plans of ensnaring vows, etc.

(c.) They foster a vicious and unhealthy development of the religious character. The exposure and parading of sentiments which should be most sacred and delicate before a public audience, and that a *promiscuous* one of Christians and sinners, many of the latter profane, and even scoffing, is deadly to delicacy of feeling, especially among young persons and females. The system produces a sensational religion, and a dependence

on clap-trap for religious warmth. Modesty and reserve being broken down, there is a fearful danger of awakening vain glory, and a fondness for display and applause. The new measures tend to banish *reverence*, which is the essential spirit of true piety, and to foster a flippant and profane spirit. They are an inlet for disorders, as lay preaching, the thrusting forward of neophytes into an unwholesome publicity in leading in prayer and exhortation, etc., and even the public praying and exhorting of women. For the prime thing to be done is to *make a sensation* anyhow, and if stale novelties will not effect this, then fresher ones must be resorted to.

In this connection, I note the two other pleas for these new measures: that they are necessary to give suitable special *instruction* to inquirers; and that they lead believers to special prayer for them. To the first I reply, no time or move could well be more *unpropitious* for such instruction. Witness the actual transactions; a few muttered or whispered words of commonplace to a mind blind with confusion and passion. If individual instruction is needed, no place is suitable except the pastor's study or the person's home; if collective, then the desk is the proper place. As to the latter plea, what sort of intercessory spirit is that which must needs be *piqued* by the *sight* of the weeping, agitated mourners before it will pray for them? More like clap-trap than faith.

4. The real impulses which propel ministers to the new measures, while sometimes ignorantly pious, are more frequently improper, a prurient impatience to hurry and huddle the work which God reserves as his own,—sinners' conversion,—with a secret mistrust of the power of the simple truth, with prayer and faith; a love of notoriety, and of the reputation of effectiveness; a desire to count large numbers of converts, and especially an indolence which is impatient of God's method, the detailed, unobtrusive, sustained work of pastoral and catechetical instruction. It is, in a word, a system of spiritual *quackery*. It relies not on spiritual powers, but on theatrical sympathies and manipulations.

5. The charge would be sufficient against the new measures, that they constitute an *Εδελιο-θρησκεία*. The system is not set down and authorized for us in God's word; and this is enough to make it contraband to a strict Protestant. They plead sun-

dry things in all Protestant churches, all probably different from, and additional to, what was in the primitive precedent, as pews in churches, choirs, etc. Answer: If these are right, they are only the natural and fair development of rites of worship which are ordained in sacred Scripture. The new measures are more,—a substantive addition. The motive stamps them as the sin of will-worship; for that motive is notoriously the desire to employ human inventions, springing out of the mistrust in God's plans. Every corruption of popery was, at its inception, a "new measure," prompted and apologized for precisely as we hear in our day, and several of them decidedly more plausible and reverential: pictures and statues in churches, relics, monkery, confessional and penance, processions, sacred dramas, etc. Only time is needed to develop these modern ones into as palpable a system of man-made religion as popery.

Last. Events have disclosed a marked tendency of the *new measures* to foster Pelagian and semi-Pelagian doctrines. See the history of the New School and of the Missionary Baptists, both of whom were largely corrupted by these measures. See their chief prevalence among semi-Pelagian sects, United Brethren, Wesleyans, Lutherans (New School), Winebrennerians, Cumberland Presbyterians, *et al.* In fact, they do not *cohere* with the Bible doctrines of original sin, effectual calling, and sovereign grace.

In connection with these measures, let us consider the usage of the prompt admission of professed converts to the Lord's table. The reasons *against* this usage are obvious. In favor of it, they plead (*a*,) That it is well to get them *committed* at once; (*b*,) The example of the apostles at Pentecost, etc. The answer to the first is, that it is the wrong sort of committal, to motives factitious and unwholesome. To offset the apostolic example, Dr. Miller says that there was a special reason why they must be seemingly precipitate, namely, that the bulk of their converts were only assembled for the week of the feast, and would then disperse. Dr. Alexander says: A similar precedent would impose on us community of goods, that Christ chose, not to make his apostles infallible as to every point and detail of pastoral discretion by an inspiration, but left them to learn from experience like other Christians. It may be added: suppose God was pleased to give, in that work, a gen-

eral purity, and to reveal to the apostles a guarantee of it, such as are not given in our modern revivals, then, of course, we are not to imitate their immediate reception. Paul says to Timothy, "Lay hands suddenly on no man." In a word, experience shows that to imitate them would now be mischievous, and a violation of that pastoral prudence which is undoubtedly enjoined. (See Shorter Catechism, Question 97; Book of Discipline, Chap. I., Sec. II.; Directory of Worship, Chap. IX.)

Time has exposed the hollowness of the conversions under discussion so frequently that the persons who persist in employing the dangerous methods dare not deny it. But their plea is "that some are genuine converts; that one soul is of priceless value, and that, if nine out of every ten go back, they are only where they were before, while the tenth is saved." The apostle does not speak thus. The wood, hay, and stubble, when built into God's spiritual temple, is not as well off as when left in the forest or the field. That building is destined to be tried by fire; and in that day woe unto the perishable stuff which has been thrust into it. The plea just stated assumes two things both of which are untrue. One is that the majority, who prove to be spurious fruits of these excitements, are no worse off than before; the other is that the small minority of genuine fruits would not have been gathered in without these means. Of the latter assumption I remark, first, that it is notoriously untrue. In almost every case where true grains of living wheat are found among the masses of chaff raked together by these efforts there will be formed a preparatory work in the heart, the result of intelligent scriptural teaching and consistent Christian example, watered for some time by the Holy Spirit in the retirement of their homes. And the only result of the revival appliances as to them has been to hurry them a little, perhaps, in their disclosures of their new feelings, and at the same time to mar and pollute the wholesome soundness of their spiritual character. Had scriptural means of grace been used with them, and no others, they would have come into the church in due time, none the less surely, and with a piety more symmetrical and profound.

Nor is the other assumption true, that the rest who are not savingly converted are no worse off than before. Is it nothing that the power of divine grace and the sanctity of a religious

profession are dishonored before the world, till the very name of revival becomes trivial? Is it nothing that the misguided converts who apostatize have the guilt of broken vows and professions, and perhaps of sacraments profaned, added to all their previous lists? But this is not all; the spiritual effects of one of these delusive and abortive excitements are blighting. At best, the sensibilities of the subject are exhausted and worn out to no purpose, until his heart becomes almost incapable of impression, and his "conscience is seared with a hot iron." Those who have passed through two or three of these fires are usually found the most impious and heaven-daring of profane swearers, revilers and mockers, where they are not restrained by principles of social decency and respectability. If they belong to the latter class, they are usually found in a state of skepticism or hostility as to the very truth of Christianity. They feel that a cruel trick has been played upon their inexperience by the ministers and friends of Christianity in thus thrusting them, in the hour of their confusion, into false positions, whose duties they do not and cannot perform, and into sacred professions which they have been compelled shamefully to repudiate. Their self-respect is therefore galled to the quick, and pride is indignant at the humiliating exposure. No wonder that they look on religion and its advocates henceforward with suspicion and anger. Often their feelings do not stop here. They are conscious that they were thoroughly in earnest in their religious anxieties and resolves at the time, and that they felt strange and profound exercises. Yet bitter and mortifying experience has taught them that *their* new birth and experimental religion at least was a delusion. How natural to conclude that those of all others are delusions also? They say: "the only difference between myself and these earnest Christians is, that they have not yet detected the cheat as I have. They are now not a whit more convinced of their sincerity and of the reality of their exercises than I once was of mine. Yet I know there was no change in my soul; I do not believe that there is in theirs." Such is the fatal process of thought through which thousands have passed; until the country is sprinkled all over with infidels, who have been made such by their own experience of spurious religious excitements. They may keep their hostility to themselves in the main; because Christianity now "walks in

her silver slippers;" but they are not the less steeled against all saving impressions of the truth.

But what shall we say of that large number, who having entered the church with a counterfeit conversion, continue there as formal and dead professors, blinded by habit, pride of consistency, and self-righteousness, to their real condition? Their case is, alas! worse if possible than the former. Humanly speaking, everything concurs to keep them insensible to their true condition. Their false hope, like an adamant shield, turns aside every arrow of wholesome admonition or awakening. Is Christ offered in the gospel as a Saviour for lost sinners? They consider themselves as among the found. Is the danger of the unconverted painted in the most alarming colors? It is nothing to them, for they consider themselves as among the converted. Are the privileges of believers held forth? They appropriate them all, saying to themselves: "Peace, peace, when there is no peace." The result is that their mistaken professions convert all the gracious promises, which are the nutriment of the regenerate soul, into deadly poisons to them; and close their mouths against the reception of a single one of those bitter but wholesome convictions, which are the necessary medicines for their dangerous case. Let ministers address faithful and discriminating warnings to professed Christians, against self-deception, or against inconsistency, and you shall see that all the truly humble, sound, consistent Christians in the audience, whose piety nobody doubts, will at once accept the admonition with contrite thankfulness, and diligently search their hearts therewith as with a lighted candle. But every dead professor, for whom they were especially intended, will be seen busily applying the warnings to his neighbors, and with a self-satisfied air perhaps admiring and complimenting the fidelity of his pastor! "Verily, the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of heaven before" these (Matt. xxi. 31). Let us appeal again to the testimony of experience. We know that the churches contain multitudes of these dead believers; and yet, though they are usually church-goers, and so, within the reach of the means of grace, when revivals come, it is the rarest thing in the world to hear anything of the conversion of this class. A few of those who have undergone a spurious conversion and discovered their delusion are now savingly renewed, along with

numbers of open, careless sinners; but how few of those who "have a name to live and are dead?" When Satan gets the "wood, hay, and stubble" quietly built into God's spiritual temple, he is best pleased; for he knows that they will probably remain there undisturbed till the day that trieth every man's work by fire; and then they will be inevitably consigned to everlasting burnings. THEN "LET EVERY MAN TAKE HEED HOW HE BUILDETH."

It is not intended in these remarks to imply that delusive conversions and unsanctified communicants are only found in those congregations which employ the dangerous expedients described above; but only that they may be reasonably expected to be more frequent among them. So strong is the tendency to self-deception and formalism in man's sinful soul, much of it will exist in spite of the most scriptural preaching and cautious management. Doubtless the purest churches have dead branches. But does not this sad fact constitute a strong reason for shunning all those expedients by which this danger of self-deception, so prevalent at best, is manifestly increased in a high degree?

RULES FOR PASTOR IN REVIVAL.

1. The chief use to be made of the juncture is to *present important truth*. Hence catechetical work should be then most active, preaching most doctrinal.

2. Gently repress all excitement which the Holy Ghost does not make.

3. Give personal instruction as much as possible *in private*.

4. Beware of permitting anxious persons to *lean on* the pastor, instead of the Saviour.

5. Keep John vi. 29, and Acts xvi. 31, *ever foremost*. **Do not** permit anxious persons to feel that anything is done, until **this** is done.

6. Present Christ in his prophetic and kingly, as well as his priestly work.

7. Don't allow *any one* to thrust you aside from your proper share in the work.

8 Minimize the recoil of the excitement.

9. Commend Dr. Plumer's *Hints on Past. Theol.*, Ch. XXI.

THE WORLD WHITE TO HARVEST:

REAP, OR IT PERISHES.¹

“Behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes and look on the fields; for they are white already to harvest.”—JOHN iv. 35.

THE most familiar truths are the most influential. This is a fact which our ambition to be novel often causes us to overlook. Much that is ingenious, and at the same time correct, has been said upon the commercial, civil, and social results of missions and of Christianity. There is some danger of our prosecuting the evangelical work from these considerations, to the exclusion of the more sacred motives drawn from eternity. In the latter must ever be the main spring of the church's zeal. The same vast, old, familiar truths, which made Paul, Peter, Jesus Christ, missionaries, that the whole human race are children of wrath and in the highway to everlasting ruin; these must move our missionary efforts also. Our faith should constantly recur to these great facts, to receive from them fresh impulses of their might. This is just the method of our Saviour in the text, when he introduces the enforcement of gospel effort by saying, “Lift up your eyes and look on the fields.” And the preacher of the gospel ought to be far more ambitious to be able to restate these trite but potent doctrines, with a seriousness, fervor, and palpable faith appropriate to their awful importance, than to win the applause of his brethren by an eloquent or ingenious novelty. There is the more reason that we should recur to our principles, now that infidelity so boldly charges that the church is no longer impelled in her evangelical toils by a vital and actual faith in the threatenings of sacred Scripture against “the nations that forget God.” They have found, alas, but too much pretext for the taunt, in the biting

¹ A sermon preached for the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, in New York, May 2, 1858.

contrast between the tremendous urgency of our creed and the sluggishness of our endeavors.

You recognize the text as a part of the discourse uttered by our Saviour after his interview with the Samaritan woman at the well. She had gone for a moment to the town to call her friends to hear the gracious Teacher. Meantime, the disciples returned with supplies for our Saviour's weariness, which had arrested him first at that spot. But now they find the claims of hunger and fatigue silenced in him by his more consuming zeal for souls; his meat, his solace for toil, his cordial for fainting nature, is to fulfil his great mission as Teacher and Redeemer of the perishing. He proceeds to assign the reason for his self-denying diligence in this work in the words, "The fields are white already to harvest." This illustration is a favorite one with our Saviour.¹ Its propriety is evidently in this fact: that when the pale yellow of maturity colors the fields of wheat, the precious grain must be gathered at once, or else it will fall to the ground and perish. The harvest labor of the husbandman is peculiarly one which admits no delay. When the golden crop beckons him with its nodding plumes, he must bestir himself, disregarding of scorching heat and panting fatigue; next month it will be too late, for mildew and rot will have reaped his fields before him. So the labor of the spiritual husbandman is also harvest toil. The harvest of souls awaits no man's sluggishness. Death is afield with his flashing scythe mowing down the nations and gathering his sheaves for hell fire; so that the work of redeeming love for them must be done at once, or never. In this is the point of our Saviour's reasoning. This is obviously true of each generation of sinners, as to its own generation of Christian laborers, on the supposition that the whole world is indeed subject to condemnation. Our Saviour evidently extends the application of the fact to all his servants in the harvest, as well as to himself. But I am persuaded that his words include a meaning more extensive and profound. Not only is the short lifetime of each generation the harvest time of its souls; some eras of the world are harvest seasons as to many preceding and subsequent generations. There is then a conjunction of rare influences and circumstances, rendering evangelical labors practicable and successful, so that a hundred

¹ Matt. ix. 37, 38; Mark iv. 20; Luke x. 12.

fold as much may be done as afterward, when that conjunction is dissolved. Such a season the sacred Scriptures clearly describe the era of Christ and his apostles to have been. Then "the fulness of time had come,"¹ chosen by God to bring his first begotten into the world. Then was fulfilled the gracious and golden hour, foreseen by Isaiah,² for Christ to call to the isles and the people from afar, "in an acceptable time, and in a day of salvation." So deemed Paul when he said³ to the men of his age, "Behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation."

If this apprehension is correct, the text will be found to carry for us a twofold meaning. The first of the two important truths which it teaches is this, that the souls of this generation of mankind will quickly perish unless they be saved by the gospel efforts of Christ's church. You will perceive, my brethren, that we are confronted here with that solemn question on which professed followers of Christ are by no means agreed, *Whether the souls of the heathen will certainly perish without the gospel.* Let us look briefly for the answer the sacred Scripture gives it. For if the present ignorance of the heathen exempts them from the curse of a broken law and a fallen nature, while their instruction in revealed truth would subject them to it, like ourselves; and if we may anticipate the probable success of that instruction in turning them to Christ, by the obduracy of sinners at home; then the result of our misplaced zeal may mainly be to scatter broadcast the gratuitous seeds of an aggravated damnation. It were better to centre all our energies on the rescue of sinners at home, who have certainly made themselves subject to the curse by their neglect of Christian light. But if the heathen are also destined to perish inevitably unless the church thrusts forth its laborers into the harvest; then here is the great, the dreadful motive, next to God's glory, which should strain every nerve of every redeemed soul to rescue all he can.

I. It has been urged that a just God cannot punish the breach of a law, or neglect of a gospel, which the heathen could not know. I answer: he will punish no one unjustly. But hath he left himself without witness among them?⁴ "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork." Idolatry and its crimes are not all sins of ignorance.⁵

¹ Gal. iv. 4.

² Isaiah xlix. 8.

³ 2 Cor. vi. 2.

⁴ Ps. xix.

⁵ Rom. i. 20.

"For the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead; so that they are without excuse." They who have no Bible may still look up to the moon walking in brightness and the stars watching in obedient order: they may see in the joyous sunbeams the smile of the Universal Father, and in the fruitful shower the droppings of his bounty; they hear the rending thunder utter his wrath, and the matin jubilee of the birds sing his praise; the green hills are swelled with his goodness; the trees of the wood rejoice before him with every quiver of their foliage in the summer air; and the floods clap their hands in praise, as their multitudinous waves leap up flashing the laughing sunlight from their crests. Are they, then, without blame who turn aside from all this to worship abominations? Nature, by her universal anthem, says, No;¹ "because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God."

Or shall we suppose that, while every nominal Christian sometimes disobeys his own conscience, heathens are so much purer that they never do? To many moral distinctions they may be blind; but among them, as everywhere else among our fallen race, men's light is better than their walk. When the pagans bow down to vile stocks, or defile themselves with universal fraud and lies, infanticide, murder of parents, and all abominations, shall we be told that natural conscience utters no protest? Be it besotted as it may, it cannot wholly tolerate these things. It were a libel on him who made man in his own image to say that even heathen idolatries and crimes could so crush out the moral sense, the noblest trait of his handiwork in us. No; there is not a rational heathen in the world who, however blind his conscience, does not sometimes violate that conscience. There, at least, is sin: there is ground for the righteous judgment of God against him.² "For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law." Nor need we tarry long for that other objection: that a merciful God will surely smile upon that man who sincerely desires to do his duty, and who lives honestly up to the best creed which it was possible for him to know, erroneous though that creed be. The short answer is, that among Adam's sons there is no such man.³ "For we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under

¹ Rom. i. 21.² Rom. ii. 12.³ Rom. iii. 9.

sin." Every man comes short of his own creed, whatever it may be.

These objections lie too near the surface of the question to detain us long. We are compelled to admit the sorrowful truth by reasons far more profound; and one of these is suggested by the pleas which have just been set aside. It is this: 1. That while all men are guilty, no pagan, no infidel scheme provides an adequate atonement. The necessity of this full atonement for pardoned sin is declared by every attribute of God, by every interest of his universal government, and by all the teachings of his word and works. Do not these attributes and principles direct his government of pagans as well as of nominal Christians? Is not God everywhere the same? He "will render to every man according to his deeds, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile; for there is no respect of persons with God."¹ Yea, the heathen conscience has itself written this necessity for atonement all over their superstitions, in horrid characters of torment and blood. Their ablutions, their penances and self-tortures, their costly and ceaseless oblations, the sweat and dust of their pilgrimages, the abhorrent offerings of the fruit of the body for the sin of the soul, confess at once a sense of guilt, and a conscious need of satisfaction for it. And in the more refined creeds of Islam and Deism, we read the same confession in their proposal to compensate for their guilt by alms, good works, reformations, or repentings.

But all these atonements are inadequate,² "for it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins." Least of all would those speculative persons, with whom Bible assertions are of little weight, admit that these spurious virtues or senseless abominations can atone for guilt; they only add to it. The only atonement is that which God has provided for us in the sufferings of his divine Son. And the only way by which any one can share this atonement is the exercise of evangelical faith. Our argument, then, is this: that all pagans are self-convicted of some sins, at least against the light of nature; no sin can be pardoned without atonement; but the gospel is the only proposal of atonement to man.

2. Paganism is also fatally defective with regard to the other great want of the human soul, moral renovation. Here we take

¹ Rom. ii. 6, 10, 11.

² Heb. x. 4.

our stand upon the great doctrine of our Confession,¹ that all the race are "dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body." However men may differ in degrees of wickedness, the best, equally with the worst, are wholly prone to worldliness instead of spirituality; and the hearts of all are fully set in them to disobey some of God's known commands. The natural will of every man dislikes and rejects the holiness, the communion, and the service of God; and this by the perpetual and certain force of those innate dispositions which determine rational volitions. No power but one from without and above can renew that will, because all within it is of course determined by those controlling dispositions. I shall not affront you by supposing it necessary to offer proof of these statements. Such is the inheritance which our own eyes see all in Christian lands deriving from their first father. But we have the testimony of God, that all the heathens bear to Adam the same relation. "He hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth."² And if our smaller vices mournfully substantiate this view of man's moral state here, how much more may we assert it of the heathen, from the general and loathsome corruption of their lives?

Now, "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."³ Here is a prohibition, not pronounced only by the divine justice, but made inexorable by a natural necessity. The carnal mind cannot enjoy a holy and spiritual heaven; but this is the only state of real and everlasting welfare which a holy God can appoint for moral beings. To be unholy is to be unhappy. Were the justice of God dethroned, and the very throne of judgment demolished, were all his holy attributes repudiated, and all the interests of his kingdom disregarded, still the truth, "ye must be born again," would remain a flaming sword, turning every way to keep the path to paradise. But no pagan creed provides means or agency for the new birth. The very conception is strange to them. Their languages lack the very terms for expressing the holiness which it produces. So far are their theologies from any sanctifying influence, their morals are immoral, the deities which they invite man to adore and imitate are often impersonations of monstrous crime, and

¹ Conf., Chap. VI., Secs. 2, 3.² Acts xvii. 26.³ John iii. 3.

the heaven which is to reward their zeal is a *pandemonium* of wickedness, triumphant and immortalized.

Where now are the claims of those virtuous heathens, a Confucius, a Numa, an Aristides, who are supposed to have walked uprightly according to that scanty light of nature vouchsafed by Providence? We might waive the considerations that every earthly child of man is condemned by his own standard, and that justice must be satisfied for these shortcomings. Where is the upright heathen who has shown true spirituality of heart; whose gratitude and love towards a holy God, whose hungerings for sanctification, whose delight in communion with heaven, have proved him "meet for the inheritance of the saints in light"? Have travellers or missionaries found such hearts, formed under the tutelage of paganism? Now, if we decide—as we must—that the most magnanimous gentleman in this Christian land, the most amiable wife, mother, or sister, whose understanding approves the Bible, and whose social life is regulated by higher ethics than ever Aristides dreamed, that he also must be new created unto holiness before he can see God; it is simple absurdity to talk of heathen men admitted to heaven for the uprightness of their intentions. But let us speak of the common grade of pagans, of those whose whole life was brutal vice, whose hearts were all uncleanness, whose very worship was a carnival of lasciviousness and blood. What would that heaven be to them, which we awfully recognize as too pure to admit the most ingenuous of our sons, the loveliest of our daughters, whose social graces are the perfume of our homes and hearts, while they are ungenerated? Let us suppose that the whole sentence of God against the Gentiles, were: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still."¹ Then look at that earthly hell of destitution, domestic tyranny, public barbarity, revenge, and unbridled passion, which heathen society often makes in this life; and judge what these elements will evolve when let loose in the world of spirits, without social restraints or the illusions of hope, and deprived of those animal enjoyments which now form their chief happiness. In fine, the heathen, like us, are depraved; they need a new birth. Therefore they cannot be saved without the gospel, which is the only instrument of regeneration.

¹ Rev. xxii. 11.

We know there are Christians who reject this conclusion, thinking God cannot justly condemn any man who is not endowed with all such means and ability for knowing and loving him as put his destiny in every sense within his own choice. These means the heathen do not fully possess where their ignorance is invincible. The principle asserted is, that God cannot justly hold any one responsible who is not blessed with both natural and moral ability. I answer, that our doctrine concerning the heathen places them in precisely equal condition with those unhappy men in Christian lands who have the outward word, but experience no effectual calling of the Spirit. God requires of the latter to obey that law and gospel of which they enjoy the clearer lights; and the obstacle which ensures their failure to comply, not indeed with any physical constraint, but with a moral certainty, is a depraved heart which is unwilling to submit. Of the heathen, God would require no more than full obedience to that limited light of nature which his providence has granted them; and the obstacle which ensures their failure also is the same—a depraved will. When God holds the heathen responsible for their light, therefore, he deals with them no more unfairly than with the finally impenitent under the gospel.

This is too obvious to be denied; and hence it has been found necessary, in order to maintain the moral ability of sinners, to assert that every human being, Christian and pagan, enjoys a common sufficient grace, consisting of various influences alluring him to the right, which restores the depraved will to its *equilibrium*. And it is said, where any heart yields to this common grace, God's mercy and fidelity stands pledged to second those movements of the yielding soul, and bestow all the helps necessary to redemption. And if a poor pagan, guided by this universal light, begins to feel after God, if haply he may find him, surely the Father of mercies will not leave unrewarded the strivings which his own grace has awakened; but will find some way to give saving knowledge and the Holy Spirit.

The fatal answer is, that the Scriptures, properly understood, are silent concerning such universal sufficient grace. Our experience contradicts it; for we usually see the actual operations of God's grace far less extensive than the means. How then can it be plausibly said that, in other cases, the grace is ex-

tended so far beyond its outward means? So far is God from extending a universal gracious influence sufficient to restore *equilibrium* to a perverted will; Paul tells us that "whom he will he hardeneth."¹ And of the pagans especially it is said, "even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind."² Once more: if this grace is sufficient, why does it not bring all alike to God? If it is successful in some cases only because He adds something to its influences, then in the other cases it was not sufficient grace. If he added nothing, then the different result would show that the common grace found in those cases less perversity of heart to overcome. All men would not be in the same spiritual condition towards God, as the Bible most distinctly asserts they are. "They are all gone out of the way; they are together become unprofitable."³ "Who maketh thee to differ from another; and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?"⁴

We find, then, that the foundation-truths of redemption forbid us to hope for the escape of the heathen; we can only indulge the thought at the expense of those prime axioms on which our whole theology and our own salvation depends; while the customary palliations of their danger do but touch the surface of the terrible case. Every child of Adam, Christian or pagan, must have justifying righteousness; and he must have a new heart. We know not that adult and rational men can obtain these gifts, save by the intelligent reception of the gospel: I say not the reception of the full details of the New Testament, but of that rudimental gospel and those great primal conceptions of God, holiness, sin, gratuitous justification, and sanctification, embraced by a living faith and hope, which pervade the patriarchal as well as the evangelical revelations. "Neither is there salvation in any other; for there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved."⁵

But admitting all this, may we not still hope that there are elect Gentiles, objects of God's sovereign and omnipotent grace, and that they receive from Him those gospel rudiments in some way extraordinary and unknown to the church? Would God that we had abundant grounds to hope this; but alas, experi-

¹ Rom. ix. 18. ² Rom. i. 28. See also, ² Thess. ii. 10-12. ³ Rom. iii. 12.

⁴ 1 Cor. iv. 7.

⁵ Acts. iv. 12.

ence and revelation, while they may not absolutely denounce its possibility, command us to act just as though all depended upon the agency of the church. Have our missionaries found among the heathen hitherto untaught of man the fruits of such divine teachings? Have they told us of men who, while they may not have learned to worship Jehovah by the names we use, yet know and love a Being of true godhead and holiness; who hate sin, trust in free grace, strive after righteousness, and triumph over death by hope? We fear the instances are few and doubtful. If there are cases which relieve the common picture of selfishness, fraud, and lust, they are but instances of worldly uprightness. The heathen, like the unredeemed of our own land, are found to live in bondage to evil desires and a guilty conscience, and to die in superstitious delusion, or beastly apathy, or despair.

And while God has not said that he sends his saving truth as the medium of his saving grace by no hand but that of Christian effort, every example and precept of the Scriptures bids us act as though this were true. The great commission is, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature,"¹ as though every human being under heaven were dependent on this loving ministry of the church. The inspired preachers, by their consuming zeal in the missionary work, implied the same truth. Why did Paul, for instance, submit to dangers of death oft;² to receive of the Jews forty stripes, save one, five times; to be beaten thrice with rods; to be stoned; to spend a night and a day in the deep; to endure varied perils, weariness, watchings, hunger and thirst, cold and nakedness? Like his Divine Master, he believed that a harvest of precious souls was perishing for lack of Christian reapers. And when the charge of insanity was provoked by his gigantic labors, from men too dead in unbelief to comprehend him, his simple solution was, "The love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus judge, that if One died for all, then were all dead."³ And, in one word, God gives us the rule of our hopes and duties, as to the unevangelized world, in the Epistle to the Romans. "There is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How, then, shall they

¹ Mark xvi. 15.² 2 Cor. xi. 23-27.³ 2 Cor. v. 14.

call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?"¹

We conclude, then, that the church should feel and act towards the human race substantially as though all without the gospel were perishing forever. Do any murmur at our earnest, yea, vehement, zeal to drive the dread conviction home upon you? I answer: It is not because we are glad to have it so, but because we sadly know it is so. We think our true compassion is to face the dire reality, and thus rouse ourselves and you to that burning activity which alone can mitigate it. That is but a false and puling tenderness which professes not to see it, in order that its indolence may evade the toils of the rescue. Should I discover one of these dwellings burning over its sleeping inmates, while you, their neighbors, were skeptical of their danger, my cry of fire would be no argument of my delight in the catastrophe, but of my zeal to arrest it. And now that I see a world threatened by the devouring fire of hell, while the church slumbers that ought to stay the destruction, must I not lift up my voice like a trumpet? Oh! if we could but relieve the danger of the heathen by arguing that it was slight, how joyfully would we plead the glowing theme! But this cannot be.

Here, then, is the vast, yet simple, case: At least four-fifths of the thousand millions of our race are without the Bible, and must therefore sink into hell as fast as death can mow them down. In about one-third of a century the generation of our contemporaries will be forever beyond the reach of our love. We seem often to imagine that India, that China, that Africa will still remain a century hence awaiting our tardy zeal; but it is a terrible delusion. Unless we bestir ourselves now, the India, the China of to-day will be gone, and another India, another China, inheritors of their crimes and miseries, will be there to wait a little time upon the succor of another Christian generation, and then, unless our successors be more prompt than we have been, to plunge into perdition in their turn.

Now, have we thought what a plunge this is? Have we followed with our minds the ruin of one poorest, darkest, weakest

¹ Rom. x. 12-15.

pagan soul, through its progressive depravity and despair, through its increasing capacities for sinning and suffering, and through the never-ending, ever-widening, vistas of its immortality, till the woe is vaster than the wreck of a world? And do we remember how frequently this ruin occurs? Every blast of war, or pestilence, or famine which shakes the human crop strews hell with precious seed of lost souls as thickly as when the November wind sweeps the sere leaves of some trackless wood into its silent lake. If the deaths of this generation of sinners were perfectly regular in series, it would furnish well-nigh sixty for every minute; so that, while we sit here deliberating in cold debate, somewhere in this field of death every second of time marks the dying gasp of a human being! Hark to the fatal beat! Each stroke of the pendulum tolls the knell of another soul that drops; each stroke is another plunge into the pit, and a new burst of another everlasting wail joining the many-voiced threnody of despair. Oh! terrible world in which to live! Oh! dread responsibility of this living harvest, in the reaping of which we must race with death! How can our sluggish feet overtake the swift angel to snatch the prey from his grasp, when the baleful shade of his wings is seen flitting over isle and continent, even as the gathering gloom of night would appear to some watcher from the skies to sweep around the revolving globe? Should we not shrink in shuddering horror from the tremendous competition till we recur to our Divine Master to infuse us with his strength, and to wash out the sin of our sluggishness with his blood? Yet let us not be cast down; we remember that so swiftly as the dark edge of night devours the surface of our world from sight, even so swiftly does the advancing flush of day revolve behind it, and reconquer it to light and joy. Thus will the light of the Sun of Righteousness follow and outrun the shadows of death until they darken the earth no more.

II. There are eras in the world's progress which compare with other ages as harvest seasons for Christ; and such an era our Saviour evidently considered his own generation to be. I cannot suppose that when he pronounced "the fields white to harvest," his all-seeing eye, which declared "the field is the world," embraced only the approaching clusters of Samaritans summoned by the startled woman to the well; or only the teem-

ing villages of Galilee and Judea. Doubtless he meant to include that general preparation for the gospel pervading the civilized world at that day, which had brought in "the fulness of time," and "the acceptable year of the Lord."

Many important elements concurred in this preparation. Both Jews and Gentiles were aroused by a general hope of a divine intervention, and the clear announcements by which Hebrew prophets had heralded the coming of the Messiah were repeated in the fainter echoes of eastern Magi and Latin poets. It was also the Augustan age of mental activity, when the languages of antiquity had received the finishing touch of their cultivation, and human speculation had borne its maturest fruits. The Greek tongue, fittest of all for expressing moral distinctions and already, in virtue of the Septuagint version, a sacred language to God's people, was diffused throughout the civilized world as the language of polite intercourse and traffic. The Macedonian arms had carried it from Ionia to the jungles of Hindostan and the cataracts of the Nile; and even after Greece herself fell before the Roman, the rough conqueror, by adopting his captive as his tutoress, had spread it throughout the west. More than this, in "every nation under heaven" were found the Jews of the dispersion, nursing the great spiritual doctrines and worship of the Old Testament, and that most often in the Greek scriptures; so that to whatever place of note in any land the evangelist might go he found in the bosom of paganism a place and audience familiar with at least the rudiments of his system. Yet more, the civilized world was at length at peace. The empire of the Cæsars, so vast that it proudly styled itself by a name synonymous with the habitable globe, had consolidated the nations under its iron rule, and stilled their jars with a force too mighty to be even assailed. From the Atlantic to the Euphrates her armed police protected the freedom of travel and traffic, so that the stranger of every tongue was safe in every other land, whatever the lawful purpose of his journey. The barriers of danger and prejudice which fenced people from people were levelled, and mankind were mingled in a fermenting, inquiring mass. Once more, the pagan mind had outgrown the swaddling bands of its mythologies. Understandings, sharpened by the dialectics of Athens, Tarsus, Alexandria, rejected the puerile theogonies which impressed the awe-struck fancies of their

rude fathers. And while human depravity, thus educated, disdained the fears of a fabled Rhadamanthus and Tartarus, and rushed to every excess of crime, thoughtful minds felt the instinctive craving for a creed and a resting-place, and recoiled from the blank unbelief and chaos of moral corruption which threatened to absorb every hope of humanity. The race had now fully wrought out the long experiment, whether "man by his wisdom could know God," and stood aghast at its disastrous failure, when Christ appeared, "by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believed."

Such were the features of this harvest time. The apostles and their fellow-reapers thrust forth into the field with the vigor inculcated by the example and injunctions of their Master, to gather fruit unto life eternal. Divine wisdom taught them to comprehend the emergency; and the result was, that they carried the gospel in one century from the Indus to the Pillars of Hercules. The energy and speed of the heralds of the cross was not unworthy of the symbol by which prophecy impersonated them: "an angel flying in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth, and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people."¹

These favorable circumstances continued but a few generations. Let us suppose that the primitive Christians, instead of toiling with the urgency of harvest laborers, had contented themselves with a few decent exertions, resigning themselves for the rest to a snug and selfish religious epicurism. After the first generation came fiery and bloody persecutions, which seemed for a time almost to drown the churches in their own slaughter. Next came the decay, the internal convulsions, the world-resounding fall of the empire, whose arts and arms had all concurred to make a highway for the Prince of Peace. Barbarian and pagan hordes ravaged and dismembered the mighty fabric. The language of the gospel, of science, of civilization, became a dead one, except to one people, the rare accomplishment of the learned few, and the curse of Babel again separated nation from nation. Literature was banished by the din of wars and rapine; order, commerce, travel were almost at an end; and at last there remained only the chaotic sea of the middle ages, strewn with the eddying wrecks of the ancient world, and tossed with perpetual

¹ Rev. xiv. 6.

storms, from which a new order was slowly and painfully to emerge.

Now, need we state the contrast between the probable success of missionary effort in this dreary and turbulent winter, and in the glorious summer of the Christian era? True, it was still the duty of the church to endeavor to obey the perpetual injunction, regardless of gigantic obstacles; for with her almighty Head all things are possible. True, it was still her privilege to hope that faithful toil would not be wholly fruitless, even in the most untoward seasons. But still, Christ does not wholly abrogate the force of natural causes in his providence over his kingdom. It was also true that the church was now bereft, not only of her golden opportunity, but also of her gifts, (miracles, tongues, prophecy,) and of much of her primitive purity. But the possession of these, as well as of the opportunity to employ them fortunately, was among the things whose concurrence made the harvest season; and their lack will account only in part for the failures of the church. She was not forgetful of the work of missions in the dark ages; but how scanty and difficult were the conquests! The first century sufficed for her to run the circuit of that Mediterranean Sea, around which were then grouped the civilized races of man; but now she consumed four hundred years in creeping doubtfully from the Rhine to the Vistula; and in most of the new ground which she essayed to tread, her footprints were obliterated as she passed, as though they had been made in the shifting sands.

Consider, next, how long this impassive reign of darkness continued. Only in the fourteenth century did the twilight begin slowly and dimly to emerge, which at length in the sixteenth broke into the new dayspring of the Reformation. From that day to this there has been a steady progress in the reërrangement of all the influences which can facilitate the world's redemption: "And now behold, lift up your eyes and look on the fields, for they are white again to harvest." Never since the era when Christ sent forth apostles and evangelists into the whitened crop has the world seen a second season so propitious as our age for the ingathering of the people to him. Let us see how many of the elements of favorable preparation have been reproduced.

One of these was the mental activity of the Augustan age.

But ever since the triumphant insurrection of the human mind against Popery, thought has been increasingly free and active, until this age claims it as its peculiar glory. The whole realm of science known to the ancients has been reoccupied, and other domains have been added, as unknown to them and as magnificent, by comparison with theirs, as the new world which Columbus opened to our industry. Everywhere the human mind ferments, inquires, and discusses. The printing-press, though four hundred years old, still develops new magic in its powers: an agency for which Paul would probably have gladly exchanged his gift of tongues. We even see the strange fact that Papists and Brahmins eagerly employ this engine of light, and with judicial blindness accustom their people to its use, only to destroy their own empire of darkness.

Second, No universal monarchy now dominates over the world, compelling the nations to a temporary and enforced brotherhood; but in its room we have the benignant sway of imperial Peace, with her handmaid Commerce, more potent over human passions by the blessings she confers than was ever Assyrian or Median, Greek or Roman conqueror, by the devastations which he threatened. For even where the short and partial wars of our day prevail, Christianity has so narrowed their operation to actual combatants, and legislated for their atrocity, that the peaceful labors of traffic, letters, and religion are scarcely suspended in their presence. And under the wings of this peace and commerce the Christian may go to more peoples and tongues than were ever dreamed of by the fabulous geography of the ancients, with a safety as great as was invoked by the proud challenge, "I am a Roman citizen!" Need I refer to those wonders of modern science by which distance is abridged, and we may almost say with prophecy, "there is no more sea" to divide the nations?

Third, In place of the common language of antiquity we have now the English, a tongue yet nobler, and spoken in more different tribes, and in more of the hives of men than was the Greek in the days of Paul. And with this language goes the *prestige* and fear of the British people, protecting us almost equally with them. For such is the community of tongue, race, character, religion, and interests, between Britain and America, that in the pagan world men fortunately almost forget to dis-

tinguish between us. What silent sea or ancient river is not vexed by their prows and visited by their enterprise? In what mart do not their flags inspire fear and respect? So that—to omit their vast dependencies, more ample than the empire of Augustus—there is scarcely a province in the pagan world where Protestant power and enterprise have not so preceded that the Protestant teacher may enter securely and perform his mission under the shield of their protection. For even China and Japan, the last strongholds of exclusive jealousy, will doubtless, before long, disclose their mysteries before the inevitable forces of the age.

When we turn to the lands of the Beast and the False Prophet, we see there also a rapid relaxation of hindrances. Moslem fanaticism burns but feebly in our day, for decrepitude and dependence now compel those powers, once so terrible to Christianity, to purchase the protection of the most Protestant nation at the price of a tolerance of Christians which they were little wont to exercise. How wondrously hath God wrought here! Even popery, enemy of the gospel more inexorable than Islam, is compelled by triumphant moral influences to relax its exclusiveness. In Sardinia, France, Belgium, in Brazil, and the other States of Central and Southern America, soon to be seats of teeming empires, a partial liberty is yielded to the gospel. And as though it were not enough to open every door to us abroad, providence has precipitated a part of the destitute into our arms at home, by directing the emigration of popish Europe to our Atlantic, and of pagan Asia to our Pacific border.

While God has thus prepared the field for us, he has also prepared us for the field. In those Protestant nations to whom he has virtually given the empire of the world, he has given to his churches the numbers, the wealth, the education, the moral influence, requisite to enable them to go up and occupy the ground. Never since the Christian era has there been a second concurrence, such as this, of everything which promotes the facile and successful spread of Christianity. "The fields are white to harvest."

But now let us solemnly remember, that a harvest season is from its very nature short. Let us review these advantages, not in the spirit of pompous self-gratulation too often seen, but with a trembling sense of the duties which they imply. For,

be assured, this fortunate juncture cannot be permanent. *It is too good to last*, unless it be improved. As reasonably might we hope that two planets, which had been wheeling their long cycles in devious opposition around the remoter verge of Saturn, when at length they meet one instant in our field of view, would arrest their ceaseless courses to remain in conjunction. It is the attribute of human affairs to revolve. And when this great living wheel of providence, which "is so high that it is dreadful,"¹ shall have once more turned away its auspicious segment from the church, who can tell how many ages may elapse before its stately revolution will restore it to us? Let us take a probable warning from the past. The harvest time enjoyed by the primitive church was spent, and it returned not again until a mighty year had rolled around, of which the months were ages, and winter the ten dreary centuries of barbarism and the frosts of spiritual death. So if we waste this summer which seems at length returning, after so long a winter, so tedious a spring, and so many capricious frosts blighting the rising promise of the church, when will the third harvest for the world return? By what second series of dark ages, by how many national convulsions and retributive woes, may not God chastise the church for its neglect; and, then, by how many throes of great, struggling souls, by what strifes and toils, by what streams of martyr blood, may she not be required to earn for mankind another season as propitious as the one we now waste?

And should this picture be realized by the shortcoming of the church, history suggests another probable warning of special significance to us as Americans. It is not likely that our land will be one of those which will be honored to send forth that third day-spring of gospel light to the race of man. When once the soil of a country hath been polluted by the failures and apostasies of God's church, he removes his special favors from it, to return no more for long and disastrous ages. Look at those lands on which the Hebrew and the primitive churches enjoyed, and misused, and sinned away their splendid opportunities; how blighted, how benighted, how accursed, have they lain ever since! God sought out other lands which had lain in reserve in virgin wilderness, untainted by the church's treason

¹ Ezek. i. 18.

to his cause, or else which had undergone the lustration of centuries of chastisement, in which to relume the light of the gospel. So, if we waste this golden season, it is probable that America will not be the land to which the Gentiles will come for the church's light, and kings to the brightness of her rising. While this fair domain will lie blasted by the guilt of its inhabitants, some new church on some soil now pagan will enjoy the privilege of sending forth to a benighted world, and to our degenerate posterity, the dayspring of the millennium.

And what, my brethren, is the catastrophe of a series of human generations, mainly lost through the betrayal of that critical one on which providence thus partly stakes the fate of many of its successors? We have endeavored to grasp the evil implied in the death of one pagan soul, but found it too great for imagination. We have endeavored to represent to ourselves the immense interests of the generation of our pagan contemporaries, who are directly dependent on us for their rescue from perdition, but the mind staggered under the vastness and the frightfulness of the thought. We must now add this further truth, that the destiny of our critical age may largely determine that of many coming after it; and then we begin to see the weight of our responsibilities. Take this great and dreadful fact home to your meditations, and let it grow upon your comprehension in the hours of silent thought and of communion with God. Had I the tongues of men and of angels, it would still be mere mockery for me to seek words by which to exalt your conception of it, for words cannot utter the unutterable.

And now we doubtless all feel that the discussion of such themes as these should have but one conclusion, the enforcement upon our own hearts of the duty of most intense exertion in this awful yet blessed work of the world's redemption. But who shall dare to define and paint that energy, or to fix the standard of that zeal which is commensurate with the vast exigency? Who, that had not, like Isaiah, received the touch of a live coal from off the altar upon his lips, or, like Paul, been caught up into paradise and heard unspeakable words, would be sufficient for the task? Let me not attempt it. But there is a picture of the love, the effort, the liberality which the occasion should inspire, a picture accurate, and equal to the case.

It is the living image of the Saviour's own example, when he came as the Missionary of Heaven. See, then, in Him, and not in the stammering words of man, the application of his truth. Let us learn to describe our labors for the lost in his words: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work."¹ And when we give of the abundance with which God has blessed us, let us consider "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor, that we through his poverty might be rich."²

¹ John iv. 34.² 2 Cor. viii. 9.

THE GOSPEL IDEA OF PREACHING.

FROM the days of Enoch, who prophesied (Jude 13), and of Noah, who was a preacher of righteousness (2 Peter ii. 5), to our day, God has employed "the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." To us who hold that "the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants," both the warrant for preaching, as a religious ordinance, and the model for its performance, must be given from the word of God. The patriarchs, the prophets, probably the Aaronic priests and the pious kings, preached to Israel. But the first full description of the nature of the exercise is the oft-cited passage from Nehemiah viii. 1-8, when Ezra and his associates "*read in the book of the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading.*" Here we have the true scriptural idea of the preacher's function: to make the people understand what is in God's word. The Christian minister's commission is in these words: "Preach the word; (*herald the word*;) be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine." (2 Tim. iv. 2.) The object of preaching is the salvation of the soul; and that salvation consists in a redemption from the guilt, love, and practice of iniquity. The instrument of this redemption is God's truth, *as he has revealed it*. "Sanctify them through thy truth." The preacher is most explicitly called a herald; that is, the deliverer of a message. Now, the herald does not make his message, he merely transmits it. He has nothing to do with judging its wisdom or fitness; let him simply proclaim it as it is given to him. This was God's command to an ancient preacher: "Arise, go unto Nineveh, that great city, and preach unto it *the preaching that I bid thee.*" (Jonah iii. 2.)

Or, the preacher's office may be illustrated by the work of one who uses a die put into his hands, to form impressions on some plastic substance. The sinful soul is that substance. The word

of God is the die; and the divine image of knowledge and true holiness is the impression to be formed. God, who made man's soul, and therefore knows it made the die; and of course he best knew how to make it, to produce the impression he desired. Now, the workman's business is not to criticize, re-carve, or alter the die which is committed to him, but simply to press it down upon the substance to be shaped. In this view, how plain is it that all preaching must be accurately representative of Bible truth, and in Bible proportions? Else it is not God's work. The preacher's business is simply to take what he finds in the Scriptures, and as he finds it, and press it down upon the understandings, hearts, and consciences of men. Nothing else is his business as a preacher. The die is just so sharp and hard, so large and so perfect as God would have it. *He* judged it was the right die to produce the impression he intends. This is enough for us. Here we have a few obvious truths which none will dispute who are known as evangelical Christians. But if we are not mistaken, they contain the following deductions, by which many things very prevalent in the practice of persons considering themselves evangelical are condemned.

1. Not only must Bible topics form the whole subject matter of preaching, but they must be presented in scriptural aspects and proportions. God made the Bible for the people; not raw material which the religious philosopher is to work over into new forms. Here is a simple and admitted fact, which is full of neglected inferences. The book of God is not like the book of creation, a mixed and crude mass of the ore of knowledge, which must become the subject of scientific re-arrangement, to become intelligible to common minds. The Bible is for the people; this is the great principle of Protestants. And this implies that God, who knew best, has set forth the truth he purposed to apply in such forms and aspects as he knew would best suit the human mind. There can be no other forms of presentation so suitable to the people, because God has chosen these. "The preacher's business is just to show the people what is in the Bible," as God has there set it forth.

2. These principles cut up by the roots the whole fashion of "preaching up the times," as it was quaintly called by our Scotch forefathers. If the preacher's business is the redemption of the soul, and his instrument is the Bible truth, it is plain that he has

no business in the pulpit with Nebraska bills, Abolitionism, politics, Eastern questions, and all the farrago of subjects with which infidel ministers of Christianity essay to eke out, as they suppose, the deficient interest and power of the message of salvation. The preacher's business in the pulpit is to make Christians, and not to make free-soilers, Maine-law-men, statesmen, historians, or social philosophers. His message from the pulpit is that which God has put into his mouth, and nothing else. The question may be asked: "Are Bible principles never to be applied, then, to the correction of the social evils of the day by those who are the appointed expounders of the Bible?" So far as God so applies them in the Bible, yes; but no farther. Let the preacher take the application of the principles, as well as the principles applied, from the word of God; let him take, not only his starting position but his whole topics, from God's word, and he will be in no danger of incurring that sarcasm, as biting as it is just, directed against those who "take their texts from the Bible, and their sermons from the newspapers." Many preachers seem to think that if it is a scriptural principle which they use, it matters not how unscriptural or extra-scriptural is the use which they make of it. They forget that it does not follow, because a man has drawn his weapon from the king's armory, that therefore he is fighting the king's battle; soldiers have sometimes used the sovereign's arms to fight duels with each other. It may be asked again: "Is the preacher to forego and disuse all that influence for social good which his Christian intelligence gives him? Has he ceased to be a citizen and a patriot because he has become a minister?" No. But when he appears in the pulpit he appears not as a citizen but as God's herald. Here is a very simple and obvious distinction much neglected. The other channels of patriotic influence are open to him which other citizens use, so far as he may use them without prejudice to his main calling. To cleave to this alone is made his obvious duty by three reasons. The importance of the soul's redemption is transcendent. All social evils, all public and national ends, sink into trifles beside it. Hence God's ministers owe this practical tribute and testimony at least to this great truth; to devote all the machinery and power of religious ordinances—that single domain into which the all-engrossing world does not intrude—to this one grand object. That minister is false to truth and to

his Master who says by his conduct that there is anything on earth important enough to subtract one atom of sacred time or sacred ordinances from their one great object. Again, by securing the redemption of the soul, the preacher will secure all else that is valuable in his hearers. Let him make good Christians, and all the rest will come right without farther care. If we have a nation of Bible Christians, we shall have without trouble all the social order, liberty, and intelligence we need. And last, he who undertakes the work of the social philosopher, the legislator, the politician, will diminish his energies, zeal, time, and influence for promoting his higher object. He will waste on the less those energies of head and heart which were all needed for the greater. He will shut up his access for good to all the minds which are opposed to him on these secular questions, and thus incur a hindrance which will incapacitate him for his own Master's work, by undertaking work which belonged to other people. What is this but treason?

3. From the scriptural idea of the preacher's work we may learn what is the true nature of that spirit in the minister which thinks it necessary to take a more ample range in preaching than simply showing the people what the Bible means. How many are there who would shrink back with dread from what they consider so confined a walk of ministerial labor. "There is not interest enough! There is not variety enough! The preacher would not have elbow-room enough to display his mental powers! It is too plodding and simple a business for the theological philosopher! There would not be mental pabulum enough to feed the intellects of well-informed hearers!" And so, in some latitudes, we have, as a supplement to the leanness of the gospel, metaphysical discussions of the psychology of religion, analytic dissections of the religious actings of the human soul. In others we have grandiloquent expositions of the moral system of the universe. In others, scholastic discussions of heads of divinity, splitting up "the bare bones of orthodoxy" into splinters as angular and dry as the gravel of the desert. Now what is all this but unbelief? Or else it is unbelief combined with ignorance of those treasures of heavenly wisdom which the word of God contains. God puts his sword into the minister's hand, and tells him that with this he shall conquer. He distrusts it, and endeavors to add something more trenchant. God tells him,

"take this die and press it on the human soul; the result shall be the lovely image of God." He insists on re-carving it before he will apply it. God says, in his infinite wisdom, "these are the truths which are quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow; and which are discerners of the thoughts and intents of the heart." "No," says the unbelieving servant, "they are dull; I can devise truths more piercing." This is the spirit of infidelity, and such preaching breeds infidelity. Such men are wholly unfit to do the work of that God who "hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, and base things of the world and things which are despised, yea, and things which are not to bring to naught things that are."

There have been two stages in the defection of the church from the simplicity of the gospel in past days. The first has been when the ministry have held to the truths of the gospel system, but have insisted on arranging and presenting them according to the methods of the fashionable human philosophy of the day. The second—and it is close to the first—has been when they have gone to human philosophy, both for their arrangement and their doctrines. The eras of efficiency and spiritual might have always been prior to both stages, when the ministry were content to set forth Bible truths in Bible aspects. The preaching of the primitive church was simply scriptural and expository, and the word had free course and was glorified. From Origen's day we find the Christian Fathers constructing their discourses on the principles of philosophy, and a false, artificial rhetoric. Then began the season of shallow and heartless conversions and of general corruption. And soon after came Arianism, Prelacy, Neo-Platonism, Pelagianism, Popery. The same steps of decline were trodden again after the Reformation. Luther and Zwinglius, Farel and Calvin, Latimer and Knox, preached expository sermons, in which the word of God was simply set forth in its application to the soul; and the consequence was a revival almost as wide as christendom. In the next century succeeded the age of scholastic preaching and the bandying to and fro of orthodox symbols, under which the *odium theologicum* was far more cultivated than the love of God;

and then came Rationalism. Many of us are now in the first stage of decline, and many more among us have illustrated its tendencies by passing down to the second. How many are the pulpits in New England, now Socinian, which fifty years ago rung with the metaphysics of religion! (*A la* Jonathan Edwards, as they vainly supposed. They forgot that Edwards wrote his *Freedom of the Will* for philosophers, and preached the simple gospel for his flock.) This class of preachers seems to have selected its favorite and prevalent topic, not by asking what is most nourishing to a believing soul, but "what is best adapted to display my powers of discussion or of analysis?" And so some have occupied the Sabbaths of their people with those polemics by which the philosophic theologian has defended the outworks of Christianity, bordering on the foreign domain of human psychology against infidel assailants. And thus they have committed the absurdity of *feeding* the flock inside the fold with the bristling missiles which should have been hurled at the wolves without. Others of them have dissected, or sublimated, or evaporated, truths which they should have embodied in the warm proportions of life, as though they would try to feed the sheep with an analysis of grass instead of the grass itself, tender, rich and fresh from the green pastures; or would present a kind of chemical resolution into first elements of skin, horns and hair, instead of pieces of the strong meat of the word itself.

4. If the business of the preacher is simply to make the people see and feel what is in the word of God, preaching should usually be what is popularly known as "expository." In most cases it is no fair exposition of the divine meaning to single out a single proposition from its connection, and fix the whole attention on it, to the exclusion of those truths which God has placed beside it. The Scriptures are a whole. To resume the illustration of the die, if we would produce a whole impression we must impress the whole die. We shall never obtain a symmetrical image by detaching little fragments of a feature, a wreath, or a letter or two of the legend here and there, and enstamping them with great force. Passages of Scripture must be unfolded in their connection. Yea, whole books and epistles must be so applied to the Christian soul. And where we depart from this method, to preach topically upon a single proposition

of the Scriptures, it should yet be a true exposition, an evolution of the meaning of the spirit in that text. There seem indeed to be but two classes of subjects where such preaching is strictly consistent with the gospel minister's position. One is where a single proposition of the word of God contains a truth so fundamental and so operative that it justifies an unusual expenditure of time. Such are the cardinal doctrines of depravity, the new birth, faith, repentance. The other class is composed of what we may call representative texts; where the single proposition contains the point of a discussion, or the *moral* of a story, stated for us by the Holy Ghost himself. Thus, Romans vi. 1, "What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" states the subject of discussion of the whole sixth chapter. We may take this one verse for our text, but in doing so it becomes our duty to unfold the argument of the apostle upon it, and not one of our own devising. The sermon is still a true exposition. So Luke xviii. 7 sums up the instruction of the parable of the importunate widow. In preaching on it we expound that parable. The representative text may also be fairly used, though not in juxtaposition with the passages it represents; as John xvii. 21 states what is unfolded in John xv. 1-8, 1 Cor. xii. 11-27, Eph. iv. 16, etc., etc. But still it is God's discussion which is expounded, and not man's.

OUR COMFORT IN DYING:¹

A SERMON.

“Lord Jesus receive my spirit.”—Acts vii. 59.

IT is proper that the minds of Christians should be familiar with thoughts of death. This seems to be the object of the prayer of Moses in *Psa. xc. 12*: “So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom.” It is inculcated by our Saviour, in *Matt. xxiv. 42*: “Watch, therefore, for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come.” In the season of health and prosperity it will be wholesome for us to remember that it is appointed unto men once to die. It will sober our inordinate desires and restrain us from abusing our abundance. And to the mind accustomed to look its destiny in the face, the sorrows of old age, of sickness and of death, will not come with the bitterness of surprise.

It is somewhat remarkable that under each dispensation the first believer's death which is recorded was that of a martyr. In the Old Testament it was that of Abel; in the New that of Stephen. Let us endeavor to conceive the awe and dreadful

¹The private correspondence of General T. J. Jackson with Mrs. Jackson was found to contain an account, and quite a full and correct analysis, of the following sermon, in a letter written August 26, 1861. The author has been induced, by what, it is hoped, will be considered a pardonable infirmity, if it is an infirmity, from the knowledge of this fact, to select it for insertion, from among the many preached in the camps. It was prepared and preached many years before to a little social assemblage in the author's pastoral charge, with especial reference to a venerable “mother in Israel” there present. On the 25th of August, 1861, the Sabbath day, the 18th regiment was encamped within a mile of the Stone-wall Brigade. The latter lay on the wooded ridge east of Centerville, Fairfax Co., Va., where the main road to Alexandria crosses it. On the right of the way was the encampment of the infantry and on the left that of the artillery and the quarters of the General. Being requested by him to preach for his command, and having secured a supply for his own regiment, the author delivered this sermon in the woods, in the presence of the General and his staff, and a promiscuous assemblage of men and officers. It seemed to him to present a subject not inappropriate to

curiosity with which the first human beings witnessed the first execution upon one of their fellows of the threatened doom, death for sin. Hitherto, the visage of death had never been seen; man only knew that it was something irresistible and terrible, which terminated the existence of the body and restored it to the dust from which it was taken. But now they beheld it; they saw the glazed eye, the sunken and pallid countenance, the marble rigidity, and above all the ghostly aspect of the corpse. How much was the terror of the spectacle enhanced by the fact that the death of their brother was by violence: that his blood was poured out in murder, and the image of humanity in him foully marred before he became food for worms!

There is also a peculiar interest in the death of the first Christian of the new dispensation; for the grave and the world of spirits had now received a new illustration. The saints of the Old Testament had, indeed, good hope that "their souls should not be left in Hades." But the instructions and the resurrection of Christ had now illuminated the tomb with a new flood of light and hope.

"There the dear flesh of Jesus lay,
And left a long perfume."

His death had now conquered the king of terrors, disarmed him of his sting, and led captivity captive. Believers, with such an example, must surely learn a new lesson of submission and courage. Accordingly, the death of the proto-martyr, although accompanied with every outward circumstance of cruelty and horror, was full of consolation and peace. Persecuted upon the unjust charge of perverting the religion of Moses, he had defended himself and rebuked his accusers' sins with a faithful boldness by which they were cut to the heart, insomuch

Christian soldiers, whose business it was to die for their country. It was hoped that the sublime truths revealed to us in this passage of God's word would be impressive to those who were out of Christ, and consoling to those who were united by faith to him; and especially, that the Divine Comforter would bless them to such as, in his secret purpose, might be appointed unto death. Subsequent events have shown that among this number was the great leader himself; and it is felt as no small favor of the Head of the church that this discourse was carried as a message of consolation and strength to that devout and consecrated heart, as was shown by the elevated joy with which he received its doctrine, and his reference to it in his letters. So may it strengthen the souls of all God's chosen ones to whom it comes, and "deliver them who, through fear of death, have been all their lifetime subject to bondage."

that they gnashed upon him with their teeth. His justification of himself and his charges against them were unanswerable; but the tyrant's argument remained to them, and they resolved at once to silence his voice and to gratify their malignity by his death. He was condemned to that ghastly mode of execution, stoning to death with stones. Surrounded with a raging multitude, who were rather wild beasts than men, he was dragged out of the city; and while a young Pharisee named Saul, afterwards the great apostle of the Gentiles, kept the clothes of the executioners, they stoned Stephen, calling upon *God*, and saying, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

But his Redeemer, who had so recently passed to his throne through a similar ordeal, did not forsake him. By the power of the Holy Ghost he vouchsafed to his dying servant a vision of the glory of God, and of Christ standing on his right hand, which was sufficient to repay for the agonies of a violent death. How amazing, my brethren, was the contrast between that scene, which was obvious to the eye of sense, and that different one which disclosed itself to the eye of faith at the same time? The one presents us with a solitary, helpless sufferer, the centre of a group of murderous assailants, prostrate, crushed with innumerable blows, his dying countenance begrimed with dust and blood, and his palpitating form mangled almost beyond the semblance of humanity. But oh! behold the other! Look up! There opens before us that heavenly court, which violence, sin and death can never enter, radiant with light ineffable, displaying the throne of Almighty justice, now newly occupied by the God-man, who rises up at his martyr's cry, and with a countenance combining unutterable human love and pity with the terrible glories of deity, stretches forth his hand, lately bleeding for us on the cross, now armed with the sceptre of the universe. At his beck the liberated soul leaps from its poor, dishonored tenement, leaving it all insensible to its wrongs, and mounts, beaming with love and triumph, to the inviting arms! Blessed compensation. What are the pains of dying compared with such a reward?

Could we see invisible things we should often witness similar contrasts at the bedsides of the departing people of God. That which our senses make known to us is a gloomy, shaded room, a couch, a circle of tearful, solemn watchers and a gasping, pal-

lid mortal, in what men call the agonies of death. But could we see in the light of the upper sanctuary, we should more correctly call them the agonies of birth. One moment the sufferer is hovering in insensibility upon the faint line which separates life and death, or wrestling with the strong throes of his last struggle. The next, the body lies a corpse, and the suppressed wail of bereavement from the survivors fills the chamber of death. But could we follow the ransomed spirit, as it soars to its home, how different would be the world of glory which bursts upon its sight, and the shout of joy with which it enters in?

But I have proposed, my brethren, to consider especially the proto-martyr's dying prayer, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

First. This seems to teach us that Stephen regarded Jesus Christ as very God. There are sundry places in the Scriptures where this prime doctrine is not so much dogmatically asserted as unintentionally, though clearly implied. These evidences of our Saviour's divinity are, in one aspect, even more satisfactory to the mind than the set and formal assertions, because so obviously sincere expressions of the sacred writer's inmost heart, and because they show how this cardinal truth is interwoven with the believer's whole experience. We are told by Scripture that Stephen was an eminent saint and an inspired man. The heavens had just been opened to him, and the celestial realities had been disclosed, with the position of Jesus at the right hand of the Father. And now, immediately after this vision, and amidst the solemn emotions of the last hour, he prays to Jesus Christ, addressing to him the most momentous petition which the creature can raise to deity. Your English bibles read: "They stoned Stephen, calling upon *God* and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." You will notice that the word *God* is printed in italic letters; by which our translators would signify that there is nothing in the original answering to it, but they have judged it better to supply it in order to complete the sense. In my judgment it would have been more correct to have it as it stands in the Greek: "They stoned Stephen, invoking and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Thus the intention of the evangelist, which was to state that Christ was the object of his prayers, is made clear. But even though his meaning be lost in this point, the petition which is raised to Jesus Christ in the last clause is one which no scriptural believer could address

to any other than God. He alone is the proper object of religious worship; and the man is blind, indeed, who would entrust his everlasting all in the article of death to any other than an omnipotent arm.

In every office of the Redeemer the enlightened Christian feels that he could not properly rely upon him for salvation unless he is very God. It is "because he is God, and there is none else," that Isaiah invites "all the ends of the earth to look unto him and be saved." But in the hour of death especially, the Christian needs a Saviour who is no less than God. An angel could not sympathize with our trial, for they cannot feel the pangs of dissolution. A human friend cannot travel with us the path through the dark valley; for the creature who yields to the stroke of death is overwhelmed, and returns no more to guide his fellow. The God-man alone can sustain us; he has felt the mortal blow, for he is man; he has survived it, and returns triumphing to succor us, for he is God. Unless this divine guide be with us we must fight the battle with the last enemy alone and unaided. Just when the struggle becomes most fearful to the soul, the veil of approaching dissolution descending between it and all this world shuts it off in the outer darkness; and then, in vast solitary night, must the king of terrors be met, with no human arm to succor and no ear to hear the cry of despair that is lost in the infinite silence. So must you die, my friend, and I. Though wife and children, and officious comrades be crowding around your bed, and loved ones be stooping to receive your last sigh to their very hearts, and your dying head be pilloved upon the bosom which was the dearest resting place of your sorrows while living, the last approach of death will separate you from them all, and you will meet him alone. The icy shadow of his dart, as it comes near your heart, will obstruct all the avenues of sense by which their sympathy can reach you. Even then, practically, you will die alone; as truly alone as the last wanderer in some vast wilderness, who falls exhausted on the plain, and sees nothing above but the burning sky, or around save the boundless waste; as truly alone as the mariner who, when the ship is rushing before a gale through the midnight sea, drops from the mast-head, and buffets vainly with the innumerable billows amidst the pitchy darkness, while his despairing shriek is drowned by the tumult of the deep.

But then it is that Jesus Christ draws near as an omnipotent Saviour. He alone of all the universe has fathomed the deepest abysses of death, has explored all its caverns of despair, and has returned from them a conqueror. He is not only sympathizing man, but omnipresent God, who can go with us into the *penetralia* of the court of death. When our last hour comes, then let us say, brethren, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." "When I pass through the valley of the shadow of death, be thou with me; let thy rod and thy staff comfort me."

Second. I am taught by this prayer of the martyr to expect an immediate entrance into the blessed presence of Jesus Christ. I see here that Stephen believed that "the souls of believers are, at their death, made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory." He evidently did not expect that the grave would absorb his spirit into a state of unconscious sleep, to last until the final consummation; or that any *limbus*, or purgatory, was to swallow him for a time in its fiery bosom. His faith aspired directly to the arms of Christ, and to that blessed world where his glorified humanity now dwells.

Some would persuade us that death is an unconscious sleep; that the soul is not a distinct substance, possessed of its own being and powers of thought independent of the body, but a mere *phenomenon*, the result of the body's organic action, as sound is of the vibration of the musical chord; and that so there is an absolute suspension of the soul's conscious existence until such time as the body is reared from the dust in the resurrection. So thought not the inspired martyr. He manifestly regarded his spirit as separable from the body, and therefore as true, independent substance. The latter he relinquishes to the insults of his enemies; the former he commits to Jesus Christ. So taught not that Saviour and his two favored disciples when they showed us Moses and Elijah in glory. So promised not the dying Redeemer to the penitent thief, when he said, "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise." His body was left upon the tree a prey to the brutality of his executioners, and probably to ravenous birds. Yet his soul, the true being, passed with his dying Redeemer into immediate blessedness. So believed not Paul when he said that "to him to live was Christ and to die was gain," and that "to be absent from the body was to be present with the Lord." And would he ever have been in a strait betwixt the

two desires, to live and labor for his converts and to die, had the latter been a sleep of dreary ages in the dust? Surely this zealous laborer for Christ could not have hesitated between the choice of such a useless, unconscious blank on the one hand, and a life of praise and of happy activity on earth on the other hand, albeit it was chequered with toils and persecutions.¹

How much more dreary would not the tomb be if the sentient, thinking soul were engulfed in it along with the body? Nor is there an answer in the saying that its loss will virtually be no loss, because the soul will be totally unconscious of it at the time. But it would not be unconscious of it before and after. Man is a being of forecast and of retrospection; and it is impossible that he should not recoil with dread from the absorption of his own active, thinking being by this realm of annihilation, and the dedication of so many ages which might have been filled with usefulness and enjoyment to fruitless non-existence. Such is not our creed, my brother. If only we are in Christ by true faith, the grave will have naught to do with that which is the true, conscious being. Is the tomb dark and doleful and chill, and loathsome with the worm and the dust? What is that to me? I shall never lie there; I shall never feel the gnawing worm. The coffin lid will never confine me! The spirit, the conscious, spontaneous, thinking, knowing, feeling thing, which constitutes the true man, the *I*, which alone can hope or fear, or experience the tooth of pain, will have soared away to a brighter realm before these abhorred scenes overtake it. Only the poor, disused tenement, the unconscious clay, will be their victim.

It is with equal comfort that the believer's mind is emancipated from the fears of a purgatory beyond death. The efficacy of Christ's vicarious righteousness is asserted in terms which forbid the thought that any retribution will ever be exacted of one who by a true faith has become interested in Him. "There is now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus." "Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth; who is he that condemneth?"² "For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. . . . And their sins and iniquities will I remember no more. Now, where remis-

¹ See Luke ix. 30, 31; Luke xxiii. 43; Phil. i. 21; 2 Cor. v. 8; Phil. i. 23.

² Rom. viii. 1, 33.

sion of these is, there is no more offering for sin.”¹ I will not detain you uselessly by following all the thorny sophisms by which this most potent engine of superstition and priest-craft is supported. One conclusive view will show you that it cannot be true. The passages cited teach, beyond a peradventure, that no other penal retribution exists or is required for the guilt of the believer’s sins than that of Christ’s sacrifice. I now add: neither is it possible that any purifying chastisement, sent in love and not in judgment, by purgatorial fires after death, can be inflicted upon believers, for the reason that *when they die they are at once made perfectly holy*. How can that be purged which is already absolutely clean? But that justified sinners are at death immediately made perfect in holiness is taught beyond dispute, where we are told that they go directly from death to heaven, and that heaven is a place of perfect purity. “Lazarus died and was carried by angels to Abraham’s bosom.” To the thief it was said, “This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise.” Stephen, looking up from the bloody ground which was about to be his death-bed, said to a present Saviour, “Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.” “If our earthly house be dissolved, we have a building of God in the heavens.” “To be absent from the body” is “to be present with the Lord.” But “corruption doth not inherit incorruption.” That upper sanctuary is the assembly of “the spirits of just men made perfect,” “and there shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth.”²

On these impregnable foundations rests the blessed assurance of our immediate glory after death. “And I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the *Lord* from henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors; and their works do follow them.”³ Dreary would be the Christian’s death-bed, indeed, if the best prospect which could be offered him amidst the decays of nature were but this: that he must pass from the toils of life and the pangs of dying to fiercer pains beyond the grave, of uncertain duration, which could only be abridged by the piety and doubtful care of survivors. Blessed be God, such is not our hope; but when once life’s pilgrimage is ended, if we live in faith and love towards

¹ Heb. x. 14–18. See also Ps. ciii. 12; Micah vii. 19; Rom. v. 1.

² Luke xvi. 22; xxiii. 43; Acts vii. 59; 2 Cor. v. 1, 6–8; 1 Cor. xv. 50; Heb. xii. 23; Rev. xxi. 27.

³ Rev. xiv. 13.

God, the eternal peace begins. The pains of our last struggle are the last experience of evil to which the ransomed spirit is called forever.

Third. We learn from the text to what guidance the Christian may commit his soul during its unknown journey into the world of spirits. Let us endeavor, my brethren, to obtain a practical and palpable conception of that world. I believe that heaven is as truly a place as was that paradise of the primeval world where the holy Adam dwelt. When we first arrive there we shall be disembodied spirits. But finite spirits have their locality. The clearer evidence, however, that heaven is a literal place is, that it now contains the glorified, material bodies of Enoch, of Elijah, of Christ, and probably of the saints who rose with their Redeemer. But where is this place? In what quarter of this vast universe? In what sphere do the Man Jesus and his ransomed ones now dwell? When death batters down the walls of the earthly tabernacle, whither shall the dispossessed soul set out? To what direction shall it turn in beginning its mysterious journey? It knows not; it needs a skilful, powerful and friendly guide.

But more; it is a journey into a spiritual world, and this thought makes it awful to the apprehensions of man. The presence of one disembodied spirit in the solitude of night would shake us with a thrill of dread. How, then, could we endure to be launched out into this untried ocean of space, peopled by, we know not what, mysterious beings? How would we shrink with fear at the meeting of some heavenly or infernal principality, rushing with lightning speed through the void, upon some mighty errand of mercy or malice, clothed with unimagined splendors of angelic attributes, and attended by the hosts of his spiritual comrades? How could we be assured that we should not fall a prey to the superior power of some of these evil angels? How be certain that we might not lose our way in the pathless vacancy, and wander up and down forever, a bewildered, solitary rover, amidst the wilderness of worlds? This journey into the unknown world must, else, issue in our introduction to a scene whose awful novelties will overpower our faculties; for even the very thought of them, when they are permitted to dwell upon our hearts, fills us with a sense of dreadful suspense. Truly will the trembling soul need some one on whom to lean, some mighty,

experienced and tender guardian, who will point the way to the prepared mansions, and cheer and sustain its fainting courage. That guide is Christ: therefore let us say, in dying: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

It is a delightful belief, to which the gospel seems to give most solid support, that our Redeemer is accustomed to employ in this mission his holy angels. What Christian has failed to derive sublime satisfaction as he has read the allegorical description in the *Pilgrim's Progress* of Christian and Hopeful crossing the river of death, and ascending with a rejoicing company of angels to the gate of the celestial city. It is, indeed, but an allegory, which likens death to a river. But it is no allegory—it is a literal and blessed truth—that angels receive and assist the departing souls which Christ redeems. "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation?" When Lazarus died "he was carried by angels to Abraham's bosom." They are our destined companions in the upper world to which we go. With what tender sympathy will not these pure spirits assist the dying moments of their ransomed brethren of earth; and with what loving joy will they not welcome them to their home? When we were brought by repentance out of our guilt and enmity, there was joy among them. During all the long and wavering contest of the saint on this earth these ministering angels are his watchful assistants. And now that the victory is won, the culture of the soul for heaven completed, and the fruit which first budded in his repentance is matured for glory, with what glad songs will not the angels shout the harvest home? We cannot distinguish by our gross senses the presence and agency of these incorporeal assistants. Even while they minister to us they are unknown to us, by name, as in nature. But none the less are they present.

"There are more things in heaven and earth
Than are dreamed of in our philosophy."

And when the walls of the flesh are battered away by death, the vision of the spiritual world will flow in upon us unobstructed. Not seldom does the death-bed of Christ's people present instances which seem as though some gleams of that celestial light, and some glimpses of the beings who inhabit it, begin to reach the dying saint before he quite leaves the clay, through the rents which are made in his frail tabernacle by the strokes of the last

enemy. What is it that sometimes makes the sunken countenance light up in the article of death with a sudden glory, and the eye, but now devoid of speculation, beam with one more expiring flash of heaven's light? Has the soul seen through the torn veil already the angels' faces bending over its agony, and heard their tender call, unheard by ears of flesh, wooing it out of the crumbling body:

"Hark! they whisper; angels say,
Sister spirit, come away!"

But perhaps these questions are not authorized by the revelation God has vouchsafed to give us of the secrets of the other world. Yet there is one more truth which is revealed, even more glorious than this. It is that ransomed souls are the actual companions, not only of angels, but of the "God manifest in the flesh." When the martyr uttered the prayer of the text he manifestly looked to the arms of Christ as his final home. We are authorized by his example to say, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit, not only that thou mayest sustain it in the pangs of dying and guide it to its heavenly home, and clothe it in thy own robe of righteousness and answer for it in the great day of accounts, but that it may dwell with thee in a world without end. Thou didst pray, 'Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory;'¹ and thee the Father heareth always. Thou didst show the holy apostle that, after thou comest with the voice of the archangel and the trump of God, 'we shall ever be with the Lord.'² Thou has taught us that, 'when thou shalt appear, we shall be like thee; for we shall see thee as thou art.'³ Oh! blessed resting place! "In thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand are pleasures for evermore."⁴ Let us, brethren, live and die like believing Stephen, and our spirits will be received to the place where the God-man holds his regal court, to go out thence no more forever. We shall see him on his throne, so gloriously earned; we shall see the same face which beamed love upon the sisters of Bethany and upon the beloved disciple, and which wept at the grave of his friend; not, as then, marred with our griefs and pensive with the burden of our sorrows, but shining as the sun. Yet that splendor will not sear our vision; it

¹ John xvii. 24.

² 1 Thess. iv. 17.

³ 1 John iii. 2.

⁴ Psalm xvi. 11.

will be the light of love. We shall see the very hands which were pierced for us; not then bleeding, but reaching forth to us the sceptre of universal dominion to guide and protect us. We shall hear the very voice which once said, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden," bidding our worthless souls welcome to his glory. And as we gaze and adore and praise, we shall be changed by his Spirit into the same image of holiness. "This honor have all his saints.'

But, alas! all whom I address have not the faith and holiness of Stephen. They live in wilful impenitence, and call not on the name of Christ. Yet they too must pass through this iron gate of death! On whom will you call, you who have neglected your Saviour, when you pass down into this valley of great darkness; when the inexorable veil begins to descend, shutting out human help and sympathy from your despairing eyes; when death thrusts out your wretched soul from its abused tenement; when you launch forth into the void immense, a naked, shivering ghost; when you stand before the great white throne? Can you face these horrors alone? How will you endure a beggared, undone eternity?

It may be that you will seek in vain this terrible, helpless solitude, rather than the worse alternative which the justice of God may assign you. The devils who now tempt you may then become your captors, beset your dying bed and seize your wretched soul, as it is cast out from the body, to bind it in everlasting chains under darkness against the judgment of the last day.

Call on Christ, then, to-day, in repentance and faith, in order that you may be entitled to call upon him in the hour of your extremity. Own him now as your Lord, that he may confess you then as his people.

THE CHRISTIAN SOLDIER.¹

“Be of good courage and let us play the man for our people, and for the cities of our God; and the Lord do that which seemeth him good.”—2 SAMUEL x. 12.

THE duties of patriotism are not prominently urged in sacred Scripture. This we account for, not by supposing, with a certain sickly school of moralists, that this sentiment is selfish, narrow or inconsistent with the broadest philanthropy; but by the facts, that the obligations of the citizen are not directly religious, and that they are so natural as to require little inculcation. The Hebrew Scriptures do indeed say enough, as in the text, to justify an intense love of native land and its institutions. Civil government is God's ordinance, and if it be just, one of his greatest temporal blessings. The diversity of tongues, characters, races and interests among mankind forbids their union in one universal commonwealth. The aggregation of men into separate nations is therefore necessary; and the authority of the governments instituted over them, to maintain internal order and external defence against aggression, is of divine appointment. Hence, to sustain our government with *heart* and *hand* is not only made by God our privilege, but our duty. Our best way to advance the well-being of the race is to advance that of the portion of our race associated with us in the same society. He who extends his philanthropy so broadly as to refuse a special attachment to the interests of his own people, will probably make it so thin as to be of no account to any people.

I therefore believe that there is nothing opposed to an enlightened Christianity in a warm patriotism for our particular country. This feeling is made up of several elements: a legitimate regard for our own welfare and worldly estate, interest in that of our families, and a wider benevolence towards our fellow-citizens; together with an honest pride in the glories of our his-

¹ A sermon, commemorative of the death of Abraham C. Carrington. Preached in College Church, Va., Dec., 1862.

tory, and in the justice of our institutions, with the attachments of local affection to the very scenery and soil of our native land.

The text expresses this sentiment in action against the unrighteous assailant of our country. It was uttered by one who was very far from being a friend of God at heart, the haughty and violent Joab, the murderer of Abner, the patron of the dissolute Absalom, the chieftain who closed his stormy career by bringing his hoary head at last to the block for treason against his master's chosen successor. But Joab was now the lawfully appointed general of Israel. Although not a child of God, he was probably a sincere patriot; and his unsanctified lips, like those of Balaam, were now employed by God to utter words of truth and duty. We regard the text, then, as God's command, not because it was spoken by Joab, but because his language is virtually sanctioned by the Holy Ghost in the general tenor of the narrative and the issue of the transaction. The Ammonites, after publicly affronting King David's ambassadors without provocation, had hired a multitude of pagan Syrians, and were threatening to desolate the land of the Hebrews. Joab went to meet them, and after making the most prudent disposition of his forces, exhorted them, "Be of good courage," etc.

Unprovoked war is the most monstrous secular crime that can be committed; it is at once the greatest of evils, and includes the worst forms of robbery and murder. Wherever war is prompted by mere pique or lust of aggrandisement, or ambition for fame and power, it deserves all that can be said of its mischiefs and criminality by the most zealous advocates of peace. And nothing can rescue a people waging war from this guilt except the fact that their appeal to arms is necessary for the defence of just and vital rights. But while the Scriptures teach this, they give no countenance to the weak fanaticism which commands governments to practice a passive non-resistance in such a world as this. Nations are usually unjust and unscrupulous. The very fact that they are politically sovereign implies that there is no umpire between them, except divine providence. A passive attitude would usually only provoke, instead of disarming, attack. Hence its only effect would be to bring all the horrors and desolations of invasion upon the innocent people, while the guilty went free. God has, therefore, both permitted and instructed rulers, when thus unjustly assailed, to retort these

miseries upon the assailants who introduce them. The very fact that all war is so terrific a scourge, and that aggressive war is such an enormous crime, only makes it more clear that the injured party are entitled to their redress, and are justified in inflicting on the injurers such chastisement as will compel their return to justice, even including the death and ruin which they were preparing against their inoffensive neighbors.

It is perfectly clear that sacred Scripture legalizes such defensive war. Abram, Moses, Joshua, Samuel, David, Josiah, the Maccabees, were such warriors; and they were God's chosen saints. It was "*through faith* they waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens." (Heb. xi. 34.) God fought for and with them, by giving, in their battles, answers to their prayers and miraculous assistance to their arms. Under the New Testament, when Christ's forerunner was preaching the baptism of repentance, he did not enjoin on soldiers the surrender of their profession as sinful, but only the restricting of themselves to its lawful duties. The New Testament tells us of a centurion affectionately commended by our Redeemer as possessed of "great faith;" and of a Cornelius, who was "accepted with God, as fearing him and working righteousness." (Luke iii. 14; vii. 9; Acts x. 35.) The Apostle Paul (Rom. xiii. 4) tells us that the magistrate "beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." It would be strange indeed if the ruler who is armed by God with the power of capital punishment against the domestic murderer could not justly inflict the same doom on the foreign criminal who invades our soil, unprovoked, for the purpose of shedding blood. The security of life and property which the magistrate is intended to provide by his power of punishing would be illusory, indeed, if it could only be used against individual criminals, while the more mischievous and widespread crimes of organized multitudes must go unpunished. Aggressive war is wholesale murder; and when the government sends out its army to repel and chastise the invader, it does but inflict summary execution on the murderer caught in the act.

I have briefly stated this truth in order to ground firmly your belief in the righteousness of the calling of the Christian soldier. God has authorized him. The objects for which he contends are excellent, noble, yea of supreme temporal value. "for our

people and for the cities of our God." Our homes and the shelter of our families, the rights bequeathed to us by our ancestors, the whole earthly welfare of us and all our fellow-citizens, every thing which is included as valuable in the words, *my country*, is committed to his protection. And how much that phrase includes he can appreciate who, as a conquered exile, has no country. We could understand in part lately, when we began to fear that this fate might be ours. The godly soldier is called to defend also the far dearer interests of the church of God, involved in so many ways with those of the country in which it is planted. He protects all these precious objects by the exercise of the noblest attributes of manhood, courage, self-devotion, faith in God.

The glory of the soldier's prowess has always inflamed the admiration and dazzled the fancy of mankind above all other greatness. To the warrior who has done acts of high emprise on the bloody field, have ever belonged the loudest shouts of popular applause. The multitudes throng his chariot wheels as those of no other benefactor. His name is written highest on the monumental marble. The heart of ingenuous youth thrills more warmly as he reads his exploits than at all the other marvels of history, and even tender woman reserves for him her sweetest smiles, "and loves him for the dangers he has passed." Let not the pseudo-philanthropist say that this universal, this resistless impulse of the popular heart is merely an irrational remnant of the more bloody and ruthless ideas of Paganism, or a gust of the fancy fevered by the romance

"Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hairbreadth 'scapes i' th' imminent deadly breach;"

that it is unworthy of the benevolence and knowledge of a Christian age; that the admiration of men should rather be bestowed on those who bless by the gifts of science and the exertions of our nobler part, the mind, than on those who are eminent only for their power to destroy; that he who has "made two blades of grass to grow where but one grew before," or who has helped to civilize his fellows by invention in the arts of peace or the lessons of high philosophy, should be the true hero, and not he who exhibits the might of a mere animal rage to devastate and degrade.

It is true that, if this admiration of the military virtues is be-

stowed on the hireling, the mere soldier of fortune or the scourge of nations, who, like "Macedonia's madman or the Swede," fights from the lust of fame and power; it is a monstrous perversion. But the great instincts of the human heart and reason never go totally astray. These perverted instances would not occur unless there were a *true* military glory, to blind men as to the black deformity of its counterfeit. This universal applause of the martial virtues is the instinctive testimony of man's heart to the fact, that they require the exercise of the noblest sentiments of the human soul. He who cultivates the arts of peace does, indeed, make a worthy contribution to the well-being of his fellow-men; but he who defends them with his life makes the contribution of supreme value. He maintains that peace and security which are the necessary conditions for enjoying all other acquisitions. But for his protection it would be of no avail to the citizens that the two blades of grass grew for every one that grew before, when all were trampled down by the ruthless invader. Nor is it true that the exploits of the soldier are merely those of the brute muscle and sinew, and of animal courage. War, and especially modern war, is not an unreasoning art; but it is a profession requiring, especially in its leaders, the widest combinations of the elements of thought, the most sleepless reflection and most rapid sagacity.

But the true glory of the Christian soldier is in this: that he is called to the noblest exertions of the emotions and the will. And even if his occupation were contrasted with those of the civilian and the philosopher, as being non-intellectual, which we have denied, the moral sentiments which actuate his exertions justify the exalted admiration of his fellow-men. For the heart is nobler, wiser, greater than the head. The speculations of the head are cold and devoid of moral trait. It is the impulses of the heart which characterize man as a moral being. To love is better than to analyze. To will magnanimously is more noble than to invent. Disinterestedness is more excellent than ingenuity, and courage for the right is grander than talent. If a man go upon the battle-field in foolish forgetfulness of his duty and danger; if he is bold merely because he refuses to think; if he rushes forward only with the senseless fury of the bull maddened by the trumpet, and

"His courage dwells but in a troubled flood
Of mounting spirits and fermenting blood;"

if he is moved by no moral appreciation of the cause for which he stakes his life, he is not brave; his frenzy is not true courage; he is not the man of whom we speak, however he may sometimes intrude himself into his honor.

But let us suppose the Christian man, who wholly prefers peace and its joys to the turmoil of war, who considers all his risk, and weighs well the preciousness of the home, the life and the love, from which a violent death would tear him, but who yet foregoes those dear delights of peace, and deserts that home and its loves, for a time, and jeopard's life itself, reluctantly, yet with determination, because he finds that *duty*, dearer than peace and home and life, demands the sacrifice. This is he who "is of good courage and plays the man for his people and for the city of his God." And I assert this Christian courage is but another name for self-sacrifice. It does but postpone self to duty, and to the good of others. Its spirit is precisely that of the martyr, who yields up his life rather than be recreant to duty, to his church and to his God. It expresses the same disinterestedness, the same consecration to the sentiment of obligation, the same faith in God. I believe that in many a soldier who is now baring his breast as a bulwark for our rights, this determination is as true a work of the grace of God as was ever fulfilled in the Christian martyr when he embraced the stake rather than deny his Lord. Yes, this courage, I assert it with reverence, is, in the true Christian soldier, but the reflection in his humbler measure of the spirit with which his divine Master set his face steadfastly towards Jerusalem and calmly braved the baptism of fire which awaited him there. He is the vine; they, the branches. He is the noblest exemplar of true moral courage; they, the feeble reflectors of his spirit in their lower spheres. It was this magnanimous sacrifice of Christ which purchased for him the throne of universal dominion, and filled all heaven with the acclaim of angels and ransomed saints. Shall we not, then, pay to his followers, when, for their humbler imitation of his self-devotion, they die for their people and the city of their God, the best tributes of our earthly affections? Such, I believe, was the courage of our brother, prompted, indeed, by a chivalrous and honorable nature, but regulated and sustained by the grace of God derived from the example and spirit of Christ his head.

The temper of the Christian soldier is also one of high faith and profound submission to God. While he plays the man for his people and the cities of his God, he adds, "And the Lord do that which seemeth him good." Here is a recognition of the overruling providence of God in the fate of commonwealths and the decision of battles. Here is expressed a hearty confidence in the wisdom, goodness and justice of the event which God may ordain, and acquiescence in his decisions. There is here no senseless fatalism, dis severing the appointed means from the desired end, and reposing in vain confidence or supine despair. But the truth is recognized that "duty is ours, events are God's." Every nerve is strained to perform the task allotted by the providence of the hour, manfully, and if in its performance death or defeat is met, it is well. The Christian accepts this result as a revelation of the fact that this was the hour and this the place appointed by God for his end, and that, therefore, no other hour and place can be so suitable. He feels that if duty be courageously done all else will be secure. He may die, but the cause of his country is immortal; the blood with which he enriches her soil becomes to his fellow-citizens a new argument of the preciousness of the cause in which it was shed, and a sacred pledge to persevere in it to the end. Thus the blood of our country's martyrs becomes the seed of our new armies. The dying patriot achieves more for her by his death than by all his life, and lays down his sword at the gates of the tomb in the triumphant assurance that a people contending for their right in the fear of God will be made invincible by his aid. He leaves the family for whose home he was fighting; but his God and a grateful country become their guardians in his place. "I have been young," says the Psalmist, "and now am old, yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread." Life is ended; but it is to begin a better life in heaven. Matthew x. 39: "He that loseth his life for Christ's sake, shall find it."

Death, and especially what men call a premature death, must ever be regarded by us as a natural evil. If I should profess to be, myself, or should demand of you, to be insensible to it, you would justly consider me as guilty of cant. The very instincts of man's animal nature abhor it, and his earthly affections shudder at the severance which it effects between them and their dear objects. So, the death of friends cannot but be a felt bereave-

ment to survivors, be its circumstances what they may. But it has ever appeared to me that, in the fall of the Christian soldier in battle, there was more to mitigate the stroke and to overcome death by the victory of triumphant consolation than in any other by which the good man meets his fate. The unreflecting may be startled by this assertion. They think of all the externals of a death on a battle-field; of the ghastly forms in which the destroyer comes; of the corpse prone upon its mother earth, begrimed perhaps with the sweat and dust of the conflict; of the burial to which he is taken fresh and gory from the field, his breast unconfined by coffin or winding-sheet, and shrouded only in his martial cloak; and of the nameless grave where he sleeps alone in his blood. All this is pictured in contrast with the solemn decencies of those funeral rites which affection renders, in more peaceful seasons, with a sort of mournful delight. They afflict themselves with the thought that no friend was near to minister to his pangs, no saintly man of God to calm the agitation of his soul by his prayers, no mother or wife to receive his last farewell; that his dying groans found no echo but the thunders of the receding battle.

Well, all these things are true; too often, alas, have I seen them verified; but they are true as elements of pain only to the survivors. The dying hero feels them not. Here is our illusion: that we cheat our sorrow into the belief that these ministrations of affection reach the insensible clay when in truth they only solace our own bereaved affection. Death is always a solitary struggle; however we may be surrounded by friends, when the shadow of the great agony falls upon us it shuts us out like a dark veil from their aid, and we must meet the last enemy alone. And however the neglect of the beloved remains may harrow the feelings of those who loved him, the departed is all unconscious of it. On the other hand, is it nothing that he is translated to his reward by a sudden and painless stroke? He feels one electric shock as the deadly missile smites him, and then the very capacity for pain is benumbed, and he awakes no more till he awakes in that world where pain is unknown. He has no share in the long tortures of wearing sickness or the mortifying decay of age; he feels none of the anxious forebodings, the hope deferred waning into sickening despair, by which the more peaceful bed of disease is haunted. Death casts none of its shadows before.

But in place of all this there is the calm testimony of a good conscience, the elation of the manly soul nerving its noblest powers for duty, the tumultuous rapture of those powers in highest action, the generous emulation, the hope of triumph, the joy of victory. And in the midst of this exaltation of soul comes the sudden stroke, and death is finished almost before it is felt. Such an end is not a death; it is a translation. Shall the bereaved count it no compensation for their loss, too, that the warmest instincts of every man's soul declare the glory of the soldier's death? There is solace in this; yea, more than consolation, there is proud triumph in it. And it is a triumph not unworthy of the Christian heart. It is even more appropriate to us than it was to the Greek to sing:

"Glorious his fate, and envied is his lot,
Who for his country fights, and for it dies;"

for we contend, not only for the lawful interests of home and country, but for the more precious and sacred cause of God and of souls. I am not one of those who hold that these sentiments are the birth only of pagan ferocity, or unholy pride. The principles of personal honor and the love of glory have been perverted among us into a code of wickedness and bloody retaliation, for which we now doubtless suffer the chastisement of an offended God. From this abuse the professors of a spurious and debased puritanism have taken occasion to decry all such sentiments until they seem to be vanished from among them; and the vileness of public morals, which is the consequence of this extreme, has become as loathsome as the other was violent. But there is a true glory and a true honor, that which cometh from God and not from man: the glory of duty done, of obstacles overcome, of fears resisted, and of generous sacrifices made to a worthy cause, the honor of an integrity of principle stronger than the sense of pain or the fear of death. He deserves most of this honor who from pure motives braves the direst evils and pays the costliest sacrifice for the noblest object. What fear can be darker than that of death? What more precious than life? What object more worthy than the cause of our country and our God? In attuning our souls so as to make them thrill at the applause of our fellows, our Creator doubtless assigned to this affection some legitimate scope. Its lawful exercise is found when we seek the approbation of

the good and wise, which is but the echo of the divine verdict, "Well done, good and faithful servant." Such applause, when nobly won, is valuable; it is ennobling. It is an inheritance of honor to the children who emulate the virtues that won it. Is there one who "hath the stomach and mettle of a man" that would not rather leave his sons freemen, enriched only with this heritage, won for them by a father's blood, than wealthy slaves? And is there a true woman who would not elect, heart-rending as it might be to make the election, to be the widow of such a Christian hero than to live in the embraces of a dishonored and abject man, the serf of despots?

The doctrine which I have now drawn, as I believe from the word of God, finds strong illustration in the death of Lieutenant Carrington. My conception of the proper objects of funeral discourses has usually forbidden all eulogistic reference to the dead. If its purpose were to gratify or benefit the departed, it would be superstitious folly. Not only are they forever removed beyond the reach of our applause or blame, but beside the solemnities of that bar before which they have been arraigned, our verdict would seem to them infinitely trivial and impertinent. If the purpose of funeral encomiums is to compliment bereaved survivors, it might be admitted to be socially amiable; but to employ the pulpit for such a purpose is a perversion. God has appointed him who stands here to be the herald of his truth alone. No other message is allowed to proceed from his mouth. The only lawful purpose of these services is to commend that truth to the living.

But God sometimes teaches us by example; and when his grace has given to the church an instance peculiarly bright, it should be improved to impress the lessons of Christianity by the aid of the affections and memories which cluster around it upon the hearts of survivors. To pass over such a Christian character as that of our brother, and let his memory drop in silence without thanksgiving to him who formed him to holiness, would be ingratitude to God and neglect of the instruction of his church; for never have I known a man in whom grace bore more excellent fruit in its short summer time than in him. Under the ministry of the late venerable pastor, Doctor Rice, the sacred instructions of his childhood ripened into faith, and he devoted his early manhood to God. From the very first his

modest, brave, and honorable nature displayed the refining influence of grace, and he assumed at once the standing of a thorough Christian. His religion was of that type which, like Joshua's and Caleb's, "followed the Lord fully." The result was that, after two years, he was introduced into the eldership, with the unanimous approval of the church. In that office he was a model of fidelity, ever postponing his private convenience to the calls and duties of the elder, firm in discipline, in purity of life an "ensample to the flock," and ready to assume any burden of labor or responsibility to which duty called him; so that, though of all men most modest and least pragmatical, he soon found the largest share of the church's work resting on his shoulders. It was thus that I came, first as stated supply and then as pastor of this church, to know and love him. If I did not know that my estimate is warmly sustained by all who knew him best, I should suspect myself of a too partial affection, and put a constraint upon my heart and lips; for truly can I say that my soul was knit to his as the souls of David and Jonathan. And now that I have lost him, I can find no words to express my personal bereavement better than those of David in the requiem of his princely friend: "How are the mighty fallen in the midst of battle! O Jonathan, thou wast slain in thy high places; I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan; very pleasant hast thou been unto me." (2 Sam. i. 25, 26.)

Need I commend his kindness as a neighbor when I see so many glistening eyes before me attest it? Need I remind you of his public spirit, his inflexible integrity, his courage for the right in this community? On the graces of his character as son, brother, husband, father, in the interior circles of his home, the sacredness of the grief which his loss has left behind it almost forbid me to enlarge. Abram C. Carrington was the *truest man* with whose friendship it was ever my lot to be blest. Let him but be convinced in his clear and honest judgment of the call of duty, and his effort to accomplish it was as certain as the rising of the sun; and it was made at once, without a pause to consider whether the task was easy and pleasant or arduous and repulsive. Let him once bestow his friendship upon you, and he was yours in every trial, with fortune, and hand, and heart, and, if need be, life blood.

As a soldier, his courage was of the truest temper. His com-

rades whom I see before me will remember how his body was prostrate with disease at the first battle of Manassas, but the energy of a determinate will seemed to be medicine for his weakness; so that, instead of making it an excuse for going to the rear, as so many did, his spirit invigorated his failing strength. In the battle of Gaines' Mill, where his regiment had one man of every three struck, his gallantry was conspicuous; and on Monday, June 30th, at Frazier's Farm, he was encouraging and cheering on his men, when he fell, with a bullet through his breast. His was the courage of the Christian. It was as truly exhibited by his steady Christian example in the camp as on the field. In a letter written on the morning of the day he died, while describing the carnage through which his company passed the Friday before, he modestly says of himself: "Amidst it all, I lifted up my heart to God in prayer for safety, and, thanks to his holy name, he was pleased to hear me." In the same calm spirit, he again commits himself to God in prayer and well doing with reference to the bloody day before him.

And now, my hearers, of what use shall this symmetrical and lovely example be to us? Let me exhort the young men of this community to be "followers of him as he also was of Jesus Christ." Let me also commend the example of our brother to my co-presbyters, the elders of his church. How many of us, my brethren, how many of you who have instructed me to preach this sermon and display the lessons of the life we have reviewed, will come up to the measure of his fidelity, of his manly and vigorous piety, of his industry in the concerns of God's house? Who will fill the breach we now feel? Happy would that people be whose pastors were always actuated by his steady zeal! And I will add, boldly bidding away every thought of personal offence by the awful solemnities of that bourne whence our dead colleague's example preaches to us, happy would those pastors be whose sessions all sustained them like other Abram Carringtons!

THE SIN OF THE TEMPTER.¹

“Woe unto him that giveth his neighbor drink, that putteth thy bottle to him, and makest him drunken also, that thou mayest look on their nakedness.”—HABAKKUK ii. 15.

ABOUT six hundred years before Christ, the great Chaldean or Babylonian empire reached the height of its power. It rose rapidly in a few generations upon the ruins of the Assyrian or Ninevite kingdom by treacherous rebellion and violent wars, until it reached the zenith of its wickedness and success under Nebuchadnezzar. It is this triumphant power which forms the main subject of Habakkuk's prophecies. He foresees it founded in violence and revolt, ravaging its unoffending neighbors abroad, and building up its splendor at home by domestic tyranny and exaction, until its iniquities are full; and it meets an overthrow as astounding as its successes. But it was in this short and rapid career of national crime that it was employed by God as a rod to scourge rebellious Judah. In like manner had Assyria been used to punish the kingdom of the Ten Tribes.

We learn that rapacity and violence were not the only crimes of the Babylonian kingdom. It appears that it was also notoriously guilty of propagating its false religion: a form of gross idolatry which was probably peculiarly arrogant and wicked. This people not only overthrew the altar and worship of the true God, and did what they could to suppress the very existence of his visible church, but profanely asserted the inferiority of Jehovah, and inculcated in the conquered nations the imitation of their own vices. Idolatry is as corrupting to man as it is dishonorable to God. It is the parent of all forms of moral depravity, and of all crimes. Hence the question between idolatry and the worship of the true God is always one between vice and virtue; so that, even if God's exclusive claim to the homage of

¹ A sermon preached in the College Church, Hampden Sidney, Va., February, 1860.

his creatures be set aside, a most solid reason remains for his forbidding and punishing the worship of idols.

This intimate relation between false religions and gross morals may help to explain the fact that the symbolical language of prophecy has selected some of the more sensual vices to represent the complex guilt of idolatry. In many places (as Jer. iii. 1; Ezek. xvi. 15; and Rev. xix. 12) it is represented by the sin of unchastity; in Rev. xvii. 2-5, the idolatry of Rome is symbolized by the combined figures of adultery and drunkenness; and in the text, the inculcation of false religion by the Chaldeans by enticing to the sin of drunkenness alone. When we give this general sense to the figure of one putting his bottle to his neighbor, we by no means exclude a particular reference to the literal sin of intoxication; for doubtless this was one of the abominations with which the orgies of their pagan worship were celebrated.

Now, as Babylon was the great persecutor and destroyer of the church under the Old Testament, so the Romish apostasy has been its great enemy and corrupter under the New. Hence it is, that in the Apocalypse, *Babylon* is the prophetic name for Rome and Popery. The symbol of Rev. xvii. 2-5, a pompous and licentious queen, as abandoned as splendid, seducing with the golden cup of her uncleanness and abominations the mighty ones of the earth, and drunk with the blood of saints, may assist us to explain the figure of the text. The crime of Rome was that she persecuted and slew a part and endeavored to corrupt the remainder of Christendom with her false religion and gross morals. Such, therefore, was the sin which the text denounces in Babylon: the teaching of irreligion and vice, and soliciting to its commission. The disgraceful exposure resulting from the seduction of the foolish victim represents the degradation and shame which the malignant tempter produces, and then scorns.

The principles of God's moral government are stable; the tremendous judgment of the Chaldean empire is but one instance of the righteous rule by which God has ever punished those who tempt their fellows to sin. The verses next to our text predict, in language of terrible power, the appropriate retribution which he poured out upon Babylon. The humiliation and ruin which this people had wrought upon so many of their innocent neighbors was speedily visited in its extremest form upon them; and

the heaven-daring compound of impiety and sensuality, which they had gloried in inculcating, was the immediate occasion of their punishment. The proud kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar so speedily raised to the pinnacle of pomp and seeming strength, as speedily tottered to its fall. In the third generation from him the weak and impious Belshazzar held the throne, successful only in disorganizing his empire, provoking his enemies and distinguishing his own infamy. In the very night that he was celebrating an impious and disgusting revel, profaning the holy utensils of Jehovah's temple, and filling his palace with vile excess and lust, the hardy Medes and Persians forced the two-barred gates of brass, ravaged the pompous city, and slew the swinish king with his herd of parasites in the midst of their debauch. Here ended the haughty dynasty of Chaldea in ignominious and vile defeat, the victim rather of its own baseness than of its enemies' force. And the same God who directed this retributive drama sits in judgment upon sinners now, and pronounces the same "woe" against him who entices his neighbor to dishonor God by irreligion or himself by vice. Do not feel, my hearer, that we are enervating the majesty of this truth when we descend from the review of that grand assize of Providence in which nations and thrones were the culprits, and apply the principle to the conscience of the individual tempter of his fellow-man. Viewed in the light of eternity, the infliction of the disease of sin upon one soul is a more tremendous calamity than the overthrow of dominions and powers on this earth. No scenery of earthly crime and woe can form too grand a background for the suitable presentation of this sin and its punishment, though pertaining to the smallest sinner in this house.

My subject, then, is *the sin of tempting a fellow-man to transgression*. For the sake of brevity, I must classify the multifarious forms in which this sin is committed, under four heads.

The lowest class in guilt is that which unintentionally entices others to transgression by the mere force of evil example. These persons directly intend only their own sinful gratification in the breaking of God's law, and, therefore, their purpose is not intentionally malignant towards their fellows, nor their guilt so aggravated in this respect. But yet it is their duty to remember the obvious fact that man is an imitative and social creature, so that every deed performed by fellow-men exerts some

influence to produce its imitation. The power of different habits and principles dictating opposite acts may not be in every case overcome by this influence, but it is always to some extent undermined by a process, it may be as slight and yet as sure as the "continual dropping which weareth away a stone." No evil action done in the knowledge of a fellow-creature is wholly devoid of the mischievous power of example, and no man is so obscure as to be without influence on others. Hence, while he who creates an unintentional evil example is not guilty of the malignant design of ruining the souls of others, he is guilty of a reckless indifference to their ruin. In carrying out the sinful and forbidden purpose of grasping unlawful pleasures, he incurs the further sinful result of misleading others. As he who accidentally takes life when he intended to commit an unlawful assault is guilty of murder, so these men are guilty of the blood of souls.

The second class is of those who provide for their fellow-men the means and appliances of vice from motives of gain or other selfish good to themselves. Their immediate object is not to ruin the virtue of others, but to secure for themselves advantage from the employment of the *apparatus* of transgression, while they well know, and coolly disregard the fact, that the use of the appliances they provide usually and surely results in sin, guilt, and injury to their victims. If it were equally convenient to secure from those victims the selfish advantages which they desire, by some more innocent expedient, they would have no objection to doing so; but as interest and convenience dictate it, they deliberately plan to make their ends out of the ruin of their neighbors' morality. To this class belong those who offer to the community the common means of drunkenness; to it belong all the varied troops of harpies, the gamesters, the thespians, the "singing men and singing women," who live by the dissipated and corrupting amusements of society. Here, likewise, must be classed all those literary caterers, whether the Grub-street hack who spins out of his sordid brain the penny fiction for the million or the towering genius who seeks readers and applause (objects as sordid, when prized as he prizes them, as the rusty shilling that is craved to relieve the hunger and purchase the dirty debauch of Grub-street) by painting vice or inflaming unholy emotions; whether the merchant prince at whose golden wand

steam presses whirl to print the mental poison or the smaller dealer who scatters them for a penny profit through the land. We denounce the unfeeling man who for filthy lucre will offer his fellow-man the stupifying anodyne or the fiery draught which steals away the brain. By what argument do we judge him a less sinner who perverts the heavenly gifts of intellect in order to debauch the conscience or to burn in on the mind the images of lust and vice with the fires of eloquence or fancy till the brain is intoxicated with a worse phrensy than that of wine?

The guilt of all this class of tempters is far heavier than of the first, because the result is with them intentional and the motive selfish. In God's sight they are the deliberate producers of all the crime, guilt, and misery which may be reasonably foreseen as flowing from the vicious appliances which they provide and display. According to the Levitical law (Exod. xxi. 19), the man who reared an ox which slew a human being, if he knew that his ox was *wont to push* with his horns, was judged guilty of murder; he was held responsible for the whole result which he had selfishly contemplated for a paltry gain.

The third class exhibits a still more revolting grade of malignity. It is composed of those who inculcate vice and solicit transgression for the very pleasure of corrupting those who are less guilty than themselves. There are men, such is the fiendish malice to which human nature can sink, who, after they have degraded themselves to the abyss of corruption, delight to drag down as many others as they may into the same slough. Their superior experience in evil, their guilty skill in the commission of crime, are the merits on which they plume themselves; and the callousness with which they can tread on conscience, on vows, on all sanctities and restraints, where less hardy sinners blush to venture their foot, is the very glory of their position. It is on these super-eminent traits of depravity, and on the exploits of superior crime they base their proud pretensions to be the admired instructors of younger sinners than themselves. Does the fair earth bear on its indignant bosom a spectacle more abhorrent than that of one of these "oracles of profligacy," as he gathers around him his circle of younger sinners, less lost than himself, busies himself by every art of treacherous kindness or unfeeling ridicule to obliterate the last blush from the cheek of his victim, and encourages the dubious heart yet

trembling with some sense of right to plunge into the debauch, or to roll forth the words of blasphemy, or to venture the approaches of her whose house is the way to hell? Other tempters win at least a selfish advantage by the ruin of their fellow-men. But this, like the gorged tiger, destroys for the gratification of a pure malignity, which draws its delight directly from the useless miseries of its victims.

The fourth species of this sin, doubtless, deserves the "bad preëminence" above all other forms. It is that usually designated by the term "seduction," when used in popular language in its special sense. If you will consider, you will decide that the honorable mind justly condemns it as the most loathsome combination of treachery, cruelty and selfishness which can be exhibited towards a fellow-creature. The victim is one whose feeble sex should have appealed to every manly instinct for honorable protection instead of wrong; and whose love, stronger than the instinct of life, creates of itself a sacred obligation to refrain from injury. But that very love, so generously and unsuspectingly bestowed, is the fatal weapon employed with meditated perfidy for her ruin. And then, the wiles by which virtue is disarmed; what are they but pretended tenderness and false vows of affection, in which the sacred bonds of truth and love, which are the foundation of all well-being, are prostituted by the traitor to his treacherous purpose. The baseness of the means can only be surpassed by the atrocity of the result; a result by which parents and relatives are wrung with a shame and anguish, beside which the emotions which would have followed the lost one to an early grave seem almost a joy; and the miserable victim herself, after becoming the sacrifice of ruthless selfishness, is "flung like a worthless weed away," and left either to a remorse, if enough of virtue survives a wrong so crushing to feel remorse, and a shame which court the grave as a coveted refuge; or else to a degradation and despairing depravity more lamentable than even a despairing death. Is there any symbol vile enough to body forth the seducer's wickedness? None but that serpent form which the satanic father of the brood assumes. Like a serpent he glides into the household he would ruin, hiding his sibilant malice and his fatal fangs under his burnished skin; displaying his perfidious graces with pretended innocence, until the moment is found to strike his remediless venom into the bosom

which he has beguiled to cherish him. And yet there are men who, though foul with these treasons against all that is most holy and tender of human affections and social vows, dare to call themselves "men of honor!"—so honorable, forsooth, that the insinuation against their spotless fame must needs be washed out in blood! For such hypocritical iniquity there is no earthly infamy deep enough and no penalty heavy enough. The very cord that should stop their perjured breath would be dishonored to embrace their necks, and the gibbet would be defiled by the burden it had to sustain.

Having pointed out the leading forms in which the sin of tempting to evil may be committed, I proceed to that which is the main object of this discourse—to justify the "woe" which is pronounced against it—by some general considerations. And—

I. The sin of the tempter is enormous, because in enticing his neighbor to do wrong he has inflicted upon him the greatest mischief of which his nature is capable.

It has been said :

" Who steals my purse steals trash,
But he who filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And leaves me poor indeed."

With a more truthful emphasis may this be said of him who robs his fellow-man of his innocence; he strips him of that which adds no wealth except store of wrath to the plunderer, and leaves the victim beggared of happiness. Sin is the monster mischief of our world. He who brings it upon his neighbor has thereby helped to dash the image of God in which he was created, and to mar the health of his nature. He assists in spreading a moral leprosy which eats into the soul until the last lineament of virtue is effaced, and the corruption of spiritual death is spread over the whole being. He assists in opening a spring of perpetual misery in the victim's soul, from which the bitter floods of remorse must some day burst forth, with all their ingredients of selfishness, hatred, fear and despair. The transgression which he inculcates may for a season appear to sear the conscience in corrupting it, but just so surely as there is truth in Jehovah must man's "sin find him out," and avenge itself in the lashes of self-accusation. Nor does the tempter injure the object of his seductions alone: others suffer with him the pangs of shame and mor-

tified affection, and those others perhaps virtuous, or at least innocent of wrong against the author of their calamity. But, above all, to entice into sin is to lead our brother under the wrath of the Almighty. It is to pluck down upon his head the penalty of eternal death. It is to thrust him into a quarrel with the omnipotent God, whose righteous wrath "burns to the lowest hell"; whose justice condemns the impenitent transgressor to make experiment of what infinite power can inflict through endless ages in recompense for the outrage of infinite attributes. This, sinful man, is what transgression accomplishes—that transgression which you so lightly commit—which you seek to thrust upon your comrade as though his fall into it were a merry jest. "Fools make a mock at sin!" That sin at which all else above the pit is solemn as eternity—"which brought death into our world and all our woe"—which hollowed out the abyss of hell and filled it with its torments and wails—which kills the soul with the second death. Had nature sense and feeling it would not be unreasonable to imagine the ground in mourning, and the skies dropping down their tears at every sin; as when the first tempter triumphed, Milton sang

"Earth felt the wound, and nature from her seat,
Sighing through all her works, gave signs of woe
That all was lost."

II. The wrong done to our neighbor and to God in this sin is enormous, because it is irreparable by man. The creature can successfully solicit to evil, but God alone can efficiently recall the corrupted soul to good. Sin, when once committed, leaves its *virus* in the soul to spread and propagate itself in evil habits and dispositions, defying all stay by human power. Nor does he who tempts to evil intend to make any effort for its arrest. He puts forth his hand to begin or to accelerate the downward career, but he has no mind to trouble himself to stay it. No! when the irreparable injury is inflicted, he is done; his purpose is accomplished, and unless there is still some lower deep of ruin into which his victim may be plunged, he has no further concern with him than, like the Chaldean in the text, to ridicule or to despise the degradation which he has helped to produce.

Nor is the tempter either able or willing to bear the wrath of God which he has been the instrument of drawing down upon

his fellow. Had he even magnanimity enough to offer it he would be refused; for it is written (Prov. ix. 12), "If thou be wise, thou shalt be wise for thyself; but if thou scornest, thou alone shalt bear it." The selfish cruelty which could inflict the mischief will not now awaken into disinterestedness when it has plucked down upon its comrade the mountainous load of Almighty vengeance, or put forth so much as a little finger to lighten it. And did it endeavor the rescue, it would find itself immovable beneath a still more tremendous burden—the judgments due to its own guilt.

So that, according to every rule of fellowship by which the men of this world combine, there is an element of mean treachery in the conduct of the tempter. When one invites his fellow to join him in some venture or enterprise of risk, it is well understood that he thereby makes an implied promise, in case his invitation is accepted, to stand by his comrade in any danger or disaster which may result. The associates are to be faithful to each other in sharing both the gains and the losses of their common undertaking; and the man who was not willing to be pledged to this, would refrain if he had one spark of magnanimity or honesty, from soliciting any one to join his enterprise. Thus, when the professed patriot summons his fellow-citizens to join him in the dangerous attempt to pluck their liberties by force from the grasp of the angry despot, and when they rally to his side, they expect him to share their risks and exposures—to share in the storm of battle, and if defeat and captivity must needs be, to share their bonds. When men who have any spirit combine to break the laws, when heedless youth associate to tempt the authority of their instructors, even they would think it foul shame that the very inventor of the offence should desert the friends whom he had inveigled into it, so soon as danger or exposure overtook them. Now, then, seeing that the tempter is neither willing nor able to do anything to remedy either the defilement or the guilt—either the shame and remorse of the polluted conscience, or the wrath of God incurred by the sin he is about to inculcate—if he has one spark of the honor of a man, one instinct of honesty or pity, he should refrain. If you must walk the dangerous road of transgression, if you must brave the power of the Almighty, we beseech you proceed on your way alone, and carry no comrade with you to your dreary fate. It

will be horrible enough without being aggravated by the sight of their ruin, procured, in part, by your treachery, and without the torment of their just reproaches.

III. The work of the tempter has this farther element of treachery, that while the purpose is mischievous, and either directly or indirectly malignant, the pretence is always one of good fellowship and kindness. Whatever be the sin to which the inexperienced is allured, the seducer well knows, as it is his solemn duty to know, that it must in the end result in nothing but misery; and if his immediate purpose is not to inflict that misery, it is at best a purpose to gain some unholy, selfish, and often trivial end, by a reckless indifference to the terrible result. He is willing to help to murder a soul in order to gain the coveted companionship of an hour in forbidden indulgences! Were this repulsive atrocity of purpose candidly professed, who would not recoil from it with salutary horror? "In vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird." But it is always concealed under the veil of benevolence. The aggravated perfidy by which the destroyer, in the peculiar sin of seduction, employs the dearest and most sacred symbols of affection and vows of devotion to work his purpose, has been already noted. But all tempters are in this alike. Saith Solomon, "When sinners entice thee they plead, 'we shall find all precious substance, we shall fill our houses with spoil; cast in thy lot among us—let us all have one purse.'" Here is the language of a pretended generosity, of a genial, free-handed kindness. "But they lay wait for their blood; they lurk privily for their lives." In the case of all the classes who seek their selfish ends at the expense of their neighbor's moral injury, by offering the apparatus of dissipation, we find the same mask. Do they publish the cold selfishness of their purpose to batten on the sin and ruin of their fellow-man, to clear a shilling on a folly of his which will be to him more costly than all the jewels of an emperor's estate? Not they. Do they advertise thus, "The public is invited to come, that I may turn a penny by giving them to drink liquid damnation"? Or, "The young of both sexes are requested to attend, in order that I may give them the fires of remorse for their money"? Not they. Well would it be for their dupes if they did. But their guise before the public is always one of cheerful, benevolent alacrity, of polite attention, as though they delighted to

confer true happiness. And the hardened reprobate who glories to extinguish the virtuous scruple from the heart, and the ingenuous blush from the cheek of the inexperienced, also assumes the suppleness of the serpent, and professes that his only motive is to confer enjoyment. So that in every form of the sin of the tempter, there is some degree of that TREASON, smaller or greater, which gave the satanic trait to the crime of Joab, the son of Zeruiah, when he took his comrade, Amasa, by the beard to salute him, while he smote him with his sword in the fifth rib; and to that blackest human act ever wrought on earth, in which Judas betrayed his Redeemer with a kiss.

IV. I have intimated that there is a satanic trait in all such enticements. Here, in truth, is the most startling view of their wickedness; that they do precisely the devil's work and carry out his cause. Consider the fearful analogy between the two. The cause which impelled Satan to attempt the ruin of the human race was that he had himself fallen; he desired to make his fellow-creatures as miserable as himself. So the seducer of his fellow-man endeavors to drag him down, because he cannot patiently endure the sight of a virtue superior to his own. The instrument by which Satan seeks to destroy is not the sword, or fire, or poison, but sin; so that his victim may be his own destroyer. It is thus with the human tempter. The guise under which the adversary appeared was one of innocence and amiability, and his plea was, "in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." So the seducer pleads only the gratification which he pretends to offer. And last, the result in both cases is the same—the *death of the soul*—a misery irreparable, immeasurable and endless. To this whole class of sinners then may be justly applied those words of our Saviour to the apostate scribes—words too full of dread severity for any other than the all-knowing to frame: "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do, who was a murderer from the beginning."

Not seldom the dire results of temptation begin to manifest themselves on earth, so that the soul-murderer is enabled to look on his own work in its true lights. Pictures of those results are so frequent in human experience, dark as they are, that I shall not be justly liable to the charge of personal allusions, when I draw one or two in such a way as to represent what is, alas! too

generally real. Who can live to old age in this evil world, and fail to know only too many of such scenes? There was the amiable and genial youth, who departed for college or some place of business freighted with sacred affections—with a father's blessing, a mother's unutterable prayer, and pure sisterly yearnings. He went away innocent, and even ignorant of vice, gay and confident of well-doing. But he returns with the slime of the serpent upon him. His cheek is still red, but it is the flush of wine, not the rosy hue of health. His eye is no longer beaming with domestic love and cheerful animation, but is dull with the reaction of excess, or else fired with baleful passion. The simple pleasures and affections of his home are now all too mild to suit his palate, debauched with the fiery flavor of vice. Now let his tempter note the thrill of anguish which harrows the parents' hearts, as the suspicion of his change first shoots through them. Let him watch the long agony of the contest in which they strive against evidence, and are at last compelled to admit that he is lost, and the blight of the sister's bosom, as even she at last surrenders his cause and owns that she has no longer a brother. Let him follow the impetuous career of his ruin—it will not detain him long, for the fallen reprobate hastens to his catastrophe—until he is brought to his home the last time, slain, it may be, in drunken broil or dying of excess. And let him contemplate the hoary heads that are brought down in sorrow to the grave. There is his work: let him study it. There is "the beginning of the end."

Or, it may be, that the progress of the tempter's work in the early life of his victim is slower. He comes to man's estate with uncertain virtue, indeed, yet not wholly fallen; sometimes yielding far more from amiability and good fellowship than from actual love of vice, yet always restrained in part by his better instincts. His true friends tremble for him, while they love him for his generosity, and kindly conceal his danger from his own house. Thus he fares along until other destinies are linked with his own, so that when he falls he must carry a wider desolation. He has become a husband—a father. As the insidious seductions of his tempters and the folds of evil habits wind around him, he struggles against them sometimes even more manfully than before, for he is not dead to the gentle and potent pleas of love. But still his seducers return to the charge.

The quick instincts of the wife have long divined, ah! too acutely, that all is not secure; and every absence from home is to her a torturing suspense, which yet she must conceal. But we will not attempt to detail this hidden warfare of fear and hope where each party in the strife is armed by love itself to rend her gentle breast and which embitters even the happiest days of her existence. At times his irregularities almost turn her fears into despair, and then the pleasing promise of permanent amendment is so prolonged that the agitating hope rises painfully towards peaceful confidence. It is at the end of some such season that his boon companions of former days meet him again. They are delighted to see him; they urge him to go with them to some festive resort, where they may drink again to the memories of "auld lang syne" and renew its wild enjoyments. But he demurs, and at first with apparent firmness. They press him again and again, and demand to know what ungenial change has come over him. Still he deprecates the proposal, and, it may be, alludes to the dangers which overhang his sobriety, explains in touching words the long and, he trusts, successful struggle he has made to save himself, and even suggests the sacred ties which draw him to self-denial. But what is all this in their profane eyes? They regard the compunctions of honor, principle, and love as no better than childishness; they rally him on his puritanism. He reminds them of what they well know, that with the first indulgence his self-command is liable to be overthrown, and begs them to spare him. They reply by jeering him for timidity, and assure him that he is in no danger; for where is the harm of a little jollity? At length he yields to their perseverance and his own false shame, and accompanies them "as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as a fool to the correction of the stocks, till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird hasteth to the snare, and *knoweth not that it is for his life.*" They drink; they jest; they laugh. There is one hour of vivid social enjoyment, while his false friends applaud him for his wit, and tell him that now he is himself again. But the slumbering demon appetite, which seemed long to be bound, and would soon have been starved to extinction by denial of its indulgence, has now awakened again in its fury, bursts the restraints of conscience and affection, and casts them wildly to the winds. He pours down the fiery floods with reckless hand, his

late tempters now leave him, perhaps in genteel disgust at his excesses, and day after day he plunges on in a tempest of dissipation until brain and heart are stupefied.

But we turn from the scene of his debauch, where his boon companions now stand afar off from his shame, or sneer at the bestiality which they helped to produce, to his home and to the anxious heart that beats and watches there. Night after night has passed, and the failure of his promised return has held her eyes waking, and day after day her aching sight is strained to see whether he is coming, till hope deferred maketh the heart sick, and she now understands it all only too well. Shall we venture to lift the veil from the chamber of holy grief on one of those long night watches? See her pacing the floor with convulsive step, and then pressing her wet cheek to the window as though the poor eyes all dimmed with tears could pierce the pitch darkness of the stormy night,—a darkness yet not equal to the blackness that incloses her heart. Now she wrings her hands, and, in utter abandonment of misery, tears her fair hair and calls upon God, scarce knowing whether to invoke his vengeance with all the phrensy of a ruined wife and mother on the seducers of her husband or to implore his mercy on herself and her babes. And now those little ones awake from short slumber, frightened by the tempest of her grief, and cluster around her in strange alarm. Thus wears away the black, endless night, and with the sad, gray dawn there comes a step, a well-known step, that makes her throbbing heart stand still. But she does not fly to meet it, for it is heavy and unsteady, and announces the drunkard's stagger. He meets her, it may be with stupid petulance and brutality, or it may be with the maudlin tenderness of the sot; but either way, every word is a dagger that stabs her to the heart until the heavy sleep of the inebriate arrests his folly. Now, see that chaste couch polluted by the senseless frame that lies snoring—a human swine! At length he wakes up with a shudder; he glares at the wall with starting eye-balls, which see serpents and devils writhing about him; now he screams with fright, and now he babbles wild gibberish. It is *delirium tremens*! And now the drama hastens to its catastrophe. Parents and friends gather to him with their kindly offices and assist the wife as she ministers at his bed. But they venture no word of consolation, for her countenance is dreadful and rigid with self-contained

agony, and shows a sorrow too deep to be intermeddled with. At length there is a bursting forth of the smothered anguish, and the wails that go up from the sick man's room tell that all is over. His ravings are now quiet, the inflamed cheeks are blanched, and the blood-shot eye has lost its speculation and its life and ceased to stare at the visions of the diseased brain. "He is dead, and gave no sign."

Shall we attempt to follow the guilty soul as it passes into the awful world of spirits and the presence of its God, from this scene of guilty pollution? No! we will not attempt to follow it; the heart recoils from an inquiry so dreadful. Let us turn rather, and look once more at the wife, as she sits a wan and woeful widow in her father's house, gathering her orphan children around her knees. They must henceforth bear a dishonored name, and study to forget the memory of him who gave them existence.

And now, what say the tempters to this, their handiwork? Perhaps they drop a word of hypocritical regret; or, more probably, they speak virtuously of the folly of the man who "makes a beast of himself, and thus destroys the happiness of his family!" And then they walk forth, defying the stars with their brazen front, as though they had done no wrong. Just heavens! is there no thunderbolt in your arsenal to strike such monsters dead? Look at their haughty impunity, and say, is it wrong to rejoice, with a stern and righteous joy, that there is a Judge who will know how to avenge, and a hell deep enough to give to such bottomless atrocity its full deserts? Yes, it is wrong, we will not rejoice, but rather pray to be enabled to say of them, as the Redeemer said of his murderers: "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do."

No doubt they would be more ready than is just to avail themselves of this excuse, if taxed with the mischiefs they wrought, and to plead *thoughtlessness*. Yes, the palliation is, that these terrible consequences were neither intended nor foreseen; that they thought of nothing more than a little trivial amusement. It is to be hoped, for the credit of humanity, that this extenuation is true. But for what is forecast, understanding, memory, given to man, except to show him the well-established consequences of a given course of conduct? If men will disuse their faculties—will shut their eyes—will refuse to look

at results which they could not but know lay just in the path they are wickedly pursuing, are they therefore innocent? Nay, verily! Inspiration hath decided this: "As a madman who casteth fire-brands, arrows and death, so is the man that *deceiveth his neighbor, and sayeth, am I not in sport?*"

There is another pretended justification which is often used by certain classes of the purveyors of the means of transgression. They plead, "Man will have such indulgences; if we forbear to provide them it will make no difference in the result, and we might as well enjoy the advantage of furnishing them as others." We need not dwell upon the obvious fact that this plea is always false in part, and that every addition thus made to the facilities for dissipation helps to swell the tide of temptations which bears increasing numbers to perdition. We rejoin: What is the plea itself, even if admitted to be true, but this: "Here are fellow-creatures who are bent on self-destruction, and, therefore, we are covetous, for the sake of a little filthy lucre, of a share in the horrible exploit of their damnation—of a part of the stain of the blood of souls, and of a portion in that unutterable woe which God denounces against those who give to their neighbors drink." If it is so certain that these misguided men will be corrupted by others, better leave to them the unenviable guilt and doom of that work.

Another excuse, raised frequently by other classes of tempters to evil is, that the subjects of their sinful allurements were already fallen: "They were corrupt before by the agency of themselves or others: we made them no worse." I reply, every repeated transgression makes the transgressor worse—more hardened and more guilty; and if ever these fallen fellow-creatures are to escape final perdition, must it not be by "ceasing to do evil and learning to do well?" Your plea, then, is this: Some previous hand thrust those wretched souls into the water: you found them in it, but alive, and only helped to hold them down until they were dead!

Sometimes a more defiant justification is pretended, and the tempters to evil say the men whom they helped to mislead were free agents; they had as good opportunities as others to know what was best for themselves, and to choose; they were not constrained to sin, and they went to it with their eyes open. "On their own heads be the consequences." I reply: just there is the

refined malignity of the tempter's work, that it ruins his fellow-man without taking from him his free agency. If the means which drew him to sin were constraining, then responsibility would be at an end, and his damnation would not result. But because the tempter acted freely and sinfully in soliciting, and the tempted in yielding, therefore, they both shall be punished for the common ruin of a soul. When one hires a bravo to strike the dagger into the heart of his neighbor whom he is too cowardly to attack alone, the hired assassin acts freely, but they both are guilty of murder. When the father of tempters seduced Eve she yielded freely, but his doom was none the less accursed.

In conclusion ; standing as I do before so many of the young, the inexperienced, and the comparatively innocent, I must be permitted to apply this discussion as an enforcement of the advice of inspiration : "My son, if sinners entice thee consent thou not." When solicited to evil, I beseech you to look behind the deceitful veil of good fellowship and geniality which is worn, and consider the end, which is the death of the soul. Shun such associates, whatever their pretensions or their fascinations, as you would the scaly splendors and the serpentine grace of the venomous snake. Flee for your life.

And because we are told that, wheresoever the prey is, thither are the eagles gathered together, we fear that some of these classes of tempters to evil are here also, dogging the steps of intended victims. To them I would say: See here the dread depravity of which the human heart is capable! When these malignant instances of cruelty present themselves in the persons of hoary sinners, whose habits are hardened and whose consciences are seared by a long course of sin, the spectacle is repulsive enough, though, alas! not unnatural. How much more monstrous and abhorrent, then, to see a young man so early in his career of transgression reach this bad preëminence in mischief? Hardened men, look into your own hearts and shudder at yourselves. Look up at the woe denounced by God, and tremble before his coming judgment. And fly, even you, with all your aggravated guilt, fly to the Lamb, that he may turn your stony hearts to flesh and purge away your dreadful guilt. "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool." (Isa. i. 18.)

MEDITATION A MEANS OF GRACE.

“My meditation of him shall be sweet; I will be glad in the Lord.”—*PSA. civ* 34.

REVERIE is at once the seductive temptation of every sensitive mind, and the subject of reprobation in our current treatises upon education and morals. These tell us that it is the dreaming of the waking mind; that its name is from the verb by which the French denote the act of dreaming, and that this has a suspicious relationship to the word “rave.” They warn us that reverie is idle, enervating, unhealthy; that it is, in a word, the rust and canker of the spirit. But, for all this, was there ever a soul that had in it the stirrings of a true manhood which has not felt the allurements of this prohibited delight? There is no youth of pith and promise who has not felt the impulse to propitiate these stern censors, asking them whether the dew of their own youth is covered so deep with the dust of their utilitarianism that they cannot recall some still summer eve, when the breezes were sighing themselves asleep, and the slant rays of sunlight lingered upon the eastern tree tops; how they sat upon the hill over against the homes of their hearts, dreamy and lapped in bliss, while the ploughman’s homeward song, the voices of the kine lowing for the folds, and the notes of the evening bird, softened to the outer ear like echoes from elf land, mingled with the tide of sweet memories upon which their souls floated at will? Have they never known this? Then let us pity them, say we, as dull souls to whom the higher teachings of nature have ever been a sealed book.

The grandest of all the human theories of reverie was that of the ancient Mystic; for this consecrated the waking dream, provided only it was haunted by the right visions, and drew its interpretation from the depths of a past eternity, in which they supposed the intellect was born from the infinite Spirit, and made it a prophecy of the ransomed immortality, when it is to

be restored to his bosom. According to this creed man is not body and soul only, but three-fold—body, animality, and intellect. And this intellect, the true personality of the man, was not born of woman, nor even created of God, but was evolved from the Infinite Spirit himself as his progeny, in the distant past, before the world was. Many blissful ages had these spirits dwelt in the ethereal spheres, until, for some sin against the Father, they were coupled with animal souls, and imprisoned in material bodies. But this habitation manacles, besmirches, and soils them with sin and sense, until the very consciousness of their birth and high estate is obscured.

What then, said the Mystic, can restore them but disengagement from animality and matter? And how can this be effected? Only by quietism and meditation upon God, assisted by solitude and those austerities which exclude sense and macerate the flesh. Even as they suppose Christ Jesus, the God-man, effected the personal union between the human reason and the eternal Word by a heavenly meditation, in long centuries before his incarnation, so intense that the human was absorbed at last into the divine; so must the Christian, to become Christ-like, suspend the life of sense, and exist only in spiritual reverie. The obtrusive clamor of the world must be shut out by the door of the hermit's cell. Animal joys must be forbidden to tempt the eye, the ear, the palate. The body must be subjugated by asceticism. Even the mind must be repressed from every activity of investigation and reflection; the attention must be held absolutely passive, and waiting for the influx of the divine reason. Let the saint do this, said they, and the human and divine intelligences will reassert their primeval relationship. Spiritual communion will be resumed. The eternal word will flow in and fill, and by filling purify, the waiting intellect. When it again shuffles off its mortal coil it will return to the bosom of God, and there be embraced in immortal bliss by being absorbed in him.

This weird and shadowy scheme implies errors fatal to almost every doctrine of revealed Christianity. It perverts and misrepresents the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in Christ, and discards his true vicarious purchase of our souls in his sacrifice. It scouts the representative connection of our race with its head, Adam, and our common fall in him.

It represents our reasonable souls as still intrinsically pure, only soiled externally by a defiling association, and, therefore, it discards the necessity for a regeneration by grace, and makes the man his own sanctifier. It must reject the hope of the resurrection and glorifying of the body as inconsistent. Tracing sin to its wrong source, it proposes a futile remedy, and thus, while it boasts of purity, leaves men slaves to deceitful lusts. Yet has it shown an abiding potency over the human soul. Not only does Paganism confess this by the prevalence of monkery under Islam, Brahma, and Buddha, it has tintured the Christian church in all ages, and during its darker seasons has given it the most sincere type of its perverted piety in such saints as Thomas à Kempis (whoever he was), Gerson, Molinos, Madam Guyon, and the amiable Fenelon.

But errors which have no elements of truth have no vitality; the human reason cannot openly outrage itself by entertaining them. Can this element of truth in quietism be eliminated? I answer, it is given to us in those Scriptures which, like the text, teach the exercise of adoring meditation.

Both the philosophy and the practical temper of our age are in contrast with quietism. We represent man's morality and sin as residing in his will. We regard the virtuous habitude of soul as the effect of a series of virtuous acts only. We value only what results in a palpable good; and our whole tendency is not only busy and utilitarian, but sensuous and materialistic. The popular vocabulary has few terms by which it denotes a stronger sense of worthlessness, than "muser" and "dreamer." But there is an extreme here also, and the more sure word of prophecy gives us the just mean. It recognizes not only the busy but the contemplative state of the Christian soul, and calls it to meditation upon God and joy in his perfections. The Bible, and especially the Psalms, are full of this duty. Psalm i. 2: "His delight is in the law of the Lord; and in his law doth he meditate day and night." Psalm iv. 4, bids you "commune with your own heart upon your bed, and *be still*." Psalm xxxix. 3: "While I was musing the fire burned." Psalm lxiii. 5, 6: "My soul shall be satisfied as with marrow and fatness, and my mouth shall praise thee with joyful lips; when I remember thee upon my bed, and meditate on thee in the night watches." This silent adoration is not the mental bustle of investigation, but the dwell-

ing of the thought upon the ascertained perfections of God, until the soul is suffused with sacred affections. It is not to have the lesser lights chase each other like meteors flashing athwart the horizon of the soul; but it is to have an absorbing and ascertained verity rise to its zenith, and dwell there, bathing the whole continent of thought with its light and warmth. This placid state of the intelligence is not the pursuit, but the possession; not the search, but the fruition of the soul.

Now, it was the mistake of the two extremes; that the Quietists represented the meditative habit as a passive state of soul; and our active temper, regarding it as such, disdains it. But I assert that true meditation is, in the best sense, active. It is not true that even idle reverie is passive. You may exclaim, "What! is there not a clear contrast between mere musing, when the soul drifts idly, with the current of thought and study, in which the will directs it along a selected line of inquiry?" There is, but it is not the contrast of passivity and activity. When the youth idly pursues his ball or his dog, in amusement, his limbs are surely not at rest? The difference between this sport and labor is, that the activities of his sport—and it is, perhaps, intensely active—are prompted by motives which meet no inward resistance, and so require no self-denial; while in labor his activity is moved by a different motive, which in controlling him conquers some competing tendency of self-love, so that his labor is a struggle and a victory. But this difference does not show amusement to be an intrinsic evil; it is only when it wastes time, or directs to corrupting objects, that it becomes such.

But holy meditation is not reverie. It does not yield the soul to the current of suggestions. It steadily directs the attention by the power of the will to a noble object. Now, is not all voluntary attention active? It is only when it is the subject of outward impressions that the waking soul is, or can be, passive. Action is its nature. Every conceptual process, however quiet, is action; for if the soul itself did not act, whence the conception, seeing its name confesses it to be from no outward source? To hold the thought fixed upon the same idea is the highest function of will; it is one to which none but the noblest souls are competent. When the wrecked mariner clings all day to the life buoy, is there no volition, no action, because there is no progress? Yea, most intense; although the man moves not, save

as he is raised by the heave of the billow. Since, then, true meditation is not a passive state, the cavils of our active theory are removed.

True, this exercise of soul is calm; it is even a quiescence, in that it stills the clamor of the senses and of doubt. But it is energy, and not idleness; calm, because it is an action which perfects itself. This bustling and materialistic age has so perverted our habits, not only of business, but of study, that we value truth only for the excitement of its pursuit, or from some application to satisfy our material wants. Some have so misunderstood the spirit of philosophy herself as to glory in this grovelling perversion as her chief honor. They would have our minds like some beasts of prey, which hunt their game only for the pleasure of the pursuit, but have no use for it when caught. When the truth is found the interest is gone, and a new race is begun for novelty. They are like the miser, who is capable of enjoying his wealth only in its acquisition; when once it is won, he cannot use it more; or if the truth acquired has any subsequent use, it is only to make him more skilful in providing for some sensual appetite. If man is something more than an accomplished beast, like the serpent, which was more subtle than the other beasts of the field; if his heritage is an immortality without an animal nature, then truth must be an *intrinsic* good. Then there must be a mental fruition, as well as pursuit. *This is meditation*, the harvest home of the mind's husbandry.

Is the field of divine knowledge an *arena* only, furnishing strife, dust, emulation, and exercise, but no fruit, save for the body,—like the Olympic stadium, where the sole prize was a fading wreath, and the applause the only real end? Surely, no! Truth ascertained is a possession of the soul. The end must ever be better than the means. The artist who has given the last touch to his picture lays down his brush and stands silent, drinking in, by happy contemplation, the joy of the beauty he has achieved. So every lover of truth knows something of that calm delight, better than the interest of inquiry, which arises upon the view of results determined. Sir Isaac Newton was justly celebrated for his powers of concentrated reflection. Who can doubt that, at the conclusion of one of those immortal processes by which he evolved the principles which rule the planes, he returned again and again to hang with quiet rapture over the

grand result? It was not a problem which then entranced his intellect, but a solution; not a doubt, but a certainty; not curiosity, but satisfaction. But was his delight caused by the thought how these principles might so interpret to him the signals of the stars as to assist him to steer the ship freighted with his lucre more cunningly to its market? No; while his philanthropy did not despise the slightest utility which attended upon his discoveries, it was the intrinsic beauty, justness, and harmony of the truth itself which satiated his soul.

If there is such enjoyment in the fruition of scientific truth, what shall we say of that higher realm of spiritual truth whose chief objects are God, his perfections, his law, his works, and his redemption? There the mind is fed with most perfect verities, the conscience is filled with moral complacency, and the heart satisfied with love. Not one, but every power of the soul is here provided with its appropriate good. God himself is the uncloying object of meditation, full orb'd, many sided, of manifold and infinite perfection. Let men call the meditative Christian a dreamer. It were better for us to sleep in this world of sin and sense, if only we dreamed of him.

I prove the excellence of this exercise of soul by the fact that it is the great characteristic of our heavenly state. The vision and fruition of God are a part of its bliss. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." (Matt. v. 8.) "As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness." (Ps. xvii. 15.) "For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know, even as I am known." (1 Cor. xiii. 12.) Then our doubts will be solved, our inquiries will be ended, and heavenly intuition shall take the place of curiosity. But will the glorified saint thereby become any the less an intelligent being, or will his rational activity be impaired?

But I have a proof even higher than this. God, the "Father of spirits," the infinite intelligence, never investigates. There is with him no pursuit of truth, no inquiry, no doubt, because there is no ignorance. "His understanding is infinite." His knowledge was always omniscience. If God has, in the lapse of time, deduced or discovered anything, then before that discovery or inference was made, he knew it not. He who always knew all things searches not. Therefore it must be that his cognition is

intuition, his thought all simple contemplation. Is God any the less the highest intelligence ; and are his intellectual blessedness and glory thereby impaired ? Our perfection is to be assimilated as much as may be to him ; so that the quiescent contemplation of holy, spiritual truth must be the highest and healthiest exercise of the human mind. Let us, then, trace some of its valuable effects.

1. The meditative temperament is often reviled as inert. But I assert that it is the very one from which to expect the noblest action. For it is this brooding upon great and assured objects which fires the soul with those intense sentiments that incite exertion. Such is the testimony of history. What more energetic than fanaticism ? If there have been human beings who have approached a satanic strength and activity in blighting the earth with mischiefs, they have been fanatics. But fanaticism is the child of solitude. The hermit's cave, the monk's cloister are its native homes.

The fiery energy with which Mohammed inspired his hordes, and by which he founded at once an empire and a faith, was bred in the caverns of stony Arabia, where he had fasted and dreamed day dreams of angelic messengers and heavenly revelations. It was the hermit Peter, whose ghostly ardor, nursed in deserts and cells, set Europe on fire with crusading fury.

The strength derived from meditation has also been potent to bless. To this are due the evolutions of the greatest truths of philosophy and religious freedom which form the heritage of civilized man, as well as the noblest exploits of arms and policy. The authors of human progress have not been your self-styled "practical men," whose only notion of activity is change ; whose only energy is restlessness ; who see no end for truth save its immediate application to corporeal good. Let not these say that they can well resign to the man of meditation the shadowy glories of philosophy, since the arts are theirs which supply men's practical wants. They cannot even do this ; even in their own poor, materialistic sense. But for the nobler dreamers, they could not have taught us to navigate ships, to spin calicoes, to compound drugs. Where would be your dexterous man of arts, your navigator, your chemist, your machinist, without the musings of a Kepler, a Bacon, a Newton ? No ; your merely practical man is not he who descends into the central caverns and primeval abysses of nature, to mine for us the golden ore of truth and

right ; he is but the trafficker, who circulates it from hand to hand, and who tarnishes and wastes it in his traffic.

The men who have changed the face of the world have been the reserved, the meditative ; men of profound insight, wont to retire into the depths of their own consciousness ; men who receive the beautiful and the good with a poet's intense appreciation, and hold them with unwavering grasp of mind and heart. See King David, warrior, conqueror, legislator, busy founder of a polity and dynasty ; he, more than any other inspired author, delighted in holy musings, and satisfied his soul with midnight meditations, as with marrow and fatness. See the man from whose giant will proceeded, more than from that of any other man, that revolution of thought upon whose swelling tides we are still borne, after more than three centuries, whither, we know not. Luther burst upon Europe as teacher, preacher, critic, poet, musician, statesman, ecclesiastic, polemic, patriot, and filled it with the din of his activity. It was amidst the musings of a convent and the reveries of his prison at Wartburg that the fires of this will were kindled. And this is what one should anticipate. Man *feels* as he *sees*, and acts as he feels. A great purpose is only formed when a great idea is kept in contact with the soul, by prolonged communion with it in the depths of its own conception. The mind which has basked long in the light of some quickening truth, like the tropic earth, bursts with the most vigorous and fruitful germs of purpose.

2. The habit of silent adoration is a fountain of happiness to the soul. "I will be *glad* in the Lord," saith the text. There is immediate pleasure in the sight of a material object of taste. We pause instinctively over a flower. We stand before a masterpiece of art, and crave leisure to enjoy it, deprecating analysis, criticism, and even converse, that the soul may silently imbibe the happiness of its perfection. When we look up, and see the moon walking in brightness, and the stars shooting their radiance from a stainless and unfathomable depth, we receive a spell of peaceful joy upon our hearts. But most happy are we when our meditations are charmed by the beauty of holiness and our eyes filled with the perfections of God ; for there are the transcendent glory and symmetry to satisfy the intellect, the taste, and the conscience at once. What thought can be as sweet and grand as that of the Christian's God, infinite in being, in dura-

tion, in knowledge, in power, in holiness, directing his boundless kingdom with the calmness of infallible might, and yet with the beneficence of infinite love communicating himself as widely as his universe, and "opening his hand to satisfy the desire of every living thing," to creatures like us, tossed amid vanities, cares, and change? How full of calmness is the thought of a Being sufficient to himself, as unchangeably blessed as he is excellent? In this vision of God are merged our noblest conceptions of the stability of the spheres, the purity of the fields of azure, the duration of grandest cycles, the might of all elements, all creature beauty, all good, all power, all wisdom, all blessedness; all are in him, even as one drop is in the sea; and the more the soul expands towards the thought the more are we assured that everlasting intuition will never exhaust nor even comprehend its glories.

3. But the Christian's adoration includes a richer element than the sense of intellectual and æsthetic joy. This divine object is the image of perfect moral beauty, the supreme object of moral complacency. And this is at once the highest and purest sentiment of the soul, in which reason and heart and conscience find their supreme satisfaction. I have admitted that a thing of beauty is an immediate joy. But how poor are its charms beside those of a pure and lofty virtue! No eye can refuse to dwell with pleasure upon the stalwart grace of manhood in its symmetry of health and vigor, or upon the softer beauty of woman adorned with the glow of youth, gentleness, and sensibility. But look now upon the face of the dying patriot soldier, toil-worn and sunburned, but beaming with the heroic purpose which yields his life a willing sacrifice for duty and native land; or upon a Christian mother, pallid it may be, or even haggard with watchings and tears, bending with ineffable pity over the anguish of a reprobate son. Beside the moral beauty of these faces, reflections of heaven's light, how paltry are those material charms which pleased you just now! Ah! now your eye has passed from the brightness of a lamp which man lighted to the radiance of the skies; and the other, which before seemed splendid, is, in comparison, murky and dim.

Now, every virtue of holy creatures is but a reflection from the perfect holiness of God. This glory, which is in them a slender, refracted ray, is in him an ocean of light. Let us learn to

look up from even Christian excellence as it is disclosed in history and experience to the holiness of God as it shines in the history of his law and works, and our souls may rejoice as he who hails the day after a starlit night.

4. The crowning good of a meditative spirit is that, as it dwells upon God, it is sanctified by its converse with the divine idea. But let us not babble the nonsense of the ancient Mystic, as though the soul could disengage itself from sin, by its own agency filling its thought with his image. Our corruption is within, and not without; the soul is not only besmirched with the soil of its encasement; it is sick. The will itself, which is thus vainly expected to embrace the image of perfect purity, is perverted, and obstinately in love with evil. The new birth must precede; we must obtain the answer to that prayer of Psalm cxix. 18: "*O Lord, open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law.*" Then the cleansing light finds access, and the vision of God becomes a potent instrument to purify the soul. Adoring meditation beholds the perfect model which both incites and instructs the longings of the heart after righteousness, while it imbues it with his temper. Thus "we all, with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." (2 Cor. iii. 18.) Is not the vision of God in Christ one of the means which we shall employ in heaven for perfecting our nature? "We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."

This truth has to us, under the second dispensation, a sweetness which the psalmist could not taste in it. In this, as in other things, our Father hath favored us with a privilege which prophets and kings desired, but never saw. The immediate object of our meditation is God in Christ. Messiah hath come, and hath displayed to us his lovely person, saying, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." He is "the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person." Our adoration is assisted by having its object both softened and defined for us, so that its severer glories are veiled without obscuring them, and adapted to our feeble eyes.

↙ This text, with its kindred ones, teaches us that the Christian life must have its seasons of quietude and calm meditation. Too much of even a religious bustle is unwholesome for the soul.

Time must be allowed in sacred seasons for divine truth to steep the heart with its influence. Our hurry and externality has impoverished our graces. Solitude is essential to the health of the soul. Is not our modern life far too hurried? Surely we are in too much haste to be rich; we are too strange to self-communion; our very education is too stimulating and mercenary; and while we degrade the heavenly minister, science, to material uses, we teach our young men to forget that the true, the beautiful, and the good are in themselves the happy heritage of the soul. The clangor of our industry and the dust and glare of our skill have repelled the heavenly Dove and exhaled the dews of his grace out of our life. How woeful is the waste of our holiness and happiness by this mistake! Let us, then, learn to commune with our own hearts and be still.

Sacred meditation explains the delight which every true believer takes in prayer and praise. These acts of worship are sweet to him, because they are simple and direct acts of communion with God; because they present his perfections as the immediate objects of adoring thought and love. And the indifference of the major part of men to these exercises shows how shallow and external is their religious life. Unless the acts of direct homage to God are rendered tolerable by the material charms of music, they are regarded as but irksome preludes, detaining men from the sermon (the only part of the service which concerns them), hindrances which they must endure as decently as they may. In these simple ascriptions to God of his known perfections, there is nothing to *entertain* them, nothing to pique their curiosity, nothing upon which the edge of their acumen can be whetted, nothing of which to prate after they withdraw. Had these men stood where Isaiah was when he heard the Seraphim proclaim, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory," while the temple was filled with smoke, and the solid pillars of its door vibrated with the thunder of their tones, they would only have said in their hearts, "Well, what of that? We knew it before." The triteness of such a doxology would quite have fatigued them!

Yet is praise the occupation of heaven, and its words, if only the heart make melody along with them, are the noblest utterance of the human tongue. If they are level to a child, they are also the highest language of angels.

THE POPULAR ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENDLESS PUNISHMENT

UNSATISFACTORY AS A SURE GROUND OF HOPE.¹

"Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden. . . . And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die."—GENESIS iii. 1, 4.

WITH a heart which craves to sin, a plausible doubt counts for much more than it is worth. If men listened to reason, they would no more brave a chance than a certainty of a useless danger or loss. This should be our decision as to a life of sin, unless we can certainly demonstrate that there is neither judgment, nor heaven, nor hell. There is no man who will deliberately say that a life of piety and purity detracts, on the whole, from our earthly well-being or honor. As long, then, as there is a possibility of future retribution for a life of sin, to choose such a life is as gratuitous a folly as though the transgressor saw the future punishment before him. But to this reasonable conclusion the sinful heart refuses to listen. It seizes on the imagined doubt and magnifies it into a shield of impunity. Satan understood this weakness of human nature. Hence, he began his seduction of our first parents by suggesting a doubt (vs. 1), and then irrationally leaps to a denial (vs. 4). He trusted to the force of temptation on the heart to make his victims follow him blindly across this chasm of evidence.

The very same process is now taking place in a multitude of souls throughout Protestant Christendom, and, it is not unnatural to suppose, at the prompting of the same tempter. The death denounced against the first transgression was not so much bodily as spiritual—the death of the soul rather than of the body; so that the doubt raised by Satan's first question is substantially the same with that which is now enticing the minds of

¹ A sermon preached in the chapel of Union Theological Seminary, and published by request of the students.

sinful men. Hath God said that final impenitence in transgression shall be followed by everlasting death? May we venture to doubt this? Such is the question by which men are now really deceiving their own hearts. They strive to see at least plausibility in the pleas of those who deny—an easy task for a heart yearning after license in sin! And when this stage is reached, they then proceed to cast away restraint, just as though they had certainly proved that there is no hell. Let but the head decide that *it is questionable* whether God hath said so, and the heart rushes to the practical conclusion, “Ye shall not surely die.”

One mode by which men sometimes find a pretext for rejecting the solemn truth is to get up a species of resentment against what, they say, is the temper of Christians in testifying to it. They charge that our severity and harsh dogmatism cause us to take a cruel delight in asserting terrible dogmas. They even claim to enlist all the benevolence and amiability on the side of the skeptical position. Now, to this I reply, that I have no dogma whatever to assert at this time. It is impossible that I can have any interest in asserting unnecessarily that the second death waits on sin, for I am a sinner myself. The judgments of God are just as formidable to me as to you, my unbelieving brethren. I have no more ability to endure them, or to escape their condemnation, than you. Could I be so insane as to dig out a hell, of set purpose, in the spirit of bigotry, into which I know I am as certain of falling as you, except as I have a hope of deliverance through the sacrifice of Christ? Sure I am, that if hell can be disproved in any way that is solid and true, and consistent with God’s honor and man’s good, there is not a trembling sinner in this land that would hail the demonstration with more joy than I would. Can any of you give that demonstration? Let us see it. Let us see whether it will answer as a foundation on which I may venture an immortal soul. I repeat, I have no counter proof, at this time, to advance. My only purpose is to show you how I have endeavored to find some footing in the sentiments on which the doubters seem to build, and how the footing has utterly failed *me*. I have painfully studied the speculative logic and the wire-drawn criticisms by which what seems to be the plain declaration of Scripture is impugned, and have found nothing there but a pavement of mist. It is not with

these I would deal now. I have placed myself in sympathy with the more practical sentiments which I perceive infecting or swaying the minds around me. I have felt them with all the force which the interests of a common guilt and a common dread could give. But I wish to tell you simply the results to which my sinful soul has been unwillingly forced as to these so influential sentiments, and I would show you how baseless they are as foundations of any solid hope that sinners shall not surely die.

I. Men are, after all, much more influenced by feelings than by analytic reasonings. Here is one sentiment which is, doubtless, doing its work with all to hide the formidable side of this question from our minds. There is great comfort in numbers. Man is a social being. He is largely governed by the example of those nearest to him, and it is easy and grateful to our indolence to imitate and to save ourselves mental effort by thinking as the multitude thinks. When we see the vast majority advancing with gayety and confidence in the path our hearts crave to follow, we seem to have all that mass between us and the peril, and we are incredulous that death can consume all this affluence of life in order to get to us. Now, when we set this doctrine in contrast with the actual feelings and conduct of the world, we see that everybody is evidently acting as though the doctrine of a hell could not be true. If the world thought it certainly true—nay, if there were but a probability it might be found true, then the simplest child can see how all the sinful world ought to act. Every sinner should ask: Is it so that I am condemned already, except I repent and find deliverance by faith? That this sentence is the everlasting curse of the Almighty? That it is to fill my soul and body with intolerable torments? That hope is to depart for ever and ever, and eternal despair is to gather up the infinite aggregate of future woe, and in every conscious instant crush my soul with the tremendous prospect? That all this is to go on and on, parallel with the eternity of God; and that between me and this death there may be but the step between health and sickness, or present security and sudden accident? Is this my peril? “Horrible! oh, horrible!” Then what time have I for pleasure? what business with the riches which perish in the using? I ought “to say of laughter, It is mad; and of mirth, What doeth it?” Everything

except the one means of escape from this infinite woe, ought to be loathsome for its frivolity. I ought to have time for nothing but prayer; every breath ought to be a cry, and tears ought to be my drink until the mercy of Christ pluck me from the awful verge. Thus ought every sinner to agonize. And this wide world ought to be a Bochim. Who can gainsay it?

But what do we see? The world eats and drinks, marries and gives in marriage, pursues riches, earthly pleasure, yea, seeks to "kill time," as though it had too much of it; sings and dances, and fills its atmosphere either with jest and laughter, or with new insults to this awful Judge; in a word, studies to act precisely as though it were certain there is no hell. Now, has all the world gone insane? Is all the keen sagacity which we meet everywhere in its worldly pursuits and rivalries clean turned into madness? So it would seem, if this doctrine of a hell were true! But it is hard for a denizen of this world to conclude thus of his own kind, as well as of himself; and, therefore, the practical feeling of doubt comes, like a penetrating tide, into the soul, that somehow the ghastly dogma cannot hold. Who has not felt the seductive influence, not reasoned out perhaps, possibly only semi-conscious, yet seducing the soul back from the rough, harsh warning of conscience into luxurious relief by the plea, "Ye shall not surely die"?

But, my friends, there was one discovery which, so soon as my unwilling reason was constrained to look at it, dashed all the ease and solace which my deceitful heart was drawing from the sentiment. I was compelled to see that if the Bible is true, and man's nature what my own observation evinces, the pleasing inference has only a foundation of clouds. Suppose, as the Bible says, it is the nature of the sin which imperils to produce this very insensibility? Suppose that warning should be sober truth, which tells us to beware of "being hardened by the deceitfulness of sin," so that it is literally true; that "madness is in men's hearts while they live"; and that this dense callousness is itself one of the surest symptoms of the reality of the disease? If I were to find a freezing man in the snow, and he were to answer my rousing appeal by the assurance that he was suffering no evil, and needed nothing except the balmy sleep to which he wished to resign himself, I should understand well that this ease was but the symptom of approaching death. So, if this spiritual

torpor of the world may perchance be only the indication of the approaching frosts of spiritual death, then plainly it is madness for us to argue safety from it. The Bible represents also that this benumbing and deluding quality of sin is one of the very features which has caused a God, at once all-wise, just and benevolent, to estimate it as so immense an evil, and has constrained him to adopt means so stern for curbing it. Can this be true? Can you or I refute it? And when we turn to our own observations, do we see that in fact human experience does contain frequent monitions of a solemnity and dreadful awe precisely appropriate to these revealed facts; that God does indeed from time to time lift a corner of the veil which mercifully hides the pit of despair, and makes men hear in anticipation the wails of its torment in the cries of guilty death-beds, the catastrophes of dying nations, the ghastly ravages of plague and war, and that men refuse to hearken and strive to forget the salutary warning? Then we have before our eyes the proof that *sin can make a world as dull, as insane*, as we saw the argument of the Bible implied. Alas, yes! we see men all around us, under parallel influences of deceitful lusts, shut their eyes to known and experimental dangers. We see the drunkard madly jesting of his "pleasure and jollity," when every worldly wise man except himself sees *delirium tremens* grinning over his shoulder. We see even woman, intoxicated with flattery, rushing into the snaky coils of the seducer, while every one but she perceives nothing but the envenomed fang that is to poison her soul. Yes, they go "as a bird hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life." With this solution assigned by Scripture for men's insensibility in spiritual danger, and this stubborn confirmation of its reasonableness in my own experience, I can no longer find any solace or hope in the blindness of the world to its own destiny and duty. It only enhances the fearful picture, and its perverse example adds a formidable obstacle to all the others which exist between me and my safety.

II. Another plausible but most practicable element of doubt arises from the example and deportment of professed Christians. How should they act for themselves, they who profess to have the vision of faith, if they saw the doctrine certainly true? The hope of deliverance they already have in Christ might indeed exempt them from the anguish which should fill the souls of the

guilty and condemned; yet should they feel that they had a race to run with perdition to make good their exemption. To this every power of their souls should be bent every hour of every day, like the muscles of a racer upon the course. Is not this what their Bibles enjoin? Should they not say to themselves:

“Be this my one great business here—
With holy trembling, holy fear,
To make my calling sure”?

“And what should be their demeanor towards us sinners?” doubting men may ask. “Do they indeed know that we are ‘condemned already,’ and that but a few uncertain years or days divide us from that unutterable hell? Do they see us insanely wasting, as they judge, our fleeting opportunity, and trifling on the brink of so unspeakable a fate? With what a visage, then, should they not meet us! Tears ought to break forth at the sight of us, as one would weep at the sight of a felon on his way to the gallows; every cheek ought to turn pale at our meeting, and there ought to be no time nor heart for anything but ‘entreating us night and day with tears’ to flee from the wrath to come! Surely this would be but the natural behavior for them. But what do we actually see? We spend days and months with these believers in future endless torments, and the time is all filled up with worldly jest or worldly aims; they pursue what we pursue, and apparently live for what we live for. They jostle us at every turn in our eager race for this world’s honors and pleasures. They seem to have neither thought nor care for our approaching misery. What, now, are we to conclude? That these kind, cordial, jovial friends and brothers of ours, who are so generous in relieving our little earthly evils, are harder than the millstone, and more cruelly indifferent than a wild beast to our immense and certain misery? This, surely, is a harsh conclusion! Must we not rather conclude that these good, kind, believing people, who have the faith and know what is true, have discovered that sinners ‘do not surely die’; that their dreadful creed is somehow a pious fiction, and the warnings of their preachers are not expected to find a reception in their literal sense?” Such is the doubt as it forms itself in the private thought of many a transgressor, or as it flows, unformed but influential, in their unreasoning feelings. Alas, that Christians should give so much ground for this doubt! Alas, that the most plausible and influ-

ential argument that contradicts the warnings of God should be the drowsy example of his professed people! Alas, for the blood of souls, which will be found partly in our skirts in the day when God shalt call these doubters to their account! Forgive, O Christ, this unnatural contradiction, and deliver us from the woe which is denounced on "those by whom the offence cometh." Forgive us, ye deceived souls, for the mischief we have done you in thus assisting you to drug your own consciences. And we beseech you, believe us not, trust us not, for we are verily unworthy to guide you. But now let me tell you, doubters, the reasons why I have been compelled to conclude that this inconsistent example of professed believers furnished me no ground of confidence whatever that I should not surely die by my sins. I found that I could not trust to it one instant: *First*, because I saw that it was every way likely, probable and natural, that the faith of weak Christians should be benumbed by that same "deceitfulness of sin" which we have found deluding the unbelievers into an insane rashness. This Bible of theirs, the same Bible which tells of the hell we are so unwilling to admit, explained that spectacle of the weak Christian forgetting his own faith; explained it with a consistency so clear that it made the rising hope of security in sin die within me. It told of indwelling sin. And as I replied, How wrong, how perverse, that sin should still work, and work inconsistencies so glaring in quickened souls, it rejoined: Well, you have there but another and a more formidable illustration of the malignity of sin, that it can thus poison and mislead the hearts even of those in whom the Holy Ghost dwells! We read lately in the journals of French workmen in a deep pit who fell stupefied by the foul air, and while in momentary danger of death, were already as helpless as corpses. But as we learned further how the healthy men who descended to their rescue also became stupid and staggered and fell, we shuddered more than at first at the malignancy of that poison. Suppose that God may take this view of sin in Christians and of the guilty callousness it produces, I can see nothing there but another reason why he should hate it the more, and should judge the sternest measures proper in order to curb it.

But *second*: I saw, upon closer inspection, that the sorry, common sorts of believers were less callous to my danger than I had supposed. I found they often rebuked themselves for that

timidity which had shrunk from warning me to flee from wrath. I discovered a cause, a cause not unnatural, which kept them silent, even when yearning to speak some word of awakening; and that was my own observed callousness. They knew that I knew my peril, and yet saw me reckless. They heard the most solemn admonitions of the pulpit launched at me, pointed with all the human force which study, preparation, and burning earnestness could give; but they fell from my heart blunted as by a shield of adamant. It was, if not right, yet how natural for them to say in their discouragement: "What can we do? Our words will be yet more vain!" Thus I discovered that they limited their efforts to prayer for me in secret. Yes, not seldom after an interview, when all their converse with me had seemed of the earth earthy, they went away and prayed in secret that my eyes might be opened. Thus I found that, after all, I had much over-estimated their apparent callousness to the fearful truth.

Then, *third*: I could not but observe that there was a difference among these Christians. Some compelled much more of my respect by the honest consistency of their lives. And I always found that, just in proportion to this, these few did approach that mode of living and striving which their solemn creed demanded. They obviously were "working out their own salvation with fear and trembling"; they did meet me and greet me with the aspect of tearful and solemn concern, and they did not forget to warn me of the coming wrath, even with a fidelity which was irksome and offensive. Thus, wherever I extended my observation, I found that, just in proportion as the Christian's integrity of life commanded my respect and confidence, that life was most nearly squared upon the theory that hell is real! A Paul, for instance, that apostle whose sturdy heroism inspired even my dead heart with a thrill of moral admiration; who had seen invisible glories, and heard words which it was not lawful to utter, braved seas, and robbers, and prisons, and scourges, and deaths that he might "warn every one night and day with tears." Thus I was forced to say to myself, how absurd to put my chief trust touching this momentous question on the very kind of Christians for whom I have scarcely enough respect to confide in them in an ordinary bargain! If I am to derive any inference as to the question whether I must surely die

for my sin, it is the men I respect most whom I had better regard, distasteful as is their solemn conviction.

But, once more, there has been one Man on earth who was of all others best qualified to judge of the urgency of a sinner's condition on earth and the degree of his danger, and of all the beings who have ever lived among men was the truest, the most disinterested, and the wisest. He knew the real state of the case, for he came from the other world, and thus had the advantage of the perfect knowledge of an eye-witness. This was the man Jesus. And he is the one being who has literally lived and preached and toiled up to the full standard of that zeal and devotion demanded by the claims of eternity. Let any one look at him, and infer from his proceedings what was his sense of the case. The one aim of his life was "to seek and to save that which was lost." To this every power and every day was devoted with a zeal so intense that his worldly relatives said, "He is beside himself"; and his disciples beheld in his burning career a fulfilment of the prophecy: "The zeal of thy house hath eaten him up." Laborious days of teaching were followed by whole nights of prayer. Not one hour did he ever divert to the pursuits of business, or ambition, or pleasure; and, after a ministry of superhuman energy, he submitted his life itself to a cruel sacrifice for the redemption of your souls from the fate whose infinite bitterness he alone could appreciate. Here, then, is the safest example from which to infer the real truth, whether we shall surely die for our sins. Jesus must have felt that hell was real; for there is no other solution of his career.

III. Again, some who pretend to speculate more profoundly argue that the eternal ruin of sinners is inconsistent with the appearances of things which providence itself has instituted. "The order which he has impressed on this earth and our mortal life is not such as a wise and consistent God would have selected, if our race were, indeed, moving to such a fate." And here, say they, we argue, not from the actions or feelings of our fellow-men, who may mistake, but of the Sovereign Judge himself. "Consider, then," say they, "what the aspect of this world should be if this dogma of an endless hell were true. Take in all the consequences which are involved, in all their horror: that all, all the thronging millions who compose our generation, except the few consistent Christians, are going straight

down to that tremendous doom, one single instance of which, if properly conceived, should be enough to make a world stand aghast; that all the successive generations which fill the centuries are born only to inherit this fate, save so far as the tardy efforts of this delinquent church may rescue a few; that mortal life is then, in most men, but an unutterable curse! But, if all this is literal, what is this earth but a charnel-house of dead souls; a yawning gateway through which men may be borne into hell! Would God ever have put it into man's better nature to rejoice in the birth of children, or have said, 'Blessed is he that hath quiver full' of these arrows of the strong man, if our paternity only avails thus, in most cases, to multiply the instances of immortal ruin and woe? In what scenery of woe should not such a world have been draped? It should be like the condemned ship, which floats away in the dark night, with its black flag, freighted with its load of crime and despair, to the solitary ocean. Its atmosphere should be darkness visible, its sole occupation the wailing agony of entreaty. The globe itself should blot the sky with its disk, and be followed as it rolls in its orbit by a dirge of pitying angels, while its fair sister-spheres should veil their light at its approach, even as a tender woman would cover her face from the sickening horrors of the scaffold. Such should God have made the home of a race who 'were by nature children of wrath.' But what has he made it? Behold its light and beauty and beneficence! Lo! its scenery is gilded with sunlight and overarched with azure. 'He sendeth the springs into the valleys which run among the hills. They give drink to every beast of the field. By them shall the fowls of the heaven have their habitation, which sing among the branches. He watereth the hills from his chambers; the earth is satisfied with the fruit of his works. He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man, that he may bring forth food out of the earth; and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which strengtheneth man's heart.' And throughout this beautiful earth 'he setteth the solitary in families'; he invites man to hope and joy by social sympathies, and teaches the mother's heart to sing for joy that a man is born into the world. Do not nature and providence, then, refute this gloomy and saturnine view of man's destiny?"

Glad should I be, my hearers, to read the appearances around us thus; but, alas! there is another side of the picture which must be viewed. The earth is full of blessing? Yes; but it is like the vale between Ebal and Gerizim: the curses are over against the blessings. Gloomy night answers to day, tempest to calm, freezing winter to teeming summer, desert to fruitful field; the poison grows beside the flower and the fruit, and death waits on life—the death which is to every heart the monster-evil. And when the man has viewed the whole scene, and tasted all that earth can give, his reluctant testimony is, “Vanity of vanities”! Nor are all the aspects of Providence smiling! Turn your eyes to the darker scenes, which fill all the larger pages of history, where human crimes and divine retributions have made this sinful earth an Aceldama. Harken to the scream of the oppressed upon the rack! Hear the roar of battle, the crash of falling cities, the wail of ruined nations! Does not our earth, after all, sometimes seem dark enough to be indeed the vestibule of hell? And when we examine more narrowly the conditions of man’s existence here, we find the same strict doctrines evidently applied on earth which underlie the future retributions: that man is required to fulfil a probation for his own welfare, under responsibilities to comply carefully with the conditions prescribed him, or else receive from the course of nature itself a stern and inexorable recompense. Does outraged nature, when the time has come for her to pronounce her final doom on the glutton, the drunkard, the debauchee, hold her hand, or hearken to entreaty? Alas, no! she shows herself as inexorable as the darkest dogma of the Calvinist.

How, then, shall this strange mixture of good and evil, this seemingly capricious juncture of mercy and wrath, be explained? The only solution I know is the one which Scripture proposes. It is this: that, had man’s doom been immediate and absolute, like that of the fallen angels, then the world, which is his home, would have been unvisited by one ray of mercy or light. But because the seed of the woman was appointed to bruise the serpent’s head; because God would first offer man atonement through the death of his own Son before he shuts him up in death, therefore it is that he has made us for the time “prisoners of hope,” and adorned our prison with all these alleviations in order that they might allure us to the footstool of gospel mercy.

"Account that the long suffering of our God is salvation." (2 Peter iii. 15.) "The goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance." (Rom. ii. 4.) "He left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." (Acts xiv. 17.) Thus every terrestrial blessing, from the daily food which refreshes the hunger of an hour up to the children which fill your homes with love, is a voice to remind you of that amazing sacrifice of infinite love to which God was moved by his infallible knowledge of the depth of your everlasting doom, and to woo you to flee to this city of refuge before it is too late. This is God's explanation of his earthly dispensation of good and evil to man. Does it furnish any solace to that man who is resolved to slight the only atonement? Surely there could be no mistake so tragical and so perverse as that which wrests this ministry of mercy into an argument for contumacy. Here is a state prisoner, accused, tried, condemned, locked up, awaiting his condign punishment; but because the king and the king's son have so thorough an apprehension of the horror of that fate which justice will inflict, therefore they cast about for some way of escape, whereby "righteousness and peace may kiss each other." It is found at length in this amazing plan, that the king's son shall drink the cup of death in his stead. So, to prepare the way for the message of this ransom, the gloom of the condemned cell is lighted with the sun; the fetters of the doomed man are relaxed; he is fed with dainties from the king's own table, and the cheering voices of hope penetrate his despair, inviting him to reconciliation through the son. But now the perverse wretch begins to abuse the very overtures of mercy, to argue that his sentence was not just, and the king knew it and never dared to execute it; that all this doom and threatened destruction had been only an unsavory jest. To that man "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation." His unbelief, by a dreadful alchemy, converts every fleeting blessing into an abiding curse, and stores it in the treasury of wrath against the day of wrath.

There is no safe footing here, then, for a doubt whether "we must surely die" if out of Christ. The Bible explanation of the mercies sinners experience is too consistent; to the gospel despisers too terribly consistent and reasonable. And in the light

of that explanation every earthly mercy has a voice which, even in its sweetest accents, implies that there is a hell as it cries, "Turn you to the stronghold, ye prisoners of hope!"

IV. But some, driven from God's providence, resort to his character for arguments to sustain the doubt as to his purpose to punish forever. They ask whether the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God will not forbid his forever destroying a being whom he has himself formed for happiness. Men ask, for instance, How can it be just in God to punish a puny creature eternally for a sin committed in this short life? They claim it as almost a self-evident truth that temporal punishment is sufficient for temporal sin. Now, I might dwell upon several thoughts which have presented themselves to my mind neutralizing the probability of this position. I was reminded, for instance, that neither the course of nature nor human law measures its penalties by the length of time consumed in the transgression. But sometimes the recklessness of a moment incurs a result from the laws of nature which fixes calamity and pain on the whole future life; and a murder, which it required a few moments to perpetrate, is justly punished with an everlasting banishment from this life and all its benefits. One cannot but think, again, how the estimate of his sins may be affected by the infinite glory and majesty of the Being at whom they are aimed. If the youth who strikes his own parent, for instance, is justly held far more guilty than the common brawler, how high may not the aggravations of our guilt against the Universal Father rise? But our very sinfulness and unbelief unfit us to weigh this element of our case fairly. We cannot rise to the impartial estimation of God's exalted rights and honor; we are too selfish and blind. Look, then, at another thought. None but atheists are so insolent as to deny that temporal sins deserve temporal punishment. Suppose, now, that you should *continue sinners after death, while paying off the score* of your earthly transgressions? Why not? Yes, *why not?* Because you will then be suffering punishment? We do not see that God's chastisements of you in this world have had any tendency as yet to make you any better; why should you count on them to make you better there? Or because your habits and evil principles will then be so confirmed by a life of sin? Which is easier to bend, a twig or a tree? Or because the company of hell will be so edifying or improving

to your heart? Hardly! Take, then, one sober, honest look at yourself, and answer me, what is the likelihood that you, who are an obstinate sinner now, will not be a sinner then? You, whose resolutions of repentance have hitherto been so absolutely worthless; you who cannot be in the least restrained from your sins by the near prospect of a retribution so heavy that you are now murmuring at its weight? But should the prediction of Scripture prove true, that he who is unjust now will be unjust still, and he who is filthy now will be filthy still; and should you be heaping up a second mountain of transgressions while you are paying your debt for the first, when will you ever finish? There is the question which ruins all your hope. Be God's justice what it may, obviously no reasonable being, who has once resolved to curb rebellion by penalty, can consistently stop punishing until the criminal stops rebelling. To do so before would be impotent child's-play. But after you have on this earth rejected Christ, who is to help you to cease rebelling? Who is to intercede for you with the avenging Judge to hold his hand? I see not where your hope is to hang.

"But God is supremely wise and kind!" How do you know he is? From the Bible? The same Bible that tells me, "God is love," tells me that he "turns the wicked into hell, with all the nations that forget God." (Ps. ix. 17.) Which side of this statement must we take? And if we reject either, then the Bible ceases to be of authority with you for both; it no longer authorizes us to say God is love. Or will you turn from it to God's works and plead that "the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord"? (Ps. xxxiii. 5.) When we look there we "behold both the goodness and severity of God" (Rom. xi. 22); death set over against life; calamity against blessings; war against peace; sickness and pain against health; "distress of nations and perplexity" against prosperity. And when you bid me infer that God's wisdom and goodness forbid his destroying forever even a guilty creature, whom he himself formed for immortal happiness, then I know that we have both gone far beyond our depth. Who can find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is higher than heaven; what canst thou do? It is deeper than hell; what canst thou know? Look around, and so far as your earthly wisdom can read his dispensations, do you not see him daily permitting the most ardent aspirations of your fellows to end in

vanity, despair and death? Do you not see him permitting millions of young infants, in whom he had implanted the seeds of reason, and love, and happiness, and beneficent action, die like the budding flower that drops from the tree with its undeveloped germ to rot on the ground? How is that? Do we not see him rain on the salt, barren ocean and the unpeopled deserts, while the vales on which the children of men hope for their daily bread, and whose clods they have watered with their sweat, shrivel from drought? How many men, judging by earthly reason, have ever been content to die as satisfied with the results of their life? The one thing, the only thing that is certain to us all, is that we must die; and so far as earthly wisdom can see, "How dieth the wise man? Even as the fool dieth!" Thus, when I see this awful God stamp "vanity and vexation of spirit" on all the hopes of man, I cannot undertake to decide what awful severities on the guilty he may not purpose to execute in another world. He has worlds under his government. His purposes span eternity. "Clouds and darkness are round about him; but justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne." (Ps. xcvi. 2.) Feeble man, we are out of our depth! There is here no standing ground for any hope. Let us, then, go back and hear what message the Lord himself hath been pleased to send us out of his Word. And when we look there, the most striking fact is, that the clearest, the most dreadful declarations of the eternity of the unbeliever's ruin are those uttered by Jesus. Men sometimes babble of a difference, even a contrast, between the theology of Paul and of his Master. They talk of Paul as the austere logician, excogitating a rigid system of dogmas; they prefer, they say, to turn to the teachings of the "meek and lowly Jesus," whose theology is that of love. Well, one thing we do know: never was there love like unto his love! It surpassed the love of woman. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." He laid down his for his enemies! No man can see one trait of cruelty in this Jesus; for his life was a ministration of kindness, not to the deserving, but to the "publican and sinner." Never did the cry of human woe strike his ear in vain; never did human anguish appeal in vain to his soul while on earth. And he knew, also, the real facts; for he came from the world of spirits and thither he went back. How comes it, then, that this meek and loving Jesus uttered

his warnings against hell in words sevenfold more frequent and solemn than the "austere" Paul? Is this also done in love? Yes; the beauty of his beneficent life and death permits us to think nothing else. If, then, it is the tenderest heart in the universe which cries out to us most fearfully, "Beware of the pit!" what shall we think? Is it because he who knows best and loves us best is most fully informed of its inevitable certainty and its intolerable pains? Hear this Divine pity, then—Mark ix. 43, 44; Matt. xviii. 34, xiii. 41, 42, xxv. 30-46; Luke xvi. 23-26; Rev. vi. 16, 17.

What, then, is the part of reason for you? As I said at the outset, I have no dogma to advance. I have no interest in arguing that there is an everlasting hell for impenitent sinners. If any man can prove that there certainly is none, by any evidence honorable for God and safe for man, sure I am that no man's soul will be more rejoiced than my sinful heart. I have but one parting word to utter, and that is so plainly just that it needs no argument. It will be well for you to *look thoroughly* into this doubt before you trust yourself to it. Your eternity is at stake! And if, after your faithful, honest and exhaustive examination, you are constrained to feel that there is a possibility that Jesus may be right and Satan wrong on this point, it will be best for you to come with me to the safe side, and hide under the sacrifice of Christ.

PRAYER REASONABLE.

A CHAIRMAN, presiding in one of the meetings of the late Evangelical Alliance, remarked that the cavils of infidels had had no effect in arresting the prayers of the church. Nor can they, in the nature of things, have such effect. Prayer is the most universal rational function of the human soul, in all ages and under all religions. However men differ about other things—about the objects of desire, about the divinities to be worshipped, about the mode in which they should be approached—they all agree in praying. Not even the skeptics themselves will prove exceptions in the day when “the sorrows of death compass them, and the pains of hell get hold upon them.”

About Mr. Tyndall's prayer-test, by which he hoped to demonstrate the folly of prayer, much has been written, but we have not seen the truest and shortest answers. They are these: First, the objects we pray for fall into two classes, the innocent, natural good, and the spiritual good pertaining to redemption. The healing of the bodies of sick men in a hospital falls under the former class. But God has only given an explicit promise as to the latter class. It is proper to pray for bodily health, our daily bread, and other lawful, worldly goods; our Saviour has expressly authorized us to do so. But he has, with equal clearness, told us that there are often circumstances in which these seeming goods cease to be real goods, and then he will refuse the gift to his dearest and most accepted saint. He has also refused to disclose to us in advance when those circumstances exist. Hence, for these objects, the intelligent Christian always prays with submission, and in ignorance of the issue. They do not fall in the class which we know to be “things according to his will.” It is only of this latter class that we are authorized to say, “We have confidence that he heareth us.” (1 John v. 14, 15.)

But second, and more conclusively, the proposed prayer-test

is preposterous. If there is an answer to prayer, the thing proposed to be tested, there is a personal God—a being of will, wisdom, power, and majesty. When such a test is applied, he must be a party to the response. But if there is such a God, it is the Christian's God, who has already graciously told us that he does answer prayer; who has already given us a great deal of condescending instruction on that very point in his word. Hence, that the petitioners should apply a further test to his fidelity cannot but be superfluous, and, therefore, impertinent. There must, therefore, always be a powerful motive in the mind of the Divine Sovereign for declining to respond to the test, however he may be disposed, on other terms, to answer the humble petitioner. That motive is a regard to his own honor. It would always be conceivable, yea, probable, in such a case, that this motive would prevail; so that the proposed test would test nothing, and reveal nothing, as to God's faithfulness in answering prayer, except its own impiety.

Infidel physicists make a mighty difficulty nowadays about an answer to prayer, from the uniformity of second causes, and the absolute stability of their laws. They tell us that it is the law of man's reason—if they acknowledge that reason has any fundamental laws—that we expect "like causes always to produce like effects." They tell us also, that experience shows us absolutely nothing in nature save regular laws. The widest observation of the heavenly bodies and the earthly organisms, only confirms the truth that, in nature, second causes always produce their appointed, natural effects, and interruption is unknown. Now, when we pray to God for a thing, we must expect him to give it, either by a miracle, a supernatural intervention over the natural laws which were going to bring on us some other thing, or we must expect him to bring it to pass by some modification of the second causes within the laws of nature. But either expectation, say they, is irrational.

As to the first horn of the dilemma they have made for us, they tell us that the known uniformity of nature leaves no place for the supernatural. Thus, says Mr. Baden Powell, the histories of the miracles, which were once the glory of Christianity, are now her chief embarrassment.

The first remark we make upon this supposed difficulty is, that it is but a sorry resuscitation of the ghost of Hume's once

famous sophism against the credibility of miracles, so thoroughly slain by the logic of Dr. George Campbell and other divines. How do we know that the operations of nature are always and everywhere uniform? Our own limited observation is not enough to teach us this. If we are sure of it, it must be by the testimony of others. So that we come just to Hume's exploded argument. Next, it is obvious that, if the difficulty is consistently urged, it is atheistic. Certainly creation was a miracle. The almighty acts out of which nature first arose were certainly supernatural; and it would be a queer philosophy which set the effect above its own cause, which regarded the omnipotence which produced nature and endowed it with all these regular properties as too feeble to interfere with its own work. But to deny a creation is practically to deny a creator. The truth is, nature implies the supernatural. Nature shows us herself the signs that she cannot be eternal and self-existent. She had, therefore, her origin in a creation. But what can be more supernatural than the act which originated nature? If it were indeed impossible that there could be a miracle, then this nature herself would be non-existent, whose uniformities give the pretext for this denial of the miraculous. Nature confesses that her causes are second causes—they suggest their origin in a first cause. Just as the stream suggests its fountain, so do the laws of nature, now flowing in so regular a current, point us upward to the Source who instituted them, and can, therefore, control them.

But the easiest refutation is in this exceedingly familiar fact, that our own free agency is continually originating effects outside of material forces, and is continually reversing natural forces up to a certain extent. We know, at least as well as we know the things testified by our senses, that we have a true spontaneity; that this cause does absolutely originate many effects. Take a familiar instance: the natural laws of liquids require water to seek its own level everywhere and always. But any peasant, by the intervention of his free agency of mind, produces absolutely the opposite effect; he causes it to ascend above its level in the tube of his pump. Let us trace this "anti-natural" effect in the simplest and most practical manner. This peasant observes that this rise of the water against nature is caused by the intervention of a lever moving a piston; that this

lever, however, is not the true cause, for it is moved by his arm; that the arm, itself a lever of bone and muscle, is moved by his nerves, and, finally, that these nerves are but the conductors of a volition which, his consciousness tells him, originated in his mind. Here, then, is an effect upon matter above material nature, originated by the spontaneity of a spirit! But now, when this peasant is thus simply and clearly taught that the volition of his own spirit is an original fountain of effects outside of and above material nature, and when he lifts his eyes to the heavens and sees in their wise and wondrous frame the evidences of another spiritual intelligence there like his own, but immeasurably grander, how can he doubt that this superior mind has also in its will another primary source of effects above nature? If there is a Creator; if he is a personal, intelligent, and voluntary being, governing the world he has made—the denial of either of these postulates is virtual atheism—then, since he may at any time possibly see a motive for intervening with his own possessions, our experience of our own free agency makes it every way probable that he may, on occasion, intervene. Every rational man customarily conducts his own affairs on regular methods, and occasionally, upon sufficient motive, uses unusual expedients. It is absurd for him to make any difficulty about conceding a similar free agency, upon proper occasion, to God—if there is a God. This pretended argument of infidelity is a “vicious circle.” It excludes a God because it cannot admit a supernatural, and lo! its only ground for rejecting the supernatural is its uncertainty of the existence of a personal God. This pretended profundity is thus exploded by the simplest experience of every plain mind.

But while the Christian miracles are thus proved to be entirely credible, we have no need to claim that God now answers prayer by miracle. The doctrine of the Bible is that he answers prayers for spiritual good by grace in the hearts of men, and for natural good by that perpetual and special providence through which he regulates the working of every second cause in accordance with its natural law. It is against this customary providence the cavil is mainly objected. There is no room, says the modern infidel, for the divine will to introduce an answer to prayer. Here, for instance, is a company of Christians in a leaking ship amidst a storm. On smooth water the crippled vessel might float to her desired haven, but if the tempest con-

tinues, she cannot outlive it. So the people assemble in the cabin and pray to God to arrest the storm. "Now that prayer," says the infidel, "is absurd. This storm is the natural effect of physical causes, in air and water, already established. These causes were, in turn, effects of previous physical causes. Hence, when those earlier causes were once established, the ulterior effect—namely, this storm—was potentially present in them already. And since natural causes are invariable, the whole result was naturally inevitable days or months before the prayer began. Do these foolish Christians expect their God to work a miracle now to stay the storm, as they pretend Christ once did on the Sea of Galilee? No! they disclaim that expectation. Then their prayer is senseless. They might as reasonably pray to the winds and waves. Natural law takes its course. If the continuance of the storm was in its natural causes, it will continue; if not, it will terminate. But, in that event, the termination can have no possible connection with the prayer; the natural causes had spent their force. The effect would have ceased just the same without the prayer." Such is the cavil.

The answer is, that our inability to explain *how* an all-wise God modifies natural effects in accordance with natural causes is no proof whatever that he cannot do it. The peasant sends his message with confidence by Morse's electric telegraph. He has sufficient evidence that it can be done, but *how it can be done* he can neither imagine nor explain. Now, we presume there is more difference between God's knowledge and ours than between Professor Morse's and the peasant's. We presume that Mr. Tyndall and the rest of the "scientists" would be very much outraged were we to refuse to believe that they could perform their beautiful experiments because we common folk cannot conceive how they do them!

We answer again, that we are able to regulate and employ our mechanisms, in strict accordance with their structure, to execute our special purposes. Shall we deny to the great God a similar power? What more regular and exact than a railroad? The motive power is a mechanical one, blind, senseless, and tremendous. The machinery is of iron. What more unyielding than iron? The track consists of two horizontal and parallel bars of iron, immovable, and of inexorably uniform position and distance. The trains must all run by a "time-table," whose exact-

ness imitates that of the planetary motions. The rigid rules of the road could not be infringed without the risk of a terrific crash. Yet this railroad train can be easily made to hear prayer. Its every motion is as completely under the hand of the engineer as the horse under the rein of the rider; and at the cry of a sick child, the conductor may stop the whole. Now, is God less able to manage his machine? Are his resources less than those of his creature, man?

May not this be the point of our Saviour's question in Matthew vii. 11: "If ye, then, though evil, *know how* to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father in heaven give good things to them that ask him"? We are sinful and weak, yet we have knowledge and power to give answers to our children's petitions, through natural means, without violating their nature. Is not this an argument by the stronger reason for the Almighty God's having that knowledge and power?

In conclusion, we argue that the perfect adjustment of this machinery of nature gives us the clearest proof at once of the existence and the skill of the creative mind. The more complete the machine, the more cunning the maker. Do they tell us of the unvarying regularity with which the forces of nature act through all recorded time and over all known space amidst their almost boundless complexity? Well, just so much do they exalt our conception of the resources and wisdom of the divine Architect. And shall they then tell us that the machinery of nature is so complete that the very Maker of it cannot intervene without violating its structure? This is precisely as though one should say, "There was a clock-maker of extraordinary skill, who made so perfect a clock that he himself could not regulate its motions." He was, forsooth, so thoroughly successful that the result of his very success in clock-making was to banish him in impotency from the control of his own handiwork! And yet that success in the construction is the practical evidence that he possessed boundless skill and power as to such machines. Such is the simple *residuum* of this much-vaunted scientific skepticism.

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES.¹

“And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse.”—MAL. iv. 6.

“And he shall go before him in the spirit and power of Elias, to turn the hearts of the fathers to the children, and the disobedient to the wisdom of the just; to make ready a people prepared for the Lord.”—LUKE i. 17.

THE religious importance of parental obligation may be inferred from many scriptural truths; and, among others, from the place it occupies at the end of the old dispensation and the beginning of the new. Historians tell us that from the prophesying of Malachi to the Christian era was an interval of more than four hundred years. During all these ages the heavens were silent, and the church received oracle neither by “Urim and Thummim,” nor by prophetic voice. Malachi, in his last chapter, prepares the people for this long silence of revelation by two words, of which one is a promise, and the other a precept. The command is (chap. iv. 4) to walk by the law of Moses, God’s servant, and to keep the statutes and judgments given, through him, for all Israel. The promise is, that in due time the Messiah’s forerunner, coming in the spirit and power of Elijah, shall usher in the solemn, yet glorious day of Christ, by his preparatory ministry. This was to be, therefore, the next prophet whom the church was entitled to expect. But his work was to be prominently a revival of parental fidelity and domestic piety. “He shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse.”

The next recorded message from the skies is that of the Angel Gabriel to Zacharias, given in Luke i. 11–20. The heavenly herald begins just where the earthly prophet had ended, with the promise and work of the forerunner, who was to be Zacharias’ son. “And he shall go before him (the Lord) in the spirit

¹ A sermon preached before the Synod of Virginia, at Danville, Va., October, 1879.

and power of Elijah, to turn the hearts of the fathers to the children, and the disobedient to the wisdom of the just, to make ready a people prepared for the Lord." (Vs. 17.) That this work upon fathers and children was to be far more than the removal of domestic alienations; that it was to include this, but also to embrace a great revival of parental and filial piety, an awakening of the parents' hearts to the salvation of their children, and the docile seeking and reception of parental instruction by the children,—this is plain from the whole passage; it is a turning of both to God, and a "turning of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just." We are reminded also our Saviour told his people that, oftentimes, his gospel was the occasion, though an innocent one, of family alienations, rather than reconciliations. Luke xii. 51: "Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay, but rather division."

This revival of domestic piety and parental fidelity to the souls of children, Malachi declares, is necessary to prevent the coming of the Divine Messiah from being a woe, instead of a blessing, to men. This reform alone prevents his coming to "smite the land with a curse," instead of crowning it with mercies; because the wickedness, which would otherwise prevail among men, would outrage the holiness, instead of attracting the compassion, of the incarnate God. According to the angel, the same reform is the appointed means to "make ready a people prepared for the Lord." God's way of promoting revival, then, is not to increase the activity of any public and outward means only, but "to turn the hearts of the parents to the children."

This review shows us also that the duty of parental fidelity is equally prominent in both dispensations. The old terminates with it; the new opens with it. This is the connecting link between both; it is the hinge in which they meet and combine with each other. How plain it is that God regards it as of prime practical importance for man's salvation!

It has been already indicated that the fidelity of the parents ought to imply the docility of the children. The duties are mutual. Either branch might be profitably inculcated; but space admonishes that it will be best at this time to confine the discussion, for the rest, to the duty of parents to the souls of their offspring. The attempt will be made to unfold somewhat of the unspeakable importance of this duty, in addition to the scriptural

teachings already examined, by some other facts, and thus to *turn the hearts of these parents to these children.*

I. And, first, the urgency of parental responsibility appears in a solemn, and even an awful manner, from the nature of the parental relation itself. Perhaps we fail to appreciate its momentous nature by reason of its very commonness and of our familiarity with it. Wherever human society is, there the parent is. Every man was once a child; every human existence begins in a parental relation. Our perpetual familiarity with the light of the sun disqualifies to appreciate its glory and beauty as we would, were we to behold it but once before entering on a life of blindness. Thus, we are so accustomed to see the child proceeding from the parent, that we are incompetent to perceive the solemn nature of the relation. Let us seek to gain a juster view by comparing the human race with that order of angels than which man was made a little lower. It is every way probable that to the angels the power of reproduction, bestowed on Adam and Eve in paradise, appeared the most marvellous and splendid part of this new creation of the Almighty. For the bliss and glory of the elect angels there is no multiplication. The only increase within their reach is that arithmetical addition which may arise out of their individual progress in knowledge, love and happiness. The eternal adoption of Gabriel is assured against all the powers of hell and accidents of time. But Gabriel cannot multiply his happiness and transmit it to beloved offspring of his own likeness. Except as he has communion with his fellow-angels who began their career with him, he remains solitary in his blessedness. But the glory of the Divine beneficence towards the human race appears in this, that the parents, without alienating anything of their own immortality, are able to multiply immortalities in ever-widening and progressive numbers. Thus, by the multiplications of the generations of men, the field of the Divine love and benevolence is widened as time flows on, until the subjects of the Divine benefactions and instruments of the Divine glory on earth unspeakably surpass in number the heavenly hosts. It may be beyond our skill, as it is unnecessary to this argument, to distinguish and allot the several parts of the agency which belong to God and to the human instruments in the origin of a new human soul. It is enough for us to know that God, by his mysterious

works of creation and providence, does empower human parents for this amazing result—the origination, out of nothing, of a new being—and that a rational, immortal spirit How solemn, how high, this prerogative! It raises man nearer the almighty Creator, in his supreme prerogative as Master of all things, than anything else that is done by creatures on earth or in heaven. Angels are not thus endued. The responsibility of this relation is not fully seen by merely regarding the infant as a beautiful animal, organized, in miniature, after the kind of the parents. It is the mysterious propagation of a rational soul that fills the reflecting mind with awe. The parent looks upon the tender face which answers to his caress with an infantile smile; he should see beneath that smile an immortal spark which he has kindled, but can never quench. It must grow, for weal or for woe; it cannot be arrested. Just now it was not. The parents have mysteriously brought it from darkness and nothing. There is no power beneath God's throne that can remand it back to nothing, should existence prove a curse. Yes; the parents have lighted there an everlasting lamp, which must burn on when the sun shall have been turned into darkness and the moon into blood, either with the glory of heaven or the lurid flame of despair.

The command to the first pair to be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth was given as a blessing of paradise, and while man was unfallen. To understand it, we must remember that covenant which was made with Adam as the representative of the race. God gave him an easy law to keep, with the implied promise that, by keeping this command, he should "enter into life." Had Adam stood his probation successfully, he would have been lifted from his mutable position into a permanent adoption of life, making both his holiness and his happiness indefectible. And we have every reason for believing that he would have raised all his posterity to that state along with himself. He stood as their representative. When he transgressed, "they sinned in him, and fell with him." It is hard to believe that God would have broken that representative union when about to result in the glorification of the race which he had established, and which he inexorably maintains when it issues in universal ruin and condemnation. Neither his goodness nor equity would prompt such unequal dealing. Had Adam been confirmed in glory, the law

would doubtless have held by which "he begat Seth in his own likeness after his image." All his posterity would have been holy and happy. Cain would have lived a saint, innocent of his brother's blood, and Abel would never have felt the murderer's blow. As the successive generations of men extended, parentage would have extended and multiplied immortal happiness until earth surpassed heaven. Such is the magnificence of that plan which the Creator proposed to execute through man's parental relation.

But the amazing plan was marred. The malice of Satan saw in this feature also his opportunity to execute a mischief as much more gigantic than the seduction of his brother-angels, as the aggregate of the whole series of human generations is greater than the number of the devils. It was, indeed, the infinite refinement of malice which he taught one of his heathen servants to cherish, when he inspired the Roman despot to wish that all the people of Rome had but one neck, that he might decapitate all at one stroke. Thus Satan saw that humanity had then but one head. By poisoning this, he would taint all the vast future body with spiritual death. Thus he vainly hoped he would usurp that very power, the power of parentage, which God had bestowed to be the instrument of multiplying blessedness, and he would turn it into an inlet of spreading and boundless sin and misery. By poisoning the spring-head, he would at once poison the whole stream in all its widening course, until it disembogued its innumerable drops—each drop in the flood a lost soul—into the ocean of eternity. Thus it is that we owe to this malignant perversion of God's plan of benevolence, that every parent now transmits to the child he loves, along with the gift of existence, the deadly disease of sin.

These, then, are the two facts which give so unspeakable a solemnity to the parent's relation to his children. He has conferred on them, unasked, the endowment of an endless, responsible existence. He has also been the instrument—if the unwilling, yet the sole instrument—of conveying to this new existence the taint of original sin and guilt. Can the human mind conceive a motive more tender, more dreadful, more urgent, prompting a parent to seek, for the beloved souls he has poisoned, the aid of the great Physician? And if this parent professes to have felt his blessed skill in his own soul, to be rejoic-

ing in the Divine cure, and is yet callous to the ruin he has transmitted to his own child, he is a monster, with a heart harder than a wild beast's. There are hereditary diseases of the body. Their indications pierce the parent's heart like barbed arrows, even when suspected in the beloved child. To see, beneath the hectic glow of the cheek, else so beautiful, the fatal sign of the worm at the root of life; to remember that it was from your own blood the sufferer drew the poison—this awakens the pity and love of the father to all its depths. There is an authentic illustration in the last days of the first Napoleon. As his life was consumed upon the gloomy rock of St. Helena by that fearful malady, cancer of the stomach, one of the few alleviations allowed him by his jailors was the presence of a skilful Italian physician, Dr. Antomarchi. The French officers near him relate that, when death was recognized as certain, the emperor laid his dying commands on his compatriot to return to Italy, visit his only son, watch over his health, and endeavor by every resource of his art to ward off the dire inheritance of his father's disease. Thus spoke the parent's heart in this man so ruthless and hard, who had reared his throne upon a pyramid of human skulls, and ground the nations of Europe under the chariot-wheels of his ambition! How could it speak otherwise, cruel though that heart was to others? How can you, O Christian! fail to bring your child to the great Physician of souls, to be healed of the deadly contagion you have conveyed into him?

Let us pause here to make an application of this question. All worldly parents do thus fail, as to the spiritual disease they have conveyed. Here they are callous to that pity which, in the dying emperor, melted the heart of the scourge of the nations. They see the children they love grow up and pass through their career with the disease of sin derived through them festering in their veins, and they do nothing and feel little for their piteous case. Yet, these parents do unquestionably love their children! For their temporal relief and safety they make great and disinterested sacrifices. Whence this strange inconsistency? What should we think if we saw a generous, loving woman, when her child came to her with its little petulant grief for the prick of a thorn, embracing, consoling and binding up the sufferer with eager and tremulous sympathy, and then afterward, when the same child fled to her with a smarting wound which the mother

recognized too well as the sting of a viper, if we saw her coldly thrust it away? But such is the neglect of all godless parents for the bite of the "old dragon" in the souls of their offspring, while they are eager and sincere in their zeal for the trivial advantages of this world. How can it be explained? Must it not be because this parent's carnal mind is enmity against God—because he is dead in trespasses and sins? Let the generous, the decent, the affectionate but ungodly parent, who makes his possession of these shining social virtues the pretext for denying his own total depravity toward God, ask himself for any other solution of his own amazing inconsistency. Unless he can find one more true and reasonable than the Bible solution, he is bound to accept it and to humble his pride of virtue before God, as a lost sinner.

II. The responsibility of parents is argued, again, from the unique and extensive character of their authority over their offspring. For, just so surely as God, who gave this authority, is a righteous and equitable ruler, is he certain to apply to parents that just rule of law, that men will be held accountable according to the extent of the powers intrusted to them. The steward to whom a thousand talents are committed must be held accountable for a thousand talents; he to whom ten, must account for ten. If this equitable principle must rule where the trust is nothing but dead money, how much more where power over rational, responsible fellow-creatures is intrusted to fellow-creatures! If the steward in this case were not held to account according to the degree of the power he had perverted to the injury of his fellow-creature's destiny, and of God's rights in him, this would be a glaring injustice to the victims of his abuse, and to the Divine Master whose power he had wrested. Be assured, then, parent, that you must be held responsible according to the extent of the power committed to your hands.

But it must be remembered, now, that your trust is not corruptible things, as silver and gold, but immortal souls, capable of knowing and glorifying their Maker; or, very much as you shall determine, of blaspheming him, and experiencing his almighty justice forever.

Let the extent of the parent's legitimate or unavoidable power over his children be pondered. As he is industrious and discreet, or indolent and prodigal, he decides for his children

whether they shall begin their adult existence with a competency or as paupers. As he is virtuous or vicious, he decides for them whether they shall bear an honored name, or be branded with the mark of infamy at their outset in society. As he is pure and courteous, or coarse and sensual, he assigns to his children a social grade creditable and elevated, giving them a passport to good society, or he condemns them to the association of the vulgar and low. His neglect of their early mental culture determines whether they shall reach adult life stupid boors or educated and intelligent men. Yea, more than this, character itself, at the outset of manhood, is mainly determined by the parents, and that chiefly by their example; so that they have the power of deciding with probable effect whether their children shall begin their careers with base or with virtuous principles and habits. According to the ordinance of providence, and the unavoidable tolerance of the civil law, the parent is irresponsible to any earthly authority in the use and abuse of these sweeping powers. There is no hand beneath the skies that can beneficially interfere with authority between this parental autocracy and its victims. It is true, that when the civil law assigns to the son or daughter his majority, he may then throw off the malignant *incubus*, if he pleases, and begin for himself the arduous task of reversing the evil work of the neglectful parent. He may, if he pleases, then begin the hard task of earning a personal good name in the place of his inherited infamy, and of acquiring knowledge in lieu of ignorance, culture in lieu of boorishness, and competency instead of destitution. He may—if he pleases! But what prospect is there that he will choose this hard task, with a character debauched and enfeebled by the parental curse? And if, contrary to all probability, he prove to have the nerve of steel requisite for such a revolution, how cruel is the load which the parental tyranny has assigned him to carry in this life-and-death struggle! There is no power allowed to any creature under heaven over another responsible creature so wide as this providential power of the parent. Men speak of the Czar as “the Autocrat of the Russias.” They describe with a shudder that imperial power over the property, the liberty, the life of the subject, unrestrained by constitution, law, jury, or appeal. But the power of a Czar over a subject is trifling compared with this parental power over children.

That may dispose of the body and goods; this disposes of mind and soul. How helpless is the little child to resist the destiny which the domestic autocrat is thus preparing for him! Whither shall he carry his appeal against his own father? And how dead must that parent's soul be to all magnanimity who can consider, with unrelenting selfishness, this mute appeal of a child's helpless dependence!

But the whole of this power is not yet described. All men who understand liberty believe that spiritual freedom, the prerogative of the immortal mind to think for itself, in obedience to the law of conscience laid upon it by its Maker, to judge its own duty, to select its own moral and religious opinions, and to serve its God according to its own understanding of his will—that this is the corner-stone of all other liberty, and the most precious of all. We proudly erect ourselves and declare this to be the crowning prerogative of our manhood. This liberty, we exclaim, is, next to the throne of God, the most sacred thing in the universe; and he who presumes to intrude his fallible will between the creature's soul and the immediate authority of its only Lord and Judge is guilty of a profane usurpation of the authority of Almighty God. Well, the parent has power almost to invade this sacred liberty of the soul. It is made both his privilege and his duty to impose the principles and the creed which he has sincerely adopted as the truth for himself upon the spirit of his child. Some men, it is known, vainly prate of a supposed obligation to leave the minds of their children independent and "unbiased" until they are mature enough to judge and choose for themselves. But a moment's thought shows that this is as unlawful as impossible. No man can avoid impressing his own practical principles on his child. If he refrains from words, he does it inevitably by his example. The only way to prevent the "dictation," as it has been stigmatized, is to banish the child absolutely from the parent's society and protection, and thus to be recreant to every duty of the parent. Again, if he could avoid every impress upon the soul of his child, others would not refrain. One thing is certain, this young and plastic soul will take impress from some whither, if not from the appointed and heaven-ordained hand of his parent, then from some other irresponsible hand, of man or evil angel. One might as well speak of immersing an open vessel in the ocean and hav-

ing it remain empty as of having a youthful soul to grow up in society "unbiased," until it is qualified to elect its own creed most wisely. The only alternative left the parent is either to bias the child's soul himself for God and the truth, or to see it fatally biased by other influences against both. The Scriptures here are positive. The parent is commanded to "train up the child in the way he should go." Which is that way? He must "bring up the child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." Which is that nurture? Popery, Presbyterianism, Rationalism, or Infidelity? At the time the training is to begin, the child is wholly unqualified to judge; the parent must judge for him.

Now, it is fully admitted that neither divine nor human law gives a parent the right to force the tender mind of the child by persecutions or corporeal pains or penalties; or to abuse it, by sophistries or falsehoods, into the adoption of his opinions. But this power the providential law does confer: the parent may and ought to avail himself of all the influences of opportunity and example, of filial reverence and affection, of his superior age, knowledge, and sagacity, to reinforce the power of truth over the child's mind, and, in this good sense, to prejudice him in favor of the parental creed. And how potent is this influence! Does it not almost commit the spiritual liberty of the young soul to a human hand? How mighty the power of opportunity which the parent is thus authorized to employ to propagate his creed on another soul; while as yet the pupil is ignorant of the process wrought upon him, and incapable of resisting it! There is no power beneath the skies, authorized by God, that is so far-reaching, so near the prerogatives of God himself; and for that reason there is none so solemnly responsible. When God has clothed you, O parent! with such powers, with results so beneficent and glorious, and has thus made you so nearly a God to your own children, do you suppose that you can neglect or pervert them without being held to a dire account? It were better for that man that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depths of the sea. Here appears a new argument to prove man's responsibility for his moral and religious opinions. The code which he heartily believes is, to him, his authoritative creed. It is to this the privilege of parental inculcation must practically apply. ↘

Hence, he who has perverted his own reason and conscience to mistake a lie for the truth, makes himself responsible, not only for his own destruction, but for the probable destruction of the children God has submitted to his guidance. Take heed, then, parents, how you hear and how you believe, not only for your own sakes, but for your children's sakes.

III. But would it not be an injustice toward the children's souls for God to commit so sweeping, so imperial a power over them to any creature's hand without suitable checks and guards? He has not forgotten to provide them. One is found in the strict responsibility to which he holds the domestic ruler—strict and fearful in proportion to the width of the trust. Another is found in the affection which nature binds up with the parental relation. God—blessed be his name!—has not surrendered the young immortal, undefended, into the parent's hands, but has sought to fence him in against abuse, by the strongest and purest social affection which survives the fall. Parental, and especially maternal, affection is the most disinterested principle which remains in the ruined nature of man. God has kept alive this remnant of the estate of paradise, like the one entirely fresh oasis in the desert of depravity. He preserves it, apparently, that there may be a spot whence can flow forth the water of life for dying humanity. It is the only adequate type on earth of divine love. God honors it by making it the imperfect image from which he would have us comprehend his own infinite benevolence and pity. He instructs us to address him as "Our Father which art in heaven." He declares, "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." When he would exalt the love of redemption to its most transcendent height, he can find nothing on earth which comes so near it as a mother's love, although this also comes short of it: "Can a woman forget her sucking child?" The depravity of human nature is most strongly asserted in the Scripture, and it cannot be depreciated by the just observer of mankind. Yet, it should probably be conceded that the love of even selfish, avaricious men for their children is usually sincere and profound. Many moralists suppose themselves constrained, by the doctrine of total depravity, to deny this. They seek to represent the professed zeal of such men for the wealth and social advancement of their children as but a pretext for their own covetousness, pride and lust of power. This

is a short-sighted analysis. It is true that nothing in fallen man is untainted by sin, and that these selfish desires mix more or less with the disinterested affection. But the desire for the children's secular good is usually real. We see it urging the hardest natures to self-sacrificing devotion. The griping man of the world, who can grind the faces of the poor without a pang of pity, is yet generous to his own offspring, and for them he cheerfully foregoes delights and lives laborious days. When they die he mourns more ingenuously than for any other loss. He feels that a part of himself has died; that they are bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. But there is no need to attempt the impossible task of exaggerating our conception of a parent's, and especially of a mother's, love. There is not one of our readers who is not the child of that love, and his own experience has taught him better than words or images its blessed strength.

But what does the Maker of our frames mean by planting and preserving this master affection in human hearts? It tells us, in accents as sweet as they are potent, the duty which parents owe to children, and children to their parents. It is God's teaching in the inmost heart, instructing us that the fulfilment of this affection is the highest, holiest, most urgent of all the earthly duties man owes. Parental love is the main bond of human society among creatures otherwise selfish and unjust as fallen men are. Without it society would doubtless degenerate into anarchy and men into savages. Can any reasonable mind believe, then, that God will overlook this master affection in his plans for the sanctification of a fallen world, or that God's true grace can be prevalent in any parent's heart, and not energize and direct this love?

IV. These considerations prepare us to expect that the parent's influence will be more effectual for good and evil than any or all others that surround the young soul. Hence is drawn another argument for the parent's awful responsibility. Pastoral experience teaches us that, as parents perform or neglect their duties, the children usually end in grace or impiety. The impressions for good or for evil made in the families of Christian countries are usually found too deep to be effectually changed after adult years are reached. The parent has the first and all-important opportunity. Those who come after him—the teacher, the pastor—have but the remnant. The forming hand of the parent

is armed with a venerable authority, all others with but a small portion of the delegated power. His words and example are weighted by filial love. He has perpetual familiarity and opportunity; his children are with him at his board; they sleep in their little couch at his feet; they follow him as he comes in and as he goes out. Even when his lips are silent, his example speaks perpetually to them.

But, above all, the parents have the forming of their plastic years. When they are moulding the child, his character is in the gristle, yielding to the softest pressure. By the time he has come to the hands of the pastor the gristle has been hardened into rigid bone, which may be broken by violence, but cannot be bent. Every way the parent has the advantage over the pastor; so that the latter has small prospect of reversing the parent's work when it has been for evil. If men are brought from sin to Christ after they reach adult years, examination usually reveals the fact that the remaining influence of parental piety, cleaving to the heart during its apparent indifference, has far the larger part in the result.

It may be objected that the success of the evangelist among adult pagans, and even the obligation of preaching the gospel among them, refute this view. For all these pagans had godless parents, and grew up utterly unblessed by domestic piety. If, now, the rule above claimed, as to the controlling importance of the home religious influence, were correct, all these pagan adults would be hopeless, and the duty of preaching the gospel to them unreasonable, because necessarily futile. But we know that we are commanded to preach the gospel to them, and many of them are savingly enlightened by this means of grace. To this objection there are three answers: First, it is true that the godless home influence of their childhood has left the souls of adult pagans exceedingly hard and obdurate, so that the evangelist does, in far the largest part, labor with them in vain. Second, neither they nor their parents have enjoyed any gospel offers, so that, with all their sins and hardness, they are not yet loaded with the sin of vexing the Holy Ghost. But the neglectful and inconsistent parent tacitly encouraged his child to commit this sin repeatedly, and to raise up this fearful and peculiar barrier around his stubborn heart. Third, the pagan child, with all his grossness and vice, has not yet had his soul poisoned

by the lesson of parental hypocrisy, the most deadly of all means for fatally searing the conscience and petrifying the heart.

This pagan child may have for his father a gross, sensual barbarian, and for his mother a superstitious, silly, lying babbler. He may have been carried, while an infant, to the idol temple, and made to bow his head, and cast his little handful of rice before the horrid image of Siva or Kali. This tuition is bad enough. But he has not yet experienced the spiritual curse, to which every pretended Christian home is subjected, of detecting his own father and mother—whom he is to revere, if he reveres anything—in practising cheats upon their God, in promising sacredly what they have no purpose of performing, and in giving the practical lie, by their actions all the week, to the holiest professions they make on the Lord's day. That accursed lesson the heathen youth has not yet learned from those whom he loves best and imitates most. Therein he is in a state far more accessible to truth and more hopeful than the neglected child of nominal Christians. The missionary, preaching to such heathen grown up, has a more hopeful charge than the pastor at home vainly stretching out his hands all the day long to the souls seared and hardened by the commanding influences of ungodly homes over the youthful heart.

To this correspond the experience of pastors. When they have a hardened adult or aged sinner bow apparently to the force of a preached gospel from their mouths, they are apt to find, if they inquire faithfully, that this hardened subject had not always been hard; that his youth had been spent, in part, at least, under the blessed influence of home piety; and that the seeds of good then sown, long buried beneath the clods, have at last borne their fruit. But for those early planted seeds, the later sowing of the pulpit would also have fallen upon the trodden roadway and been caught up by Satan. Pastors know that there are few cases of conversion among grown-up men who have been the children of hypocritical or nominal Christian homes. They are taught that the exploits of their spiritual weapons are puny and poor, compared with those of godly, sincere parents. The confession is not grateful to self-love, for it is natural to desire success, and it is sweet to boast in our efficiency; but candor compels this avowal. An authentic instance

now rises from the early recollections of the writer. A church was rejoicing with its new pastor in an ingathering of souls, and among the converts was one whose appearance was so surprising that it filled them with wondering gratitude. The subject was a man of the world, who had lived past middle life, far from Christ and good. He was a man of inherited wealth and social position, generous and profuse, profane when irritated, a sportsman and keeper of thoroughbred horses, a frequenter of all scenes of gayety and worldly amusements which were not low. This man now suddenly manifested a solemn interest in divine things, was constant in God's house and was found, before long, sitting like a contrite child at the feet of Jesus. And let it be added here, that his after-life nobly attested the genuineness of the change: he lived a pure Christian and devoted philanthropist, and died in the faith. There was naturally in the new pastor's heart a curiosity to know how so surprising and gratifying a revolution was wrought, and, perhaps, a trace of elation as he argued with himself that this case must be purely a result of pulpit instrumentalities. So, when the convert came to confer with the session, he was asked what sermons had been the special means of his awakening. It seemed hard for him at first to apprehend the drift of such a question, but at last he answered very simply that his change was not due to any sermons or recent means, but to his mother. To his mother? She had been dead so long that few remembered what manner of mother he had! She had been in her grave more than forty years. The oldest elder present had never seen her—had, in fact, never heard of her. She had died in the bloom of her beauty and maternity, when he was a boy of six years. Thus the wonder grew. But he explained that she was a Christian woman, a fruit of the ingathering of Samuel Davies in the colonial days, and she had begun to instruct her oldest-born in the truth. He stated that now, if he was Christ's, it was the power of those teachings over his infant mind, and especially of the dying scene, which were the true instruments for bringing him back; without which all other instruments would have been futile. When this young mother was about to die, she had gathered her little flock at her bedside, cowering like a cluster of frightened birds before the mighty hunter, Death; had prayed for and blessed them, and, as she laid her dying hand upon his brow, had charged him, her

first-born, to fear his mother's God, and remember her instructions. That hand had been upon his head ever since, through the long years of his worldliness; he had felt its touch in the haunts of business as well as in his hours of solitude; in the hunt, as he was hieing his hounds after the fox; on the race-field, as he cheered his winning horse; and it was this which, at last, had brought him back to God.

Here is the parent's responsibility, and here also is the encouragement. Our God is a faithful and a righteous God. He has not laid this heavy and fearful burden upon our shoulders without the promised help to bear it. His covenant still stands, to be a God to his people and their seed. Faithful effort and holy example shall be rewarded; and that word of Holy Writ will ever be found as much a divine promise as it is a deduction of experience, that, if we "train up our children in the way they should go, when they are old they shall not depart from it." By the very reason which makes parental neglect so blighting to the souls of children, parental teaching will prove an efficient help; and that God who, in paradise, pronounced paternity a blessing, before Satan the murderer had infused the curse of original sin into the stream of humanity, has promised through Christ, the woman's seed, still to use this holy relation for its primeval end of raising up sons unto glory.

Two inferences will close this sermon. Seeing the parental relation is what the Scripture describes it, and seeing Satan has perverted it since the fall for the diffusion and multiplication of depravity and eternal death, the education of children for God is the most important business done on earth. It is the one business for which the earth exists. To it all politics, all war, all literature, all money-making, ought to be subordinated; and every parent especially ought to feel, every hour of the day, that, next to making his own calling and election sure, this is the end for which he is kept alive by God—this is his task on earth. On the right training of the generation now arising, turns not only the individual salvation of each member in it, not only the religious hope of the age which is approaching, but the fate of all future generations in a large degree. Train up him who is now a boy for Christ, and you not only sanctify that soul, but you set on foot the best earthly agencies to redeem the whole broadening stream of human beings who shall proceed from him,

down to the time when men cease to marry and give in marriage. Until then, the work of education is never ending.

* The generation which is trained for heaven is the one that dies; the one that is born into its place is born in enmity and under the curse. Thus the task of training is ever renewed, until the final consummation shall make the race equal to the angels.

In the last place: We observe some sincere Christians, whose minds are so swayed by the assertion that personal faith must be the invariable pre-requisite to baptism and admission to the church, that they seem incapable of ever entertaining the thought that the church membership of the children of believers may be reasonable and scriptural. The doctrine seems to them so great an anomaly that they cannot look dispassionately at the evidence for it. But to one who has weighed the truths set forth above, the absence of that doctrine from God's dispensations would seem the strange anomaly. To him who has appreciated the parental relation as God represents it, the failure to include it within the circuit of the visible church, to sanctify its obligations and to seal its hopes with the sacramental badge, would appear the unaccountable thing.

We have seen that the promise of a multiplying offspring was the blessing of paradise; that paternity was the splendid expedient of our Maker for multiplying the human subjects of his blessings and instruments of his glory, and of making holiness and bliss the sure, hereditary possession of the increasing multitudes of men, through the probation and adoption of their first father. We have seen how, when Satan had essayed, with a stupendous, yet impotent malice, to pervert the invention of God to the propagation of sin and death, our merciful father rendered his victory void through the woman's seed, thus causing redemption in the second Adam to spring again out of the family tie. We hear him declare in Malachi ii. 15, long after the fall, that his object in founding the family, in the form of monogamy, was "to seek a godly seed." Thus the supreme end of the family institution is as distinctly religious and spiritual as that of the church itself.

Civic legislators speak of the well-ordered family as the integer of which the prosperous commonwealth is formed. But God assigns the family a far higher and holier aim. The Christian

family is the constituent integer of the church—the kingdom of redemption.

The instrumentalities of the family are chosen and ordained of God as the most efficient of all means of grace—more truly and efficaciously means of saving grace than all the other ordinances of the church. To family piety are given the best promises of the gospel, under the new, as well as under the old dispensation. How, then, should a wise God do otherwise than consecrate the Christian family, and ordain that the believing parents shall sanctify the children? Hence, the very foundation of all parental fidelity to children's souls is to be laid in the conscientious, solemn, and hearty adoption of the very duties and promises which God seals in the covenant of infant baptism. It is pleasing to think that many Christians who refuse the sacrament do, with a happy inconsistency, embrace the duties and seek the blessing. But God gives all his people the truths and promises, along with the edifying seal. Let us hold fast to both.

A PHASE OF RELIGIOUS SELFISHNESS.

"Justifying faith . . . respects Christ in his priestly office alone."—OWEN ON "JUSTIFICATION."

"He" (the materialist philosopher) "may be tempted to show his contempt, when he is told that actions instigated by an unselfish sympathy, or by a pure love of rectitude, are intrinsically sinful; and that conduct is truly good only when it is due to a faith whose openly-professed motive is *other worldliness*."—HERBERT SPENCER, FIRST PRIN.

ONE of these sentences, from a great divine, seems to avouch a defect, not in the gospel, but in our mode of presenting the gospel, which the other sentence, from a would-be-great infidel, bitterly charges upon it. Christ's priestly work is that in which he makes sacrifice, satisfaction and intercession for believers, to deliver them from the penalty due their guilt. The human want which this mediatorial work meets, is man's sense of guilt and danger. This feeling awakened by the convincing light of the word and Spirit, regards self directly; and it is entirely compatible with a dominant selfishness. It is but self-love awakened by foreseen danger. There is, then, nothing characteristic of the new and holy nature in it. Men dead in trespasses and sins often feel a degree of it. Lost spirits feel it. The biting phrase of Herbert Spencer, "*other worldliness*," suggests a charge against this species of Christianity which is just. We Christians use the word "worldliness" very patly to describe a selfish devotion to the pleasures of this world. We charge that it is idolatry. We point to it as the very signature of a dead soul, and justly. Now, on what principle do we proceed in this judgment? On the obvious distinction between natural good, or the advantages which confer selfish, natural gratification on our desires; and moral good, or the principles and acts which satisfy conscience and meet our accountability. We see clearly enough that, in this earthly sphere, to crave and act for personal enjoyment simply is not moral good, being merely selfish, and that it may be, and most often is, wicked. When we

see a responsible creature living supremely for wealth and what wealth purchases, gratified sensual appetites, gratified vanity and ambition, immunity from personal toil and pain, we regard him as a selfish and sinful creature. But is the principle of the case changed in the least by placing the gratification craved in another sphere of existence, and beyond the grave rather than this side of it? Obviously not. This "other worldliness" is but worldliness exaggerated and intruding its unhallowed grasp into the holy realm of redemption. It is not forgotten that there is a legitimate and righteous regard for one's own welfare, that Christianity does not extinguish this appetency, but appeals to and stimulates it. But the gospel consigns it to a subordinate place, and requires the absolute "denial of self" as the very condition of discipleship.

Every act of the soul receives its moral complexion from that of its real motive. If the sole want of the soul, which impels it to Christ in faith, is this sense of future danger from its guilt, then the faith exercised is nothing but the temporary faith of the "stony ground" hearer. Redemption is presented to this soul, not as a moral good, but simply as an advantage. The cross is to be prized and sought, not for any purpose or desire of holiness, but for its utility to an endangered selfishness. The Saviour is degraded to subserve a function precisely similar to a life preserver or life boat, or a fire extinguisher, or a dentist's forceps, or an anodyne, or a dose of other medicine. The joy of the supposed release has nothing in it distinctively spiritual, any more than the frisking of the thievish pig which has released its neck from the fence. There is no real faith, no real coming to Christ, except that which embraces him in his three offices of prophet, priest, and king. Hence there is no real coming to Christ until the soul is so enlightened and renewed as truly to view not only its danger, but its ignorance and pollution, as intolerable evils. The true believer goes to Christ in faith, for personal impunity indeed, but far more for sanctification. He is fleeing from sin as truly as from punishment. The object to which his soul moves is he "who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." This is God's representation of the matter, "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst *after righteousness*." How much wiser and safer is the statement of the "Confession of Faith" than

Owen's! "By this faith a Christian acteth differently upon that which each particular passage of the word containeth, yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God. . . . But the principal acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving and resting upon Christ alone *for justification, sanctification, and eternal life*, by virtue of the covenant of grace." It is true that Owen cautiously qualifies his questionable statement, and abundantly exhibits, in other places, a fortunate inconsistency. But the selfish leanings of human nature are too strong to permit this presentation of the gospel without a mischievous result.

Is not Protestant preaching very defective in this respect? Do we not hear Christ currently held forth too exclusively for the personal advantages of embracing him, while his sanctifying work as a Saviour from sin to holiness is left out? Sinners are exhorted to flee to the Saviour, simply that they may not be punished in hell. The penal wrath of God is described as though it were the only evil. Even the reprehension of the preacher proceeds as though the sin of neglecting one's enlightened future self-interest were the whole of the crime of unbelief. It is very true that personal recklessness is criminal; but such preaching leaves in the background the far more enormous crimes of the impenitent against God's rights. And too often, when the sinner's idolatrous and sinful selfishness is alarmed, the preacher lauds and praises him for this, as though there were something good in it. The advantages to self-love are dwelt on as the sole attractions of the church and of heaven. Oftentimes the pictures, designed to allure the sinner, appeal as directly to his self-love as those of the playbill or the tavern; and, while more decent in coloring, they are sometimes little less sensuous. Is not this a deplorable oversight? Let even the Reformed or Presbyterian pastor call himself to account here, and he will be shocked to perceive how seldom he has pleaded to sinners to come to Christ *because it is right*; how prevalently he has limited his plea to the promise that it *will be advantageous*. Let the question be urged: Is selfishness any the less idolatrous and wicked simply because it has become shrewd enough to project itself into the future?

One evil which has resulted from this defective presentation of the gospel is the filling of the churches with "stony-ground

hearers." Their selfish fears of punishment have been aroused. Their remorse has been quickened. But there is in their *pseudo* faith and repentance no "hungering and thirsting after righteousness." Hence they have no root in themselves. Not having embraced Christ in his kingly and prophetic offices, they have no spiritual life, and so soon as the alarmed self-love is quieted, immediately they wither away. Another consequence, we are persuaded, is that the gospel is shorn of much of its strength. The reasonable and valid appeal to *the conscience* is left in the background. But our Maker designed this faculty to be the mistress of the human heart. Sin has usurped its authority? True. And the monster will not be effectually dethroned without the intervention of God's grace? True. But that grace acts on human nature *in accordance with* the healthy laws of nature. Hence the instrument who neglects and omits the appeal to what ought to be the dominant faculty has no right to expect the aid of the great agent. We are mistrustful of the power of this imperial faculty over the soul; perhaps also we are mistrustful of God's promise to enlighten and enable the conscience. We aim at the baser principle of self-interest; and we fail as we deserve. We forget that in a soul dead in sin self-interest is even more impotent than conscience to prompt any godly action. If we made the argument to self-love less prominent, and said more about righteous and reasonable obligation; if we urged sinners to believe and repent, less because thus they escape hell, and more *because it is right*; if we made less of the claims of self, and more of the righteous claims of God, we should find him honoring our ministry more by making it effectual. A fashionable mother, who knew no way of controlling her children, except wheedling or force, once heard a wise Christian woman base her authority over her young child on a simple appeal to conscience—"You must do this, my dear, because it is right,"—and secure a prompt and sincere obedience. The godless woman expressed her astonishment at the method, and declared, that with her children such language would be breath thrown away. The Christian replied, that her Bible taught her the Creator had imprinted conscience in the human soul as the ruling faculty, that she had always concluded, hence, that her first duty as a parent was to appeal to it, and that the appeal was usually successful.

"But if you act," said she, "towards your children as though the faculty were not there, of course you leave it dormant." Too often the pulpit commits the same mistake. If we struck more habitually at the sinner's slumbering conscience, we should find the Spirit of God sending home the blow.

OUR SECULAR PROSPERITY

IS not this the first occasion within the memory of man when the temporal prosperity of the people was so great and general that even complaining politicians were compelled to admit it? Agriculture, the basis of all prosperity, is successful; harvests are abundant, and markets unusually good. Commerce is expansive and progressive. Money is plenty. The general standard of comfort in living is constantly improving; and among the higher classes the standard of luxury is rising with what we cannot call a rapid improvement, but at least with a rapid increase. Meanwhile, our modern Ophir continues to pour in its steady stream of gold. Perhaps such a spectacle of national plenty and increase was never seen before.

Christians are enjoying their full share in these blessings, if blessings they are. They are in the foremost rank of every lawful business and of every material comfort and luxury, and are gathering a full part even of the golden harvest of California. Besides this, the church is free among us in a sense in which it never enjoyed freedom before. Not only has it the fullest religious liberty secured by law, but it enjoys the apparent respect of the press, of the government, and of the masses. Surely "religion walks in her silver slippers." Such a combination of secular advantages was never possessed before by Christians.

Now, we have pointed out these facts to lead the minds of ministers and private Christians to the inquiry: Is this a spiritually safe state? Has the church ever been able to stand such temporal prosperity without being poisoned by it? Let us get the answer to this question from history and from human nature. The past answers that there has not been a single instance in which the spiritual health of the church has survived a season of high temporal prosperity. She has survived the sword and the fire. Like the burning bush, persecutions have not consumed her. The power of kings and commonwealths and the

gates of hell have not been able to prevail against her; but never, in a single case, has she failed to succumb before the miasm of temporal ease and plenty. When, under Joshua, God "made Israel ride on the high places of the earth that he might eat the increase of the fields, and he made him to suck honey out of the rock and oil out of the flinty rock, butter of kine and milk of sheep, with the fat of lambs, and rams of the breed of Bashan, and goats, with the fat of kidneys of wheat, and he did drink the pure blood of the grape," what was the result? "*Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked.*" And again, when the talents and virtues of David and of David's less noble son had raised the theocracy to the crisis of its prosperity, so that "Judah and Israel were many as the sand which is by the sea in multitude, eating and drinking and making merry," when the nation became so rich that "silver was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon," how long was it before the apostasy of Jeroboam, and the idolatry, of the calves, in Bethel and Dan, yea, and Solomon's own backsliding, followed? So, under the Christian dispensation, as long as the primitive church was oppressed and reviled, it remained tolerably pure and active; but from the very date of its establishment by Constantine, when it received external respect, ease, revenues, and honors, began those corruptions which, in three hundred years, wrought out the monster of popery. Thenceforward the only communions which had purity or vitality were down-trodden churches like those of the Waldenses. The pure and active churches of the Reformation were born and grew strong amidst reproach, danger, and strife. As soon as they had become safely established, and providence had given them rest on every side, their decline began. And where is now the glory of Geneva, of Wittenberg, of Leyden? Set in the dark night of Rationalism or Socinianism. Compare the pure zeal, the fraternal charity, the humility of the Church of England as it emerged from the fires of bloody Queen Mary, with its subsequent arrogance, Arminianism, popery, and worldliness. See what has been the effect of outward prosperity and power on the Established Church of Scotland, or Puritanism in New England, *and on ourselves.* Yes, let us count the feeble and retrograding beat of our own spiritual pulse, and note how much weaker is our spiritual vitality than in the days of Davies, Tennent, and Blair.

Looking to man's nature, we shall see some of the reasons of this. It ought not to be true, but it is true, that it is man's mean-spirited disposition to feel less gratitude as the favors he receives are multiplied. Try it, my brother, with any neighbor you have. Send him a quarter of mutton as a present this week and he will return you his hearty thanks; but send him one every week for three months and then omit two weeks, and he will feel as if, on those two weeks, you had robbed him of a right! It will be well if he does not tell you so. Now, we treat God in the same thankless way. The frequency and the multiplication of mercies necessarily make the reception of them a habit; and habitual incidents make less and less impression the longer the habit is maintained. So that the multitude of our blessings, instead of begetting proportionate gratitude, deadens our sense of obligation. Here, then, we have this result, that sluggish, thankless indifference to God's love and benevolence will naturally grow out of continued prosperity.

It is very obvious that the indulgence and the rewarding of worldly desires will cultivate those desires. *Diva auri fames ipsa pecunia crescit.* (Pardon us the Latin, for Horace's words are more expressive than any we can put together.) The more money men have it in their power to make, the more will they love to make money. Gain will stimulate the desire of gain. Continued success will weaken the sense of dependence on providence, and the too-prosperous Christian will "sacrifice to his drag and burn incense to his net." And when the money is made, how shall it be spent? Why, of course, in living, dressing, building more expensively. Thus comes in luxury, with its enervation, its self-indulgence, its pride, its impatience of wholesome toil, its sensual desires, and spirituality dies as surely as the lamp goes out in the mephitic air of the cavern.

But here is the most fatal consideration of all: that the danger arising from temporal ease and plenty is one which leads the Christian away from his fountain of strength, the mercy-seat, just in degree as the danger becomes more imminent. The spiritual life of a Christian or a church is like the roots of the sturdy oak, which grow more tough by the storm, because then they grasp more tightly the crevices of the rock. It is like the refined gold, which must be purified from its dross in the furnace of fire. It is like the strength and hardihood of the sol-

dier, which are formed by exposure and battle. Let the Christian be persecuted, troubled, or afflicted, and his trial, by casting down his heart, brings it to the foot-stool of grace in humble prayer, and there he finds a strength which rises elastic and indomitable under every oppression, because it is the strength of divine omnipotence. Hence it is that the Christian only grows by reproach and affliction, and that the fire of persecution has often been the most prosperous element for the church. That which crushes down, at the same time brings into contact with the source of might and life. But alas! when the forgetful Christian is most endangered by pride, fulness of bread, worldliness, and sensuality, then he is farthest from prayer. Let us borrow an illustration from classic mythology. When Hercules wrestled with the giant, Antæus, son of the earth, he was baffled by finding that his antagonist rose from every fall with renewed strength, so that the more he was subdued, the more unconquerable he became. But at last Hercules perceived that it was because Antæus, as often as he fell upon the bosom of his mother, received new vigor from the contact; and then the god of strength, lifting him up in his mighty arms, so that he could no longer touch his mother earth, crushed him to death in his embrace. So wrestles this mighty and insidious prosperity. So wrestles Satan now with the church, which he has found by other means unconquerable. Since the church has risen with immortal vigor, as often as she has been pressed down upon the bosom of her Saviour, and driven out of her pride and self-dependence by affliction, he now lifts her aloft into carnal abundance, security, and haughtiness, in order that, having separated her from the spring of her strength, he may choke her to death in his treacherous embrace.

In a word, the whole is made up of its parts; the spirituality of the church consists of the spirituality of its individual members. But let any Christian view his own life, and see how nearly his whole spiritual progress has been made in the seasons of trial. It is by their private afflictions chiefly that individuals grow in grace. Is it not on the sick bed, in the chamber of bereavement, by the dying beds, and beside the fresh graves of those they love, that their steps heavenwards are chiefly taken?

Is it, then, an exaggerated statement, that a time like the pre-

sent is one of more danger than the time of oppression and persecution? We verily believe that, splendid as is the grace which carries the martyr to the stake, and sustains him in his baptism of fire, glorious as is the display of Divine power, in a church down-trodden but indomitable, persecuted but not consumed; the grace which would carry a church through such a season of continued prosperity and carnal ease as we are now experiencing, without a decay of spirituality, would be still more mighty. The church has often enjoyed the former grace; she has not yet attained unto the latter. It seems as if this is a height of spiritual attainment, which is reserved for those better days which are to introduce the millennial reign. But the rule is, that grace is bestowed in answer to prayer. And while seasons of persecution are seasons of abounding prayer, this is a time of prayerlessness. By how much is the danger more imminent! If, then, the approach of oppression or persecution, or the prospect of the loss of our religious liberties, would awake the voices of the watchmen on our Zion trumpet loud, what should be the course now of those "who have understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do"? Should not the teachers and rulers of the church lift their voices in warning more loudly even than when Knox called upon his countrymen to stand for their lives and liberties against pope and tyrants? And should not every Christian gird himself against the danger, with a spirit more earnest, cautious and prayerful than if he were counting the cost for a final warfare with persecution? True, ours is a danger which comes with no clamor, "no distress of nations and perplexity," or roaring of the seas of popular commotion. But if it is a danger, the wise man will therefore proclaim it with a voice only the more urgent and startling. The household which should be awakened at the cold midnight with the news that an absent member was freezing to death somewhere on the highway, would start from their beds into intense alarm and exertion. But that frost which is now fast freezing their brother's or father's blood into an inexorable sleep is a thing most quiet, most noiseless; as quiet as the genial dew! And so, "the pestilence that walketh in darkness," with no outward sign or voice but the stillness and desertion of the streets, and the muffled roll of the hearse, will thrill the heart of a people with as sharp an alarm as the clamorous

voice of war. And rightly. We utter a most deliberate and sorrowful conviction when we say, that in our opinion, unless we bestir ourselves with a wise alarm and diligence, utterly unlike our present conduct, and entirely above any to which any previous church has ever been able to attain in the like case, this present ease will be our ruin, and future history will date "the decline and fall" of American Christianity from our generation. And, alas! where is the voice loud enough to pierce the ear benumbed with this worldly abundance, and to rouse the sleepy, self-indulgent soul of the church, lapped in the folds of this intoxicating ease, to more than the awakened energy and hardihood and prayerfulness of a martyr communion? Can we flatter ourselves that we shall be an exception to all previous history? We fear not. Humanly speaking, our history must be this; either to sink deeper and deeper into formalism, worldliness, heresy and immorality, with partial and temporary resuscitations, till our light shall go out in a night which shall have no morning, like that of the seven churches of Asia; or else, to be lashed back to the throne of grace and to spirituality by the loss of our abused abundance and religious liberties, by social calamities and political oppressions, till we are purified and restored, and fitted to take our place as one of the millennial churches. And if God, in his grace, shall deliver us from both these destinies, if he shall sustain and restore our spiritual life, while he leaves us our present outward prosperity, then will that display of divine power be more truly new and wonderful than anything which the church has ever yet experienced.

What then is the remedy? By what means is this rescue, so difficult, so unusual that it is scarcely to be hoped for, to be found? We shall find the answer of this question in asking another. What was God's benevolent *design* in giving this prosperity? Not to be a trap and a curse to us, surely. This is the secondary use to which his righteous and wise retribution will convert it, if it is abused by us. But surely, he gave it primarily, that we might find our safe and innocent enjoyment in it, by using it for his glory. Here, then, is our escape from its benumbing effects. We must be unlike all the outwardly prosperous churches which have ever gone before us, in the *use* which we make of our prosperity. We must be as distinguished for our large-hearted liberality and our expanded plans of beneficence as we are for

riches and temporal privileges. We must burst forth on every side into a magnificence of missionary enterprise, as marvellous as the growth of our commerce, arts, agriculture, and general prosperity. We must cast the antiquated measures and standards of Christian liberality to the winds. Our prosperity has utterly outgrown them, and calls upon us to adopt new and larger ones. This is our only safety valve for our expanding wealth. Thus alone shall we be able to consecrate it, and render it harmless. Hence, it is one of the prime duties of the ministry to inculcate new principles of Christian beneficence. And hence it is the time for the church to go forward with gigantic strides, and give tenfold expansion to all those means for glorifying God which his temporal bounties can sustain.

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTY TOWARDS HIS ENEMIES.

IT may be surmised that this is a duty whose "metes and bounds" are ill understood by many of the people of God, and that, consequently, the minds of many of them are harassed with doubts and temptations concerning it. On the one hand, many, perhaps, excuse to themselves criminal emotions under the name of virtuous indignation, and on the other some of them afflict themselves with compunctions for and vain endeavors against feelings which are both proper and natural to us as rational beings.

The embarrassment is increased by the current opinion that there is inconsistency between the teachings and examples of the Old Testament and the New upon this subject. Men read in the former the stern language of the imprecatory Psalms, for instance, of the thirty-fifth, the thirty-ninth, the one hundred and ninth, the one hundred and thirty-seventh, and the one hundred and thirty-ninth, where the inspired man prays: "Let them be confounded and put to shame that seek after my soul. . . . Let them be as chaff before the wind, and let the angel of the Lord chase them"; or describes the persecuted church as crying to her oppressors: "Happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us"; or protests: "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? And am I not grieved with those that rise up against thee? I hate them with perfect hatred." They then turn to the Sermon on the Mount and read the words of our Lord: "But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you." They thereupon imagine a discrepancy, if not a contradiction, between them, and adopt the mischievous conclusion that the two Testaments contain different codes of Christian ethics. This notion, it is to be feared, has a general prevalency. What is more common than to hear Christians, who should be well informed, and who profess full reverence for the inspiration of the whole Scrip-

tures, speak of the morality of the Old Testament, of the Hebrew saint, of the prophet, as harsh, austere, and forbidding, while that of the New Testament, of Jesus, and of the Christian is sweet and forgiving?

All these notions are of Socinian or rationalistic origin, and are incompatible with an honest belief in the actual inspiration of the Scriptures. If inspiration is but an "elevation of the consciousness," a quickening of the intuitions of the transcendental reason, an exaltation of the soul, of the same generic kind with the other impulses of genius, only of a higher grade, then it can be understood how prophets and apostles may contradict each other; although yet they may teach us noble lessons, and such as common men would never have found out of themselves. But if "all Scripture [the apostle means the Old Testament] is theopneustic," if "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," and the apostles, in their turn, had the promise of the Holy Ghost to "lead them into all truth," then a real discrepancy between them is impossible; for all truths must be harmonious among themselves. The honest believer can admit, of course, that the partial revelation of the Old Testament, although absolute truth as far as it goes, and as perfect in its principles as the God who gave it, stops short of that fulness of detail to which the New Testament afterwards proceeded. But while there is a difference in degrees of fulness, there can be no contrariety.

The same view commends itself irresistibly to the plain mind from this fact, that Jesus Christ, not to add the apostles, suspended the truth of his mission and doctrines on the infallibility and holiness of the Old Testament. His appeal is ever to them. He cites Moses and the prophets as though he thought their testimony must be the end of strife. Now, if they are not inspired and true, it follows irresistibly that Jesus Christ was either mistaken or he was dishonest. *Absit impietas*. In either case, he is no Redeemer for us. And, indeed, the former alternative of this dilemma is inadmissible for one who claimed, as he did, an infallible knowledge for himself, a preëxistence of the era of Abraham and the prophets and the authority of the Messiah by whose Spirit those prophets spoke. So that, if the Old Testament were imperfect, Jesus of Nazareth would stand convicted of criminal attempts of imposture!

There is a second reason why such an explanation cannot be applied to the supposed vindictiveness of Old Testament morals: that the same sentiments are expressed in the New Testament, and the same maxims of forbearance which are cited as so lovely in the latter are set forth, both by precept and example, in the former; so that, if a discrepancy is asserted, it must not be between David and Christ, Hebrew and Christian, but both Testaments must be charged with contradicting themselves, as well as each other. Thus, in Acts viii. 20, Peter exclaims to Simon Magus, "Thy money perish with thee!" In Acts xxiii. 3, Paul sternly denounces the persecuting chief priest, "God shall smite thee, thou whited wall!" and in 2 Tim. iv. 14 distinctly expresses a prayer for retribution upon Alexander, the copper-smith of Ephesus: He "did me much evil; the Lord reward him according to his works." In 2 Thess. i. 7-10, Christ's coming "in flaming fire to take vengeance on them that know not God," is subject of admiration in all them that believe. In the Apocalypse vi. 10, the souls of the martyrs under the altar are heard crying with a loud voice: "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" And in Matt. xi. 20, and xxiii. 13, Jesus of Nazareth is heard denouncing awful woes upon the enemies of truth.

On the other hand, the Old Testament contains substantially the same precepts of forgiveness, and examples of forbearance, which are so much admired in the New. First, the great truth, which lies at the root of all this subject, that retribution is the exclusive function of the Lord, was first published in the Old Testament, and it is thence Paul quotes it, in Rom. xii. 10, "*It is written*, Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord." It is written a thousand years before (Deut. xxxii. 35; Lev. xix. 18), "To me belongeth vengeance and recompense;" recognized by David as a rule for him (1 Sam. xxiv. 12) towards his deadly enemy, Saul,—“the Lord judge between me and thee, and the Lord avenge me of thee; but my hand shall not be upon thee;” repeated in Psalm xciv. 1, "O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth;" and cited against evil men, as a rule which they had violated, twice in Ezek. xxv. 12, 15, "Edom and the Philistines have taken vengeance, and have greatly offended." The lovely precept for rendering good for evil is enjoined upon the Israelites in a form most perspicuous and impressive to a pas-

toral people: "If thou meet thine enemy's ass or his ox going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again." (Exod. xxiii. 4.) Israel was enjoined to practice tenderness towards foreigners, a duty ignored then by the pagan world, and especially towards Egyptians, their late ruthless oppressors. (Exod. xxii. 21; Deut. xxiii. 7.) Job, the oldest of the patriarchs whose creed has been handed down to us, recognizes malice, even when limited to the secret wishes, as an iniquity: "If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hated me, or lifted up myself when evil found him; neither have I suffered my mouth to sin by wishing a curse to his soul." (Job xxxi. 29.) David, the author of nearly all the imprecatory Psalms, repudiates malice with holy abhorrence: "If I have rewarded evil to him that was at peace with me; (yea, I have delivered him that without cause is mine enemy,) let the enemy persecute my soul and take it," etc. (Ps. vii. 4.) And in Psalm xxxv. 13, he describes his deportment towards his enemies, as in contrast with theirs towards him, and in strict accordance with Christ's command: "But as for me, when they were sick, my clothing was sackcloth; I humbled my soul with fasting," etc. That all this was not mere profession, we have splendid evidence in the sacred history, where he displayed such astonishing forbearance and magnanimity towards Saul, after the most vehement provocation; twice delivering his life from the indignation of his followers, and singing his dirge with the honorable affection of a loyal follower.

This age has witnessed a whole spawn of religionists, very rife and rampant in some sections of the church, who pretentiously declared themselves the apostles of a lovelier Christianity than that of the sweet Psalmist of Israel. His ethics were entirely too vindictive and barbarous for them, forsooth; and they, with their Peace Societies, and new lights, would teach the world a milder and more beneficent code! How impertinent does this folly appear, coming from the petted favorites of fortune, whose wilfulness and conceit had hitherto been pampered by a rare concurrence of privileges, so that they had hardly experienced the call for the Christian virtue of forgiveness; and who, as soon as they are crossed (not in their rights, but) in their most arrogant caprices, show themselves incapable of one throb of David's magnanimity, and break out into a vin-

dictiveness set on fire of hell! He who knows his own heart and human nature will humbly avow, instead of accusing the Psalms of unchristian malice, that he will do well if he never goes beyond their temper, under bitter wrong, and if, while swelling with righteous sense of injury, he can always remit the retribution, in wish, as in act, to God alone.

The consequence of this erroneous admission of actual discrepancy between the morality of the Old Testament and the New is, that expositors have fatigued themselves with many vain inventions to explain away the imprecatory language of the Psalms. The generality of this feeling is betrayed by the frequency of these attempts. A curious betrayal of this skeptical impression exists to this day, in the book of Psalms, in the hands of our own Presbyterian people. Instead of a metrical version of Psalm cix., as it stands in the inspired lyrics, there is a human composition upon the beauty of forgiveness. In the psalm books in use for a whole age among the Presbyterians of England and this country, this hymn was formerly prefaced with the words (Psalm cix.), "Christian forgiveness after the example of Christ." This title the last editors of our psalm book be thought themselves to omit. Any one who compared the human poem with the actual hundred and ninth Psalm could hardly fail to overlook the suggestion of a contrast, that while the uninspired psalmist of our modern Israel gave utterance to Christian forgiveness after the example of Christ, the actual ode of inspiration expressed unchristian revenge after the example of David. How could the feeling be more clearly betrayed that the sentiments of the psalmist were indefensible?

Hence ingenious expedients have been sought to explain them away. Of these, the most current is the following: that where our version says, for instance, "Let his days be few, and let another take his office," the verbs are improperly rendered as imperatives. It is asserted that they may as fairly be rendered as simple futures, "His days will be few," etc., and then all these passages are converted from imprecations to predictions. The psalmist only foretells the divine retributions. Waiving the insuperable difficulty, that it is only to a part of these texts the explanation even plausibly applies, we perceive this general objection: that if they be all understood as pre-

dictions only, yet they are predictions to the accomplishment of which the inspired men evidently looked forward with moral satisfaction. Thus they reveal precisely the same sentiments towards evildoers as though we understood them as appealing to God with requests for their righteous retribution, while they at the same time recognize his sole title to avenge, and the sinfulness of their taking their retaliation into their own hands.

All these inventions, then, must be relinquished; the admission must be squarely and honestly made, that the inspired men of both Testaments felt and expressed moral indignation against wrong-doers, and a desire for their proper retribution at the hand of God. This admission must also be successfully defended, which, it is believed, can be done in perfect consistency with that spirit of merciful forbearance and love for the persons of enemies which both Testaments alike inculcate.

Simple resentment is an instinctive emotion, immediately arising from the experience of personal injury. It can scarcely be called a rational sentiment, for it is felt by men and animals in common, and in human breasts is often aimed against irrational assailants. It does not arise in view of the moral quality of the act, but immediately in view of the hurtfulness of the act to the person who feels the resentment. Its final cause is, to energize man for his needful self-defence. Hence resentment obviously has no necessary moral character, more than hunger, thirst, or pain; its moral character only arises when it is regulated or directed amiss. Resentment may be innocently felt, or may be criminal, according as it is properly limited, or is permitted to become inordinate. This is the sentiment concerning which Paul says: "Be ye angry, and sin not; let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Last, the emotion is strictly personal; its immediate cause is injury aimed at one's self.

Moral indignation, or moral disapprobation, in its warmer and more emotional type, is an affection often coexisting with simple resentment, and often confounded with it. But the two feelings are essentially distinct. The moral sentiment is impersonal; it is not directed merely to self-defence, but disapproves of our neighbor's unrighteous injury as of our own. It is awakened, not by mere hurt, but by injustice; that is, it arises in view of the moral wrong of the injurious act. It is strictly a

rational emotion, taking its rise in that highest and noblest form of the intuitions of the reason, the judgment of moral distinctions, and being thus the function only of rational spirits. Hence this sentiment can never be indifferent or negative as to its moral quality, as simple resentment may be ; but wherever it is not righteous, it must be wicked. And whereas the final cause of resentment, the subject's self-defence, requires it to be temporary, the final cause of moral disapprobation requires it to be permanent up to certain limits, which will be defined. No inspired man has said of this sentiment, as a general rule, "Let not the sun go down upon it."

This moral sentiment, as was remarked, often coëxists with resentment. When we are ourselves made the objects of assaults which include both hurt and injustice, the mixture of the two feelings is unavoidable. When we behold such an attack upon a fellow-creature, the impersonal sentiment of moral reprobation may be mixed with a reflex resentment received by the law of sympathy. In both cases the effect is to give a warmer and more passionate aspect to the moral sentiment.

The next truth to be considered is, that the judgment of demerit intuitively accompanies every act of moral disapprobation. The wisest Christian philosophers teach that the idea of obligation is inseparable from the idea of moral rightness in acts. In other words, to say that an act is obligatory is the same thing with saying it is right. Now, obligation implies an obligator. This judgment of the conscience is but an intuitive recognition of a relation between the personal moral agent and a personal moral ruler, God, whose will is the rule of the obligation to him. The judgment of moral disapprobation is, therefore, in its very nature, a judgment of wrong relation between the sinning agent and the personal will of the divine Ruler; it recognizes that holy will as outraged by the sin. Hence, by a necessary law of the human reason, our judgment of the sinfulness of every wrong act includes the decision that the agent has therein demerit; that is to say, it is now right that he should receive suffering for his sin, physical evil for his moral wrong, in a just ratio, as its proper moral equivalent. This judgment, we repeat, is unavoidably included in our judgment of the wrongness of his act. And this relation between sin and deserved penal suffering, the reason apprehends as morally obliga-

tory. Its preservation is necessary to satisfy righteousness; its rupture is necessarily wrong.

It appears, therefore, evident that if the reason is impelled to this judgment of demerit by the very law of its moral action, and this demand for penal equivalent to sin is a valid part of its moral verdict, the mere entertaining of it as a sentiment cannot be morally wrong. To assert that it can be, would be to assert that the soul may act immorally in the very acts which are immediately directed by the law of its nature as a moral agent. Moreover, as the judgment of moral disapprobation involves a judgment of demerit, affirming the righteousness of the requital of suffering for the sin, it is inevitable that the soul should find a pleasure in the satisfaction of this sentiment; and if the sentiment is moral, the pleasure cannot be immoral. For it is absurd to say that a rational creature is criminal for its satisfaction in the rightful actings of the laws of its own reason. How can the lawful happiness of the creature be more justly defined than as that pleasure which is found in satisfying the righteous and reasonable promptings of its own native powers? "*Happiness*," said the most profound of the Greeks, "*is virtuous energy*."

It thus appears that the impersonal sentiment of moral reprobation is lawful, yea more, that it is positively virtuous; and that the rational desire for the satisfaction of it cannot be sinful *per se*. But lest some mistrust of this conclusion should be felt, from the abstract nature of the analysis, it will be confirmed by these further considerations.

1. Every one easily recognizes this sentiment of moral reprobation as the counterpart to that of moral approbation. In the latter, the mind has, as its root, a similar judgment, in the reason, of the virtuousness of the act; it thereby recognizes the agent as meritorious for the act, that is, as righteously entitled to his suitable well-being as its moral equivalent; and the mind finds virtuous pleasure in the satisfaction of this, its verdict, by the actual enjoyment which the meritorious agent has of his reward. That a soul should be capable of witnessing a virtuous act and its reward, and remain wholly devoid of this sentiment and this satisfaction, would of itself argue a criminal defect. The man who is capable of being spectator of some splendid and lovely instance of filial gratitude and fidelity, and of its reward in the benediction of the happy father, and the well-earned

honor and prosperity of the pious son, and who can feel no pleasing judgment of approval in his own soul, and no virtuous satisfaction in witnessing the reward of merit, is thereby shown to be a cold villain, capable himself of any ingratitude or treachery to his parents.

But add to this that, in morals, wrong is the necessary counterpart of right, as every moralist admits. As absence of caloric is cold, or absence of light is itself darkness, so, in moral actions, lack of right is wrong. There is, hence, no such thing as a moral neutrality in a case involving positive moral elements. It appears, therefore, very plain that the susceptibility of moral approbation implies necessarily that of moral reprobation; that to be insensible to the latter would involve insensibility to the former. But this, as all admit, would characterize the man as positively evil. Hence it appears that these active sentiments of moral reprobation for wrong doing, so far are they from being unholy, are positively necessary to right character. The reader may find this conclusion confirmed by numerous scriptural testimonies, among which these two, from the New and Old Testaments respectively, may be cited: Prov. xvii. 15: "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord"; Rom. i. 32: Paul condemns sinners as those who "not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them."

2. When flagrant crimes are committed against the law of the land, and the "gallows is cheated," the most virtuous citizens feel the craving of their moral nature for the retribution of justice upon the criminal and the grief of its disappointment. This feeling cannot be accused of selfishness, but is wholly impersonal, for it is vividly felt by virtuous persons who have no connection with the object of the outrage, and who suffer no special wrong by it. It is found most often in the most disinterested and noble natures. It is impossible for the subject of it to rebuke himself for entertaining it; for he feels that to lack this feeling would be to lack virtuous regard for the law which has been dishonored and the innocent victim who has been wronged. Sympathy with the right implies reprobation of the wrong.

3. The Scriptures, beyond a doubt, describe the saints in glory as participating in the judicial triumphs of the Redeemer,

when he shall pour out his final retributions on the wicked; and the satisfaction of this intuitive sentiment which craves just penalty for demerit is one of the elements of the bliss of the redeemed. Psalm cxlix. 5-9 says: "Let the saints be joyful in glory. . . . Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand; to execute vengeance upon the heathen," etc. The yearning of the martyrs in heaven for a righteous vindication has been already seen in Rev. vi. 10; and in Rev. xix. 1-3 heaven is heard in jubilee over the judgment of the persecuting Babylon of the Apocalypse. Now, it will scarcely be doubted that it is right for Christians to feel here as they will feel when perfectly sanctified in heaven.

Lastly. Righteous retribution is one of the glories of the divine character. If it is right that God should desire to exercise it, then it cannot be wrong for his people to desire him to exercise it. It may be objected that, while he claims retribution for himself, he forbids it to them, and that he has thereby forbidden all satisfaction in it to them. The fact is true; the inference does not follow. Inasmuch as retribution inflicted by a creature is forbidden, the desire for its infliction by a creature, or pleasure therein, is also forbidden; but inasmuch as it is righteously inflicted by God, it must be right in him, and must therefore be, when in his hand, a proper subject of satisfaction to the godly.

Now, if the feeling of moral reprobation, when thus impersonal or disinterested, is righteous, its propriety cannot be wholly destroyed by the circumstance that he who feels it was object of and suffered by the crime reprobated. The crime is still the same in principle, and is properly the object of the same moral emotions. The only difference is that the temptation of the sufferer to inordinate and sinful resentment is thereby rendered much greater, and he is thereby called to strict watchfulness and self-control, lest the personal feeling, which is mixed with the impersonal, assume the ascendancy, and thus malice usurp the place of righteous zeal; but otherwise no reason appears why it is not as righteous to approve and desire the just penal recompense of the enemy who has assailed the right in attacking one's self as of the party who has injured our neighbor.

But, it cannot be too often repeated, the righteous desire for

recompense never craves to take its vindication into its own hands. The godly man always prefers to remit the penal settlement to a perfect God, and arrests his own forcible agency as soon as the purposes of mere self-defence are secured. It is the declared principle of both Testaments, that God reserves retribution to himself as his exclusive function. He has, indeed, delegated a limited portion of this authority to the civil magistrate, to wield it, as his representative, for a specific purpose. But this is no exception, for when civil society punishes crimes, it is as much a part of God's providential ordering, and of his providential act, as when he punishes them by sickness or dearth. The principle stands absolute: a limited resentment, purely defensive and temporary, may be man's; but vengeance is God's. This is proper, because the injured man is himself a sinner, as well as the injurer; and so rigorous a function is not appropriately wielded by one who is himself exposed to it, and who is seeking to escape it by the door of mercy. It is proper, because man is ignorant of those spiritual conditions of crimes, on which the aggravation or palliation of their demerit so much depends. It is proper, because the impersonal moral sentiment demanding retribution is, in man's breast, so seldom unmixed with the personal passion of direct or sympathetic resentment; so that it is doubtful whether a human being is ever in a condition to judge a wrong act with perfect equity. It is proper, because God is not only an omniscient and perfect being, devoid of all passion, but is the supreme proprietor and ruler of men, and his will is the source of the obligation which they violate, as well as its infallible rule. Hence, the state of feeling to which the Christian should strive, is, not insensibility to wrong, not indifference to the craving of our moral nature for its just penal recompense, but a hearty willingness to leave that retribution in God's righteous and unerring hand.

A stage has now been reached in this discussion, at which it is necessary to introduce a few plain distinctions. One is the well-known distinction of divines between the love of complacency and the love of benevolence. The former is founded on moral approbation for the character of its object, and implies moral excellence in it. The other does not, and may exist notwithstanding moral disapprobation of its object. Of the former kind is the love of God the Father for God the Son. Of the latter

kind is the love of the Trinity for sinners. Obviously the love of complacency is directed towards its object's character, while the love of benevolence is directed to the person of its object, and exists in spite of his obnoxious character. And it is thus possible that love may hate the character and compassionate the person of the same man. Such, in fact, was Christ's love to us "while we were yet sinners." The adjustment between the New Testament and the Old is partly to be found in this distinction. When Jesus Christ commands us to love our enemies, it is with the love of benevolence and compassion. When David declared that he hated God's enemies with a perfect hatred, he meant that he did not entertain for them the love of moral complacency, but, as was proper, the reverse. This love of benevolence for the person of a bad man ought to be, in the Christian, the finite reflexion of what it is in God, limited only by the higher attribute of righteousness.

Next: To understand the relations of godliness between us and our enemies, the elements involved in their injurious acts must also be distinguished. The sin of a wrong-doer against his fellow involves three elements of offence. One is the personal loss and natural evil inflicted, and is expressed by the Latin divines by the word *damnum*. The second is the guilt (*reatus*) or relation of debt to the law, by which the wrong-doer is bound to pay for his act in punishment. The third is the moral defilement or depravity of character (*pravitas vel macula*), which is both expressed and increased by specific acts of sin. Now, when the Christian is made the object of an unrighteous act, the element of loss, or *damnum*, is the only one which is personal to him, and therefore the only one which it is competent to him to remit. And since nothing but self-interest is concerned in this element, the great law of love requires the Christian to remit it without price or compensation, provided the moral conditions of the case do not forbid it. And to pursue the aggressor with evil, directly for the sake of this element of his offence, is sinful malice. The second element, that of guilt, is not personal to the injured Christian. It is not his business to pursue the satisfaction for guilt, but God's. He is to leave this element wholly to God, only taking care that his moral sentiments touching it are conformed to those of the divine Judge. But practically he has no outward duty to perform with reference to it, in any circumstances what-

ever, unless he is providentially called to fill the office of magistrate in the commonwealth; and then he is bound to execute upon the guilty that portion of the retributive penalty committed to his charge by the laws of God and his country, without either favor or malice; feeling that where guilt is duly affixed, he has no more option to remit any of its penalty than he has to give away another man's property intrusted to his charge.

The third element, that of the inward defilement represented and fostered in the wrong act, is also impersonal to the injured party. He has no option or license to disregard it, and the love of complacency has no relevancy to a prompting to overlook it. By the very reason that it is his bounden duty to love holiness, it is his duty to be opposed to impurity. He who should argue that his compassion and Christian kindness ought to, or could, lawfully prompt him to overlook this defilement, and restore his approbation and fellowship to the transgressor while still defiled in character, would be as preposterous as he who should say that his compassion justified him in agreeing with the liar that falsehood is truth and truth is falsehood. Kindness and compassion have no application to the case; but our judgment and treatment of the evil must be according to the eternal principles of truth and right. Now, for this third element of moral impurity the only remedy is true repentance, prompted by the renewing and sanctifying agency of the Holy Spirit, and manifesting and fostering itself in outward reform. For the second element, that of guilt, the appointed remedy is the atonement of Calvary, embraced by faith. For the first element, that of *damnum*, the remedy is reparation.

The light which these distinctions throw upon the Christian treatment of enemies may be displayed by applying them to a concrete instance. Let it be supposed that the crime is a robbery committed upon the goods of a private Christian. There is an element of *damnum* which consists in the privation of the use and value of the property taken. There is an element of guilt by which the robber is made debtor to the laws of the commonwealth and of God in certain penalties; and there is an element of moral defilement or taint attaching, through the theft, to the robber's character. Let it be supposed, first, that the offender provides no appropriate remedy for either; that he neither makes reparation of the stolen property nor makes sat-

isfaction to human and divine law, nor exhibits any purification of character by repentance. How ought the injured Christian to treat him? The answer is, that the law of love does not bind him to extend moral fellowship and approbation to a defiled character, nor to intervene between the guilty party and the penal claims of law; for these consequences of the sin are not personal to the injured party. But the law of love may bind him to remit the claim for restoration of the value stolen "without money and without price"; as, for instance, if the thief have become unable to repay; and in any case it binds him to succor the thief when suffering, if he is able, and to perform to him any other duty of humanity, as though he were no aggressor.

Let us suppose, again, that the thief has, from some motive implying no virtue, made exact reparation, but that his guilt is not atoned for and there is no purification of character by repentance. How ought the injured party now to treat him? The answer is, precisely as in the first case. The *damnum* is repaired indeed, but that element of offence was personal to the injured party, and it was right that he should waive it without reparation at the prompting of Christian kindness.

Let us suppose, again, that the thief has made no reparation of property because he is really unable, but that, having made full atonement to human law, he has by faith embraced the righteousness of Christ for the remission of his guilt towards God and has evinced by a true repentance the cleansing of his soul from depravity. How shall he be treated by the Christian whom he has injured? The answer is, precisely as though he had never injured him. The guilt and defilement of the sin have now received their appropriate remedy. The element which remains uncompensated is the *damnum*; and it is the Christian's duty to remit this freely and joyfully, seeing it is personal to himself, at the prompting of love.

Now, it is asserted that, if the imprecatory passages in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments be compared with these conclusions, they will be found to contain nothing inconsistent with them. And if the Christian precept of forgiveness (Eph. iv. 32), "Forgive one another, even as God, for Christ's sake, hath forgiven you," be examined, it will be found to express the same thing. God is "kind to the unthankful and to the evil" so long as the claims of his justice are suspended; but

he does not remit their guilt, nor relax his righteous disapprobation and fixed purpose to punish, without satisfaction to law. Nor does he compromise his purity by adopting the sinner who remains impenitent and depraved. What he does is this: he extends to them, in the midst of their sin, all the compassion which his wisdom, justice, and holiness permit; and as soon as guilt is satisfied by an interest in Christ, and personal defilement purged by regeneration, he graciously overlooks every outrage of his honor and person, and adopts them into his favor as fully as though they had never sinned.

The sum of the matter, then, appears to be this: the law of love does not require the injured Christian to approve or countenance the evil character manifested in the wrong done him, or to withhold the verdict of truth and justice against it when righteous ends are gained by pronouncing it. The law of love does not require him to intervene for delivering the aggressor from the just claims of either human or divine law for penal retribution; nor does it forbid his feeling a righteous satisfaction when that retribution is executed by the appropriate authorities; but the law of love does forbid his taking retribution into his own hands, and it requires him still to extend the sentiments of humanity and the love of compassion to the enemy's person so long as he continues to partake the forbearance of God, which love of compassion will prompt the injured party to stand ready to forgive the element of personal *damnum* to his enemy, and to perform the offices of benevolence to his person, in spite of his obnoxious character.

Such a discussion should not be closed without repeating the wholesome caution against the confusion of personal resentment with moral reprobation. The intermixture of the two in the breast of the injured Christian is perhaps unavoidable for imperfect man. The temptation to sanctify the inordinate indulgence of the one under the holy name of the other is dangerous. Hence every child of God under wrong is called to watchfulness, prayer, and jealousy of himself.

But it should not be concealed that there is also a subtle danger in the opposite direction. The sentiments of righteous resentment and moral reprobation are the great supports intended by God for the rectitude, nobleness, and independence of the soul. But when injuries are enormous, and often re-

peated, there is a terrible danger lest the very frequency and violence of the impressions made upon this moral susceptibility shall blunt it. Familiarity with wickedness, even when it is wickedness aimed against ourselves, ever tends to stain the purity of the soul. When the capacity of virtuous indignation is thus depraved by violent and frequent frictions, aggression comes gradually to excite the mere emotion of abject fear, instead of the nobler moral emotions; and the wretched victim gradually grows as base and servile and unprincipled as he is miserable. Both domestic and public history teem with fearful examples of this degradation by submission to wrong; and there can be no more supreme and sacred duty which is owed to God and to himself by the good man than that of protecting his own moral sentiments from this corruption. To resist wrong within the lawful limits, or to evade the power of the oppressor when resistance is no longer feasible, may be the first obligation which man owes to his own virtue.

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